The article makes it even clearer the consequences of imbalance in
economies. It is amazing. At one stage banks go out of the way to lend
money imprudently, the gains of which are shared by some people. Then
later on, in case of a debt crisis, the country as a whole is
castigated and everyone bears the losses. Private gain, public losses.
That is where the Greek protests echo the grievances of
OccupyWallStreet.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/20/AR2010052005278.html
Forget Greece: Europe's real problem is Germany
By Steven Pearlstein
Friday, May 21, 2010
Ground zero of Europe's debt-currency-banking crisis isn't in Greece,
or Portugal, or Ireland or even Spain. It's in Germany.
So says Martin Wolf, the estimable economics columnist of the
Financial Times, who this week offered this wonderfully concise, if
somewhat mischievous, description of how the vaunted German economic
machine really works:
At one end is a powerful and highly efficient industrial export engine
that generates a large trade surplus with the rest of the world,
including most other countries in the eurozone. Instead of spending
this new export wealth on a higher standard of living, however,
parsimonious Germans prefer to save it, handing it over to thinly
capitalized German banks that have proved equally efficient in
destroying said wealth by investing it in risky securities issued, not
coincidentally, by trading partners that need the capital to finance
their trade deficits with Germany. To prevent the collapse of those
banks, German taxpayers are dragooned into using what remains of their
hard-earned savings either to bail out their hapless banks or their
profligate trading partners.
We Americans, of course, know all about this rather perverse form of
economic recycling. It describes what happened in the 1980s with Japan
and more recently with China. And to a lesser degree, it describes our
economic relationship with Germany, whose banks and insurance
companies were big buyers of American subprime mortgage securities and
commercial property. It's what inevitably happens when a large,
productive country tries to run a "mercantilist" economic policy
predicated on running large and persistent trade surpluses.
Normally, what should happen to such a country is that, as a result of
its trade surplus, wages rise, along with the value of its currency,
to reflect its new wealth and productivity. That has the effect of
making those exports less competitive while encouraging workers to
spend their increased income on cheaper imports. And in that way, the
system brings imports and exports more into balance.
That rebalancing, however, hasn't happened in Germany. It hasn't
happened because much of Germany's trade surplus is with other
European countries with which it shares a common currency, so the
currency can't adjust. It hasn't happened because Germans, by their
nature, are eager to save and reluctant to spend their newfound wealth
on imported goods and services. And it hasn't happened because the
European Central Bank, driven largely by German economic rectitude and
fear of inflation, has followed a tight monetary policy that has
reduced growth and discouraged domestic consumption and investment.
But that's not how most Germans see things. They look at the current
crisis and blame their spendthrift Mediterranean neighbors for using
the cover of the euro to rack up public and private debts that they
now cannot support. They blame hedge funds and other speculators for
making a bad situation worse and profiting from other people's misery.
And they are furious that they are being told by their leaders that
they have no choice but to bail everyone out.
What Germans won't accept is that they wouldn't have been able to sell
all those beautifully designed cars and well-engineered machine tools
if Greeks and Spaniards and Americans hadn't been willing to buy those
goods and German banks hadn't been so willing to lend them the money
to do so. Nor will they accept that German industry was able to thrive
over the past decade because of a common currency and a common
monetary policy that, over time, rendered industry in some neighboring
countries uncompetitive while generating huge real estate bubbles in
others.
The danger of Germans misunderstanding the causes of the current
crisis is that it leads them, and the rest of Europe, to the wrong
solutions.
While European governments surely have long-term structural budget
problems, the immediate fiscal challenge comes from the decline in tax
revenues and the increase in transfer payments that result from slow
growth and high unemployment. The right policy response to that --
along with the very real threat of price deflation in Europe -- isn't
to put the entire continent in a fiscal straitjacket that makes the
recession even worse. The immediate need is for the European Central
Bank to deliver additional monetary stimulus in the form of lower
interest rates and direct purchases of government bonds. The reality
is that the price of avoiding a dangerous deflationary spiral in
Greece and Spain is allowing inflation in Germany to rise to 3 or 4
percent.
It's also time to give up the fiction that Greece can avoid a default.
It can't -- nor should taxpayer money be used to prevent banks and
other private-sector bondholders from suffering losses on their unwise
investments. If public money is used, it should be as a sweetener for
a "voluntary" restructuring in which bondholders are invited to swap
old bonds for new ones that have a lower face value but are insured
against default by the European Union. The same tack could be used
with the bonds of other countries facing insolvency.
Such a restructuring not only reduces the problem of moral hazard, but
it also avoids forcing countries into the kind of grinding depression
and deflation that, as with Greece, would inevitably result in a
default. And if it turns out that losses from the restructuring
threaten the solvency of some European banks, as is feared, then the
E.U. could use proceeds from its new bank tax to inject fresh capital
into failing banks in way that dilutes existing shareholders and gives
taxpayers the chance to earn a profit if and when the banks recover.
That strategy worked in the United States, and there's no reason it
can't work in Europe.
In the long run, the eurozone won't be fixed until Germany figures out
how to generate growth and wealth without beggaring its neighbors and
its trading partners. As Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble
acknowledged this week in an interview with the Financial Times,
Germany has become so prosperous "because it has more advantages from
European integration than any other country." Unless Germans can find
a way to share that prosperity, other countries may conclude that the
price of membership to its club is just too high.