Can The Government (FBI or NSA) Break PGP Encryption?
Pod
else being able to break PGP encryption. Is there a backdoor?
If anyone could provide a yes or no as to whether you have heard anything,
I'd appreciate it. I just want to know what I'm using, you know? I don't
need a false sense of security.
Thanks.
Pod
Ron B.
Pod wrote:
There is no "yes or no" answer to your question.
It is all a matter of probabilities.
In terms of pure mathematics, given the total computing power of the human
race, not enough time has passed in the universe to break PGP _as far as we
know_ . This does not mean that some alphabet agency has not found a
method that works or will find one tommorow. It is just very unlikely.
Literally hundreds of thousands of person/hours have been spent looking for
a backdoor in the source code. None has been found. That does not mean it
does not exist. It is just very unlikely.
Chances are astronomically slim that they will be able to break your use of
PGP if you use an adequate passphrase, but:
If you have done something to get these folks attention such as criminal,
terrorist or espionage activity, and they want some info that you have,
there are otherways around the problem. These include (but not limited to)
keyloggers and direct surveillance. If your activities have been
relatively innocent and have not drawn attention to yourself, they probably
don't have time to mess with you.
Followup set to alt.security.pgp
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)
iQEVAwUBPtxooUpQ41XL9/JxAQGzlwgAofBPZWHSmDHOWDXeE6lx+Wl9QIJtm+D4
O+QXIV6YS7r0ELRiCU6rvYA2ddbaOl1Yfk5MYEVZApG7FgmMKdI/BpGfXPQx9q3n
tg2P9z4QsOxjJzRruR6IwJnQvFtCCl4hHr/PzO5Ghpl6o2GfVWeeZKShaUewyDFL
xa1dGeEG2vqiW59ErU+yXX7lWFpS2FGpRCYsN98QM/60V859jqH+BTJmlQ/4ilFj
TtXVRBOxW8EkEksRQ/c2/DaCZDEl8YUW8bLL12r7SW0E8TJRteXGlCRDeH1Fe5ep
tQoQ+RjqLeuz+IVmDE1icsrn20OM+WYtySIkrSAy+h5G7WvujSMeOQ==
=PvI/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Richard
Zimmerman (maker of PGP) that culminated in the sudden withdrawl of
government harrassment that he was experiencing for a couple of years. Some
took this as a sign that he sold out and allowed the NSA to install a
backdoor into PGP. But I believe the truth to the matter is that the source
code is open to all and if someone found a backdoor in the program, their
name would surely be recorded in hacker history for such a discovery!
This link was posted in an earlier message. I found it reassuring when I
read it.
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,110841,00.asp
PGP is strong. Much stronger than the conventional encryption used by our
Interac (bank card) machines!
Bill Unruh
]I was wondering if anyone has heard anything about the government or anyone
]else being able to break PGP encryption. Is there a backdoor?
Yes, one hears about this often. Probably every week, certainly every
month there is a post which claims that the NSA can break PGP. Mind you
every month there is also a post claiming that the NSA can also directly
read your brain waves and can thus extract the password to any
encryption you use. The two are about equally believable.
PS. The source code is there for you to look at. Look for backdoors.
]If anyone could provide a yes or no as to whether you have heard anything,
]I'd appreciate it. I just want to know what I'm using, you know? I don't
]need a false sense of security.
Well, my best advice is not to develope a false sense of security. The
resistance of an encryption system to breakage is the least important
aspect of security.
Dick Watson
backdoor, but it doesn't address whether the encryption algorithm is as
strong--resistant to cryptologic attack--as we think. The organizations you
mention do have some of the best cryptologists money can buy on the payroll
with lots of experience and they provide them with the best tools another
shedload of money can buy, besides. And if they could break it back, do you
think they'd advertise that fact for us to discuss here? Anybody who *knows*
the answer certainly can't say without risking some quality time in a
federal pen.
"Pod" <nov...@home.com> wrote in message
news:cd31af6904acad85...@free.teranews.com...
Gamma3000
subjected to intense peer review. I doubt some guy in a University would be
put in jail for pointing out an encryption problem if he found the problem
himself.
"Dick Watson" <littlegr...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:J5cDa.491$qd3...@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net...
MikeyD
computer...the program has even been written, you just need the hardware to
run it on. And if anyone has a QC it will be the NSA, or possibly MI5 or
some other government agency. According to Singh's excellent code book
(which is where I get most of my knowledge from) MI5 had
dilfie/helman/merkle years before it was discovered by diffe, helman and
merkle. So it's possible they have a QC today.
"Dick Watson" <littlegr...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:J5cDa.491$qd3...@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net...
Dick Watson
way these algorithms get looked at. I was talking about somebody who *knows*
whether the mentioned agencies can get into PGPs encryptions, not just
somebody who suspects it or thinks it unlikely.
"Gamma3000" <y5r9...@sneakemail.com> wrote in message
news:3edd9c4b@shknews01...
Paul Rubin
> I wasn't talking about some guy in a university, nor is peer review the only
> way these algorithms get looked at. I was talking about somebody who *knows*
> whether the mentioned agencies can get into PGPs encryptions, not just
> somebody who suspects it or thinks it unlikely.
You think they're gonna tell you? Sheesh. Clue: anyone who tells you
what they say is the answer, doesn't know the real answer.
Gamma3000
required would raise too many eyebrows. Dilfie/Helman is just a case of
discovering the method. A QC is a case of discovering the method, building
the machine itself, and maintaining it. Also, there's no way that a
government agency would keep it a secret: they could make billions of pounds
by selling the technology. Dilfie/Helman was released for free.
"MikeyD" <m_don...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:105472017...@iapetus.uk.clara.net...
Dick Watson
news:7xn0gy8...@ruckus.brouhaha.com...
My point exactly.
Dick Watson
Project was kept secret.
"Gamma3000" <y5r9...@sneakemail.com> wrote in message
news:3ede1bce@shknews01...
Jason Tik
Hash: SHA1
I HIGHLY DOUBT that quantum mechanics has come that far...
- -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
Version: 3.12
GCS d- s: a--- C++ !U P L E? o? W++
N++ K? w++ !O M- V? PS !PE Y+ PGP++
t++ 5- X- tv+ b DI D? G e-> !h r- y-
- ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
"MikeyD" <m_don...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:105472017...@iapetus.uk.clara.net...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0
Comment: My Key: 6ACE DC2C 4C5A 9911 96F3 DDEB C7EC A953 ADE5 0951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=AEjL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Paul Henrichsen
> I wasn't talking about some guy in a university, nor is peer review the only
> way these algorithms get looked at. I was talking about somebody who *knows*
> whether the mentioned agencies can get into PGPs encryptions, not just
> somebody who suspects it or thinks it unlikely.
>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Peer reveiw is there specifically to catch holes or weaknesses.
Do you remember/have you heard about the clipper chip plan that was
floated several years back? It was basically an encryption chip for
which the US government would would have had the key for every one.
It was talked about and work was done on it, but wasn't implemented
(at least to any large scale). In the years since then, the
encryption alogorithm, 'Skipjack', has been published. It is a weak
algorithm. (IIRC the comment I heard was 'several decades behind
currently accepted algorithms'). Skipjack was created by the NSA. It,
however, did not have the peer review.
