2015/04/27
The Supreme Court is currently hearing the case of
Obergfell v. Hodges, addressing the constitutionality
of laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. However, most
of arguments are abysmally confused.
First there is confusion on what
marriage is. As a matter
of law it is a
contract among two (or more) individuals.
(Most can agree it would make no sense to use the term for a
contract between an individual and a corporation.) As a custom, it
is the physical
relationship among individuals, involving
activities like living together and having sex. But the relationship
can exist without the contract and the contract without the
relationship. So what is involved in the litigation? Does it make
sense to say that two individuals have a "right to marry" that some
jurisdictions are trying to forbid? Do the parties to such a
relationship have some right to have the state call it "marriage",
as distinct from calling it a "domestic partnership" or some other
term?
The simple obvious answer to the last question is no. A state, like
an individual, may use any name it pleases for anything it wants. No
one has some right to dictate the choice of words anyone or anything
must use for anything. Conflicting uses of different words for the
same things, or the same words for different things, may cause
confusion, but constitutionally there is no right or power to
require anyone to use terms in certain ways, as long as there is not
confusion or fraud.
Part of the confusion seems to come from regarding official
recognition of some relationship as a "marriage" as some kind of
license, that could be withheld, or that such a relationship can
constitutionally be banned by banning the contract. In the past, in
some jurisdictions, that has been attempted, with things like
marriage licenses, or criminal prosecution for relationships that
were not officially authorized, such as with individuals that were
too young, or among more than two, or fraudulently marrying one
individual while still being married to another. But there are no
more marriage licenses that carry criminal penalties, and officially
recognizing a "marriage" is not some kind of license.
Constitutionally, no government in the United States may forbid any
two or more consenting adults to enter into any contract to do
anything. The activity under the contract might be made a crime, and
the existence of a contract deemed evidence of a conspiracy, but,
except for fraud, there is no constitutional way to penalize parties
from merely entering into a contract of any kind. The courts of a
jurisdiction may decline to enforce certain contracts which it
disapproves, but not to prevent entry into them.
This case is not about attempts to forbid the relationship. The
decision in
Lawrence v. Texas established that it
is unconstitutional to penalize consenting adults of the same gender
from having sex with one another. That disposes of the issue of
official restriction of the relationship. But can the state
constitutionally refuse to call the relationship "marriage"? Yes.
Can it constitutionally refuse to enforce the terms of a contract
governing such a relationship? Also yes. Can it constitutionally
withhold benefits to the parties to the parties to such a
relationship? That depends. It may withhold some benefits to the
parties to some relationships and not to others, but not because the
parties call it marriage. It is the substance of things, not the
names for them, that matters in law. It could, for example, extend
benefits to couples with children that are withheld from couples
without children.
Many of the issues raised involve benefits like inheritance or
hospital visitation. As the first may be consented to by a written
will, and the second by a consent form, such as a "living will, then
by by calling their relationship "marriage", perhaps in writing so
they have something to show to others, the state has no rational
basis for discriminating against some wills or consent forms and not
others. The appropriate remedy is for the parties to put it in
writing.
One of the benefits government can provide is to make available a
standard contract that people can invoke by name, without having to
renegotiate the terms that have taken millennia to develop. That is
a great convenience. Of course, people can refer to the standard
contract, but then contract to deviate from the standard or to
supplement it in some ways. We call those "prenuptial agreements".
Government does that for many kinds of standard contract, such as
between landlord and tenant, employer and employee, or seller and
buyer. Having such standard contracts is a great convenience for all
concerned. But can government constitutionally forbid anyone from
using one of its standard contracts, by merely referring to it by
name? No, unless there is fraud, and fraud is a separate issue from
entry into the contract, which might be evidence of fraud but is not
essentially fraud.
The Supreme Court could do us all a great favor by making all of the
above points clear. That would mean judgment for the plaintiffs, but
not for their arguments.
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