WarGames for Apple II?

[KP]

There was a 1983 ColecoVision/ADAM game cartridge based on the movie
WarGames.

Does anyone know whether there was a version of this game, or any
other based on the movie in any way, ever released for the Apple II?

[winston...@yahoo.com]

Was it called "Computer War"? There was a version of that for the TI-99 as well. It was put out by a company called Thorm EMI.

[Tempest]

On Feb 13, 2:39 am, "winston19842...@yahoo.com"

<winston19842...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Was it called "Computer War"? There was a version of that for the TI-99 as well. It was put out by a company called Thorm EMI.

Yes I believe it's the same game. It also came out for the Atari 8-
bit/C-64 I believe. No Apple II version as far as I know.

[BLuRry]

Though it is not for retro computers, Defcon is pretty awesome at recreating the look of the Norad screens from WarGames:

http://www.introversion.co.uk/defcon/

FWIW: the Linux port is very nice and plays great at 1080p.

-B

[Michael Black]

Was there an Apple II in the movie? I saw it when it came out, but likely
haven't seen it since it aired on tv sometime afterwards.

I remember there's 8080 machine to the side of his chair, not an Altair
8800 but one of the ones with all the lights and switches that followed in
the wake of the Altair.

But he's typing on something else, and I cant' picture what it is.

Michael

[Kevin Dady]

IMSAI 8080, and he is typing on some terminal, though I cant tell what
it is

[Sean Fahey]

On Monday, February 13, 2012 11:45:00 AM UTC-6, Michael Black wrote:

> Was there an Apple II in the movie? I saw it when it came out, but likely
> haven't seen it since it aired on tv sometime afterwards.

The only Apple II in Wargames was the computer used to control the LED light show inside the W.O.P.R.

http://www.imsai.net/Movies/WarGames.htm

"The flat panel display (the early flourescent type) that carried the countdown information was the only existing prototype of a display developed by a fellow I knew in Sunnyvale who I met through Paul Lovoi, then of InTA (International Technical Associates, formerly of ILC), who built the giant strobe system we used for the end
sequence. Paul was, and is, one of the most brilliant people I have ever met - he's still in Sunnyvale and still inventing very cool stuff. I have drawn a blank on the display fellow's name, but he was a well known inventor in Silicon Valley in the 80's, and had quite a few patents to his name (Nolan...? Damn, why can't I remember that? I may have to call Paul). Anyway, I hand carried the display on my lap from Sunnyvale to MGM, where I personally installed the display in the WOPR and then connected it to an Apple II with a prototype driver card for displaying characters on the screen.

While filming the machine, I sat huddled inside with the Apple in my lap and typed commands into it per instructions from John Badham as the camera rolled. Very high tech. The display is only seen in insert because it had not yet been installed when we shot the live action around WOPR. I remember that the driver card was not built to run at 48hz, which we needed to maintain sync with the 24 frame per second camera, so I, with the help of a fellow named Larry Barton, changed out the crystal on the board, and then trimmed it by rubbing it with a lead pencil until the scope showed us 48hz. Fun."

[Egan Ford]

The DVD extras mention how the Apple II was used for the special
effects--more than just WOPR IIRC. Sadly all behind the scenes.

ITOH, Flynn (a proper hacker :-) used an Apple /// to break into ENCOM.

[BLuRry]

He probably had to mash in the chips between film shoots to keep it running though. :-D I digress, without the /// there would be no //e.

-B

[Michael Black]

Yes, that was it, I could picture it but the name didn't come to mind.

However, it just seemed to sit there, part of the background, rather than
being the computer he was using. I certainly never saw him touch it,
and saw no flashing lights. He had a "war dialer", which is how he
found the mainframe, so he had to have some local system doing the
dialing.

Michael

[Michael J. Mahon]

BLuRry <brendan...@gmail.com> wrote:
> He probably had to mash in the chips between film shoots to keep it
> running though. :-D I digress, without the /// there would be no //e.

Really?

I'm curious about that conclusion.

It seems to me that the Apple ][+ had such legs that any business would
have invested in a successor. Without the /// they would have invested
sooner.

-michael - NadaNet 3.1 and AppleCrate II: http://home.comcast.net/~mjmahon

[Michael Black]

On Tue, 14 Feb 2012, Michael J. Mahon wrote:

> BLuRry <brendan...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> He probably had to mash in the chips between film shoots to keep it
>> running though. :-D I digress, without the /// there would be no //e.
>
> Really?
>
> I'm curious about that conclusion.
>
> It seems to me that the Apple ][+ had such legs that any business would
> have invested in a successor. Without the /// they would have invested
> sooner.
>

I don't recall the III using custom ICs, which of course did happen with
the IIE. And the III wasn't really in the direction of the IIE. It had
odd things like that external ROM decoder to add functions to the basic
6502.