At this point, I trust the guy in the university to do a better job.
He will be called on it if he screws up, and other people will look
at the stuff before it gets used anywhere.
As to whether PGP has been broken: It would be possible to prove it
has been broken (if such were (or is) the case). It is not possible,
however, to prove a negative. Which means that at best we are left to
discuss the probabilities.
Do people bet their lives one PGP being secure? According to Phil R.
Zimmermann, yes they do. How much you want to trust it (and which
version you prefer) is a decision that you must make for yourself.
Paul
- -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
Version: 3.12
GS d(-) s-; a- C++ U L- E? W++ N+ !O M V PS+(--) PE++ Y+
PG++ t+ 5 X+ R+(++) tv b+++ DI++ D G e h-- r% x
- ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPuBQEcAKPcpjJcATEQLGWACgoJqqwGJSvS36D6mr+ZfHICaiE8wAn2MI
YZVfLoht+w5k9sKhtgqafLnV
=b7Id
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Dick Watson
news:cd66622.03060...@posting.google.com...
> Peer reveiw is there specifically to catch holes or weaknesses.
>
> Do you remember/have you heard about the clipper chip plan that was
> floated several years back? It was basically an encryption chip for
> which the US government would would have had the key for every one.
> It was talked about and work was done on it, but wasn't implemented
> (at least to any large scale). In the years since then, the
> encryption alogorithm, 'Skipjack', has been published. It is a weak
> algorithm. (IIRC the comment I heard was 'several decades behind
> currently accepted algorithms'). Skipjack was created by the NSA. It,
> however, did not have the peer review.
>
> At this point, I trust the guy in the university to do a better job.
> He will be called on it if he screws up, and other people will look
> at the stuff before it gets used anywhere.
I wouldn't judge the quality of all of their cryptology by what they were
eager to force upon all of us in Clipper/Skipjack. When you care enough to
send your very best...
Nor if I really thought I was betting my life against the government's
abilities would I depend on PGP to save my life. And if they were that eager
to go after little old me, there are always break-ins, keyloggers, and the
CE/RE routes, besides just intercepting PGP email and breaking it back, if
they can.
Gamma3000
military operations. I would expect a university to release information
about their progress at breaking PGP. And I would highly suspect that it
would be an academic, not a soldier, who would break PGP
"Dick Watson" <littlegr...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
news:qMvDa.772$qd3...@tornadotest1.news.pas.earthlink.net...
Dick Watson
> I would not expect the government to release information about their
> military operations. I would expect a university to release information
> about their progress at breaking PGP. And I would highly suspect that it
> would be an academic, not a soldier, who would break PGP
That certainly could be the case. The point is that we don't know for sure.
The thread title is can they? The answer can pretty much only be: we don't
know.
Sam Simpson
> "Gamma3000" <y5r9...@sneakemail.com> wrote in message
> news:3ee0ee7c@shknews01...
> > I would not expect the government to release information about their
> > military operations. I would expect a university to release information
> > about their progress at breaking PGP. And I would highly suspect that it
> > would be an academic, not a soldier, who would break PGP
Why? Because the NSA has been so honest about what ciphers they can break?
Come on....These guys spend billions every year sniffing at these ciphers -
you think we'd know if they have broken every cipher out there?
> That certainly could be the case. The point is that we don't know for
sure.
> The thread title is can they? The answer can pretty much only be: we don't
> know.
Aye......
Sam Simpson
> In the years since then, the
> encryption alogorithm, 'Skipjack', has been published. It is a weak
> algorithm. (IIRC the comment I heard was 'several decades behind
> currently accepted algorithms'). Skipjack was created by the NSA. It,
> however, did not have the peer review.
It's only weak as a function of it's (80-bit) key length, I think.
> At this point, I trust the guy in the university to do a better job.
> He will be called on it if he screws up, and other people will look
> at the stuff before it gets used anywhere.
Yep, and a cipher that comes out of the NSA isn't going to be virgin. They
fuck up from time to time (SHA-0, cipher modes for AES etc), but how many
ciphers have been released by PhD's that are shite?
<SNIP>
Sam
Phil
> I HIGHLY DOUBT that quantum mechanics has come that far...
> Come on....These guys spend billions every year sniffing at these ciphers -
> you think we'd know if they have broken every cipher out there?
TBH, if GCHQ (I'm English) hasn't built a sufficiently powerful QC
yet, they will have done soon. QCs aren't quite so far in the future
as you might imagine, I mean I'm building one for my physics degree
final year physics project around Christmas time - and if I'm building
one, they are definitely researching more powerful ones. IBM
demonstrated a 7-qubit QC a while ago, using NMR techniques rather
than cool-ion. The NMR technique is limited by the capabilities of
your detectors and the kinds of chemicals you can manufacture. So
given that they're likely to have the very best of both, I wouldn't
put it too far into the future. cool-ion techniques using single ions
and lasers are more scalable than NMR, but inherently more difficult
to use. However, if someone has made a big step forward in decoherence
times and isolation of the system, that method may bring sufficiently
powerful QCs soon as well. There is also talk of a theoretical method
of solid state NMR on silicon, which yields around 10^3 qubits, and
with that capability no traditional encryption is really safe.
So if not yet, soon. The fact that I'm quite keen on being one of
those who develops it for them is entirely beside the point...
Phil
Bill Unruh
]Sorry to dredge up, but I only just found this thread:
]> I HIGHLY DOUBT that quantum mechanics has come that far...
]> Come on....These guys spend billions every year sniffing at these ciphers -
]> you think we'd know if they have broken every cipher out there?
]TBH, if GCHQ (I'm English) hasn't built a sufficiently powerful QC
]yet, they will have done soon. QCs aren't quite so far in the future
]as you might imagine, I mean I'm building one for my physics degree
Yes, they are.
]final year physics project around Christmas time - and if I'm building
Uh, hu. And this is just an interlude to the real project which is
building a ladder to the moon. You have a 10 foot one already, and the
moon is not that far away.
]one, they are definitely researching more powerful ones. IBM
]demonstrated a 7-qubit QC a while ago, using NMR techniques rather
]than cool-ion. The NMR technique is limited by the capabilities of
So? It is also known that NMR techniques will crap out at about 10 bits.
Since breaking pgp requires more like 10^6 bits, and since the "moore's
law" for QC is about 1 bit every year, it will be a bit of a wait.
]your detectors and the kinds of chemicals you can manufacture. So
]given that they're likely to have the very best of both, I wouldn't
]put it too far into the future. cool-ion techniques using single ions
They have no history of working with any of the technologies. Just
because they are good mathematicians does not mean they are good
physicists.
]and lasers are more scalable than NMR, but inherently more difficult
]to use. However, if someone has made a big step forward in decoherence
]times and isolation of the system, that method may bring sufficiently
]powerful QCs soon as well. There is also talk of a theoretical method
]of solid state NMR on silicon, which yields around 10^3 qubits, and
]with that capability no traditional encryption is really safe.
Yes, it is. Shor's method requires about L^2 bits where L is the length
of the number. And that is logical bits. Since error correction requires
another at least about 10 bits per logical bit for each level of error
correction, and about 10^4 operatins per logical operation, QC are still
a long way away.
