Password Memory Download [BETTER]

[Kortney Yoh]

<div>I found a potential issue in the latest KeePass 2.X (default settings). Given a process memory dump, I am able to reconstruct the master password. It doesn't matter whether the workspace is locked or not, it works regardless. The memory source also isn't important - for example, it can be a pagefile (swap) or the hibernation file. No code execution is needed, just the memory alone.</div><div></div><div></div><div>SecureTextBoxEx is a class used only in KeePass, it's part of the code. Windows.Forms.TextBox is a class in .NET Windows Forms. There are other UI frameworks, like WPF, that have dedicated password boxes (e.g. PasswordBox). There are also many other programming languages and UI frameworks that may or may not have the same issue. This particular behavior isn't related to the OS, but rather .NET CLR (Mono on Linux/macOS).</div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div>password memory download</div><div></div><div>Download File: https://t.co/rY1zgqTTbV </div><div></div><div></div><div>Unless you expect to be specifically targeted by someone sophisticated, I would keep calm. The issue here could be, say, someone stealing your computer and taking the HDD out. It's not eniterely unrealistic, after all that's what the police will try to do in a raid. You can find several companies developing special forensic software for these kinds of scenarios. But it's really not what most people should panic about. If you use full disk encryption with a strong password, it gets even more unlikely.</div><div></div><div></div><div>I think the HDD is the most troublesome vector to consider. I'm not confident that the average consumer will be employing full-disk encryption, nor that they will securely destroy their HDD (or the data thereon) before disposing of an old computer. The fact that it works with the database locked is worse, that's perceived to be a "everything is safe, nothing sensitive is in memory" state. There was that issues a few years ago with several major password managers exposing decrypted passwords in memory after their database was locked that I recall KeePass was given some praise for, since it only exposed entries which had been recently used (and none when locked) while a lot of people got very upset over e.g. 1Password's implementation which didn't fully scub all traces of passwords from memory until the app exited. This seems similar.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Let me add another idea to improve existing security: use a keyfile which is not on your machine but on a share. The password alone would be useless for an attacker without the keyfile. Even physically stealing the HD would give the attacker no access to the DB.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Password Memory 2009 encrypts and manages your passwords and helps you to log in to websites much more easily and quickly than having to enter them every time you visit them. Firefox already offers this option although Password memory 2009 is surely a much safer way of storing particularly sensitive passwords (such as for banking sites). In fact, Password Memory 2009 uses several different algorithms to guarantee a very high level of security.</div><div></div><div></div><div>The interface follows the same format as that of Microsoft Office and simply requires you to add passwords into a clipboard where they will then be automatically transferred into the right fields when you surf to that particular site. If you want a hard copy of your passwords, you can also export them to XML, HTML, text files and Excel in a few clicks.</div><div></div><div></div><div>The user interface resembles the standard Microsoft interface, so it will look familiar to most people. Prominent command buttons to add, open, and delete password profiles are easily found. The program contains a search feature to look up a specific profile. We found it extremely intuitive, and we were able to quickly create a new password profile. Creating a new profile requires that you enter your username and password for the specific account, as well as set an expiration date, if any. Once we added the required information, we clicked the OK button, and immediately an error message appeared. The program did not save our information. The program includes a Help feature, but it merely takes you to the publisher's Web site for support. A visit to the forum did not provide the help we needed to successfully save our password profiles.</div><div></div><div></div><div>While we loved Password Memory 2009's easy-to-use interface, we were disappointed by its lackluster performance. If you're in the market for a free password manager, we recommend that you keep looking for one that doesn't produce so many errors.</div><div></div><div></div><div>However I was thinking to storing username as plaintext and encrypted password for later auto-diagnosing purpose in which I may call a method in catch() which will re-initialize connection by using same username and decrypted password.</div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div>the value of a SecureString object is automatically encrypted, can be modified until your application marks it as read-only, and can be deleted from computer memory by either your application or the .NET Framework garbage collector.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Hashing makes sense on the server side where the password (or the hash) is stored on disk/in a database. On the client side, you cannot hash the password since you need it to authenticate to the web service.</div><div></div><div></div><div>The much publicised Heartbleed bug allowed attackers to retrieve items from servers' memory in 64KB chunks. However, the strategy here is to have a vulnerability management (patching process) in place rather than coding round these types of problems.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Regarding encrypting passwords - this is something you should rely on HTTPS for rather than encrypting them on the client in Javascript. When they arrive on your server store and compare them in hashed format using a slow algorithm such as bcrypt, scrypt or pbkdf2. Also use cookies marked with the secure & http only flags, implement a HSTS policy and you should be good to go on the password storage and transmission front.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Actually, I have never seen any sites encrypt the password client-side. Encrypting on the client and then decrypting it on the server gains absolutely nothing. That's what SSL certificates are for. Almost all sites I've ever seen in my life just send the password in plain text to the server and then hash it there (we hope).</div><div></div><div></div><div>If you are trying to prevent the server from ever having the plain text password in memory, you could hash it client-side and then hash the hash on the server. Just keep in mind that when you hash a password on the client, the hash actually becomes the password.</div><div></div><div></div><div>In short, they were able to extract the master password, secret key and individual items and respective passwords from memory. It was done either when 1Password was in an unlocked state or locked state. The only way to clear memory was to exit out of the application totally.</div><div></div><div></div><div>With Proton Pass for Firefox all vault passwords can be found plain in memory (RAM). This can be done if you create a memory dump file of all browser processes and then edit the images. This works even with the extension is locked. Probably it has to be unlocked first to load the passwords in RAM.</div><div></div><div></div><div>Even if somehow vault data such as passwords could remain encrypted while loaded into process memory, the encryption key would still have to be stored in the memory, so an attacker who is able to access your device memory could still decrypt your encrypted passwords using this key.</div><div></div><div></div><div>This is not to mention the simple fact that an attacker who has such unfettered access to your device as to be able to dump the memory contents, would easily be able to install malware/spyware on your device that would exfiltrate your master password (and/or encryption key), as well as the vault contents.</div><div></div><div></div><div>There are some approaches which would certainly improve the situation, some libraries implementing this are libsodium and memguard. One technique makes access harder by sandwiching the pages holding secrets between guard pages that will cause a segfault when accessed. Building upon this a technique called Boojum described in Bruce Schneier in Cryptography Engineering could be used, which constantly (every few milliseconds) rotates the in-memory encryption.</div><div></div><div></div><div>3. Why does the MSP430FR5969 reboot and begin running my program code when I send it multiple bad passwords in RX_PASSWORD messages? Seemed like the whole point of this was to make sure no matter what the memory gets wiped?</div><div></div><div></div><div>TX_BSL_VERSION is a protected command and will not return a proper response until the correct RX_PASSWORD is supplied. Since you supply the device with application firmware then the reset vector (at location 0xFFFE) is a valid value instead of 0xFFFF, therefore the password supplied is incorrect and will result in a mass erase. If you were to supply the same password a second time (after a delay to wait for the mass erase to complete) then the BSL would be unlocked and you would be able to get the correct BSL version number. Note that unlocking and entering the BSL are two different functions.</div><div></div><div></div><div>and I use a password of all FF"s I can download an image that seems to work. The iv_'s are pointers to the top 16 interrupt vectors. So I'm manually erasing them so I can use the 0xFF password. I think one key thing that has been very misleading in TI's documentation is the lack of mention that the MPU protects the memory space. It looks like without clearing the MPUEN bit you can't access memory and I"m assuming that the erase procedure causes a system reset because of this.</div><div></div><div> df19127ead</div>