In article <kg3ddp$321$
1...@news.xmission.com>,
Kenny McCormack <
gaz...@shell.xmission.com> wrote:
>In article <
barmar-2148D7....@news.eternal-september.org>,
>Barry Margolin <
bar...@alum.mit.edu> wrote:
>...
>>If you had xauth set up, connections from remote clients would be
>>checked against it. Rather than open you up entirely to connections at
>>the remote end, it sets up fake xauth data and uses that. It's warning
>>you that it's doing this.
>
>OK. So far, so good.
>
>Now, what *is* this "fake auth data"? What does it do? What are its
>limitations? Why should I care?
>
The fake auth data is a cookie that's been generated and put into
~/.Xauthority on the machine you ssh'ed into, and must be supplied by
clients connecting to the forwarder (preventing other users on the
remote machine from connecting to your X server, unless they can read
your ~/.Xauthority).
The limitation is that it doesn't protect the traffic all the way from
end to end. After the traffic goes through the ssh connection, the rest
of the journey to the X server is only being protected by xhost.
X clients started inside the ssh session will not be able to tell the
difference. They believe that they are talking to the X server over a
fully xauth'ed connection, so they won't be able to warn you about the
degraded security mode. If the situation was not intended, a warning
from ssh is the only way you'd ever find out about it.
There doesn't seem to be any option to declare that the situation *is*
intended. I guess that's because even the minimal startx script sets up
xauth these days. You have to work extra hard to not have xauth.
--
Alan Curry