ANNOUNCER: Five times during Holy Week, Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Israeli civilians. The Israeli army counterattacked, isolating Yasser Arafat inside his compound. There were mass arrests and deaths. Full-scale war is in the air.
NARRATOR: Bethlehem, shortly before Christmas. As daylight fades, the fighters of the second intifada come out onto the streets. These men are all wanted by Israel. The Israeli security services and army are tracking them all the time. They fight knowing that at any moment they could be picked up or picked off.
Firstly, the soldier takes it. He will want to sell it. Who does he want to sell it to? He wouldn't sell it to me, as he would be court-martialed. He sells it to one of the drug dealers who is close to him. The drug dealer then sells it on to another man. It might be an Israeli Arab. But we do not have direct contacts with the Israeli army itself.
JIHAD JA'ARIE: [through interpreter] This is the car of the martyr Hussein ABAYAT. He was assassinated by the Israeli army. They fired rockets from a helicopter at his car. It was hit by more than five rockets. His assassination took place whilst he was one of the main leadersof the Brigades of the al-Aqsa in the West Bank.
JIHAD JA'ARIE: [through interpreter] The Israeli army has acknowledged that in Bethlehem we have engaged them in intense fighting. They admit to the effectiveness of our targeted shooting and our snipers.
NARRATOR: Good intelligence is vital- surveillance,listening devices, information from collaborators and prisoners. The work begins with military units monitoring the movements of Palestinians inside West Bank towns. A specialist commando unit called Egoz has been brought in to plan an ambush of Palestinian gunmen who have been firing on Jewish settlers.
Egoz developed its ambush skills in Lebanon, using intelligence tip-offs to capture or kill Hezbollah fighters. When Israel withdrew in May of 2000, the army decided to disband Egoz, thinking its skills would no longer be needed. But the second intifada put an end to that. Egoz, along with other specialist units of the Golani Brigade, were suddenly back in demand.
NARRATOR: A recent operation. This thermal night camera records the heat given off by Egoz commandos as they set up an ambush. They are after Palestinian gunmen who are planning to shoot at settlers.
NARRATOR: At midnight a gunman is spotted as he moves across the ridge line. Before Egoz commandos can open fire, they have to be certain their target has a gun and intends to use it. The gunman suddenly seems to sense the presence of the Israeli commandos. They fire. He gets up. He's shot a second time.
NARRATOR: Sometimes the Israelis have to use more than one method. Late last year, the army tried to seize a senior Hamas leader, Abu Hunnud, who they say masterminded a number of suicide bombings. The operation went badly wrong. Three soldiers died in the gunfire, and Abu Hunnud escaped.
COMMANDER: [subtitles] We're building a model of the house. The house with the half-story is this one. The one with the tank is here. The whole house is lower here. Here's the house next door. One of you will open the gate. We go through and surround the house with the red roof.
NARRATOR: The commandos are now ready, but they have to wait. The timing is crucial. They need real-time intelligence- immediate, up-to-the-minute confirmation that the target is going to be where they want him to be.
JIHAD JA'ARIE, Al-Aqsa Leader: [through interpreter] We placed explosives in the routes that we knew would be entered by the Israeli tanks. We also placed explosives inside uninhabited and empty houses, in the expectation that these might be entered by the Israeli army. These explosives created a burden for them and made it more difficult for them to go through this area.
ANNOUNCER: There's more to explore at our Web site, including FRONTLINE's interviews with the Israeli army's chief of staff and leaders of the Palestinian fighters, a chronology of the escalating violence, which began in September, 2000, opinion pieces on what, if anything, can end this crisis, and something new. Find out on our Web site if this FRONTLINE program will be shown again on your PBS station and when.
The problem was that this diving unit was working in the shadows, out of the public eye. A total of 146 of these watches had been issued and some, in fact, had been returned to this elite commando unit at the end of the mission or when the divers retired. But how to find these heroes who had completed top secret diving operations between 1969 and 1975?
The current DOXA team accomplished the remarkable feat of accurately tracing 128 of these 146 timepieces, by cross-referencing records from the army with those from production. Now all that remained was to find the divers! This would be no ordinary mission: these frogmen working in the shadows had returned, anonymously, to civil duties, or had kept a low profile pursuing their career in the military. And the youngest of them would now be nearly 70 years old...