Note that almost all traditional encryptions would be safe against QC.
Public key are in trouble but not secret key. Even with Grover, the
strength of say 128 bit AES is still greater than that of DES. Doubling
the key size of traditional crypto is far far far easier than QC.
]So if not yet, soon. The fact that I'm quite keen on being one of
]those who develops it for them is entirely beside the point...
Good luck. It is a fascinating field, but you need to go into it
realistically.
]Phil
Jason Tik
Hash: SHA1
Thankyou for supporting my position here!
- --
- -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
Version: 3.12
GCS d- s: a--- C++ !U P L E? o? W++
N++ K? w++ !O M- V? PS !PE Y+ PGP++
t++ 5- X- tv+ b DI D? G e-> !h r- y-
- ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
"Bill Unruh" <un...@string.physics.ubc.ca> wrote in message
news:bc549o$sou$1...@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0
Comment: My Key: 6ACE DC2C 4C5A 9911 96F3 DDEB C7EC A953 ADE5 0951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=nFYs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
MikeyD
> Version: 3.12
>
> GCS d- s: a--- C++ !U P L E? o? W++
> N++ K? w++ !O M- V? PS !PE Y+ PGP++
> t++ 5- X- tv+ b DI D? G e-> !h r- y-
>
> - ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
Martin Armstrong
<m_don...@hotmail.com> writes
>Huh?
For enlightenment see http://www.geekcode.com/geek.html
--
Martin Armstrong martin @ tactilis.co.uk
cajones
Hash: SHA1
"Pod" <nov...@home.com> wrote in message
news:cd31af6904acad85...@free.teranews.com...
" PGP is the most widely used hybrid cryptosystem around today. There
have been AMPLE rumours regarding it's security (or lack there of).
There have been rumours ranging from PRZ was coerced by the Gov't
into placing backdoors into PGP, that the NSA has the ability to
break RSA or IDEA in a reasonable amount of time, and so on. While I
cannot confirm or deny these rumours with 100% certianty, I really
doubt that either is true. This FAQ while not in the 'traditional FAQ
format' answers some questions about the security of PGP, and should
clear up some rumours... "
http://www.stack.nl/~galactus/remailers/attack-faq.html
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2 - not licensed for commercial use: www.pgp.com
iQA/AwUBPu3aFng/fXG79TAzEQLDUQCg68hAuECmrCu/Z+jdkT5ZMgAew+QAoMma
LddhIH1tP9n2PsyF7ae6fPU8
=DWkN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Boise
Hash: SHA1
"Richard" <n...@home.com> wrote in message
news:xXZCa.142145$Vi5.4...@news1.calgary.shaw.ca...
"The FBI declined to comment on ongoing investigations, and Italian
authorities would not reveal details about the information or
equipment seized during the shootout."
After the " route " of Saddams' soldiers ( paid to go home/defect to
the west)I would not put anything past the NSA, CIA etc. If the
encryption is broken it is( like the Enigma Machine ) only of worth
to them if it is kept secret. To have 'criminals' think PGP etc is
safe then they need use anything else and all info is deciphered by
CIA at will. In fact it is the less sophisticated terrorists that
cause the most headaches for the West by not using encryption
techniques.
I would like to know if any encrypted messages were gleaned from WTC
Sept 11 fiasco.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2 - not licensed for commercial use: www.pgp.com
Comment: (use this key)
iQA/AwUBPvMCPHg/fXG79TAzEQK66gCgvyG0T5NBqSvCi8UljJRK4hCnExwAn1rr
8dlT3r0m38kIGXNhNwXKjgWv
=gHYx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Harris Georgiou
> > or anyone else being able to break PGP encryption. Is there a
> > backdoor?
> >
> > If anyone could provide a yes or no as to whether you have heard
> > anything, I'd appreciate it. I just want to know what I'm using,
> > you know? I don't need a false sense of security.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > Pod
Typical answer fo a typical question in this ns:
It is 99% sure that PGP cannot be broken today by software and hardware
resources available today, if and only if it is used properly.
It is 99% sure that a quite large group of goverment agencies can 'break'
into a PGP-protected home PC, if they think it's worth the cost and effort,
by means of key logging, password retrieval or standard surveillance
methods.
See group's FAQ for more details.
--
--
Harris
For possible preemptive bombing
action my position is:
41 15'N 24 15'E
Jason Tik
Hash: SHA1
| It is 99% sure that a quite large group of goverment
| agencies can 'break' into a PGP-protected home PC, if
| they think it's worth the cost and effort, by means of
| key logging, password retrieval or standard surveillance
| methods.
Key logging alone would only get the passphrase. They need
the private key too. (I am NOT saying that they could not
get that also)
| For possible preemptive bombing
| action my position is:
| 41 15'N 24 15'E
Not precise enough...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0
Comment: My Key: 6ACE DC2C 4C5A 9911 96F3 DDEB C7EC A953 ADE5 0951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=eQhf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
mhamrick
> else being able to break PGP encryption. Is there a backdoor?
>
> If anyone could provide a yes or no as to whether you have heard anything,
> I'd appreciate it. I just want to know what I'm using, you know? I don't
> need a false sense of security.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Pod
Cryptonomicon.Net has a couple of articles apropos to this discussion:
Can the Spooks Read My PGP Encrypted Email?
http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=264
Can the Spooks Read My Email, Redux
http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=363
and my favorite:
Can the 4th Graders Read My Encrypted Email?
http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=369
The first article quotes a member of "the intelligence community" as
saying "Much of the information on Mohammed's laptop computer was
protected by an encryption code that CIA analysts cracked easily, U.S.
intelligence officials said... The analysts said the code was
surprisingly simple." This article goes on to list a few ways that
someone could collect information about a secret or private key or a
passphrase.
The second article quotes an informed source as saying that they could
not break the encryption used by common applications. Paranoids
amongst us might say that the domestic intelligence agencies will SAY
they can't break encryption in order to reinforce the argument of
regulating electronic privacy technologies, while the anti-terror and
military guys cut through PGP like a knife through warm butter.
/etc
Matt H.
Robert M.
> I was wondering if anyone has heard anything about the government or anyone
> else being able to break PGP encryption. Is there a backdoor?
>
> If anyone could provide a yes or no as to whether you have heard anything,
> I'd appreciate it. I just want to know what I'm using, you know? I don't
> need a false sense of security.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Pod
My PGPDisk volume was cracked within a fraction of second by German
police departament.
My story:
----------------
Hello,
I want to inform you about my experience with PGPDisk security.
For many years i have been working at governmental agency. Over time i
was collecting sensisitve documents from my work and storing copies at
home. Due to status of documents i stored them on PGP encrypted
volume, passphrase length 28 characters, algorythm CAST 128bit,
passphrase was kept only in my mind, it was not written down.
The agency i was working for once, by accident, discovered that i was
making copies of confidential documents. So agency reported to police
and police visited my house.
Police connected laptop to my desktop computer and within fraction of
seconds they got access to all the files i stored on encrypted volume.
It is not possible to crack 128bit key within 60 seconds with today's
laptop computers, neither it's possible to exaust all combinations of
28 character passphrase. The only explanation is that there is a
SERIOUS BACKDOOR, a SECURITY FLAW in PGP.
