Cosatu Media Monitor 17 March 2009

The municipality unilaterally ended its contract with the embattled bus company Remnant Alton, which has been plagued by strikes and has not been able to keep its full fleet on the road.

“There will be a complete cessation of services for two to three months to enable the buses to be brought up to standard,” Mayor Obed Mlaba said.

Mlaba said Remant Alton had declared itself technically insolvent and in breach of the contract. The municipality had wanted to retain the buses, but an illegal six- week strike late last year had derailed the plan.

“Problems with the interim maintenance of the buses have led to a huge number of buses being off the road. In recent weeks only 150 to 160 buses have been available and many scheduled trips have been cancelled,” he said

He urged commuters to use trains and taxis in the meantime.

Cosatu yesterday blamed the municipality for the “state of crisis and paralysis”. It called on transport MEC Bheki Cele to intervene.

“We urge the MEC to intervene and ensure that those who are on the wrong are brought to book,” said Cosatu’s Zet Luzipho.

“We are opposed to the privatisation of municipal services. The public transport crisis is a vindication of what we warned before.

“Our people deserve better and cannot be made victims of a wrong choice, in particular of such an inefficient company [as Remnant Alton].”

The bus service has deteriorated since the consortium took over in 2003 in a black empowerment deal.

Drivers complaining about poor working conditions, wages and benefits went on strike shortly after Remnant Alton took over. Now the staff face an uncertain future.

Commuters have also been complaining about the poor condition of buses.

Last week hundreds of commuters gathered at the city hall carrying placards calling for the municipality to take over the buses. They complained that too few buses serviced their routes, leaving thousands stranded.

1.2 Writing on wall for SABC board

Buddy Naidu, The Times, 17 March 2009

Bill gives Parliament power to axe broadcasting bosses

The days of the SABC board are numbered. President Kgalema Motlanthe has finally signed off amendments to the controversial Broadcasting Bill that gives Parliament the power to fire the board.

This comes as businessman and board member Peter Vundla announced his resignation over the weekend.

The bill, gazetted on Wednesday, firmly places the board in Parliament’s sights after a fractious year during which the broadcaster has careened from one controversy to another at breakneck speed.

The bill was opposed by most opposition parties. Last year also saw the passing of an ANC-led vote of no confidence in the board.

The party’s communications spokesman, Khotso Khumalo, said yesterday he could not speculate on “whether the days of the board are numbered or not”.

He said allegations levelled against the board in the media will be discussed by the ANC study group in parliament next Tuesday.

“The study group will guide what decisions we make before the communications committee meets. I can’t pre-empt any discussions.”

The DA’s Dene Smuts said she was not sure whether the board would be axed.

She said: “There are 38 days left before the elections and it was always clear that the game plan on the side of the ANC MPs was to kick this board out and install a small, hand-picked, interim board before the elections.”

Smuts said this was now impossible because a full inquiry would have to be convened and charges would have to be formulated against the board as stipulated in the amended Act.

“Given the short time I don’t think this will happen. Once the election results are in, and if the ANC wins, it’s possible that it would lose interest in the whole matter.”

The IFP’s Suzanne Vos said the board comprised “highly competent individuals” but “operated in a hostile environment”.

“It is the intention of the ANC that the current board’s days are numbered,” she said.

Former president Thabo Mbeki appointed the board shortly after his crushing defeat by Jacob Zuma at the ANC’s Polokwane conference in December 2007.

The board is seen to be loaded with Mbeki’s acolytes, among them its chair, Kanyi Mkonza, businesswoman Gloria Serobe and his former spokesman, Bheki Khumalo.

1.3 Pamodzi Gold faces liquidation demands

Justin Brown, Business Report, 17 March 2009

Beleaguered Pamodzi Gold is due to face a demand in the Pretoria High Court today for the liquidation of its Orkney mines over R21.8 million owed to Engineering Labour Hire and Mining Supplies.

The latter company made its application to the court last Tuesday. It said it had been providing 700 workers to Pamodzi Gold for underground work.

Bongi Radebe, a Pamodzi Gold spokesman, said the firm was aware of the application and would be opposing it.

Johan Engelbrecht, the Solidarity trade union's legal adviser on liquidations, said that another creditor, whose application papers he had not seen, was seeking the liquidation of Pamodzi's Free State mines

He added that the second creditor could be seeking payment of R30-40 million.

Pamodzi Gold has been battling to pay employees and suppliers for months as it scrabbles for loan finance. At the end of September 2008 it owed suppliers R722 million.

In December 2008 it announced loans of R400 million to help it through its difficulties. It has received R200 million from the Industrial Development Corporation but is still waiting for R200 million promised by little-known Best Rock Investments.

Last week two senior executives of parent company Pamodzi Investment Holdings flew to New York, Toronto and Dubai in search of funding.

Kobus du Plooy, Pamodzi Holdings' director of resources, who made the trip, said he was working on a complete financial solution for Pamodzi Gold that would "take the company to the next level".

