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Re: Question words, and what's an answer
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Ross Finlayson
Feb 11, 2024, 3:12:27 PMFeb 11
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On 08/05/2023 05:27 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On Sunday, June 18, 2023 at 9:29:01 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On Thursday, June 8, 2023 at 2:24:53 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, April 26, 2023 at 11:00:27 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On Tuesday, April 25, 2023 at 8:21:14 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On Monday, March 27, 2023 at 5:46:48 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On Friday, March 24, 2023 at 6:59:35 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On Friday, March 24, 2023 at 12:39:19 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, March 22, 2023 at 6:18:44 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, March 19, 2023 at 12:02:51 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> There are about seven question words in English. What do question words do?
>>>>>>>>>> Question words pose placeholders for statements of referents that when fulfilled make answers.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are these:
>>>>>>>>>> who why when where
>>>>>>>>>> about referents of persons, reasons, times, locations,
>>>>>>>>>> what which
>>>>>>>>>> about type of referents
>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>> about means, then sorts compound question words
>>>>>>>>>> how many
>>>>>>>>>> how much
>>>>>>>>>> how often
>>>>>>>>>> and various variations and archaic types
>>>>>>>>>> whither whence howso
>>>>>>>>>> that question words form usual parts-of-speech that reflect each when they are posed and well-formed that the
>>>>>>>>>> various parts of speech in statement establish the considerations of the facts or statements that fulfill resolving
>>>>>>>>>> the placeholder of the question words, with a constant or a predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Question words in clauses may be pronouns. The general question word is "what", and the usual
>>>>>>>>>> referent of a pronound can be replaced with "that", or "what":
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "what is it that it is so how"
>>>>>>>>>> "what is it that it is so which"
>>>>>>>>>> "what is it that is is so why"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and so on.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (C.f. Faith No More's Epic's "what is it" and Brad Pitt's "what" and "what's in the box" from Fight Club or Seven.
>>>>>>>>>> "What is it" is "you want it all and can't have it" and "what" is "let's fight" and "what's in the box" is "the death of my love".)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are "would", "could", and "should", with respect to "why", also known as 'wudda cudda shudda',
>>>>>>>>>> posing in the immediate what follows a referent with respect to the posing of a question without question words,
>>>>>>>>>> in English simply reversing object and verb.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "If I would, could you?"
>>>>>>>>>> "What time is love?"
>>>>>>>>>> "So what?"
>>>>>>>>>> ("In case you didn't feel...")
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The declaration of a question with question words or immediately poses that there are referents
>>>>>>>>>> that fulfill the placeholders under general substitution. I.e., that a question is well-posed and
>>>>>>>>>> well-formed makes for implicits and explicits that there are referents of objects in their statements
>>>>>>>>>> what result answers to the question, then in terms of right and wrong answers or questions without
>>>>>>>>>> answers or questions with multiple answers or questions with yes/no answers and questions without
>>>>>>>>>> yes/no answers when an answer is assumed or an answer at all is assumed or not assumed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "..., desu-ka?": "what?"
>>>>>>>>>> "..., no?": "?"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's for "what" and "which", that what is for types and which is for elements, in a usual sense. This gets into quantification,
>>>>>>>>>> where for various specialization of quantification:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> universal:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> for-each
>>>>>>>>>> for-any
>>>>>>>>>> for-every
>>>>>>>>>> for-all
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> existential:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> exists
>>>>>>>>>> exists-unique
>>>>>>>>>> exists-multiple
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and various forms of kinds and types and categories.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "what categories ..."
>>>>>>>>>> "which members ..."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> have these imply there are whether the question has an answer that categories do or don't exist,
>>>>>>>>>> and members do or don't exist, which match predicates fulfilled by the referents so place-holded.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> These have implicits
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> for -what -all
>>>>>>>>>> for -which -each
>>>>>>>>>> for -how -every
>>>>>>>>>> for -if -any
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's a usual sort of negation that goes along with the fulfillment of predicates, or lack thereof.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>> none
>>>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>>>> not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's that "necessity" goes with "negation".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, usually derivations are posed as statements, but, they answer q uestions. Any posed statement
>>>>>>>>>> automatically or as a complement of its declaration, poses questions so answered, that all posed
>>>>>>>>>> statements together must answer the same questions, or that all posed questions together, must
>>>>>>>>>> refer to the same referents and facts, or after science and probability, estimations.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> These duals, of statements making referents to fulfilled nouns and questions posing frameworks
>>>>>>>>>> of placeholders and abstractions of referents, make for space in usual languages that admit a
>>>>>>>>>> very direct statement in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I suppose then there's "if", and its role. There's "if", for what's "given".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (For what that that's given, for what that that that's given, and so on, make for that the
>>>>>>>>>> use of "that" can fill in implicits.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, let is consider what that and that what defines a well-posed question, and words.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What's a "gift of words".
