More than anything, these readings highlight for me just how saturated the discourse of climate change is with moralization, hypocrisy (both real and perceived), social tension, and deeply engrained cultural attitudes. Pralle’s work is an interesting dissection of the class antagonism surrounding light trucks in the U.S., but arguing that the anti-SUV discourse signifies an inversion of the normal class polarities in ‘Anti-___’ movements requires more empirical justification than is illustrated here. It seems most of the evidence supporting the notion that the real antagonism is aimed at the upper class is anecdotal, and to me, it rings somewhat hollow. Poor people don’t always react to pleas for ‘sufficiency’ (least of all having to do with transportation) as advocates or social reformers might expect; renouncing consumerism in this or any other field is usually easier to do when you have some economic capital as insulation. The Thompson paper (I couldn’t find this one, so I read the moral protagonism one instead, which I’m guessing makes many similar points) seems to me to be more important here, because it shows that consumption practices are interpreted in vastly different ways based on the people involved. Activists might wail against H2 drivers for being overfed or spoiled, but the drivers predictably see it more as indicative of their hard work and social mobility. We see many of the same things in Norgaard, as people perceive certain actions in different ways based on their cultural surroundings, and in a more economic/utilitarian sense, their own best interest. While this can be conceived of as collective denial, I would argue there is a germ of truth to some of the backlash; I’ve had people living in 4,000 square foot houses (and with more than two children, the ‘replacement rate’) roll their eyes at my car, which results in nothing but resentment. In many ways this is a vast collective action problem made worse by considerations of costs and benefits relative to one’s position in the socio-economic (and cultural) spectrum. Why should I front the costs of carbon emissions abatement when I have so little capital to bring to bear on it? In a similar vein, why would Norwegians give up a lucrative (and, it deserves to be said, considering it’s mostly natural gas, comparatively clean) market when Qatar or Russia are more than happy to meet demand? True, carbon allotments may help alleviate these structural problems, but they have issues of their own. On the one hand, the logistical difficulty of actually putting a system like that into practice (especially having to coordinate between public and private organizations in the process- one wild guess as to how the latter would react to a regulatory regime so all-encompassing); on the other, what basically amounts to indulgences. These considerations ultimately lead me to believe that while these approaches may not be bankrupt, they need to be complemented by a global political regulatory system which prevents some of the dilemmas outlined. Still, there will always be problems, and even though they are cultural, they are hardly all illusory constructions. Perhaps activists and advocates need to admit to themselves that reconciling climate mitigation with social equity is a more difficult proposition than it is portrayed as.
This week’s articles let me know how the diverse discourse regarding climate change has been framed in a social context. Before taking this class, I thought that global environmental problems such as climate change belonged only to the natural or physical environments, distant from the realm of sociology. From my previous perspective, an environmental problem had nothing to do with the main concepts of sociology — social values and cultural symbols, social class, power conflicts, social structure, or economic politics — and could not be understood or analyzed in terms of the lens of sociology. However, after reading this week’s articles, it especially struck me that my idea about the environmental problem had been completely wrong. The global environmental problem is strongly a social problem and should be considered in a social context.
In the article on the anti-SUV campaign, Pralle states that the campaign is a kind of rejection crusade of the automobile as a symbol of freedom and choices. He further states that the campaign is faced with ambiguity between pro-consumerism and anti-consumerism in socio-cultural and political-economic contexts. Also, this anti-SUV campaign has been understood within a history of moral reform movements. In light of the historical and contextual meaning, the anti-SUV campaign can distinguish itself from other moral reform movements because it targets the reversed class and status, namely the upper and middle classes. I like Parelle’s approach on the anti-SUV campaign from the perspective of social structure, but I think she could have strengthened her argument by emphasizing and providing more evidence on social structure, such as class and status, in relation to the anti-SUV movement. Even though Pralle tries to explain it, I still wonder that why the anti-SUV campaigners concentrated on SUVs. Pralle covered a lot of topics regarding reasons of the concentration on SUVs but did not elaborate on them enough to persuade the readers including me. I think it is possible jealousy had more impact on the movement than Pralle discussed, resulting in a movement resembling a witch-hunt.
On the other hand, Norgaard’s “We Don’t Really Want to Know” emphasizes that Norwegian’s collectively deny environmental issues because of its political and economic environment. Although Norwegians know the information and are well aware of the risks of the environmental problem, they do not respond because of their way of life and economic prosperity gained from the nation’s oil production. Here Norgaard indicates the social influence on the environmental problem. Curiosities arose as I was reading the article. Norgaard only addresses individuals and social structures and insufficiently covered the in-between, the media’s role. Also, I want to put more weight on Norgaard’s statement on each individual Norwegian lacking of understanding of how to apply environmental protection measures in everyday life. I think, after all, Norwegians do not have enough information on environmental issues.
I was very interested in the Pralle article on the politics of the anti-SUV campaign, especially in its relation to personal freedom. According to Pralle, the consumer has become the new citizen in that consumers are “essential to a democracy” because of their purchasing power (415). Certain material goods, such as cars or specifically SUV’s, are so highly valued for their convenience and social prestige they become tied into the meaning of “individual freedom,” and then evolve into a perceived “right” (421). Comparing this idea the Thompson and Coskuner article from last week, CSA advocates see organic farming as true freedom. Farmers base their “sense of autonomy and personal sovereignty” on keeping their farms “free from corporate dependencies” (22). These two notions, that of SUV’s and organic farming, are startlingly different. Is there a way to reconcile the American notion of personal freedom within the new green movement? Is it possible to bring together the anti-SUV campaigners and organic foodies because they both feel passionately about protecting their individual freedoms, which can only be achieved through protecting the earth?