Pamodzi is under particular stress at its Free State mines, where in February it paid more than 4 000 workers only 60 percent of their wages. Solidarity has set up a fund to give these workers financial support.

Dirk Hermann, Solidarity's deputy general secretary, explained: "Due to the late payments, employees' medical aid funds have been frozen, while many are already experiencing considerable food shortages.

"According to our calculations, each mineworker supports eight to 11 dependants, which ultimately means that an estimated 32 000 to 44 000 individuals here will be without essential food and supplies."

Hermann said a "social welfare crisis" was unfolding in the Welkom area and could spread to the rest of the country.

So far Solidarity's social fund had raised R50 000 and distributed 150 food parcels to Pamodzi workers in Free State.

Pamodzi Gold employs 15 000 people, including contractors. Job losses of this magnitude would add to the already serious employment losses, mainly in the platinum and ferrochrome industries, that have resulted in thousands of workers thrown on to the streets.

Du Plooy declined to say who he had met during his overseas trip nor how much money he was seeking. "We are speaking to a number of funders," he said. "We believe that Pamodzi Gold has a very good future."

1.4 Ngqula boards gravy plane

Eleanor Momberg, Sunday Independent, 15 March 2009

Ousted South African Airways chief executive Khaya Ngqula has received more than R33-million in salary, bonuses and severance pay from the troubled national carrier.

According to SAA's annual reports, Ngqula earned R2 295 000 in the 2004/05 financial year, R6 850 000 in the 2005/06 book year including a R1 850 000 bonus payment, and R5-million in the 2006/07 financial year.

In the 2007/08 book year when SAA posted a R1 billion loss, he earned R5 880 000, including a R688 000 retention bonus.

In 2009 he would have earned around R6,3-million, including a retention bonus and the 7 percent salary increase to which managers were entitled.

He would have received another 7 percent increase and a retention bonus in the new financial year bringing his earnings to R6,7-million - amounts apparently calculated into his severance package.

The SAA source said Ngqula had received a severance package "equivalent to what he would have earned had he completed his term of office".

He had repaid about R1,2-million in retention bonuses in terms of the state-owned company's clawback clause in the event of resignation.

The payments exclude the cost of several helicopter trips to meetings in Gauteng during his four-and-a-half year tenure and the cost of a chartered flight from London to Paris where he apparently has a home.

Ngqula's departure from SAA came less than a month after he was suspended pending the outcome of a probe by KPMG's forensic auditors, who were appointed by the company's board of directors in February to investigate numerous irregularities.

These included: the payment of R60-million in retention premiums to 127 senior airline officials; procurement irregularities related to SAA's restructuring drive; the payment of more than R100-million to Seabury consultants, which had recommended that 2 000 jobs be cut; and allegations of a conflict of interest after it came to light that Mbali Gasa, Ngqula's wife, was a director of the empowerment company awarded the airline's lucrative in-flight catering contract.

As Ngqula cleared out his office, the South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union (Satawu) ended its strike, saying further labour action was possible because of bonuses approved for rival union members who had not joined the industrial action.

The union had gone on strike to demand that SAA stop using labour brokers and for the termination of retention bonuses.

When its leadership met SAA management on Thursday to sign the agreement ending the strike, Satawu officials learnt that personnel who had not taken part in the action would receive a R2 500 bonus, approved by the executive committee.

An SAA source said it would be easy to determine who would receive the gratuity because those who had gone on strike had done so on a "no work, no pay" basis.

The official confirmed that the agreement had been concluded with the Aviation Industry Workers' Union, saying the payments would be made soon.

A Satawu source argued that the strike was in fact protected and legal, and that the agreement entered into with an opposing union was unfair discrimination that would cause a chasm in labour relations.

"Satawu is going to call for new management at SAA. We want a new broom to sweep clean because of what they have done," said Kenneth Monnana, the Satawu spokesperson.

Allegations of excess and impropriety dogged Ngqula - the former head of the Industrial Development Corporation - from the time he took up his position at SAA in 2004.

In 2008 Satawu asked then public enterprises minister Alec Erwin for a meeting to present proof of mismanagement, nepotism and wrongdoing at SAA, but this never took place.

Instead, Satawu's dossier was handed to Brigitte Mabandla, Erwin's replacement, a few weeks ago, prompting a meeting between the ministry and the SAA Board at the beginning of last month.

Ngqula's departure came less than six months after Mabandla, in response to parliamentary questions, praised him for the implementation of a comprehensive and challenging restructuring programme that had enabled the airline to post an operation profit of R123-million, prior to restructuring costs at the end of the 2007/08 book year.

On Friday Jakes Gerwel, the chairman of the SAA board, denied that Ngqula, who serves on 20 boards of directors, had been dismissed.

"His employment has been terminated by mutual agreement between employer and employee and in consultation with the shareholder (the Department of Trade and Industry)," he said.

Satawu welcomed Ngqula's departure, saying it was a "victory that Satawu and its members fully claim as part of our ongoing campaign for clean and good governance at the national carrier".