>>>>>>>>> So, it seems reflexive for "tests of reflexes" that any given stipulation, makes for according
>>>>>>>>> to arrangements of relations in types, answers, of questions more and less specific and
>>>>>>>>> general, according to specialization of type and abstraction of type, for inference of type.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, there's a usual sort of notion that "according to extensionality, what answer same
>>>>>>>>> questions are same things". This is just like model theory, that "structural" or "duck" typing
>>>>>>>>> of a sort models an interface or value, or behavior, that it is so that behavior is simply a value
>>>>>>>>> over time and space, what is described as a model a configuration space what is described in
>>>>>>>>> a field theory a lattice occupation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, for various sorts of quantifiers, and where quantifiers are refined into the behavior
>>>>>>>>> of the numbering or counting, the reckoning, the results after quantifiers, what is so answered
>>>>>>>>> and how things so answer, is for a first-class arrangement of questions as establishing of sorts,
>>>>>>>>> types.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, I'm curious a development already of what with respect to type theory and the theory of
>>>>>>>>> types and model theory of the theory of types, and, questions and answers, about what in
>>>>>>>>> the affirmative and negative and multivalent or indeterminate, there are types statements,
>>>>>>>>> how it can be formalized quite neatly to encode, that a given collection of evaluated knowledge,
>>>>>>>>> can result a read-out of a cataloged indexed question-and-answer setting, for example to
>>>>>>>>> automatically establish what questions do and don't have answers given various facts,
>>>>>>>>> and what those are, inclusive of the specifics and the general, and incorporating how to
>>>>>>>>> address the many dimensions of reference and relation in fact, as about the implicit quantifiers
>>>>>>>>> so described after formation in natural language, that of course it results that a subset of natural
>>>>>>>>> language is curated to a perfectly and demonstracy optimal symbolic language, that reads out
>>>>>>>>> in plain, natural language.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'd imagine that the formal theories of linguistics and knowledge representation have these,
>>>>>>>>> then for what it results how there are fundamentally and elementarily normal forms, of these
>>>>>>>>> cataloged and collected projections and their referents, to make it so that it's easy to define
>>>>>>>>> and refine and narrow and expand, all sorts matters making for analytical deduction.
>>>>>>>> The idea of coding up the question words or a "query language, strongly typed", and including for
>>>>>>>> example that "questions are answers to what kind of questions are answers" and in the usual notion
>>>>>>>> of cultural reference that "Alex Trebek's gameshows include Jeapordy a trivia game in the format of
>>>>>>>> your response must be in the form of a question, that is posed as if the given answer was instead a
>>>>>>>> question that it's unambiguous according to unique existence it's right or wrong there's one question",
>>>>>>>> here is for a brief formal outlay of an encoding of question words, that represent a subset of natural
>>>>>>>> language, a symbolic language, that happens to structurally reflect category, naturally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "This ... is a referent."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So I'm curious if anyone here can tell me that of course there must be all sorts various efforts in
>>>>>>>> linguistics and knowledge representation, and, _lack-of-knowledge_ representation, here for
>>>>>>>> what results a, "theory of potentials", for knowledge, after questions words, and as above,
>>>>>>>> for "what" and "that" or "that that that", and, quantifier disambiguation according to comprehension,
>>>>>>>> and, the conditional or "what-if", and, necessity and negation, working up a brief algebra, in symbolic
>>>>>>>> terms, that results a natural encoding of statement and question, of a "theory of potentials" or
>>>>>>>> potential, for classical theories of knowledge, and, a, "theory of potentials" theory of knowledge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, it might help if you're already familiar with "theory of potentials" in other usual theories,
>>>>>>>> like mechanics and physics and here for the notions of conservation of knowledge for conservation
>>>>>>>> of truth for continuity and conservation laws, usual theories, or, at least one.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, it's figured "it may be totally easy to make all sorts knowledge representation what is
>>>>>>>> fulfilled by a terse encoding, what makes for most usual cases of knowledge inference, in
>>>>>>>> small and well-defined and contained blocks of code, not requiring much more than a few
>>>>>>>> kilobytes of parallelizable algorithmic code according to an abstract machine's general-purpose
>>>>>>>> machine code", to represent knowledge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's like, today I was reading a McGann's "Towards a Literature of Knowledge", how brief can ontology be?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, the idea that after "what" and for "that", and "that*", then for types and group nouns
>>>>>>>> and collection verbs and collected nouns, usual genera of the other question words according
>>>>>>>> these, for the proper and individuals and so on, isn't it so that this makes a dual and complement,
>>>>>>>> and, a space of after affinity, a "theory of potentials of quest in knowledge"?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, this idea of a "normal quest" goes along pretty well with other usual, questions,
>>>>>>>> in metaphysics and logic and of course for that language is intent, natural symbols for knowledge,
>>>>>>>> and more-than-less a rigorous, quantified, strongly-typed, working subset of formalizable,
>>>>>>>> symbolically, natural language.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, of course, that readily extends to the verification of natural language generally,
>>>>>>>> accordingly to well-formed and well-reasoned natural language.
