Protecting your encryption keys is bad?
Tim Smith
Roy's upset at the development of open source software to use hardware
encryption and tamper detection to make Linux computers safer:
<http://boycottnovell.com/2009/11/20/suse-opensuse-tpm/>
I tried to follow his links to get his reasoning, but just ended up in
various unrelated complaints about Bill Gates and such.
Roy, can you explain exactly how using hardware on my computer to
enforce that my computer only runs the software I want it to run, and
that helps enforce limiting encryption key access to programs that I
approve of, is "lock-in" and "takes your rights away"?
--
--Tim Smith
7
sock Tim Smith wrote on behalf of Half Wits from Micoshaft Appil
Department of Marketing:
>
> Roy's
You are obsessed. Soon you will become mad.
Go get a life of your own.
Count some lamp posts for example or go train spotting.
It makes interesting change from pure asstroturfing all day.
Or install Linux and check out all the new features
in Ubuntu 9.10 in you interested in genuine Linux advocacy.
http://www.distrowatch.com
http://www.livecdlist.com
Richard Rasker
Not to answer for Roy, but "Trusted Computing" has attracted its share of
criticism -- obviously not for its ability to increase the security of your
own data and applications, but because it can also be used to deny the user
control over what's happening on his own computer, e.g. for DRM purposes.
Here's a rather clearer (compared to the links on Roy's site) article about
real and percieved threats of TC:
http://www.cippic.ca/trusted-computing/
The key problem in TC is that by definition, the user isn't the highest
trusted authority on his own computer any more.
Richard Rasker
--
http://www.linetec.nl
High Plains Thumper
> Not to answer for Roy, but "Trusted Computing" has attracted its
> share of criticism -- obviously not for its ability to increase the
> security of your own data and applications, but because it can also
> be used to deny the user control over what's happening on his own
> computer, e.g. for DRM purposes.
>
> Here's a rather clearer (compared to the links on Roy's site) article
> about real and percieved threats of TC:
>
> http://www.cippic.ca/trusted-computing/
>
> The key problem in TC is that by definition, the user isn't the
> highest trusted authority on his own computer any more.
It reminds me of the statement, "We're the Government and we are here to
help."
I want to be in control of my data and my software purchases, not
someone determine for me what is right or wrong.
Sounds like weasel words.
--
HPT
Tim Smith
Richard Rasker <spam...@linetec.nl> wrote:
> The key problem in TC is that by definition, the user isn't the highest
> trusted authority on his own computer any more.
The TC drivers for Linux are fully open. It is entirely up to the owner
of the computer what TC is used for, there is no higher authority.
--
--Tim Smith
Lusotec
"Trusted Computing" (TC) and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) has several
applications. Some are useful to the user but most are *not*.
I see two that may be useful to the user.
The first is disk encryption but it has serious problems. The key is stored
in hardware and the encrypted file systems can only be decrypted on that
hardware. This is a problem for removable file systems and in case of
(inevitable) hardware failure.
The second is file white listing validation. White listing executables,
libraries, and configuration files with hardware support is a strong way to
protect a systems. The user must be in control, otherwise, it can be used to
control the user's computing experience (e.g. what OS, apps, files the user
can use, view, copy).
Regards.