South Africa

2.1 SACP; 2.2 Thint; 2.3 Mandela; 2.4 Jobs; 2.5 Zuma; 2.6 Analysis

2.1 ANC welcomes Derby-Lewis ruling

M&G Online, 17 March 2009

The African National Congress (ANC) on Tuesday joined the family of slain South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani in welcoming a high court ruling dismissing Clive Derby-Lewis's bid for parole.

"The African National Congress has noted the decision of the Pretoria High Court [North Gauteng High Court] to dismiss the parole application of Clive Derby-Lewis, one of the killers of ANC and SACP [South African Communist Party] stalwart Chris Hani," ANC spokesperson Jessie Duarte said in a statement.

"The ANC respects and welcomes the decision of the court.

"The callous murder of Isithwalandwe Chris Hani in 1993 struck a grave blow to those South Africans who regarded him as a hero of the liberation struggle, and threatened to derail the process towards a political settlement in this country," Duarte said.

The Hani family said in a statement through spokesperson Chris Vick that the ruling had "strengthened our resolve and provides some reassurance".

"We will continue to do everything in our power to ensure that this man serves his full sentence, and that justice runs its full course."

The family also appreciated the support it had received from "many, many people and organisations" who had been opposed to Derby-Lewis's early release.

Asked to comment, Derby-Lewis's wife, Gaye, said: "I have absolutely nothing to say. Let the country decide," before hanging up the phone.

The North Gauteng High Court on Tuesday dismissed Derby-Lewis's parole application with costs.

Handing down judgement, Deputy Judge President Jerry Shongwe said it was the unanimous decision of a full bench.

Derby-Lewis, 73, had served 15-years of a life sentence, after his death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment when the death penalty was abolished. – Sapa

2.2 Key Zuma witness will 'never testify'

Karyn Maughan, The Star, 17 March 2009

The author of the infamous encrypted fax that implicated Jacob Zuma in corruption says he will never testify in the ANC president's trial.

And Alain Thetard has hinted that he could have been a valuable defence witness for Zuma's former financial adviser, convicted fraudster Schabir Shaik, had he not been scared off by the state's plans to arrest him.

In an affidavit filed at the Pietermaritzburg High Court on Thursday, Thetard - who is a former representative of Thint, the French arms company accused of offering Zuma money for his political protection - repeatedly stated that he was incapable of trusting Zuma's prosecutors.

Thint has applied for the prosecution against it to be permanently stayed.

"As a result of the conduct of the representatives of the National Prosecuting Authority, I have no faith in what they say and I believe they will use any excuse to arrest me or have me arrested should I return to South Africa, irrespective of any undertakings they may give," he says.

In a 19-page affidavit, Thetard - who the State and counsel for Shaik previously slammed as a "liar" - explained why there was no love lost between himself and the NPA.

Central to his complaints was the "encrypted fax", a draft document that three courts have found was proof that Shaik solicited a bribe for Zuma. Shaik trial Judge Hilary Squires found that the fax "spoke for itself" - setting out the arrangements and terms of a R500 000 bribe for Zuma - and dismissed Shaik's claims that the R500 000 payment was a donation to the Jacob Zuma Education Trust.

While confirming that he had stated under oath that he was the author of the encrypted fax, Thetard said he feared that the terse way in which the NPA had forced him to structure it, could be misconstrued.

He then wrote a second affidavit, in which he claimed that the fax merely recorded his thoughts and had never been sent. It was this affidavit, and the potential vindication it offered Shaik, that could have prompted the State to apply for an arrest warrant against him, Thetard said.

"It takes little imagination (if any) to arrive at the conclusion that the State considered that I might be a useful witness for Shaik - especially if I was going to repeat my explanation regarding the encrypted fax."

The arrest warrant issued against him, Thetard said, "smacked of an attempt to prevent me from testifying to anything that might have harmed the State's case against Shaik".

Thetard further claimed that the time-frame of Zuma and Thint's alleged corrupt activities was so long ago, that "I do not have sufficient independent recollection of events that transpired… to be of any assistance", he said.

2.3 Winnie’s in - even though FF Plus insists she is not eligible to stand in polls

Sowetan, 17 March 2009

The ANC has pledged to respond to the complaint by the Freedom Front Plus about Winnie Madikizela-Mandela being one of its candidates for the National Assembly.

“The ANC will respond to any objections lodged against any of its candidates through the process set down in law and according to the timetable set out by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),” ANC spokesperson Jessie Duarte said yesterday.

She said the ANC had made every effort to ensure that its list of candidates was compliant with all relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Electoral Act.

She said the process for choosing ANC candidates for this election was the most extensive and democratic of any party in the country.

“The members of the ANC have chosen a corps of cadres who have the experience, resolve and credibility to serve the South African people capably and with diligence,” Duarte said.

The FF Plus said earlier it would object to the IEC against Madikizela- Mandela’s inclusion on the ANC’s national elections list.