>>>>>>> Here's some more reading as getting into Maugin's development,
>>>>>>> for phonons and about Rayleigh then into Feynman and London,
>>>>>>> with comment about reading and dogma and then for models of light.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMBcectYDws
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> After the three R's, you figure there's relevance three G's:
>>>>>>> grammar, geometry, and gnosomy
>>>>>>> about then three C's:
>>>>>>> calculus, construction, conventions (or calluses)
>>>>>>> that there are already words and English is a reasonably
>>>>>>> rich language, and there are conventions like IUPAC naming
>>>>>>> outrageously long compounds, I expect to research some terms
>>>>>>> and find various sorts of detail about them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> technical detail
>>>>>>> artistic detail
>>>>>>> abstract figurative detail
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, I wonder to look for "algebraic grammar", in terms of that parts of
>>>>>>> speech assemble to clauses combine to phrases, in sentences and of
>>>>>>> their para-graphs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Algebraic Grammar": Clough, 1930
>>>>>>> "Algebraic Grammar, Geometric Grammar": Vailati, 2020
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I generally consider to rely on the field of linguistics with respect to
>>>>>>> natural languages, where in terms of "formal languages" those are
>>>>>>> mostly as totally unstructured "the alphabet of a formal language"
>>>>>>> as being untyped symbols-of-coding, then that grammars in the usual
>>>>>>> context of program languages, are as up after Chomsky's hierarchy of
>>>>>>> the context of lookahead and context-free and what are formal methods
>>>>>>> about the "parse-ability" of languages, and various results from usual
>>>>>>> old formal grammars what make "too long, didn't read" and "language
>>>>>>> parse too hard you obviously aren't doing it".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I.e., even parsing railroad-diagrams makes for a simple approach of
>>>>>>> recursion and back-and-forth which result much larger classes of parse-able
>>>>>>> grammars than usual right-linear productions in Backus-Naur grammars
>>>>>>> with usual old "the head only moves forward" and "the window is fixed
>>>>>>> and closed", that incorporating references in natural language is a simple
>>>>>>> enough matter of multiple passes over the content what results the
>>>>>>> brakceting and grouping and commenting and joining and up after the
>>>>>>> identification of the parts of speech, thus that it's framed from the beginning
>>>>>>> in a higher-order allotment of resources, resulting being closed up in some
>>>>>>> square and factorial resources, instead of blowing up and running out on down.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "A Methodical English Grammar"
>>>>>>> "A Comprensive Grammar of the English Language"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Fundamentals of Language", Jakobson, 1956
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Introduction to Language and Linguistics", Fasold, Connon-Linton, eds., 2006
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language",
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cambridge_Grammar_of_the_English_Language
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "... why should Oxford have all the fun."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Standard American English, Definition, Accent, & Use", not so much
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "[CamGEL] is both a modern complement to existing descriptive grammars
>>>>>>> (Quirk et al. 1985; Biber et al. 1999) and an important resource for anyone interested
>>>>>>> in working with or finding out about English. In addition, the book is a very complete
>>>>>>> and convincing demonstration that the ideas of modern theoretical linguistics can be
>>>>>>> deployed in the detailed description of a particular language.[20]" -- Brew
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raising_(linguistics)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phrase_structure_grammar
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_grammar
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> hmm, it seems these are the two major diagrams of grammars, I wonder which we learned.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ah, it is surely the"dependency grammar" of the two, not the "AST" or "constituency".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The distinction between dependency and phrase structure grammars
>>>>>>> derives in large part from the initial division of the clause.
>>>>>>> The phrase structure relation derives from an initial binary division,
>>>>>>> whereby the clause is split into a subject noun phrase (NP) and a
>>>>>>> predicate verb phrase (VP). This division is certainly present in the
>>>>>>> basic analysis of the clause that we find in the works of, for instance,
>>>>>>> Leonard Bloomfield and Noam Chomsky. Tesnière, however, argued
>>>>>>> vehemently against this binary division, preferring instead to position
>>>>>>> the verb as the root of all clause structure. Tesnière's stance was that
>>>>>>> the subject-predicate division stems from term logic and has no place
>>>>>>> in linguistics.[8] The importance of this distinction is that if one acknowledges
>>>>>>> the initial subject-predicate division in syntax is real, then one is likely
>>>>>>> to go down the path of phrase structure grammar, while if one rejects
>>>>>>> this division, then one must consider the verb as the root of all structure,
>>>>>>> and so go down the path of dependency grammar.
