SGI spoofing vulnerability in arrayd authentication

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SGI Security Coordinator

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Jun 22, 2005, 1:32:24 PM6/22/05
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______________________________________________________________________________
SGI Security Advisory

Title: Spoofing vulnerability in arrayd authentication
Number: 20050604-01-A
Date: June 22, 2005
______________________________________________________________________________

SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its
consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends
that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. SGI reserves
the right to change or update this Security Advisory without notice.

SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis
only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied
or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for
any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect,
special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising
from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions
or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________


SGI acknowledges a spoofing vulnerability in arrayd authentication and is
currently investigating as SGI BUG 937655. The spoofing vulnerability can
lead to unauthorized root or user access to a remote system running arrayd.

The default authentication for arrayd, for both SGI ProPack and IRIX 6.5.5
and above, is NOREMOTE. NOREMOTE has been found not to be vulnerable to the
original exploit found on http://lsd-pl.net/code/IRIX/irx_arrayd.c or it
variants that have been created. Sites that require the use of authentication
NONE or SIMPLE are vulnerable, unless the systems are placed on trusted or
isolated networks with a trusted user base where spoofing is not a concern.

To verify which array services authentication is being used on the
system, check /usr/lib/array/arrayd.auth which is a readable only by root.
The default authentication scheme is NOREMOTE which is not vulnerable to the
spoofing vulnerability based on on-going investigations.

SGI advises to run with the default arrayd authentication of NOREMOTE at
this time until a solution is available. Systems that require authentication
NONE or SIMPLE should be placed on trusted or isolated networks to minimize
exposure of the array daemon and run with a trusted user base where spoofing
is not a concern.

Before IRIX 6.5.5, the default authentication for arrayd was NONE,
which is vulnerable to the spoofing exploit and its variants:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-1999-0692
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/19990701-01-P
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-09.html
http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/j-052.shtml

No further information is available at this time.

As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be
issued.

For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose, discuss
or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has occurred and
any necessary patch(es) or updates are available for all vulnerable
and supported SGI ProPack for Altix and IRIX operating systems.

Until SGI has more definitive information to provide, customers
are encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take
appropriate steps according to local site security policies and requirements.

As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be
issued via the normal SGI security information distribution methods
including the wiretap mailing list.


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______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and
may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way,
SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes
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