I trusted PGP because it claimed that it can prevent major governments
from accesing my files, but what i got....?
Sincerely,
Robert
-----------
That how it happened
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Robert M. wrote:
> Police connected laptop to my desktop computer and within fraction of
> seconds they got access to all the files i stored on encrypted volume.
> It is not possible to crack 128bit key within 60 seconds with today's
> laptop computers, neither it's possible to exaust all combinations of
> 28 character passphrase. The only explanation is that there is a
> SERIOUS BACKDOOR, a SECURITY FLAW in PGP.
If any regular german cop was carrying around a laptop capable of cracking
PGP, the world would know as much. The security flaw is almost certainly
something you did (entered the passphrase while at work for example), than
one in
PGP.
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPvg5i+XlGBWTt1afEQLXmgCfVR3XlWbISB3vaNwa7hoba2HkrecAoMCn
INNsRJf53ywV4qt3y9nWVdTE
=aRBy
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
John Veldhuis
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Robert M. wrote:
>
>>Police connected laptop to my desktop computer and within fraction of
>>seconds they got access to all the files i stored on encrypted volume.
>>It is not possible to crack 128bit key within 60 seconds with today's
>>laptop computers, neither it's possible to exaust all combinations of
>>28 character passphrase. The only explanation is that there is a
>>SERIOUS BACKDOOR, a SECURITY FLAW in PGP.
>
>
> If any regular german cop was carrying around a laptop capable of cracking
> PGP, the world would know as much. The security flaw is almost certainly
> something you did (entered the passphrase while at work for example), than
> one in
> PGP.
>
He did not claim PGP was cracked, he claimed it took the police 60
seconds to access files stored inside a PGPDisk, which is imho another
matter.
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Did you read his final line? It mentions "serious backdoor" and "security
flaw in PGP". I agree that using a backdoor isn't strictly speaking
cracking, if that was your point, although exploiting a security flaw would
be. But that's just nitpicking on the definition of the term "cracking".
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPvhOFOXlGBWTt1afEQKaJwCfaB4zLBAGB3RMtwp24uWBdowUGqsAoPln
WeUu5Uz68OlXFWThMHzgRknb
=1tqU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
John Veldhuis
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> John Veldhuis wrote:
>
>>>>Police connected laptop to my desktop computer and within fraction of
>>>>seconds they got access to all the files i stored on encrypted volume.
>>>>It is not possible to crack 128bit key within 60 seconds with today's
>>>>laptop computers, neither it's possible to exaust all combinations of
>>>>28 character passphrase. The only explanation is that there is a
>>>>SERIOUS BACKDOOR, a SECURITY FLAW in PGP.
>>>
>>>If any regular german cop was carrying around a laptop capable of
>>>cracking PGP, the world would know as much. The security flaw is almost
>>>certainly something you did (entered the passphrase while at work for
>>>example), than one in
>>>PGP.
>>
>>He did not claim PGP was cracked, he claimed it took the police 60
>>seconds to access files stored inside a PGPDisk, which is imho another
>>matter.
>
>
> Did you read his final line? It mentions "serious backdoor" and "security
> flaw in PGP". I agree that using a backdoor isn't strictly speaking
> cracking, if that was your point, although exploiting a security flaw would
> be. But that's just nitpicking on the definition of the term "cracking".
>
I guess he meant to say that there is a serious backdoor, a security
flaw with the implementation of pgpdisk he was using, and not pgp in
general. Or maybe he unwittingly used an additional decryption key ;-.)
Kind regards,
John
Frode
Hash: SHA1
John Veldhuis wrote:
>>>>> 28 character passphrase. The only explanation is that there is a
>>>>> SERIOUS BACKDOOR, a SECURITY FLAW in PGP.
>>> He did not claim PGP was cracked, he claimed it took the police 60
>>> seconds to access files stored inside a PGPDisk, which is imho another
>>> matter.
> I guess he meant to say that there is a serious backdoor, a security
> flaw with the implementation of pgpdisk he was using, and not pgp in
> general.
How is that not in PGP in general? PGP Disk is one of 3 major components in
PGP (file, mail, container). That doesn't mean it pertains to file/mail of
course, if that's what you're getting at. But it it's definitely a PGP
problem. Unless you're assuming he compiled it himself or got it from
another unofficial source. In that case you're right of course. But since
otherwise wasn't stated I assumed he had bought it.
> Or maybe he unwittingly used an additional decryption key ;-.)
Probability is high he made up the whole thing. But if he didn't, I think
we can all rest assured he fucked something up someplace.
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPvl1tOXlGBWTt1afEQL+FgCfQVC6OFx6mZ1GriMWT/WsAGZUAiIAni23
empKLICsy2mJlHTjDQ9STTRJ
=UZZ1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Robert M.
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> PGP, the world would know as much. The security flaw is almost certainly
> something you did (entered the passphrase while at work for example), than
> one in
> PGP.
They weren't that regular. They were from departament who has
experience in such cases.
Passphrase has never left my computer, because documents were stored
at my desktop computer at home. Originals of documents were destroyed,
copies wiped with pgp wipe. Passphrase was not written down.
Keyloggers also are excluded because i'm regularry reinstalling
computer from scratch, ful formatting drive, fresh operating system,
fresh pgp installation, ... Volumes were always unmounted when not in
use. Freespace wipe was done once in week.
Impossible that there was passphrase leak, because it is only in my
head.
Robert
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Robert M. wrote:
>> PGP, the world would know as much. The security flaw is almost certainly
>> something you did (entered the passphrase while at work for example),
>> than one in PGP.
> They weren't that regular. They were from departament who has
> experience in such cases.
If they were no way they would've "hoooked up something" to your computer
and turned it on in your own home. Even regular (braindead) cops know that
the only way to secure evidence is to keep the computer powered down until
the storage medium can be accessed securely in a lab.
> Keyloggers also are excluded because i'm regularry reinstalling
> computer from scratch, ful formatting drive, fresh operating system,
> fresh pgp installation, ...
This doesn't exclude tempest and the likes. Nor does it exclude hardware
keyloggers on a motherboard level (or inside the keyboard). I'm having
trouble taking the rest of your info seriously due to the method of
penetration you describe they used.
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPvmLbeXlGBWTt1afEQJPxACfXwBSfxUqBCYFZmXjegQoXaWTZCoAoP7F
6tnkPdQBgZKn57K5w7R0hIsd
=22Oa
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Gamma3000
news:280cb468.03062...@posting.google.com...
> <snip>
> They weren't that regular. They were from departament who has
> experience in such cases.
What department?
John Edgecombe
Frode wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> John Veldhuis wrote:
> >>> Police connected laptop to my desktop computer and within fraction of
> >>> seconds they got access to all the files i stored on encrypted volume.
> >>> It is not possible to crack 128bit key within 60 seconds with today's
> >>> laptop computers, neither it's possible to exaust all combinations of
> >>> 28 character passphrase. The only explanation is that there is a
> >>> SERIOUS BACKDOOR, a SECURITY FLAW in PGP.
> >> If any regular german cop was carrying around a laptop capable of
> >> cracking PGP, the world would know as much. The security flaw is almost
> >> certainly something you did (entered the passphrase while at work for
> >> example), than one in
> >> PGP.