>>>>>>> -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_grammar#Dependency_vs._phrase_structure
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Oh, no, "phase structure" is only for parsing "dit dit dit dot dot dot Morse code"
>>>>>>> not "the structure of an utterance its meaning in words".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The traditional focus on hierarchical order generated the impression
>>>>>>> that DGs have little to say about linear order, and it has contributed to
>>>>>>> the view that DGs are particularly well-suited to examine languages with
>>>>>>> free word order. A negative result of this focus on hierarchical order, however,
>>>>>>> is that there is a dearth of DG explorations of particular word order phenomena,
>>>>>>> such as of standard discontinuities. Comprehensive dependency grammar accounts
>>>>>>> of topicalization, wh-fronting, scrambling, and extraposition are mostly absent
>>>>>>> from many established DG frameworks. This situation can be contrasted with
>>>>>>> phrase structure grammars, which have devoted tremendous effort to exploring
>>>>>>> these phenomena. "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_grammar#References
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hm. "Delta, Delta, Delta, can I help ya help ya help ya."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Yes? This is Letters...."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "ACE texts are computer-processable and can be unambiguously translated
>>>>>>> into discourse representation structures, a syntactic variant of first-order logic."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse_representation_theory
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "In one sense, DRT offers a variation of first-order predicate calculus—its
>>>>>>> forms are pairs of first-order formulae and the free variables that occur in them."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Technical_English
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "What is question word, that."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Alright then, that's sort of what I'm looking for, then to make for the abstraction
>>>>>>> above that, and meaning, to be, what is the question, to make for natural views of
>>>>>>> representation, according to the reader, and their knowledge.
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3LnC4srnwtY
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's some more reading from Maugin and also some
>>>>>> about the path integral and atomic theory, or Knuth, Noether, and Feynman.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I found a copy of Curme Volume 1 or "Parts of Speech, and Accidence", so feel pretty
>>>>>> comfortable that for English at least those are mostly the terms I would use. The bookseller
>>>>>> referred me to Skeat's Etymology and so I'm also interested in the Wortenbuch, or some
>>>>>> apocryphal "a dictionary of all the words in all the languages, giving definitions and pointing
>>>>>> to the languages and origins". I haven't found a copy of Cambridge Grammar of the English
>>>>>> Language yet, but Curme goes a long way, and I like that mostly he only has examples of
>>>>>> the words and their parts of speech, not much entanglement with examples of usage,
>>>>>> so I imagine that this kind of multi-pass parser approach and resulting as of dependency
>>>>>> grammars for building terse, concise models of the referents, will go a long ways towards
>>>>>> natural, normal forms for the codification of natural language, and for of course showing
>>>>>> directly where it's possible that according to type theory there's natural theorem-proving.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Reading through Curme, I've been learning some names of parts-of-speech
>>>>> that really help a lot, about all the appositives and adjectival and adverbial force,
>>>>> copulas and the English languages' success courtesy copulas, lots of things.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Once an argument has been transformed into symbolic form
>>>>> an important part of logical analysis has been accomplished.
>>>>> The next step involves the applications of the Rules of Distribution". -- Huppe and Kaminsky
>>>>>
>>>>> Then they go on to describe enthymemes and Sorites.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, I'll be looking to go through the type theory expressed in Curme,
>>>>> and making out for it a neat system of derivations and hierarchy.
>>>> It's said that "Roger Bacon" was working on "Universal Grammar" back in the "Dark Ages".
>>> I found a copy of Curme's "Volume II: Syntax" to complement "Volume I: Parts of
>>> Speech and Accidence", I'm quite excited about it and looking forward to figure
>>> out how to codify it into a model of natural speech.
>> Here's an interesting paper about inference. https://aclanthology.org/L14-1119/
>>
>> The authors describe that there are _simple_ and there are _hard_ inferences,
>> and about "contextual" readings and "generosity".
>>
>> Lots of issues in the semantics of knowledge representation are explored in https://aclanthology.org papers.
>>
>> There's something to be said for looking through those and learning models of models
>> of learning of languages of languages.
>>
>> So, from Volumes I and II of Curme, Parts of Speech and Accidence and Syntax, one might aver that
>> this would be treating English like a dead language, but, it had already had a very long life.
>> Indeed it's not a dead language, neither for that matter is Latin in Italian or Sanskrit in Hindi,
>> but what Curme's descriptive grammar outlines is a very full treatment of usage and structure
>> of statement in English (and what would be models of such statements in other natural languages).
>
> So far my favorite part of Curme is the index at the end of Volume II. There is
> collected quite a useful ontology of the elements of syntax and their intent
> and their force and their organization. In a section of about twenty pages of
> entries, it seems a summary richer even than the usual linguists' of the day's.
>
>
We were talking about this on comp.theory,
about how question words establish contexts,
for what's relevant.
One thing that came up was natural language,
which is, an open language, and its suitability
for formalism, which, it has, if for as above
the sorts of formalisms in the language that
result the formalisms in the expressions just
to relate that the natural suffices as well
the plainly symbolic, though which may be more
terse or concise in its details, as that it
also results that symbolic expressions,
also falls under "natural language" as simply
as it falls under "formal languages" as simply
as it falls under "language".