“The FF Plus is of the opinion that Madikizela-Mandela does not qualify in terms of Section 47(1)(e) of the Constitution (108 of 1996),” said FF Plus spokesperson Pieter Groenewald.

He said the section clearly determines that anybody found guilty of a crime and given a prison sentence of more than 12 months without the option of a fine did not qualify to be a member of the National Assembly.

“The relevant section determines that the disqualification ends only five years after a sentence is served.

“The complaint will, as is required by the Electoral Act, be submitted to the ANC and the IEC ,” said Groenewald.

Madikizela-Mandela’s nomination by the ANC on its election list for the National Assembly appeared to have been approved by the IEC, despite her criminal record.

On the official provisional list of candidates published yester day, Madikizela-Mandela appears in fifth place for the ANC, just after Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and ahead of Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma.

Legal experts have warned that her conviction for fraud makes her ineligible for a seat in Parliament.

She had a five-year sentence for fraud and theft reduced on appeal to three-and-a-half years for convictions for fraud in July 2004. The sentence was suspended for five years. – Sapa

2.4 Motor industry has lessons to learn from miners

Business Day, 17 March 2009

There is a huge difference between being a price taker and being a price maker. Just look at two industries’ contrasting responses to the economic crisis.

Faced with crashing demand, the motor industry wants to hike prices to cushion it from the impact of a weaker rand. That’s at the same time as it gets out the begging bowl and asks the state for subsidies or soft loans .

The weaker rand is probably just about the only thing that’s cushioning the mining industry from global meltdown. But faced with crashing dollar commodity prices and a deep slump in global demand, miners know there isn’t all that much they can do, beyond trying to mitigate the effects. And while unions and employers in the motor industry are putting their efforts into trying to organise a bail-out package, unions and employers in mining are working together to try to find ways to minimise retrenchments and provide safety nets for affected workers and communities.

The contrast, in a way, is companies versus people. In the motor industry, the emphasis seems to be on trying to get the state to rescue companies. There’s very little acceptance, it seems, that after the past few years of unprecedentedly high demand for vehicles, the market has contracted and some firms, or at least some production lines, might have to go out of business for good. Some troubles may be only temporary but some clearly are more permanent, and using public resources to prop up firms that are not fundamentally viable is simply a waste. And if firms can’t survive in this environment without big price hikes, they surely are not viable.

That’s not to underplay the tragedy of firms going out of business in areas such as the Eastern Cape, which relies on the motor industry for jobs, or in communities that rely on mining for their livelihoods. But the motor industry could take a leaf out of mining’s book and look at what to do to lessen the human tragedy of a crisis that inevitably will erode industries and jobs.

2.5 JZ worthy of security

Sowetan, 16 March 2009

The security debate over Jacob Zuma is unnecessary. At best, it reminds us of the folly of the tendency to politicise who is entitled to security measures on the taxpayers’ account.

Zuma is a former deputy president of the country and therefore is entitled to certain levels of security. Furthermore, it is an established norm that the risk assessment and not popularity, as the Democratic Alliance wants to suggest, determines what kind of security a person will receive from the state.

For even if popularity were the benchmark, the world’s graves are full of popular men and women whose popularity could not save them from the assassin’s nefarious plan.

Much as we appreciate that this is election season, we should not forget that all other living former heads of state and their deputies are entitled. That means that Zuma, in the same way that FW de Klerk and Phumzile Mlambo- Ngcuka – in their capacities as the other former deputy presidents – is entitled to same.

Parties should be arguing that in these trying economic times all state entities should make the best attempt to make cutbacks.

The era we are entering requires leaders who will do whatever they can to cut on the pomp and ceremony so as to identify with the millions facing economic uncertainty.

2.6 South Africa - another turning point?

Alex Davidson, The Socialist Correspondent, 15 March 2009

Amid the allegations of corruption and misuse of power, the political struggles within the ANC have reflected a growing disenchantment with the economic policies of the South African Government.

The African National Congress Conference at Polokwane in December 2007 elected Jacob Zuma as its President, defeating the incumbent, Thabo Mbeki. The other five officers (1) were all elected from the 'Zuma' slate and virtually all of those associated with the Mbeki government failed to get elected to the National Executive Committee with some notable exceptions. (2)

This reflected a growing discontent with the Mbeki government and leadership. Corruption charges against Zuma were still being pursued but then in October 2008 Judge Nicholson found that Zuma had not been properly consulted on the charges according to the law and in his judgement referred to political interference by the Executive. Following this judgement, the ANC National Executive Committee recalled

Thabo Mbeki as President of the Republic. Thabo Mbeki resigned as President and some ten Ministers and Deputy Ministers followed with their resignations.

