Re: Russian Govn Blocked Tutanota Service In Russia To Stop Encrypted Communication
Errolan Price
Most of the population has access to third generation (3G) and fourth generation (4G) technology for mobile networks. The Inclusive Internet Index noted that 88.7 percent of the population has access to a 3G or 4G network.5
Russian govn blocked Tutanota service in Russia to stop encrypted communication
DOWNLOAD https://vbooc.com/2yM5fx
The Russian government planned to launch 5G services in Moscow in 2020 and throughout the country in 2021,6 but the launch has repeatedly been delayed. In January 2022, the Rostec State Corporation presented a plan to develop 5G base stations under an agreement with the government, with production scheduled to begin in 2024.7 However, the authorities reduced funding for the frequency conversion of 5G networks from 43 billion rubles ($704 million) to 7.85 billion rubles ($130 million) for the period up to 2024, which could have adverse effects for the Rostec plan.8 The impact of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union (EU) in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as the withdrawal of telecom equipment manufacturers from the Russian market, have also impacted the launch of 5G.9 In December 2022, the government announced that it would develop future 4G and 5G networks exclusively on Russian equipment; it set a goal of 6 million people having access to domestically produced 4G networks by 2025, and 300,000 having access to domestically produced 5G networks in 2024.10
The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions continue to affect the cost of internet access. In 2022, telecom operators and internet providers in Russia increased the monthly cost of home internet plans by 2 to 10 percent, depending on provider.1
According to 2022 data from the ITU, a monthly fixed-broadband subscription cost 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while a mobile plan offering 2 GB of data cost 0.7 percent of GNI per capita.2
In March 2023, the State Duma adopted a law that obliges owners of technological communication networks with autonomous system numbers to store user data for three years (see C6), which could further raise costs for users.5
At the end of 2022, analysts predicted an increase in the cost of home internet in 2023,6 largely due to the departure of international suppliers from the Russian market and the increased cost of telecom equipment. In January 2023, Moscow-based fixed-line broadband providers increased the cost of monthly plans by 5 to 10 percent.7
In July 2021, President Vladimir Putin signed a law on free access to socially significant websites,8 which followed a pilot of the program from March 2020 to July 2021. The list of sites for free access included the websites of the president of the Russian Federation and the government of the Russian Federation, sites of federal ministries and nonbudgetary funds, state media, Russian social networks (such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki) and Russian email services (such as Mail.ru), among other sites. The law obliges providers and operators to grant access to these sites without charging a fee.
A digital divide persists in Russia along geographic lines, with users in smaller, more remote cities, towns, and villages paying significantly more for internet access than users in major urban areas. According to one study, the cheapest fixed-internet subscriptions were available in the Central Federal District, which includes Moscow, while the most expensive fixed-internet subscriptions, which cost almost twice as much, were found in the remote Far Eastern Federal District.10 This dynamic also held true for mobile internet subscriptions, although the price difference was less extreme.
The government has continued taking steps to centralize control over the country's internet infrastructure, after it restricted access to widely used social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter following the invasion of Ukraine during the last coverage period.
In July 2022, Putin signed a law that introduces fines for telecom operators that have not installed TSPU,2 and in July 2023, after the coverage period, Roskomnadzor announced that it would start issuing these fines (see A4).3 The authorities explain the need to use this equipment for censorship by the presence of "information threats to Russians." In January 2022, VPN users from several Russian regions reported problems connecting to VPN services,4 which may indicate that protocol blocking is being tested within TSPU.
In July 2023, the government ran a test exercise to disconnect itself from the international internet. The government reported that the test was successful, though many international websites and government websites were inaccessible during the two-hour test.16
In April 2023, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that Russian and Chinese officials had shared censorship strategies, with Russian officials aiming to learn how to more effectively restrict VPNs and censor messaging applications.17
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the introduction of onerous obligations that threaten to limit the diversity of service providers, including measures requiring operators to obtain approval from the Federal Security Service (FSB) before launching a network.