> > He did not claim PGP was cracked, he claimed it took the police 60
> > seconds to access files stored inside a PGPDisk, which is imho another
> > matter.
>
> Did you read his final line? It mentions "serious backdoor" and "security
> flaw in PGP". I agree that using a backdoor isn't strictly speaking
> cracking, if that was your point, although exploiting a security flaw would
> be. But that's just nitpicking on the definition of the term "cracking".
>
> - --
> Frode
Note the careful phrasing used "had access to", and not "could read the
cleartext".
Yes, I can have access to the files by connecting my laptop to that computer;
it would not do me any good if all I could read was the encrypted text (if it
was encryted non-trivially).
--john
Frode
Hash: SHA1
John Edgecombe wrote:
>> Did you read his final line? It mentions "serious backdoor" and
>> "security flaw in PGP". I agree that using a backdoor isn't strictly
>> speaking
>> cracking, if that was your point, although exploiting a security flaw
>> would be. But that's just nitpicking on the definition of the term
>> "cracking".
> Note the careful phrasing used "had access to", and not "could read the
> cleartext".
> Yes, I can have access to the files by connecting my laptop to that
> computer; it would not do me any good if all I could read was the
> encrypted text (if it was encryted non-trivially).
We're talking about a PGP Disk here, not individually encrypted files. If
you can access the files within it it is mounted and thus accessible. If
the disk is unmounted all you get is the container file, not the files
contained therein. I don't think you can even get any filenames out of it
without decrypting it.
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPwFb0+XlGBWTt1afEQLH1wCfRsZB68nkVgYCPo1yKZa8MNILoWQAoOlZ
aIaHkgxP3Otu7NsLEzud8Gi4
=9sld
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Jason Tik
Hash: SHA1
| I don't think you can even get any filenames out of it
| without decrypting it.
You cant. No sizes either.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0
Comment: My Key: 6ACE DC2C 4C5A 9911 96F3 DDEB C7EC A953 ADE5 0951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=NYnT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Christopher Culver
> They weren't that regular. They were from departament who has experience
> in such cases.
> Passphrase has never left my computer, because documents were stored at my
> desktop computer at home. Originals of documents were destroyed, copies
> wiped with pgp wipe. Passphrase was not written down. Keyloggers also are
> excluded because i'm regularry reinstalling computer from scratch, ful
> formatting drive, fresh operating system, fresh pgp installation, ...
> Volumes were always unmounted when not in use. Freespace wipe was done
> once in week. Impossible that there was passphrase leak, because it is
> only in my head.
It's possible that they got your passphrase from a TEMPEST attack and then
used to access your drive.
Or you could just be making the whole thing up, which is probably.
Christopher Culver
Paul Rubin
> Keyloggers also are excluded because i'm regularry reinstalling
> computer from scratch, ful formatting drive, fresh operating system,
> fresh pgp installation, ... Volumes were always unmounted when not in
> use. Freespace wipe was done once in week.
Even if your story weren't fiction the above conclusion is wrong. For
example, IIRC, the key logger the FBI used against Nicodemo Scarfo was
a hardware device that recorded keystrokes in its own chunk of flash
memory. There was absolutely no way to detect it or bypass it or
remove it by reinstalling or changing the computer software. Some of
these things are small dongles that plug between the keyboard and the
motherboard keyboard connector, so you could find it by looking for
it, but it's also possible to put the logging directly into the
keyboard controller chip on the motherboard where it would be almost
impossible to find.
Iconoclast
Hash: SHA1
The simple answer to the title question is -- yes. Yes, an intelligence
agency (particularly the NSA) is capable of breaking your encryption,
and it won't take them a millennium to do it.
The answer is yes, because:
1. The primary rule regarding encryption is to NEVER, EVER assume that
it is foolproof.
2. The biggest weakness in any cryptographic system is the user.
3. Most people use only alphabetic characters in their passphrases,
mainly dictionary words and passwords of short length, which they do not
change regularly.
4. Currently, the NSA has the largest amount of hardware and software
devoted to cryptologic purposes in the world.
5. The amount of those resources they devote to you is directly
proportional to how import they think your information is.
However, all that said, it is unlikely that they would bother to
actually devote the resources necessary to break each encryption. It is
more likely that the information is obtainable through a myriad of other
ways, from obtaining your passphrase or unencrypted files to other
humint/sigint information you release. In other words, it doesn't
matter whether you have the best encryption in the world on something if
you talk about it openly to everyone you meet.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQE/JCTTRXdnWwUG3P8RAmGOAKDA+XoxS6A11HjxOHFAOPTUouSJtwCg847V
SeZegeHb4fpw/qdo1phzs0M=
=M3Le
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Iconoclast
> On Sun, 27 Jul 2003 20:15:48 +0100, Iconoclast
> <icono...@iconoclast.me.uk> wrote:
>
>
>>The simple answer to the title question is --
>
>
>
> Randolph.
> .
> Thought For The Day
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> " You can always tell when a politician is lying.
> Their lips move."
> - Max Headroom
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
So you believe that PGP is unbreakable? Or do you believe that the
average user actually conforms to good practice? Where do you disagree?
Care to elaborate?
Iconoclast
Hash: SHA1
If you mean that
1. Given a properly generated large key
2. A properly secured large mixed passphrase
3. Proper protocolled use (including the proper paranoia) and
4. Attention to detail
it's hard enough to make the government look at all the other possible
means that the same information could be obtained, then I believe that
that is what I stressed in my own post.
If, on the other hand, you do not think that enough computing power
currently exists in the hands of the government to significantly shorten
the required time to break encryption on a file, then I disagree.
However the user you have stipulated is a perfect user. As I have
stated, the user is the weakest link in any system of encryption. A
vault is not the weak part of a security system. The guard who can be
convinced to open it with a gun to his head is.
Therefore, given the average user of PGP with very little training in
information security, it becomes much more likely for an agency to get
hold of his passphrase or at worst his private key, and begin work from
a couple of steps up the ladder.
The question is not how secure the information is, but who is willing to
go farthest to obtain/protect it. Frankly, if it were worth the effort,
the average user would not be able to withstand the methods that could
be applied to obtain the passphrase to a symmetrically-encrypted drive.
However, on top of that, as I also said, those who can be paranoid
enough to think that every phone is wiretapped can sometimes be trusting
enough to repeat it to the wrong ears. So in the end using encryption
to protect what you throw about freely is useless.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQE/LA7XRXdnWwUG3P8RAvMnAJ4u5alDJ7ZpSRpFQj5dtA5DzSNvDgCffCFh
tLDNAk/ll+q0PPffO2ZeYE0=
=l2M8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Mike
"Iconoclast" <icono...@iconoclast.me.uk> wrote in message
news:7aUWa.15468$Id1.1...@newsfep2-win.server.ntli.net...
You may find this link to have some very interesting reading:
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/cases.html
Iconoclast
Hash: SHA1
I did find it interesting, thanks.
I see I can stand by the human factor being the weakest link in the
cases listed that used actual encryption software, since only one was
listed as being brute-forced (by the well-known DOE supercomputer, which
is used by ___). The rest were plea-bargains and sell-outs.