The Deputy President of ANC, Kgalema Motlanthe, was then elected President of the Republic. (3) Shortly thereafter a Convention was called by Mosiuoa ‘Terror’ Lekota (former Defence Minister) and others which established a breakaway from the ANC. It launched itself as a new party, 'Congress of the People' (COPE) in December 2008 with Lekota as leader and Mbhazima Shilowa, former Gauteng Premier, as his deputy and some other prominent ANC members have joined. (4)

The divisions in the ANC go back some time. In 1996 with the government’s adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) (5) extremely serious differences began to emerge. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which are linked with the ANC through the 'Tripartite Alliance', were unhappy with the dropping of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and its replacement by GEAR. This policy was adopted with only limited consultation with the Alliance partners. The economic policy of the government was seen as neo-liberal, favouring business rather than labour. However, Mbeki saw GEAR as a means of self-reliance rather than a capitulation to old colonial masters. At the core of the programme was the fear of the begging bowl, of giving up South Africa’s limited sovereignty to the IMF and/or the World Bank.

These differences with the government’s economic policies deepened and were reflected by new leaderships emerging in both the SACP and COSATU. Blade Nzimande was elected General Secretary of the SACP at the party’s congress in 1998. He was one of the earliest and most outspoken critics of GEAR: “The difficult relationship between Mbeki and Nzimande is rooted in a combination of ideological dispute and personal grievance.”(6) Zwelinzima Vavi became General Secretary of COSATU, replacing Mbhazima Shilowa in 1999. Initially Shilowa had been opposed to GEAR but was persuaded to change his position by Mbeki.

Increasingly, the SACP and COSATU became critical of the ANC government. Notwithstanding this, Thabo Mbeki was elected President of ANC following the retiral of Nelson Mandela and he was elected President of the country in 1999 and re-elected in 2004.

From 2004 the question of the leadership succession developed. Constitutionally a person can only serve two terms as President, so for Mbeki to serve another term the constitution would have to be changed. Mbeki denied wanting a third term as President of the Republic.

Corruption charges

The corruption charges against Jacob Zuma relate to a major arms deal. Mbeki chaired a cabinet sub-committee on arms procurement from 1996-1999 that put together and approved the purchase of 30 billion rands worth of military hardware. The arms deal eventually cost double that owing to the unstable rand.

The first casualty of the deal was Tony Yengeni, ANC Parliamentary Chief Whip, charged by the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), known as 'the Scorpions' and subsequently found guilty of having accepted a big discount on a luxury 4x4 Mercedes Benz. Then in 2001 Schabir Shaik was arrested after a Scorpions search-and-seize operation on his offices and home. In 2003 the South African Sunday Times ran a story suggesting that Mac Maharaj (Transport Minister in the Mandela government and ANC veteran) had received monies from Shaik. Maharaj was subsequently investigated by the Scorpions, Maharaj found himself at the centre of a political storm when he confirmed allegations that Bulelani Ngcuka, Director of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), had been investigated by ANC intelligence in the 1980s for being an apartheid spy. This led to a government initiated enquiry, which cleared Ngcuka. While Maharaj was under investigation Ngucka tried to get him to persuade

Zuma to answer certain questions.

Smeared by the brush of corruption, Maharaj fought back, accusing Ngcuka of abusing his office and daring Ngcuka to charge him. Maharaj has never been charged.

In his memoirs, Mac Maharaj wrote:

…why was Ngcuka abusing his power in such an unscrupulous way. What was his agenda? I can’t say… I believe it was about who would succeed Thabo Mbeki; it was about the direction this country takes; it was about whether it will be undiluted GEAR (the government economic policy) or a regulated market; and about who can make the most from black economic empowerment. It seemed to be about who becomes the kingmakers in South Africa. (7)

Accusations of corruption against Jacob Zuma, at that time Deputy President of South Africa, emerged during the trial of Schabir Shaik, charged in 2001 and who was found guilty of corruption and fraud related to the arms deal and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on 2nd June 2005. Neither Shaik nor Zuma denied that payments had been made by Shaik to Zuma. Both insisted that the transactions were loans.

President Thabo Mbeki then relieved Zuma from his post as Deputy President of the Republic and appointed Phumazile Mlambo-Ngcuka, then Minister of Minerals and Energy and wife of Bulelani Ngcuka, as Deputy President. Corruption charges were to be brought against Zuma by the National Prosecuting Authority. Zuma remained Deputy President of the ANC.

In December 2005, Zuma was charged with rape but was acquitted in May 2006 in a very high profile trial, which stirred much emotion throughout the country. During this time the leadership succession question remained front page news.

In October 2005 Billy Masethla, Director of National Intelligence, was sacked. He was accused of being behind hoax e-mails implicating senior ANC members in a conspiracy against Jacob Zuma who was at the time the Deputy President of the ANC. Masethla appealed against his dismissal and the court upheld his appeal. Masethla was elected to the ANC NEC in December 2007.