> On Sunday, June 18, 2023 at 9:29:01 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On Thursday, June 8, 2023 at 2:24:53 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, April 26, 2023 at 11:00:27 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On Tuesday, April 25, 2023 at 8:21:14 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On Monday, March 27, 2023 at 5:46:48 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On Friday, March 24, 2023 at 6:59:35 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On Friday, March 24, 2023 at 12:39:19 AM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, March 22, 2023 at 6:18:44 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Sunday, March 19, 2023 at 12:02:51 PM UTC-7, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> There are about seven question words in English. What do question words do?
>>>>>>>>>> Question words pose placeholders for statements of referents that when fulfilled make answers.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are these:
>>>>>>>>>> who why when where
>>>>>>>>>> about referents of persons, reasons, times, locations,
>>>>>>>>>> what which
>>>>>>>>>> about type of referents
>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>> about means, then sorts compound question words
>>>>>>>>>> how many
>>>>>>>>>> how much
>>>>>>>>>> how often
>>>>>>>>>> and various variations and archaic types
>>>>>>>>>> whither whence howso
>>>>>>>>>> that question words form usual parts-of-speech that reflect each when they are posed and well-formed that the
>>>>>>>>>> various parts of speech in statement establish the considerations of the facts or statements that fulfill resolving
>>>>>>>>>> the placeholder of the question words, with a constant or a predicate.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Question words in clauses may be pronouns. The general question word is "what", and the usual
>>>>>>>>>> referent of a pronound can be replaced with "that", or "what":
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "what is it that it is so how"
>>>>>>>>>> "what is it that it is so which"
>>>>>>>>>> "what is it that is is so why"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and so on.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (C.f. Faith No More's Epic's "what is it" and Brad Pitt's "what" and "what's in the box" from Fight Club or Seven.
>>>>>>>>>> "What is it" is "you want it all and can't have it" and "what" is "let's fight" and "what's in the box" is "the death of my love".)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are "would", "could", and "should", with respect to "why", also known as 'wudda cudda shudda',
>>>>>>>>>> posing in the immediate what follows a referent with respect to the posing of a question without question words,
>>>>>>>>>> in English simply reversing object and verb.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "If I would, could you?"
>>>>>>>>>> "What time is love?"
>>>>>>>>>> "So what?"
>>>>>>>>>> ("In case you didn't feel...")
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The declaration of a question with question words or immediately poses that there are referents
>>>>>>>>>> that fulfill the placeholders under general substitution. I.e., that a question is well-posed and
>>>>>>>>>> well-formed makes for implicits and explicits that there are referents of objects in their statements
>>>>>>>>>> what result answers to the question, then in terms of right and wrong answers or questions without
>>>>>>>>>> answers or questions with multiple answers or questions with yes/no answers and questions without
>>>>>>>>>> yes/no answers when an answer is assumed or an answer at all is assumed or not assumed.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "..., desu-ka?": "what?"
>>>>>>>>>> "..., no?": "?"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's for "what" and "which", that what is for types and which is for elements, in a usual sense. This gets into quantification,
>>>>>>>>>> where for various specialization of quantification:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> universal:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> for-each
>>>>>>>>>> for-any
>>>>>>>>>> for-every
>>>>>>>>>> for-all
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> existential:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> exists
>>>>>>>>>> exists-unique
>>>>>>>>>> exists-multiple
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> and various forms of kinds and types and categories.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "what categories ..."
>>>>>>>>>> "which members ..."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> have these imply there are whether the question has an answer that categories do or don't exist,
>>>>>>>>>> and members do or don't exist, which match predicates fulfilled by the referents so place-holded.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> These have implicits
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> for -what -all
>>>>>>>>>> for -which -each
>>>>>>>>>> for -how -every
>>>>>>>>>> for -if -any
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's a usual sort of negation that goes along with the fulfillment of predicates, or lack thereof.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>>> none
>>>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>>>> not necessarily
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's that "necessity" goes with "negation".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, usually derivations are posed as statements, but, they answer q uestions. Any posed statement
>>>>>>>>>> automatically or as a complement of its declaration, poses questions so answered, that all posed
>>>>>>>>>> statements together must answer the same questions, or that all posed questions together, must
>>>>>>>>>> refer to the same referents and facts, or after science and probability, estimations.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> These duals, of statements making referents to fulfilled nouns and questions posing frameworks
>>>>>>>>>> of placeholders and abstractions of referents, make for space in usual languages that admit a
>>>>>>>>>> very direct statement in logic.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I suppose then there's "if", and its role. There's "if", for what's "given".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (For what that that's given, for what that that that's given, and so on, make for that the
>>>>>>>>>> use of "that" can fill in implicits.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, let is consider what that and that what defines a well-posed question, and words.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What's a "gift of words".