I have never said that it would take only a short time for the
government to break a PGP encryption, but I still say that with the
situation of such files not being truly random, but conforming to a
format, and with the computing power available, it simply would not take
as long as advertised with truly random permutations. What I saw
instead was cases where they simply decide that it is too hard to bother
with when they can get the information in other ways.
I'm sorry, but in answer to the original question, I still say yes, they
can. As I said before, though, it is going to take a very good reason
for them to expend the computing power and time to do it.
One factor is the time involved. Even a short period of time can make
the intelligence useless both to the investigators and to the targets.
So why spend an unreasonable amount of cryptologic resource time, when
the information can be acquired in other ways, as it was in most of the
cases listed.
Another factor is that criminal and intelligence investigations are not
started by the discovery of encrypted material. There is some other
evidence that triggers the investigation. Often the encrypted material
may only be a bonus or final piece to the investigation. If someone is
watching you and monitoring your transmitted information, you can bet
that they didn't just happen on to you by chance. They have either
found something suspicious or someone has put them onto you.
However, although I am enjoying this conversation, I don't deal with
such things professionally anymore. So I guess now I'm an amateur.
Frankly, my primary interest in PGP is to use it on a basis which is
just regular enough to be annoying to any routine monitoring of emails.
I simply believe in privacy and in frustrating any government which
believes that it has a right to intercept my communications.
Anyone who thinks that there are *no* mechanisms in place for monitoring
would be foolish, but on the other hand at a worst case scenario, I do
not believe that such measures are complete. Therefore, I am doing my
harmless little part to confound it.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
iD8DBQE/L/vGRXdnWwUG3P8RAlq1AKCNF9ailuf66YARerdxtJF/FBAkpgCfQ86n
FsMfupKaN+dn7fc7O0WDcQE=
=1V0U
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------------------------------------------
The two most common elements in the universe are Hydrogen and stupidity.
*Harlan Ellison (1934 - )*
-------------------------------------------------
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Iconoclast wrote:
> Anyone who thinks that there are *no* mechanisms in place for monitoring
> would be foolish, but on the other hand at a worst case scenario, I do
> not believe that such measures are complete.
What's your view on Echelon?
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPzABpeXlGBWTt1afEQL5WwCg+MaNRNAFqS/CPc1F6fubTIeenx8AoL27
3anRoI6mwb+D8lvOGTZ0vs5q
=MXiZ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Anonymous
I have found this thread very interesting indeed.
I wonder if I could share this with you and ask for your
observations.
Over about four years I had occasion to have contact with a firm
which had developed quite an interesting security system. For a
start
all employees, including contractors, had to be photographed
front and
side as well as fingerprinted. We had our facial features
measured,
distance between the eys etc We also had to read a longish
paragraph
into two mikes. They also collected body odour!!! I strongly
suspect
they also ran a background check as well. In the morning we were
sniffed
at thumb tested facial features scanned before getting in. We
were
given temporary passes which expired dailly. We were also
escorted
where ever we went. Most firms I have had dealings with were
quite
secretive about security. Not this one. They positively boasted
about
it. I was lumped in with new starts and given a classroom tour of
the company, health and safety and security! and our contract
only
lasted six months, we finished in four).
No one talked about the product! And to this day I still don't
know
what it is/or was.(!)
I learned that some doors could only be opened with two swipe
cards plus
the respective holders live thumbs!! Four password holders had
to be
physically present to open the folder to get the "work units"
out. The
password holders were changed on a random basis. The passwords
were
changed dailly, but not at the same time. The really interesting
thing
I found was that the guys who unlocked the folders for the work
units
did not have the passwords for the contents. Only those working
directly
on them and their supervisor had that. The really amazing thing
for me was the number of actions which required two people to be
present!
The part we were in held 60 PCs not one linked to a network, no
direct
access to the outside world. Even the internal phones were
strictly
internal. On a separate system. All personal stuff had to be
left in the
changing room. My tools had to be examind on the first day and
left
in the building untill the job was done (buggered for homers!).
It was a tiresome job but highly profitable for our company. The
company
held on to it on and of for about four years the last job was in
2001.
I happened to be in that part of town the other week and decided
as we
seemed to have lost the contract, to see if they were still
there. Gone.
I contacted my boss to see if he knew anything and all he could
do in
response was to mutter something about apples growing again.
The security was awesome. But the worrying thing was that each
security
measure had been introduced because of "problems experienced".
Regular
emplyees were given a reward for flaws uncovered.
OK
Iconoclast
Hash: SHA1
I will not presume to doubt your post, but I only know of a few places
that would approach the security procedures you describe.
On a positive note, I think the security policy in your reply would not
even require the level of technology stated in order to work.
Technology is a poor substitute for good practice, which is more
important. Most important of all, the business sounds like it has a
healthy pro-active attitude toward security.
Requiring more than one user, and in fact different, unrelated users
from different departments, is a good practice. It does cut the risk of
lone violations to a minimum. However, one important point is to have
unrelated users, possibly having materials security on a random rota to
different departments, to lower the risk of concerted violations (i.e.
successful armoured car robberies have taken place through multiple
inside men). Four password holders is, however, unnecessarily
complicated. That said, it is still an important step.
Having no outside access is only practical in certain applications. In
certain companies, there has been what is termed "manual separation", or
a step where it requires a human being to carry a tape cassette or zip
drive with transactions over to a completely separate system in order to
transmit them. In other cases, certain privately owned networks run
parallel to but not touching the public communications networks
throughout the US.
Biometric security is only necessary at certain points. Using it at
every opportunity becomes more of a show than a practical point. In
fact, most thumbprint scanners in place still cannot tell the difference
between a live and dead thumb, since they only read the print. Body
odour is rarely used, and a simple sneeze can cause a burst blood
vessel, changing your retina outside of the recognition parameters until
the bruising heals. However, it is most important at main chokepoints
- -- entrances and floors or department entrances. Facial features, as
you may know, are realtively unique, but the measurements used have a
high error rate when attempting to validate identity through CCTV
cameras, etc. However, this is improving, as the ability to enhance
images reliably grows. Several camera scanning programs looking for
wanted criminals have met with some variable sucess in the UK and other
countries.
Requiring changing rooms, uniforms and lockers is a normal precaution.
Sanitizing tools once and then holding them until completion of the job
is also standard practice these days for anything you want secure.
The workstation practice of requiring four keyholders everytime someone
goes to the lav sounds a bit off to me. Curently, I would say that
there are few places that would require Tom Cruise dangling from a rope
in order to break them. The point of security is that it is never 100%.
~ Therefore, you have to exercise the best practice that you can.
However, you also have to maintain operability. Therefore things like
breakrooms and bathrooms are usually duplicated within larger secure
areas so that you don't need to leave more than one level in order to
use the facilities.
Those are my conservative observations.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iD8DBQE/MrPiRXdnWwUG3P8RAuzKAKDYsVUXJAbNfbHtiAaQZqk/5rd/9wCgr2y+
OdcIQTdqc0R4lPSb62U1o8E=
=Umrx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Iconoclast
Hash: SHA1
My view on its existence, purpose, limitations, etc?
If it did not exist, I will simply say that I would be extremely
surprised at the level of hoax.