The single seat craft is most suited to inland waterways, being particularly suited to the tropics where it can be used for long range reconnaissance. The fundamental advantage of the design is that it can be air-dropped with the commandos. France pioneered air-dropping regular folding kayaks but this was problematic inland where the kayaks could land in a tree or too far from the men.
The joint command unit could control the ship, any commando passengers and conceivably a task force of other ships, ground troops and air components, Rear Adm. Frank M. Drennan, commander of Submarine Groups 9 in Bangor, Wash., and 10 in Kings Bay, Ga., told National Defense.
The special operators exit and re-enter the ship via the two lock-in/lock-out chambers. The chambers are 87 inches in diameter and contain showers at their base, permitting commandos to cleanse their gear of salt water or any other contaminant before re-entering the sub.
If you don't watch shows with subtitles, you've been missing "Fauda," an Israeli series that focuses on the leader of the Israel Defense Forces' counterterrorism unit. Netflix has aired four seasons of the show, which has generated controversy for its unwillingness to offer sympathetic portrayals of people on both sides of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius' greatest general, Maximus Decimus Meridius (Russell Crowe, "Master and Commander"), wants to return home after subduing Germanic tribes. After the emperor is murdered by his son, Commodus (Joaquin Phoenix, "Joker"), Maximus moves to use his army to arrest the new emperor, but Commodus strikes first.
If you've seen Cohen only in comic roles like Borat, Ali G or Brüno, you may well be surprised at how good he is in this dramatic role. The series is in English, so those allergic to subtitles have nothing to worry about.
A 49-day-long manhunt ensued, from September 18 to November 5, resulting in the capture or death of all of the commandos except one,[2] who is believed to have made it back to North Korea.[citation needed]
A force of commandos landed to destroy machinery and other structures. German gunfire sank, set ablaze, or immobilized virtually all the small craft intended to transport the commandos back to England. The commandos fought their way through the town to escape overland but many surrendered when they ran out of ammunition or were surrounded by the Wehrmacht defending Saint-Nazaire.
Of the 612 men who undertook the raid, 228 returned to Britain, 169 were killed and 215 became prisoners of war. German casualties included over 360 dead, some of whom were killed after the raid when Campbeltown exploded. To recognise their bravery, 89 members of the raiding party were awarded decorations, including five Victoria Crosses. After the war, St Nazaire was one of 38 battle honours awarded to the commandos. The operation has been called "the greatest raid of all" in British military circles.
Britain's Naval Intelligence Division first proposed a commando raid on the dock in late 1941.[5] When the German battleship Tirpitz was declared operational in January 1942, the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) were already drawing up plans to attack her. Planners from Combined Operations Headquarters were looking at potential scenarios if Tirpitz escaped the naval blockade and reached the Atlantic.[6] They decided the only port able to accommodate her was St Nazaire, especially if, like Bismarck, she was damaged en route and needed repairs. They came to the conclusion that if the dock at St Nazaire were unavailable, the Germans were unlikely to risk sending Tirpitz into the Atlantic.[6]
The planners then examined whether a commando force could accomplish the task. An unusually high spring tide was due in March 1942 which would allow a light ship to pass over the sand banks in the estuary and approach the docks, bypassing the heavily defended dredged channel. In one early plan, the planners designed a raid to approach the docks with only motor launches.[9] John Hughes-Hallett and his colleagues immediately rejected this plan.[9] Their opposition to the plan was strong. They argued, "they'll never reach the shore..." They concluded, "no destroyer, no operation."[9] The approach was also too shallow for an infantry landing ship, but the planners believed if a destroyer could be lightened it might have a draft shallow enough to enable it to get through.[10]
When the plan was presented to the Admiralty they refused to support it. The certain loss of one or both[clarification needed] destroyers to eliminate the dry dock was out of the question. They suggested they could provide an old Free French destroyer, Ouragan, and a flotilla of small motor launches to transport the commandos and evacuate them afterwards.[10] Approval for the mission, codenamed Operation Chariot, was given on 3 March 1942. Using a French ship would involve using the Free French forces and increase the number of people aware of the raid. Consequently, it was decided the navy would have to provide a ship of their own. The RAF complained that the raid would draw heavily on their resources and the number of aircraft assigned by RAF Bomber Command dwindled during the planning of the raid. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill further complicated matters when he ordered that bombing should only take place if targets were visually identified.[8]
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