The Balkan Saga Continues

[CroRadio.net]

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19374

The Balkan Saga Continues
by Daniella Fridl

07.11.2008





With U.S.-Russia relations continuing to deteriorate in the wake of
the G8 summit and America’s continuing efforts to build a missile-
defense system in Eastern Europe, we now have another nail to add to
the coffin. In the United States and the European Union, there is a
widely held belief that Kosovo’s independence was the last missing
piece in achieving stability in the Balkans. Having just returned from
Kosovo, I would have to disagree. My observations lead me to conclude
that there remains serious potential for instability in Kosovo—with
broad implications for U.S.-Russia relations and beyond.

Serbia paid a high price for the mistakes that were made during
Slobodan Milsovic’s regime. Former Finnish President and the key
mediator in the Kosovo negotiations, Martti Ahtisaari, explained to me
that the Serbs lost Kosovo in 1999. This is not to say that Belgrade
did not have a chance to negotiate a more favorable agreement between
2005 and 2007. However, it was almost impossible for any constructive
Serbian policy to develop, given the fragile structure of the
governing coalition and the intense rivalries between nationalist
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and pro-European President Boris
Tadic.

Hence, it was politically more expedient and safe to exploit the
nationalist sentiment in the country and settle on the lowest common
denominator: claiming that historically Kosovo was and remains part of
Serbia. Instead of sitting back in denial, hoping for a miraculous
turn of events, Belgrade could have been more effective in using
Russia’s support and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which
protects the territorial integrity of Serbia, as leverage in securing
some level of sovereignty for the Serbs living in Kosovo.
Opportunities were there, but the political will, wisdom and
effectiveness that were required to achieve this outcome were lacking.

Although Kosovo is making slow progress toward obtaining international
recognition, this new European state has many other far-more-pressing
challenges. They include a still-lagging economy, high levels of
organized crime and corruption, an unemployment rate close to 50
percent, a population of about two million—half under the age of
twenty-five, and most importantly the unresolved question of Kosovo
Serbs. Some of these issues will improve, especially considering the
resources and funding that the European Union and the United States
are putting in Kosovo. At the upcoming donors’ conference, the
international community is expected to raise over one billion dollars
to help boost Kosovo’s economy. Regrettably, the northern part of the
country remains completely isolated and is not likely to reap any
benefits from this aid. Mitrovica is an ethnically divided city, with
the majority of Serbs living on the northern side of the Ibar River
and Albanians on the southern side. Ironically, the white bridge over
the river symbolizes the division between the two ethnic groups, which
is evident in the UN checkpoints and barbed-wire barricades set up on
both sides. Crossing into the opposite side of the bridge at nighttime
is not advisable for security reasons.

When I traveled to northern Mitrovica, I saw Serbian flags everywhere
and photographs of former-Russian President Vladimir Putin in the shop
windows of local bars. The new Kosovo constitution that came into
effect on June 15 envisioned the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) ceding its responsibilities to the European Union, but that
has not happened in the Serb-populated areas of Kosovo. Public
institutions, hospitals and health facilities, schools, universities
and all other local institutions are run by Serbs and funded directly
by Belgrade, which continues to have a firm grip over this territory.
The area is poor and it is common for the water supply, which is
controlled by the Kosovo Albanians, to be turned off between the hours
of seven p.m. and eight a.m. The atmosphere is calm. Yet there is
tension in the air over the unresolved status and future of the people
living there. Some 150,000 Serbs that still remain in Kosovo are
becoming self-sufficient and starting to organize themselves and form
parallel institutions. On June 28, Kosovo Serbs convened their own
parliament, with forty-five delegates from twenty-six municipalities,
for the first session of the Assembly of the Union of Municipalities
of Kosovo and Metohija. Serbs drew up a declaration in which they
proclaimed Kosovo an integral part of Serbia, thereby attempting to
split the territory with Belgrade acting as a de facto government.

Some Balkan experts in Washington claim that Serbia is the problem,
not Kosovo. They say that the United States needs to present Belgrade
with clear ultimatums and criterion that must be fulfilled prior to
Serbia’s consideration for EU membership. Based on our experience and
lessons learned from the Balkans over the past decade, are we to
believe that such a policy will set Serbia on a democratic path and
make Serbia recognize Kosovo’s independence? Will it improve an
already-strained relationship between Washington and Moscow? Not
likely.

Serbia has a unique opportunity to get back on its feet and work its
way toward joining the European Union. However, it is not in a
position to do it without the assistance of Brussels, Washington and
the continuous help of Russia. The Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA) was a timely opportunity presented to Belgrade, which
in turn helped with the May elections, and the results were evident.
Belgrade managed to form a coalition government consisting of the pro-
European Democratic Party (DS) led by President Boris Tadic and the
Socialists. Today, all eyes are on Serbia, waiting anxiously to see
whether Belgrade will deliver on its democratic promise. While
Belgrade must work on fulfilling its international obligations,
including cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, rather than putting
unrealistic pressure on Belgrade, Brussels and Washington should make
an effort to constructively approach the new government and also
encourage dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The issue of Serbs
in Kosovo can only be resolved between the two sides, whose history
and geographic location make their future interconnected.

Should Brussels and Washington choose to impose unrealistic ultimatums
on Belgrade, such a policy would backfire and create a domino effect,
which is exactly what the opposition in Serbia is hoping for. This
move will, without a doubt, send Serbia into isolation, encourage
nationalists in Republika Srpska to push for secession, provoke
radical Albanians in Kosovo and Albania to move forward with their
goals of creating a “greater Albania,” and ignite minority Albanians
living in south Serbia and Macedonia. From a broader geopolitical
perspective, such a turn of events would place a further strain on
relations between the United States and Russia.

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence resolved the question
of stability in the Balkans but only on paper. In reality, the answer
to this question is closely tied to the ability of Serbia’s new
government to deal with the many obstacles it faces on the road toward
EU membership, the most important of which is finding common ground
with Pristina and resolving the status of Serbs in Kosovo. Washington,
Brussels and Moscow have a key role to play in this process—which
means enacting policy measures that give incentives for cooperation.



Dr. Daniella Fridl is a recipient of a six-month fellowship from IREX
(International Research & Exchanges Board). Her research countries are
Serbia and Kosovo.