>>>>>>>>> So, it seems reflexive for "tests of reflexes" that any given stipulation, makes for according
>>>>>>>>> to arrangements of relations in types, answers, of questions more and less specific and
>>>>>>>>> general, according to specialization of type and abstraction of type, for inference of type.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, there's a usual sort of notion that "according to extensionality, what answer same
>>>>>>>>> questions are same things". This is just like model theory, that "structural" or "duck" typing
>>>>>>>>> of a sort models an interface or value, or behavior, that it is so that behavior is simply a value
>>>>>>>>> over time and space, what is described as a model a configuration space what is described in
>>>>>>>>> a field theory a lattice occupation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, for various sorts of quantifiers, and where quantifiers are refined into the behavior
>>>>>>>>> of the numbering or counting, the reckoning, the results after quantifiers, what is so answered
>>>>>>>>> and how things so answer, is for a first-class arrangement of questions as establishing of sorts,
>>>>>>>>> types.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, I'm curious a development already of what with respect to type theory and the theory of
>>>>>>>>> types and model theory of the theory of types, and, questions and answers, about what in
>>>>>>>>> the affirmative and negative and multivalent or indeterminate, there are types statements,
>>>>>>>>> how it can be formalized quite neatly to encode, that a given collection of evaluated knowledge,
>>>>>>>>> can result a read-out of a cataloged indexed question-and-answer setting, for example to
>>>>>>>>> automatically establish what questions do and don't have answers given various facts,
>>>>>>>>> and what those are, inclusive of the specifics and the general, and incorporating how to
>>>>>>>>> address the many dimensions of reference and relation in fact, as about the implicit quantifiers
>>>>>>>>> so described after formation in natural language, that of course it results that a subset of natural
>>>>>>>>> language is curated to a perfectly and demonstracy optimal symbolic language, that reads out
>>>>>>>>> in plain, natural language.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I'd imagine that the formal theories of linguistics and knowledge representation have these,
>>>>>>>>> then for what it results how there are fundamentally and elementarily normal forms, of these
>>>>>>>>> cataloged and collected projections and their referents, to make it so that it's easy to define
>>>>>>>>> and refine and narrow and expand, all sorts matters making for analytical deduction.
>>>>>>>> The idea of coding up the question words or a "query language, strongly typed", and including for
>>>>>>>> example that "questions are answers to what kind of questions are answers" and in the usual notion
>>>>>>>> of cultural reference that "Alex Trebek's gameshows include Jeapordy a trivia game in the format of
>>>>>>>> your response must be in the form of a question, that is posed as if the given answer was instead a
>>>>>>>> question that it's unambiguous according to unique existence it's right or wrong there's one question",
>>>>>>>> here is for a brief formal outlay of an encoding of question words, that represent a subset of natural
>>>>>>>> language, a symbolic language, that happens to structurally reflect category, naturally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "This ... is a referent."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So I'm curious if anyone here can tell me that of course there must be all sorts various efforts in
>>>>>>>> linguistics and knowledge representation, and, _lack-of-knowledge_ representation, here for
>>>>>>>> what results a, "theory of potentials", for knowledge, after questions words, and as above,
>>>>>>>> for "what" and "that" or "that that that", and, quantifier disambiguation according to comprehension,
>>>>>>>> and, the conditional or "what-if", and, necessity and negation, working up a brief algebra, in symbolic
>>>>>>>> terms, that results a natural encoding of statement and question, of a "theory of potentials" or
>>>>>>>> potential, for classical theories of knowledge, and, a, "theory of potentials" theory of knowledge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, it might help if you're already familiar with "theory of potentials" in other usual theories,
>>>>>>>> like mechanics and physics and here for the notions of conservation of knowledge for conservation
>>>>>>>> of truth for continuity and conservation laws, usual theories, or, at least one.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, it's figured "it may be totally easy to make all sorts knowledge representation what is
>>>>>>>> fulfilled by a terse encoding, what makes for most usual cases of knowledge inference, in
>>>>>>>> small and well-defined and contained blocks of code, not requiring much more than a few
>>>>>>>> kilobytes of parallelizable algorithmic code according to an abstract machine's general-purpose
>>>>>>>> machine code", to represent knowledge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's like, today I was reading a McGann's "Towards a Literature of Knowledge", how brief can ontology be?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, the idea that after "what" and for "that", and "that*", then for types and group nouns
>>>>>>>> and collection verbs and collected nouns, usual genera of the other question words according
>>>>>>>> these, for the proper and individuals and so on, isn't it so that this makes a dual and complement,
>>>>>>>> and, a space of after affinity, a "theory of potentials of quest in knowledge"?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, this idea of a "normal quest" goes along pretty well with other usual, questions,
>>>>>>>> in metaphysics and logic and of course for that language is intent, natural symbols for knowledge,
>>>>>>>> and more-than-less a rigorous, quantified, strongly-typed, working subset of formalizable,
>>>>>>>> symbolically, natural language.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, of course, that readily extends to the verification of natural language generally,
>>>>>>>> accordingly to well-formed and well-reasoned natural language.
