Re: Mere Dad Ki Maruti Sub Download
Nichole Wernett
Abstract: The opening up of the Indian economy that has occurred since the mid-1980s has forced Indian firms to face external competition. This paper looks at the spectrum of linkages between the two automobile manufacturers Maruti Udyog Limited (a passenger car manufacturer) and Eicher Tractors Limited (a tractor manufacturer) and their suppliers. A discernible shift in the assembler-supplier relationships has been seen in the case of these two automobile manufacturers and their respective suppliers. Reducing the supplier base is one of the most discernible features of restructuring, based on the just in time approach. This has paved the way for long-term contracts with suppliers, quality assurance and more assembling being carried out at the suppliers end leading to supply of subassemblies rather than mere components. The important lesson that one learns is that the supply chain, as a system, became institutionalised with the establishment of Maruti and Eicher. The autocomponents industry, which was marked by inefficiencies, such as low technological competence, poor quality and low productivity with virtually no access to the international market got the boost which it needed. The supplier firms operating in the open market in the controlled regime have now become a part of the network. Many small firms were established. Their technological development, quality awareness, and financial management were guided by the large firm. The transition can be attributed to the governments redefined role in adopting clear-cut policies and the efforts of the automobile manufacturers to innovate. The outcome of this process is dynamic long-term relationships, information exchange, skill enhancement leading to improved processes, changed raw materials, inventory reduction, product improvements, wastage reductions, quality improvements, energy conservation, continuous benchmarking, and so on, for the suppliers on one hand, and the Indian automotive industry in general.
Even though electric two wheeler (e2W) companies saw a slight recovery in July of 12 per cent with 49,518 registrations - after a wash out in June because the government slashed the FAME 2 subsidy by a third - registrations are still lower for the second month in a row compared to April FY24. The slow pace has raised doubts about whether the registrations will reach anywhere near either Niti Aayog's ambitious target of 2.4 million vehicles in FY24 or whether they will be closer to the trimmed down industry expectation of around one million. In June, e2W registrations plunged to a mere 44,253, the worst month in more than a year, as companies hiked scooter prices.
Statistics, however, tell a story of effective prevention. "If one were to isolate one single factor (contributing to industrial strife), it is the resistance (of employers) to the right to organise," says J John, executive director of Centre for Education and Communication and editor of Labour File, a bimonthly journal on worker issues. "In many cases, there is no demand for even a wage rise; just to form a union" (Das 2011). He felt that almost every strike at the numerous factories in the Gurgaon-Manesar region in the past decade had started with companies refusing to recognise the demand of workers to form a union. From the strike at Maruti in 2000 to the one at Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India (HMSI) in 2005 and the one at Rico Auto in 2009, the one common demand was to form a union. He backs it with data on unions in Haryana. The number of registered factories in Haryana nearly doubled from 5,652 in 1991 to 10,474 in 2010, while the number of registered (permanent) workers grew from 3.5 lakh in 1993 to more than 7.7 lakh in 2010 (based on data from the State Labour Department). The increase in the number of contract workers has been vastly more. In comparison, in the past two decades, the number of registered trade unions has grown by merely 400 to 1,540 (money.control 2011). In any case the problem in Maruti was a recurrent one, and its roots go back to 2000.
To what extent is this strategy successful? Success has been achieved in terms of market share, quality, launch of new models, profitability. But have these removed IR problems? In a highly competitive market, where many Indian companies have not had any IR problems for 15 to 20 years, MSIL appears to have a recurrence of these periodically resulting in production loss, and more importantly, in image loss. Or, is that a calculated risk MSIL is prepared to take? As the CEO said in a blaze manner, a mere few thousand production units lost is negligible for a company selling over a million units annually. But can it ensure that these risks will remain contained over time and not blow into large proportions? There is also the possibility that the state government may not remain as compliant. Can a multinational not look upon a union in India as a partner in its quest for higher productivity and competitive edge, like several Indian companies?
Maruti Suzuki Strike: How India Inc's New Age Unions Are Pushing for Reforms (2011), indiatimes.com/features/corporate-dossier/maruti-suzuki- strike-how-india-incs-new-age-unions-arepushing-for-reforms/articleshow/ 9403904.cms, accessed 20/8/11,
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