The ICT market in Russia is relatively concentrated due to regulatory and economic constraints. The displacement of local service providers by larger companies, and several mergers and acquisitions among these large players, particularly in the European part of Russia, have contributed to market consolidation.
Telecommunications providers are licensed by Roskomnadzor.1 The costs of complying with data-retention requirements under the 2016 Yarovaya Law (see A2 and C6) and the installation of DPI systems under the 2019 Sovereign Runet Law created a financial hardship for existing service providers and a deterrent to potential new entrants to the market (see A3 and B1). In July 2023, Roskomnadzor announced that it would begin fining providers who do not install the TSPU system between one and five million rubles. Additionally, directors of these companies can face up to three years in prison and their companies can be audited if they refuse to install this equipment.2
In June 2022, law enforcement reportedly announced they would not allow the companies Antares, Integral, and Arctur to use 1900-1920 MHz frequencies. They had planned to use the frequencies to launch a new telecommunications operator.4
Roskomnadzor, which regulates the ICT and media sectors, often fails to act fairly or transparently. The agency is under the control of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, meaning it has little to no independence from the government.
In May 2022, President Putin appointed former president and current deputy chairman of the security council Dmitry Medvedev as the head of a newly created interdepartmental commission focused on establishing the technical sovereignty of critical information infrastructure, and ensuring that infrastructure can operate independently of the global internet.7
There are several ICT industry associations in Russia, including the Russian Association for Electronic Communications and the Association of Trading Companies and Manufacturers of Household Electrical Equipment and Computers, but they do not have a strong influence on policymaking.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities intensified their efforts to block access to websites and social media platforms that could host material critical of the authorities or of the invasion, as well as international news sites, civil society websites, and Ukrainian news sites. In 2022, Roskomsvoboda reported that 247,000 webpages were blocked, including 9,000 that were blocked under military censorship since the start of the full-scale invasion.1 A February 2023 report published by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) and Roskomsvoboda found that in 2022, Russian government agencies had blocked 494 website domains in 2022.2
During the coverage period, government agencies continued to issue blocking orders, often because the targets allegedly spread false news about the invasion. In 2022 Roskomnadzor blocked Nuntiare et Recreare, a website dedicated to LGBT+ members of various religious affiliations, and the site of the Museum of LGBT History in Russia.10 In December 2022, Putin signed a law expanding the scope the ban on LGBT+ propaganda in Russia (see B3), which prevents this material from being promoted to adults in addition to children (see B3).
In February 2023, the government blocked access to the Bell, a prominent online news outlet.17 In February and March 2023, Roskomnadzor began blocking several images from stock photograph websites Alamy and Depositphotos photo stocks because of photos suggesting acts of suicide.18 The Shutterstock photo stock was also blocked, but access to it was later restored.
In June 2023, after the coverage period, an unspecified government agency ordered the blocking of Medium, the blogging platform, and it was included in the register of prohibited information.19 Later, Roskomnadzor explained the blocking was due to the failure to remove unreliable materials about the invasion. In the same month, several ISPs and telecommunications once again blocked Google News, as Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, and Wagner Group fighters marched toward Moscow.20 Later in the month, Roskomnadzor blocked online news websites linked to Prigozhin, including RIA FAN, Politics Today, Economy Today, Neva News, and People's News.21
In September 2023, Roskomnadzor blocked access to the Kyrgyzstan-based news outlet 24.kg and the Tajikistan-based outlet Payom because of their coverage of the war in Ukraine. According to digital rights organization Roskomsvoboda, Roskomnadzor initially ordered the blocking of four 24.kg articles and two Payom articles in November 2022 and May 2023, respectively. 24.kg reported that it had received takedown requests from Roskomnadzor throughout the coverage period. During the coverage period Roskomnadzor also issued takedown orders to outlets based in Kazakhstan (see B2).23
7fc3f7cf58