>>>>>>> Here's some more reading as getting into Maugin's development,
>>>>>>> for phonons and about Rayleigh then into Feynman and London,
>>>>>>> with comment about reading and dogma and then for models of light.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMBcectYDws
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> After the three R's, you figure there's relevance three G's:
>>>>>>> grammar, geometry, and gnosomy
>>>>>>> about then three C's:
>>>>>>> calculus, construction, conventions (or calluses)
>>>>>>> that there are already words and English is a reasonably
>>>>>>> rich language, and there are conventions like IUPAC naming
>>>>>>> outrageously long compounds, I expect to research some terms
>>>>>>> and find various sorts of detail about them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> technical detail
>>>>>>> artistic detail
>>>>>>> abstract figurative detail
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, I wonder to look for "algebraic grammar", in terms of that parts of
>>>>>>> speech assemble to clauses combine to phrases, in sentences and of
>>>>>>> their para-graphs.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Algebraic Grammar": Clough, 1930
>>>>>>> "Algebraic Grammar, Geometric Grammar": Vailati, 2020
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I generally consider to rely on the field of linguistics with respect to
>>>>>>> natural languages, where in terms of "formal languages" those are
>>>>>>> mostly as totally unstructured "the alphabet of a formal language"
>>>>>>> as being untyped symbols-of-coding, then that grammars in the usual
>>>>>>> context of program languages, are as up after Chomsky's hierarchy of
>>>>>>> the context of lookahead and context-free and what are formal methods
>>>>>>> about the "parse-ability" of languages, and various results from usual
>>>>>>> old formal grammars what make "too long, didn't read" and "language
>>>>>>> parse too hard you obviously aren't doing it".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I.e., even parsing railroad-diagrams makes for a simple approach of
>>>>>>> recursion and back-and-forth which result much larger classes of parse-able
>>>>>>> grammars than usual right-linear productions in Backus-Naur grammars
>>>>>>> with usual old "the head only moves forward" and "the window is fixed
>>>>>>> and closed", that incorporating references in natural language is a simple
>>>>>>> enough matter of multiple passes over the content what results the
>>>>>>> brakceting and grouping and commenting and joining and up after the
>>>>>>> identification of the parts of speech, thus that it's framed from the beginning
>>>>>>> in a higher-order allotment of resources, resulting being closed up in some
>>>>>>> square and factorial resources, instead of blowing up and running out on down.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "A Methodical English Grammar"
>>>>>>> "A Comprensive Grammar of the English Language"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Fundamentals of Language", Jakobson, 1956
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Introduction to Language and Linguistics", Fasold, Connon-Linton, eds., 2006
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language",
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cambridge_Grammar_of_the_English_Language
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "... why should Oxford have all the fun."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Standard American English, Definition, Accent, & Use", not so much
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "[CamGEL] is both a modern complement to existing descriptive grammars
>>>>>>> (Quirk et al. 1985; Biber et al. 1999) and an important resource for anyone interested
>>>>>>> in working with or finding out about English. In addition, the book is a very complete
>>>>>>> and convincing demonstration that the ideas of modern theoretical linguistics can be
>>>>>>> deployed in the detailed description of a particular language.[20]" -- Brew
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raising_(linguistics)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phrase_structure_grammar
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_grammar
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> hmm, it seems these are the two major diagrams of grammars, I wonder which we learned.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ah, it is surely the"dependency grammar" of the two, not the "AST" or "constituency".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The distinction between dependency and phrase structure grammars
>>>>>>> derives in large part from the initial division of the clause.
>>>>>>> The phrase structure relation derives from an initial binary division,
>>>>>>> whereby the clause is split into a subject noun phrase (NP) and a
>>>>>>> predicate verb phrase (VP). This division is certainly present in the
>>>>>>> basic analysis of the clause that we find in the works of, for instance,
>>>>>>> Leonard Bloomfield and Noam Chomsky. Tesnière, however, argued
>>>>>>> vehemently against this binary division, preferring instead to position
>>>>>>> the verb as the root of all clause structure. Tesnière's stance was that
>>>>>>> the subject-predicate division stems from term logic and has no place
>>>>>>> in linguistics.[8] The importance of this distinction is that if one acknowledges
>>>>>>> the initial subject-predicate division in syntax is real, then one is likely
>>>>>>> to go down the path of phrase structure grammar, while if one rejects
>>>>>>> this division, then one must consider the verb as the root of all structure,
>>>>>>> and so go down the path of dependency grammar.