A view developed that factionalism had entered the state and that the Scorpions were abusing their power:

“There are worrying indications that sensitive sectors of the state like intelligence, prosecutions and the public broadcaster have been polluted by political factionalism.”(8)

In October 2008 Judge Nicholson gave his judgement, which led to the recall of Mbeki as President. The disenchantment with the actions of the Scorpions had by now grown into a campaign for its dissolution. One of the first acts of the new President, Kgalema Motlanthe, was to introduce a bill in Parliament, which moved the Scorpions from the office of the National Prosecuting Authority and integrated them into the South African Police Service. The President also took the decision to remove the Director of Public Prosecutions, Vusi Pikoli.

There are a complex of reasons behind these divisions which have grown deeper and more serious since 1994. Some commentators see it as a question of personalities or the quest for power. Often Mbeki was seen as ‘aloof and intellectual’ and Zuma as ‘a man of the people’. Personalities do certainly come in to the issue but it is more than that. The question of personality cannot be ignored, however, the political issues ultimately are the more important. GEAR engendered far more dissent in South Africa than either Mbeki’s AIDS scepticism or his ‘quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe, and led to:

"the most serious schism the party had experienced in its century of existence – and would fuel the rebellion against Mbeki following the firing of Jacob Zuma in 2005.”(9)

From the time that the Reconstruction and Development Programme was transformed into GEAR there had been a growing discontent with the economic policies within the ranks of the Tripartite Alliance.

Whilst the economy continued to grow and many advances were made in terms of access to clean water, electrification, sanitation, housing, education and other areas of social policy, the gap between rich and poor grew wider and unemployment remained very high at some 25% officially but nearer 40% in reality. The SACP drew the following conclusion:

Thanks to our post-1994 state interventions, big capital has been the major beneficiary of 13 years of ‘stabilisation’ and economic growth. The subordinate ‘caring’ state dimension of GEAR consisted in reducing the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) into a set of technical ‘delivery’ targets funded out of tax derived from this capitalist growth – delivery but without transformation. (10)

This discontent with the government’s economic policies was exacerbated by Mbeki’s lack of consultation with ANC’s partners, COSATU and the SACP:

“For years we have had to endure from some quarters of the ANC consistent displays of contempt and disdain for the elected leaderships of the SACP and COSATU.” (11)

Jacob Zuma was seen by many as a victim and thus became the reservoir of discontent within the ANC alliance. Other factors, which have to be taken into consideration, are the issues of careerism, opportunism and corruption, largely a consequence of ANC holding power. From 1994 and the first democratic election many leaders of ANC, COSATU and the SACP had entered government, locally and nationally, as politicians or officials. This weakened the structures of the Tripartite Alliance. With the introduction of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) many others went into business.

Stepping stone

At the same time as these departures from the structures of the movement, some people saw that the best and quickest way forward for them personally was to join the ANC. The first of the ANC leaders to openly talk about these negative tendencies was former president Nelson Mandela. In his political report to the 50th National Conference in 1997, he stated:

Later in this report, we will discuss the intrusion of this self-same media within our ranks, during the last three years, to encourage our own selfdestruction, with the active involvement of some who are present here as bona-fide delegates to the conference of a movement to which they owe no loyalty... In reality, during the last three years, we have found it difficult to deal with such careerists in a decisive manner. We, ourselves, have therefore allowed the space to emerge for these opportunists to pursue their counterrevolutionary goals, to the detriment of our movement and struggle. During this period, we have also been faced with various instances of corruption involving our own members, including those who occupy positions of authority by virtue of the victory of the democratic revolution... Clearly we have to take all necessary measures to purge ourselves of such members and organise ourselves in a way that will make it difficult for corrupt elements to gain entry into our movement. (12)

President Mandela was joined in the same conference by Acting Secretary General Cheryl Carolus, who further reflected on the matter:

The competition within the organisation for positions in government has added a new dimension to the contestation of ANC leadership positions. Election to an ANC position is viewed by some as a stepping stone to positions of power and material reward within government. While such views might be inevitable, we need to ensure that personal ambition is sufficiently tempered by the needs of the organisation and the demands of the National Democratic Revolution. The organisation needs to develop mechanisms which will ensure that the contestation of leadership positions does not divide the organisation and does not detract from the key programme of the movement. (13)

These problems of careerism and corruption have continued to the present. The ANC January 8th Statement in 2008 said:

While the ANC's organisational strengths have included an ability to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional support base and adapt mass work under new conditions, it has acquired a number of 'accumulated weaknesses'. As conference indicated, these weaknesses include:-

An inability to effectively deal with new tendencies arising from being a ruling party, such as social distance, patronage, careerism, corruption and abuse of power;

Ineffective management of the interface between the movement and the state;

A flawed approach to membership recruitment;

A decline in ideological debate among cadres; and

A lack of institutional resources to give practical effect to the movement's leadership role.