I can see the point if it was "without the Lisa, there'd have been no
Macintosh" since the Lisa did take the company in a different direction
and having worked things out on it, they were able to build a more cost
effective "better computer" with the Mac.

But I don't see what great new development happened with the III that
helped the II line along. It was a separate branch, the never went
further. Unless the failure of the III meant Apple went back to extending
the II line in a more logical fashion.

Michael

[BLuRry]

A very good point, because a successful /// would have engendered an apple IV or something. But I see a lot of things made for Apple ///, such as the SOS kernel, had to be turned into something useful. Maybe Prodos and the ProFile hard drive would have happened for the // series sooner, but they had their roots in the /// development line didn't they?

-B

[Sean Fahey]

On Tuesday, February 14, 2012 1:46:32 AM UTC-6, Michael J. Mahon wrote:
> BLuRry

> wrote:
> > He probably had to mash in the chips between film shoots to keep it
> > running though. :-D I digress, without the /// there would be no //e.
>
> Really?
>
> I'm curious about that conclusion.
>
> It seems to me that the Apple ][+ had such legs that any business would
> have invested in a successor. Without the /// they would have invested
> sooner.

I think its a valid conclusion. In hindsight the Apple II had legs, but *back then* several sources cite Apple's fears (Woz is on record) that the Apple II line was aging and would have to be replaced with *something* very soon, hence the rush to get the /// out the door. I think Apple thought at the time, Sara and the II+ would give them just enough time to deliver Lisa (and eventually Macintosh).

When the /// tanked, Apple *had* to re-design the II not only to address the failure of the ///, but also to level-up with features their competition was making standard on their offerings. The other driver was to lower the chip count to make manufacturing cheaper and easier plus improve reliability. Warranty repairs on ][ and ][+ boards was expensive and Apple Service was heading toward swap and drop repair model with the dealer channel.

So, yeah - I could see the /// being the reason we got the //e - or at least for influencing the //e's features and specifications that made it the King of the 8 bit Apples.

[David Schmidt]

On 2/14/2012 10:00 AM, Michael Black wrote:
> [...]

> But I don't see what great new development happened with the III that
> helped the II line along. It was a separate branch, the never went
> further. Unless the failure of the III meant Apple went back to
> extending the II line in a more logical fashion.

The 80-column firmware was transplanted from the III to the IIe. As
Brendan pointed out, ProDOS is a direct descendant of SOS.

[Michael J. Mahon]

Yes, but these are both natural evolutionary developments that would have
occurred on any Apple II follow-on.

Apple tried to design a new machine for the business market and discovered
that what the market really wanted (besides IBM PCs) was an Apple II with
additional business features--like a lower-case-capable keyboard, an
80-column display, a clock-calendar, and a DOS with mass-storage
capabilities. (All of which had been delivered (suboptimally) by the Apple
II aftermarket!)

In 1981, I used to attend an Apple user group in Austin, TX, and several
members had Apple ///'s. I found it ironic that they were almost all used
in ][+ emulation mode (except when running the /// demo software)!

[Michael J. Mahon]

Interesting--I follow your thinking.

But one can also see the /// as proving irrefutably that the growing market
snowball of the II line demanded a strictly compatible follow-on--a lesson
apparently well-learned (some would say, looking at the IIgs, *too*
well-learned. ;-)

Viewed in this way, the /// just kept Apple busy long enough to realize 1)
that designing a new machine is no guarantee of market success, and 2) that
the marketplace ecosystem was giving the II very long legs!

[bloomer_au]

Along the lines of something that is not officially War Games, but
very similar (and predating the film), you may wish to try the game
NORAD.

Here's a gameplay video: (not by me)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqoRFnvF4hY

- Wade

[winston...@yahoo.com]

Interesting. Same thing happened with the C-128 - most ran them in C64 mode.
There was a dearth of software available for the C128, but years worth of 64 stuff, which continued to be made for another near-decade.

[Mike Maginnis]

Interesting, considering how crippled the emulation mode was. The ///
didn't catch on in the market due to the well-documented technical
issues and lack of usable software resulting from a stupidly shortened
QA cycle, not because is wasn't a II.

