Needless to add another round of the Italian sovereign debt crisis is the last thing that the world economy needs at this time of synchronized world economic slowing. The Italian economy is some ten times the size of that of Greece and it has a $3 trillion government bond market. If the 2010 Greek debt crisis shook world financial markets, how much more so would an Italian debt crisis do so today?
Looking ahead to 2025-26, provided there are no unforeseen shocks, we see growth stabilising above pre-crisis potential levels, at around 1%, driven by monetary policy normalisation, a recovery in external demand and progress towards implementing NGEU investments. These developments should bolster both actual and potential growth, which we conservatively estimate at around 0.7%-0.8% from 2027 onwards.
By contrast, Italian banks have slightly reduced their sovereign debt holdings this year, diversifying their portfolios by purchasing non-domestic bonds driven by more attractive valuations. The maturities of Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) represent another limiting factor in the return of domestic banks to the market.
The reduction in interest rate volatility is likely to encourage the return of carry trades, particularly in peripheral countries. Among these, Italy stands out for its mixture of attractive valuations and liquidity.
The medium-term outlook should be more supportive for peripheral spreads, as the central bank has likely reached the peak of its hiking cycle and should start cutting rates half-way through next year, on the back of a weaker macroeconomic picture and lower inflation from the ongoing transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. The reduction in interest rate volatility is likely to encourage the return of carry trades, particularly in peripheral countries. Among these, Italy stands out for its mixture of attractive valuations and liquidity.
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Furthermore, nothing in this website is intended to provide tax, legal, or investment advice and nothing in this website should be construed as a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any investment or security or to engage in any investment strategy or transaction. There is no guarantee that any targeted performance or forecast will be achieved.
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This website is solely for informational purposes.
This website does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation of an offer to buy, or a recommendation of any security or any other product or service. Any securities, products, or services referenced may not be registered for sale with the relevant authority in your jurisdiction and may not be regulated or supervised by any governmental or similar authority in your jurisdiction.
Furthermore, nothing in this website is intended to provide tax, legal, or investment advice and nothing in this website should be construed as a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any investment or security or to engage in any investment strategy or transaction. There is no guarantee that any targeted performance or forecast will be achieved.
The purpose of legal action is to ensure the recovery of funds owed within a reasonable period of time, seeking, where possible, to avoid the increased costs and time associated with resolving the dispute through the court system.
The purpose of this step is to invite the debtor to regularize his position amicably. This is an extremely important step because this, in many cases, allows the problem to be resolved without the need to go to court. Hence, it saves time and money because it avoids having to resort to judicial recovery of the debt.
The first step is to gather all the necessary information (due diligence): what the claim is based on, whether there is a contract or written agreement between the parties, invoices, checks or bills of exchange etc.
If the debtor refuses to pay or disputes the claim and an agreement cannot be found, it will be necessary to resort to one of the Adr, legal dispute resolution tools, alternative to going to court or, depending on the specific case, go to the court itself, initiating the so-called judicial phase.
If the debtor does not oppose and/or does not pay within the stipulated period, the creditor may initiate enforcement proceedings: precept, attachment, forced sale of assets, under the injunction decree.
The debtor has 10 days from the service of the precept to pay what is stated therein. Failing this, after 10 days have passed, the creditor can activate enforcement through garnishment.
If it took too much time from when the claim has become due to when the creditor takes action to recover it (with a letter of reminder or a specially drafted notice), there is a risk that older claims can no longer be collected because they are time-barred.
Precisely because of the frequency of debt collection with which companies face, more practical and quicker solutions might be preferred, starting with recourse to arbitration, whose confidentiality features make it the ideal resolution tool for the needs of companies, both local and international.
Regarding debt collection in Italy, consideration must also be taken to those cases in which one of the parties to the dispute is resident abroad, a circumstance that would entail additional procedures for international debt collection.
The attorneys of Debt Collection Department within Boccadutri International Law Firm have the experience in debt collection in Italy and abroad, do not hesitate to contact us for an initial consultation.
Under financial repression, banks are vehicles that allow governments to squeeze more indirect tax revenue from citizens by monopolizing the entire savings and payments system, not simply currency. Governments force local residents to save in banks by giving them few, if any, other options. They then stuff debt into the banks via reserve requirements and other devices. This allows the government to finance a part of its debt at a very low interest rate; financial repression thus constitutes a form of taxation.
The Italian tax system was not designed to cope with the heavy wartime expenditures. Prior to WWI, taxes on consumption generated more than 60 percent of tax revenue.8 During the war, the tax on land increased from 9 to 14 percent, and the tax on buildings increased from 16 to 22 percent. In addition, new taxes were established, including taxes on mobile wealth, luxury products, and supplementary income. These hikes led to a sharp increase in the contribution of nontraditional revenue sources to total revenue (Figure 5.2).9
As in many other countries at the time, Italy grappled with the politically charged questions of whether to return to the gold standard and, if so, at what parity. Prior to WWI, Italy adhered to the standard only intermittently. It became evident, however, that the country would face severe economic strain by returning to the prewar parity, and the rigid proposals by the UK and the US for an immediate return to the gold standard were rejected. Arthur Cecil Pigou, a representative for the UK at the First International Financial Conference in Brussels in 1920, observed12:
[F]or the United Kingdom, where the gold exchange is only depreciated some 20 percent, the balance of argument is clearly in favour of a return to pre-war parity; for Austria and probably Germany it points to a substantially lower parity; for Italy and France the issue is less clear, but there can be no doubt that, if a return to prewar parity is aimed at, the strain will be exceedingly severe, and the process of return must be slow.
It is scarcely necessary to emphasize that credits obtained abroad produce corresponding improvements of the Treasury cash holdings and therefore limit the necessity of expanding the note in circulation. However, it would be inconsiderate to forget that such indebtedness, contracted outside Italy, will have to be met some day, both for interest and for principal, thus requiring a continuous effort of our economic power. Such indebtedness may become a concealed menace for a long time to come, after the Peace, for the exchange of our currency and for the monetary relations of Italy with the outside world, unless adequate provisions are made in due course.
At the same time, foreign and short-term debt was also rising (Figures 5.4 and 5.6). The excessive costs related to war efforts and reconstruction resulted in significant deficits that had to be financed by the issuance of short-term debt, specifically the issuance of Treasury bills and advances by the Bank of Italy (Figure 5.6).21 In the aftermath of the war, floating debt (short-term debt of maturity that is usually two years or less) was considered problematic because the Italian government was concerned about the willingness of investors to roll over their holdings of short-term securities and about the potential monetization of debt in the event of a funding crisis.
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