In the run-up to conference, the process of leadership contestation seriously tested the ANC's unity and cohesion, core values, character, and tried and tested organisational practices. (14)

In the run-up to the December 2007 Polokwane ANC Conference the SACP stated in 'An Open Letter to the ANC Membership':

The SACP is calling for an end to a leadership style in which loyalty to individuals over-rides loyalty to the struggle, in which gross incompetence trumps effectiveness, in which favourites are propped up in the midst of endless failure and scandal. (15)

These open criticisms of the Mbeki style of leadership had been growing for some time prior to the Polokwane conference. For example, the “Presidency is too powerful” (16) and our democracy is “excessively presidential.” (17)

Following the Polokwane conference the new ANC leadership established their authority. As well as recalling Thabo Mbeki as President of the Republic, the right of ANC structures over the appointment of Premiers and Mayors was re-asserted.

The ANC has now gone into election mode in preparation for the election to be held on 22 April 2009. This includes the launch of the manifesto, determination of the national and provincial lists of candidates and deployment of cadres in the campaign.

Footnotes:

(1) Kgalema Motlanthe (Deputy President), Gwede Mantashe (Secretary-General), Baleka Mbete (Chair), Thandise Modise (deputy Secretary-General) and Matthew Phosa (Treasurer-General).

(2) Including Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Foreign Minister); Pallo Jordan (Minister of Arts and Culture); Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (Minister of Health, now Minister in the Presidency); and Trevor Manuel

(Finance Minister).

(3) Kgalema Montlanthe was Secretary-General of ANC from 1998-2008.

(4) Including Rev Allan Boesak, Nosimo Balindlela (former Eastern Cape Premier), Phillip Dexter (former SACP Central Committee) and Barney Pityana (Vice Chancellor of the University of South Africa).

(5) GEAR: Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan.

(6) Gevisser, Mark, “Thabo Mbeki: the dream deferred”, p674, pub 2007, Jonathan Ball Publishers.

(7) O’Malley, Padraig, “Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa”, p442, pub Viking Penguin.

(8) An SACP Open Letter to the ANC Membership, “We can’t go on like this..together, let’s make sure things change”, African Communist, November 2007.

(9) Gevisser, Mark, “Thabo Mbeki: the dream deferred”, p666, pub 2007, Jonathan Ball publishers.

(10) “Umsebenzi”, journal of the SACP, “A Shift to Where?”, May 2007.

(11) An SACP open Letter to the ANC Membership, African Communist, November 2007.

(12) Political Report, 50th National Conference, 1997.

(13) Organisational Report, 50th National Conference, December 1997.

(14) ANC Statement, 8 January 2008

(15) An Open Letter to the ANC Membership, African Communist, November 2007.

(16) SACP, SAPA, May 2006.

(17) Vavi M., General Secretary, COSATU, May 2006.

International

3.1 Botswana (I); 3.2 Zimbabwe; 3.3 Botswana (II)

3.1 De Beers may close Namibia mines from April

Business Day, 16 March 2009

De Beers said today its Namibia joint venture, Namdeb, was considering closing its mines in that country from April 1 for three months due to weak sales.

De Beers - 45% held by Anglo American Plc - has said it would cope with the hard times brought on by the global financial crisis by significantly reducing output levels, costs, including jobs, and capital expenditure at its mines.

Last month, De Beers’ joint venture in Botswana, Debswana Diamond, also temporarily shut its mines, and De Beers is in talks with unions in SA to cut some 1 000 jobs.

Namdeb, owned 50-50 by Namibia’s government and De Beers, was in talks with unions and other parties over the closures.

“Namdeb has put this proposal (forward) and is in discussion with unions and other parties. It is likely that if the proposal is accepted it will take effect from April 1,” a spokesman for De Beers in Johannesburg told Reuters.

“For now Namdeb’s mining operations continue. The mines are definitely not shut, they may be planning to do that but it may take a few weeks to implement something like that.”

Media reports said Namdeb had already shut the mines, and quoted the group’s manager for corporate affairs, Hilifa Mbako blaming the action on the company’s failure to make any sales in January and February.

Mbako said workers would be paid their salaries during the production holiday.

Three of De Beers’ shareholders, including Anglo, said last month they had agreed to loan the company $500m to help it weather the economic downturn, following muted sales last year.

Analysts have said the performance for De Beers, which controls around 40% of the rough diamond market, might worsen this year as the global economic crisis hits demand.

Debswana Diamond Co., the world’s biggest diamond producing company by value, shut down all its mines until at least April 14, after demand for the gems slowed. The Damtshaa mine and Orapa No. 2 plants will be shut for the rest of the year, Gaborone-based Debswana said.

3.2 Zimbabwe thanks SA for food help

The Times, 16 March 2009

Zimbabwe has expressed appreciation to South Africa’s government for agricultural inputs made under a Southern African Development Community initiative.

During the third session of the Zimbabwe-South Africa joint commission held at the Victoria Falls from Saturday to Monday, the countries also discussed ways of supporting the recovery of Zimbabwe’s productive sectors.

This included the opening of lines of credit, export credit insurance, spatial development initiatives and trade facilitation measures, they said in a joint communique issued on Monday.