--
- Mike

Podcast: http://open-apple.net
Scans: http://apple2scans.net
Blog: http://6502lane.net

[David Schmidt]

On 2/15/2012 4:35 PM, winston...@yahoo.com wrote:
> Interesting. Same thing happened with the C-128 - most ran them in C64 mode.
> There was a dearth of software available for the C128, but years worth of 64 stuff, which continued to be made for another near-decade.

And emulation continued to hinder (a la OS/2's Windows 16-bit
compatibility) or enhance (a la Windows' DOS compatibility) in various
situations. Sometimes the emulator couldn't get out from under the
emulation, sometimes it could.

[Michael J. Mahon]

I certainly don't disagree that the /// was permanently hobbled by
poor design and execution issues.

But by the time that the /// was released into the wild, the II already
had developed a pretty robust infrastructure and following. Lots of
great programs, lots of workable hardware extensions, and lots of users
anxious to make it do anything that people wanted to do.

Introducing a new computer architecture into this environment was a
serious matter, and Apple chose to play the "proprietary" and "chosen
developers" game instead of letting the market do whatever it wanted,
as happened with the II.

The result was a slower growth of software, hardware, and market
share, just as the II was accelerating like crazy.

Even if the hardware of the /// had been perfect, I think it would have
been a "one trick pony", and would never have garnered enough market
share to be a successful product against the IBM juggernaut.

-michael

NadaNet 3.1 for Apple II parallel computing!
Home page: http://home.comcast.net/~mjmahon/

"The wastebasket is our most important design
tool--and it's seriously underused."

[Mike]

While I agree that even had it been perfect out of the gate, the ///
would have had trouble competing against IBM, I doubt that many would
have still chosen the II over the /// for a business desktop.

When Apple finally got around to releasing the revised /// in late
'81, which is what it should have been to begin with, sales of that
model jumped to 5,000 a month from the 500 it had been previously. Had
the ///'s reputation not been ruined by that point, it likely would
have been even more. Woz was probably right when he joked that they
should have renamed it the Apple IV when it was re-introduced.

We're playing a what-if game here, but I see little evidence that
businesses were choosing the II/II Plus over the /// for any reason
other than ///s technical failings.

Software growth was hampered by developers taking a "wait-and-see"
attitude after all the bugs of the first ///. Apple's shortened
development cycle and constantly changing tech specs made it hard for
internal software development to make any headway. For exampe Pascal,
the first language other than Business BASIC (and assembly) to ship
for the /// didn't arrive until around the time the revised ///
appeared, and hardware development suffered similarly.

Mike Maginnis

Blog: http://6502lane.net
Scans: http://apple2scans.net
Podcast: http://open-apple.net

[Michael J. Mahon]

I agree, Mike--the "too little, too late" problem was a real killer,
and the fumbled introduction soured the market from the outset.

The best indication of what business (in the large) needed to jump
into the desktop game was what happened after the IBM PC introduction.
It's evident that most managers were unwilling to commit to any startup
with a funny name--"No one ever got fired for buying IBM."

The business computer market (not to be confused with the market for
computer enthusiasts working in businesses) was gated by the entry of
a major business machine supplier and their "faith and credit" which
had always ensured that they would do whatever it took to "get the
payroll out".

All the other personal computer manufacturers were not even serious
contenders for office desktops. Not only did the /// not make it,
but the Mac never made it either, even against 286-based PCs! (Of
course, the art department was a different story, but "creatives"
always are. ;-)

It's interesting to note that the IBM PC was also introduced with
almost no software--only with the sterling reputation of its maker
for solving business problems. The confidence that buyers and
developers immediately evidenced guaranteed the ultimate success
of the platform. IBM didn't have to fight for the business market,
it was a _fait accompli_.

It is interesting to view the hubris of Apple's "Welcome, IBM" ad
in this light.

Meanwhile, the Apple II continued its roll in the education market
and with hobbyists and gamers, as well as with many system integrators.

This momentum was only lost as the hardware and software aftermarket
for the PC overtook the Apple II. IBM had chosen exactly right in
opening the PC up using the Apple II model!

I certainly agree that this is an attempt to understand history
in terms of possible hypotheticals, but I think the discussion is
useful in illuminating the various roads not taken.

[William Heckel]

Greetings Dr. Falken, Shall we play a game ?

[Mark Frischknecht]

On 2012-02-21 03:36:39 +0000, William Heckel said:

> Greetings Dr. Falken, Shall we play a game ?

Love to. How about Global Thermonuclear War?

[Michael Black]

But didn't he get sucked into that because there were simpler and
innocuous games to be tried before that? So by the time of Global
Thermonuclear War, Matthew Broderick was sure it was just another game.

Michael