I would have some difficulty positing its purpose, as the purpose of
intelligence gathering in general is simple -- to protect one's own
interests. Anything with a more moral approach relates to application,
not basic purpose. So as far as purpose, I think it obvious that the
purposes of the clients would be their own. Concerted intelligence
resources have existed for some time. The difference is merely the type
and extent.
As far as limitations, I do not yet believe that the scope of collection
is yet complete. There are still holes, especially in voice
communications, considering the amount of networks and exchanges that
are constantly changing. Political limitations on use are farcical,
since the majority of these would be placed on the client, not on the
original collection. To have a UN-based or multinational committee in
charge of limiting Echelon would be a joke, since it would not have any
actual power and the sheer volume of collection prevents accurate
auditing of the processes to determine compliance with any limitations.
The problem with introducing morals into intelligence-gathering is that
it limits the usefulness of the info if applied at the collection point
and is meaningless if applied at the point of client service.
So, I send out encrypted messages on a semi regular basis just to
confound the entire idea. Because while encryption is available to the
common man which takes long enough to break that the effort is not worth
the reward, there is still privacy.
Was there anything else about it you wanted to discuss?
Frode wrote:
| What's your view on Echelon?
|
|
| --
| Frode
|
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iD8DBQE/MrvyRXdnWwUG3P8RAke8AJwNt2reaR+6jqkCEOOVurIYVTiC+ACgyKOY
BxFTEv5Pq5fnBSy2l8eKp8Q=
=FHNh
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Iconoclast wrote:
> My view on its existence, purpose, limitations, etc?
I have a terribly memory but I think what I was getting at was how you view
it in relation to something in the area of "complete systems" that you
mentioned (or something to that effect).
> As far as limitations, I do not yet believe that the scope of collection
> is yet complete. There are still holes, especially in voice
> communications, considering the amount of networks and exchanges that
> are constantly changing.
Ah yes, this would be the bit I was wondering about. I consider it a given
that it's highly unlikely it's capable of eavesdropping on local calls
(outside of the US at any rate, inside I wouldn't be surprised by anything
the current government might decide to do or are already doing). It seems
equally likely though that the major international lines are included
though. Obviously satellites as well. That really only leaves local
exchanges inside countries and between countries Echelon has not managed to
get established.
> since the majority of these would be placed on the client, not on the
> original collection. To have a UN-based or multinational committee in
> charge of limiting Echelon would be a joke,
The UN did investigate the existense of Echelon. It's probably linked on
echelonwatch somewhere, but the bottom line was the comittee concluded
there was a high likelyhood of it existing and some thoughts with regards
to the privacy concerns. That's about as far as the UN has gotten on the
issue afaik.
The only way of limiting Echelon is to render it useless. It has no place
in a democracy. It doesn't take much in the ways of intellect to connect a
few dots based on a few well known quotes. Knowledge is power. Power
corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. Absolute knowledge......
There's a reason I shudder every time I hear of a new "total information
awareness" or similar law proposed anywhere in the world.
> Was there anything else about it you wanted to discuss?
Wasn't looking to discuss it at all to be honest. Based on what's floating
round the rumormill about it it seems about as "complete" as it can get
without getting every government to tap every phone exchange. Was curious
as to how much it would take for you to define it as "complete" short of
every home being surveiled.
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPzLD6OXlGBWTt1afEQJ2EACgnsaPvTelq3ccR5yFciIl/SsqeZAAn3S8
fGKDQ7W/L7gVTUMkDMF+bT4R
=Pze1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Iconoclast
Hash: SHA1
| Ah yes, this would be the bit I was wondering about. I consider it a given
| that it's highly unlikely it's capable of eavesdropping on local calls
| (outside of the US at any rate, inside I wouldn't be surprised by anything
| the current government might decide to do or are already doing). It seems
| equally likely though that the major international lines are included
| though. Obviously satellites as well. That really only leaves local
| exchanges inside countries and between countries Echelon has not
managed to
| get established.
I agree fully. That was part of what I meant by exchanges and systems
changing. Not only would they have to link into every local system to
capture all local calls, but they would have to maintain it through all
the upgrades, etc. that the local telephone companies pursue. Satellite
systems will certainly be monitored, since they are the easiest (no
physical connection required). Oceanic cables are also certainly
linked, through their shore-side facilities. These are the choke points
for international calls. However, some international calls, i.e. in
certain Middle Eastern countries, do not use these choke points but
instead travel via connected local networks.
| The UN did investigate the existence of Echelon. It's probably linked on
| echelonwatch somewhere, but the bottom line was the committee concluded
| there was a high likelyhood of it existing and some thoughts with regards
| to the privacy concerns. That's about as far as the UN has gotten on the
| issue afaik.
Again, that's what I've seen as well. There is an almost certainty of
it existing. However, no international body, besides that formed by the
sponsor-clients, could actually exercise any control over it, at least
at present. Couple this with the fact that the sponsor-clients are
almost certainly all member nations, and it reinforces the impotence of
the UN in the current day to police its own members.
| The only way of limiting Echelon is to render it useless. It has no place
| in a democracy. It doesn't take much in the ways of intellect to connect a
| few dots based on a few well known quotes. Knowledge is power. Power
| corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. Absolute knowledge......
| There's a reason I shudder every time I hear of a new "total information
| awareness" or similar law proposed anywhere in the world.
The interesting part is that I still have some difficulty with believing
that word total. The problem is that the sheer volume of communications
*might* eventually be encompassed by a computer system, but even a
synopsis of that volume would be sure to overwhelm human analysts.
Therefore, all observation would still have to be targeted in order to
be effective. We have satellites that watch the entire globe. And yet
we will never know all that goes on on the face of it.
| Wasn't looking to discuss it at all to be honest. Based on what's floating
| round the rumormill about it it seems about as "complete" as it can get
| without getting every government to tap every phone exchange. Was curious
| as to how much it would take for you to define it as "complete" short of
| every home being surveiled.
As a loose "throwing around" definition, I would term complete any
system which was able to target itself accurately and intercept any open
communications of that target. As of yet, the War on Terror hasn't been
won. That is one hint that none of the electronic intelligence programs
is complete.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iD8DBQE/Mt5GRXdnWwUG3P8RAs7gAKC8/opj7fa0f2a0HJF2jQcl8V5TtwCg9F9Y
8PNVUap8PxUR30QaSfOHjtw=
=PMbi
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Iconoclast wrote:
> As a loose "throwing around" definition, I would term complete any
> system which was able to target itself accurately and intercept any open
> communications of that target.
So you include conversations while walking in the park etc? In that case
I'd agree. I wouldn't define it that specific though. For me it would be
more or less complete when all it takes is to mutter "I heard the janitor
say he might be a terrorist" in order to obtain warrants for tapping homes
and phones. That does leave out letters and conversations outside of the
home unless there's a human being following the person around with
listening devices.
> As of yet, the War on Terror hasn't been
> won. That is one hint that none of the electronic intelligence programs
> is complete.
Unless they start figuring out a way to have a satellite track someone and
listen in on conversations as well as being able to do tempest from space,
I doubt it ever will be. There will always be a place without a microphone,
or encryption too time consuming to break. The war on terror won't be won
by any of the means the current administration seems to think will do the
trick as far as I can see. All this tampering with surveillance laws will
errode civil rights more every day with no great effect versus terrorism.