The Zimbabwean delegation to the talks was led by its Foreign Minister Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, while South Africa’s was led by his counterpart Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

During the talks, the countries agreed to finalise negotiations on the bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement, the memorandum on economic co-operation and the avoidance of double taxation agreement, according to the communique.

They also agreed to enhance co-operation in the generation and distribution of power, with the establishment of a joint working committee to discuss technical details.

Accord was reached on the enhancement of production in the mining sector, the beneficiation of minerals, the finger-printing of precious metals and the harmonisation of mining policies to attract investment.

South Africa and Zimbabwe were furthermore in one mind on the need to finalise negotiations on a draft protocol on tourism and establish a bilateral tourism technical committee ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and with a eye on the Transfrontier Conservation Parks.

The countries exchanged views on collaborating to combat infectious diseases and other health management issues, labour migration, human settlement development and housing, public service administration, arts and culture, youth, gender and community development.

They also advanced discussions on long standing immigration matters between the two countries.

They further resolved to work together on Zimbabwe’s re-engagement with the international community and in the lobbying for the lifting of economic sanctions.

3.3 BOTSWANA: Retrenchments Turn Villages Into ‘‘Little Hells’’

Ephraim Nsingo, IPSNews, 16 March 2009

The closure of two major mines and the scaling down of operations at most mines in Botswana have had a knock-on effect beyond miners in this southern African producer of diamonds.

When times were still good, many mine workers hired people to do chores at their homes. But this appears to have come to an end. Informal traders also struggle to sell their goods and social tensions rise as more people lose their jobs.

‘‘Everyone is affected now. It’s not about mine employees alone. Everyone around us is also feeling the pinch,’’ laments Christian Motsamai*, who worked as a plant operator at Orapa Mine No. 2 Plant.

‘‘Most of us had our own employees who took care of things at home while we were at work. For example, I had two maids: one who looked after our baby and another who took care of the house. I also had two herd boys to look after my cattle. With current developments at the mine, I cannot afford to keep them. What will I give them?’’

Since the announcement by diamond mining giant Debswana that it is shutting down Orapa Mine No. 2 Plant and Damtshaa Mine until the end of the year and scaling down operations at most of its mines, mine workers have found themselves in the doldrums. The two mines are between 220 and 240 km west of Francistown in northern Botswana.

Other workers not directly employed by the company have also been affected, as the company immediately cancelled labour hire contracts, affecting close to 1,000 employees.

‘‘The numbers are much greater than that. Most of the workers are engaged on a short term basis and their details are not included in most of the official correspondence.

‘‘The situation appears to be getting worse. I doubt if we will once again experience the good days when one would look forward to the 19th of the month, our pay day,’’ notes Motsamai, who is also a member of the workers’ union for Orapa Mine.

With frustration written all over his face, Motsamai explains that ‘‘if the struggles we have seen in just these few months are anything to go by, then we are in for a really tough time.

‘‘This has never happened in the history of this mine. Everyone is just lost and we do not know what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month. We do not know what the future holds for us. This place never used to be like this (that is, quiet),’’ he adds.

Ordinary people from villages surrounding mines are also feeling the pinch. At Rakops, a village near Letlhakane Mine, Kaone Nare tells IPS that after the farming season most villagers would seek short term employment as ‘‘dikonteraka’’, as labour hire contractors are known among locals. Letlhakane is 190 km west of Francistown.

‘‘This had become part of our life -- that whenever we are not working in the fields, we go and work at the mines. We would come back to the village during the farming season to prepare the fields and then go back to the mine.

‘‘We got all the money for our agricultural inputs from the piece jobs at the mine but now nothing is coming up. We hear all contractors have been removed,’’ says the concerned Nare.

The sudden upsurge in the number of unemployed people in the area has led to growing tension. ‘‘Most small business operators have become very hostile to their workers because they know if they fire you, there’s nowhere to go. This place is slowly turning into a little hell,’’ adds Nare.

Small businesses have also been affected. Tshepo Baitsile, who sells fruit, vegetables and small foodstuffs, complains that, ‘‘the past three months have been very bad for me. I have lost quite a significant chunk of my wares over the last few weeks as they just rot with no one buying. It’s a really challenging situation. I still have not paid my rent.

‘‘I took some of the goods I sell on credit, hoping to settle the debt with the profits, but I have been running at a loss. I don’t know how we are going to get out of here - maybe by the grace of god,’’ hopes Baitsile.

According to Jack Tlhagale, secretary general of the Botswana Mine Workers Union (BMWU), workers’ representatives and Debswana management are engaged in meetings to find ways of cushioning ordinary employees.

But some workers have already packed their goods and left the mines before the talks being held by the joint negotiation and consultative committee (JNCC) have been concluded.

‘‘We are urging the workers not to go away as they have still not been served with retrenchment and redeployment notices. We have an agreement in place with Debswana on exit packages and we hope that it will be followed,’’ Tlhagale adds.

The workers will have to keep their fingers crossed a little longer - until Mar 17 when the JNCC is expected to meet again. *Not his real name (END/2009)

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