>>>>>>> -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_grammar#Dependency_vs._phrase_structure
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Oh, no, "phase structure" is only for parsing "dit dit dit dot dot dot Morse code"
>>>>>>> not "the structure of an utterance its meaning in words".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The traditional focus on hierarchical order generated the impression
>>>>>>> that DGs have little to say about linear order, and it has contributed to
>>>>>>> the view that DGs are particularly well-suited to examine languages with
>>>>>>> free word order. A negative result of this focus on hierarchical order, however,
>>>>>>> is that there is a dearth of DG explorations of particular word order phenomena,
>>>>>>> such as of standard discontinuities. Comprehensive dependency grammar accounts
>>>>>>> of topicalization, wh-fronting, scrambling, and extraposition are mostly absent
>>>>>>> from many established DG frameworks. This situation can be contrasted with
>>>>>>> phrase structure grammars, which have devoted tremendous effort to exploring
>>>>>>> these phenomena. "
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_grammar#References
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hm. "Delta, Delta, Delta, can I help ya help ya help ya."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Yes? This is Letters...."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://attempto.ifi.uzh.ch/site/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "ACE texts are computer-processable and can be unambiguously translated
>>>>>>> into discourse representation structures, a syntactic variant of first-order logic."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse_representation_theory
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "In one sense, DRT offers a variation of first-order predicate calculus—its
>>>>>>> forms are pairs of first-order formulae and the free variables that occur in them."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Technical_English
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "What is question word, that."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Alright then, that's sort of what I'm looking for, then to make for the abstraction
>>>>>>> above that, and meaning, to be, what is the question, to make for natural views of
>>>>>>> representation, according to the reader, and their knowledge.
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3LnC4srnwtY
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's some more reading from Maugin and also some
>>>>>> about the path integral and atomic theory, or Knuth, Noether, and Feynman.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I found a copy of Curme Volume 1 or "Parts of Speech, and Accidence", so feel pretty
>>>>>> comfortable that for English at least those are mostly the terms I would use. The bookseller
>>>>>> referred me to Skeat's Etymology and so I'm also interested in the Wortenbuch, or some
>>>>>> apocryphal "a dictionary of all the words in all the languages, giving definitions and pointing
>>>>>> to the languages and origins". I haven't found a copy of Cambridge Grammar of the English
>>>>>> Language yet, but Curme goes a long way, and I like that mostly he only has examples of
>>>>>> the words and their parts of speech, not much entanglement with examples of usage,
>>>>>> so I imagine that this kind of multi-pass parser approach and resulting as of dependency
>>>>>> grammars for building terse, concise models of the referents, will go a long ways towards
>>>>>> natural, normal forms for the codification of natural language, and for of course showing
>>>>>> directly where it's possible that according to type theory there's natural theorem-proving.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Reading through Curme, I've been learning some names of parts-of-speech
>>>>> that really help a lot, about all the appositives and adjectival and adverbial force,
>>>>> copulas and the English languages' success courtesy copulas, lots of things.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Once an argument has been transformed into symbolic form
>>>>> an important part of logical analysis has been accomplished.
>>>>> The next step involves the applications of the Rules of Distribution". -- Huppe and Kaminsky
>>>>>
>>>>> Then they go on to describe enthymemes and Sorites.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, I'll be looking to go through the type theory expressed in Curme,
>>>>> and making out for it a neat system of derivations and hierarchy.
>>>> It's said that "Roger Bacon" was working on "Universal Grammar" back in the "Dark Ages".
>>> I found a copy of Curme's "Volume II: Syntax" to complement "Volume I: Parts of
>>> Speech and Accidence", I'm quite excited about it and looking forward to figure
>>> out how to codify it into a model of natural speech.
>> Here's an interesting paper about inference. https://aclanthology.org/L14-1119/
>>
>> The authors describe that there are _simple_ and there are _hard_ inferences,
>> and about "contextual" readings and "generosity".
>>
>> Lots of issues in the semantics of knowledge representation are explored in https://aclanthology.org papers.
>>
>> There's something to be said for looking through those and learning models of models
>> of learning of languages of languages.
>>
>> So, from Volumes I and II of Curme, Parts of Speech and Accidence and Syntax, one might aver that
>> this would be treating English like a dead language, but, it had already had a very long life.
>> Indeed it's not a dead language, neither for that matter is Latin in Italian or Sanskrit in Hindi,
>> but what Curme's descriptive grammar outlines is a very full treatment of usage and structure
>> of statement in English (and what would be models of such statements in other natural languages).
>
> So far my favorite part of Curme is the index at the end of Volume II. There is
> collected quite a useful ontology of the elements of syntax and their intent
> and their force and their organization. In a section of about twenty pages of
> entries, it seems a summary richer even than the usual linguists' of the day's.
>
>
We were talking about this on comp.theory,
about how question words establish contexts,
for what's relevant.
One thing that came up was natural language,
which is, an open language, and its suitability
for formalism, which, it has, if for as above
the sorts of formalisms in the language that
result the formalisms in the expressions just
to relate that the natural suffices as well
the plainly symbolic, though which may be more
terse or concise in its details, as that it
also results that symbolic expressions,
also falls under "natural language" as simply
as it falls under "formal languages" as simply
as it falls under "language".
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