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPzN1seXlGBWTt1afEQJjGACgqVBtUhQb//c63/ca5SWPngwkxQMAniRJ
yQpYu3UhnH/2LGO7CHdCsQ6x
=KPct
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Gamma3000
> Unless they start figuring out a way to have a satellite track someone and
> listen in on conversations as well as being able to do tempest from space,
> I doubt it ever will be. There will always be a place without a
microphone,
> or encryption too time consuming to break. The war on terror won't be won
> by any of the means the current administration seems to think will do the
> trick as far as I can see. All this tampering with surveillance laws will
> errode civil rights more every day with no great effect versus terrorism.
What about the quantum computer. That'll be able to break PGP with ease -
the programs have already been written to factor public keys, they just need
something to run on. But to my knowledge, there is no encryption as yet that
is as good as unbreakable on a QC, even assuming that the person doing the
encrypting also has access to a QC.
--
-----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK-----
Version 3.12
GU d- s+:- a--- C++(++++) !U W++(+++) N+(++) o K? w+(--) ?O M>++
V? PS+ PE-@ Y+(++) PGP++ t+(*) 5 X R(+) tv(-) b+(+++)
DI++++ D G e(*) h!>--- r++ z+>+++
------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------
Lee Meyrick
<snip>
> What about the quantum computer. That'll be able to break PGP with
> ease - the programs have already been written to factor public keys,
> they just need something to run on. But to my knowledge, there is no
> encryption as yet that is as good as unbreakable on a QC, even
> assuming that the person doing the encrypting also has access to a QC.
then you havent read much, if alice and bob both have QC then they can
comunicate securely because the transmission cannot be intercepted.
It is also not known whether QC could factorise sufficiently to for use in
breaking keypairs.
Lee
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Gamma3000 wrote:
>> Unless they start figuring out a way to have a satellite track someone
>> and listen in on conversations as well as being able to do tempest from
>> space, I doubt it ever will be. There will always be a place without a
>> microphone, or encryption too time consuming to break. The war on terror
>> won't be won by any of the means the current administration seems to
>> think will do the trick as far as I can see. All this tampering with
>> surveillance laws will errode civil rights more every day with no great
>> effect versus terrorism.
> What about the quantum computer.
It won't enable you to do anything except break current encryption. It
won't help gather information you can't today except for that isolated case
with encrypted electronic communication. Chances are pretty good terrorists
rely on more old fashioned methods like triggering an action, previously
agreed upon face-to-face, with set keywords etc.
Also, by the time QCs are actually operational so will quantum encryption
most likely (as others have mentioned).
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPzTTceXlGBWTt1afEQKt1QCgquRixEPE7EXY3RnaCZ20EUruiXUAniZD
F8hIw2088oaKyBeCVcOAK0yY
=zQXs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Gamma3000
> Gamma3000 wrote:
> >> Unless they start figuring out a way to have a satellite track someone
> >> and listen in on conversations as well as being able to do tempest from
> >> space, I doubt it ever will be. There will always be a place without a
> >> microphone, or encryption too time consuming to break. The war on
terror
> >> won't be won by any of the means the current administration seems to
> >> think will do the trick as far as I can see. All this tampering with
> >> surveillance laws will errode civil rights more every day with no great
> >> effect versus terrorism.
> > What about the quantum computer.
>
> It won't enable you to do anything except break current encryption. It
> won't help gather information you can't today except for that isolated
case
Granted
> ...Chances are pretty good terrorists
> rely on more old fashioned methods like triggering an action, previously
> agreed upon face-to-face, with set keywords etc.
Actually, there are a number of cases where terrorists used PGP or similar
encryption, and the authorities were unable to break it. I think there was a
case recently in Europe where terrorists were captured with PGP encrypted
data on their palmtop, and the police could not gain access to the data
which could have contained important data about other terrorists etc.
> Also, by the time QCs are actually operational so will quantum encryption
> most likely (as others have mentioned).
Yes, but how long will it take from the government getting a QC capable of
breaking PGP type encryption to me getting my own QC in my living room
capable of encrypting data that a QC will not be able to decrypt. Also, I
read somewhere that a program has already been written for a QC to break PGP
style encryption (and just because the computer does not exist yet does not
mean that they can't write a program for it - they know how it will work,
they just don't know how to make it work), however a whole new method of
encryption will have to be devised that is QC-proof, since just picking
higher primes won't work.
Frode
Hash: SHA1
Gamma3000 wrote:
>> ...Chances are pretty good terrorists
>> rely on more old fashioned methods like triggering an action, previously
>> agreed upon face-to-face, with set keywords etc.
> Actually, there are a number of cases where terrorists used PGP or
> similar encryption, and the authorities were unable to break it. I think
> there
> was a case recently in Europe where terrorists were captured with PGP
> encrypted data on their palmtop, and the police could not gain access to
> the data which could have contained important data about other terrorists
> etc.
I read about that case too. They were supposedly members of the "Red
Brigade" in Italy. I can't claim I've heard much of terrorist attacks in
Italy I must admit. Nor any abroad acts linked to said group. But I'm not
exactly well read on these matters. Even if assuming they were big players
planning the next attack on the scale of the WTC for example, I still hold
firm that it's much more likely they'd be doing so without much use of
electronic aids. They wouldn't get an encrypted message saying "attack the
embassy now" but rather an old fashioned phonecall saying "hooppa doppa
poopa" or any nonsense that can't be linked to anything without having
previously surveilled the conversation where the above was agreed upon. And
that would likely be done face-to-face.
This all assume they have some semblance of a working mind, which they
unfortunately seem to have, and that I'm not making all the wrong guesses.
>> Also, by the time QCs are actually operational so will quantum
>> encryption most likely (as others have mentioned).
> Yes, but how long will it take from the government getting a QC capable
> of breaking PGP type encryption to me getting my own QC in my living room
> capable of encrypting data that a QC will not be able to decrypt.
Quantum cryptography already been done in the private sector using quantum
entanglement (http://tinyurl.com/jkqx). I don't see much possibility of a
govt QC capable of breaking today's encryption being viable prior to QE
based encryption being the same. Of course, this is all assumption. I'm not
a cryptographer nor is my last name Hawking.
> read somewhere that a program has already been written for a QC to break
> PGP style encryption (and just because the computer does not exist yet
> does not mean that they can't write a program for it - they know how it
> will work, they just don't know how to make it work), however a whole new
> method of encryption will have to be devised that is QC-proof, since just
> picking higher primes won't work.
Agreed. If/when QC becomes usable technology it'll be a quantum leap
(pardon the pun) in number crunching power and other encryption will have
to be deviced. But, as I mentioned above, I doubt that'll be much of an
issue. Hopefully the need for encryption will have passed before such a day
and we'll all live in a Star Trek like utopia instead :)
- --
Frode
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 8.0.2
iQA/AwUBPzZ8I+XlGBWTt1afEQKNpQCgsBNlxp9G2YAn3qVIgXmH3P9VK8sAn24p
rtybisqV9fzpoTI4gGpVXrrI
=1Mq0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----