Re: Correcting logic to make it a system of correct reasoning [ Wittgenstein and I ]( Prolog backchaining )

[olcott]

On 5/14/2022 9:59 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 5/14/22 10:42 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 5/14/2022 8:42 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 5/14/22 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 5/13/2022 7:27 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/13/22 7:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 6:01 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>> olcott <No...@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 3:46 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <No...@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/13/2022 2:16 PM, Ben wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> olcott <No...@NoWhere.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Validity and Soundness*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Good plan.  You've run aground as far as halting is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerned, so you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> better find another topic you don't know about.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It has been dead obvious that H(P,P)==0 is the correct halt
>>>>>>>>>>>> status for
>>>>>>>>>>>> the input to H(P,P) on the basis of the actual behavior that
>>>>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>>>>> input actually specifies.
>>>>>>>>>>> It is now dead obvious that you accept that no algorithm can
>>>>>>>>>>> do what the
>>>>>>>>>>> world calls "decide halting".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Tarski makes a similar mistake...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> <snip distractions>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>   That is, in the context of C-like code
>>>>>>>>>>> that you are more comfortable with, no D can exist such that
>>>>>>>>>>> D(X,Y) is
>>>>>>>>>>> true if and only if X(Y) halts and is false otherwise.
>>>>>>>>>>> Do you now accept that this is not possible?  (I know, I
>>>>>>>>>>> know...  I
>>>>>>>>>>> don't really expect an answer.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As expected, no answer.  You can't answer this because you know
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> would be the end of you bragging about halting.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> All undecidable problems always have very well hidden logical
>>>>>>>> incoherence, false assumptions, or very well hidden gaps in
>>>>>>>> their reasoning otherwise the fundamental nature of truth itself
>>>>>>>> is broken.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, YOUR definition of truth gets proved to be inconsistent with
>>>>>>> the system.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you want to insist that Truth must be Provable, then you need
>>>>>>> to strictly limit the capabilities of your logic system.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Your failure to understand this just shows you are a century
>>>>>>> behind in the knowledge of how Truth and Logic actually works.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The key thing here is not my lack of extremely in depth
>>>>>> understanding of all of the subtle nuances of computer science.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The key thing here is my much deeper understanding of how logic
>>>>>> systems systems sometimes diverge from correct reasoning when
>>>>>> examined at the very high level abstraction of the philosophical
>>>>>> foundation of the notion of (analytic) truth itself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ittgensteinW had the exact same issue with mathematicians
>>>>>> learned-by-rote by-the-book without the slightest inkling of any
>>>>>> of the key philosophical underpinnings of these things, simply
>>>>>> taking for granted that they are all these underpinnings are
>>>>>> infallibly correct.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When these underpinnings are incorrect this error is totally
>>>>>> invisible to every learned-by-rote by-the-book mathematician.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That other people have made the same errors, doesn't make you right.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note also, you are refering to a person who lived nearly that
>>>>> century ago, to a man who admitted he didn't understand mathematics
>>>>> (and thought it not valuable)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> He refuted Godel in a single paragraph and was so far over
>>>> everyone's head that they mistook his analysis for simplistic rather
>>>> than most elegant bare essence.
>>>
>>> Nope, He made the same mistake YOU are making and not understanding
>>> what Godel actually said (because he hadn't read the paper).
>>>
>>> As I understand it (and I will admit this isn't a field I have
>>> intensly studied), this statement is solely from private notes that
>>> were published after his death. If he really believed in this
>>> statement as was sure of it, it would seem natural that he actually
>>> would of published it.
>>>
>>> It seems likely that he had some nagging thought that there was an
>>> error in his logic that he worked on and either never resolved or he
>>> found his logic error and thus stopped believing in that statement.
>>>
>>
>> Since I wrote Wittgenstein's entire same proof myself shortly before I
>> ever heard of Wittgenstein I have first-hand direct knowledge that his
>> reasoning is correct.
>
> No, you THINK his reasoning is correct because you agree with it,
>

No, I independently verified his reasoning before I ever saw his reasoning.

> That is NOT proof. You thinking it is shows your lack of understanding.
>
>>
>> His full quote is on page 6
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
>>
>>
>> This is the key source of our agreement that makes Wittgenstein have
>> the exact same view as mine:
>>
>>     'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved
>>      in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system'
>>      means:the opposite has been proved in Russell's system.-
>>
>> True(x) iff Stipulated_True(x) or Proven_True(x)
>
> Which either needs to be taken as an assumption, or needs to be proved
> to be true.
>

That no counter-examples can possibly exist is complete proof that it is
true. There are no categories of expressions of language that are both
true and neither stipulated as true or proven to be true (sound
deduction) on the basis of semantic connections to other true
expressions of language.

> If needs to be taken as an assumption, it is not something that IS
> unconditionally true.
>
>>
>> There are only two possible ways that any ANALYTICALLY expression of
>> language can possibly be true:
>> (1) It is stipulated to be true. // like an axiom
>> (2) It is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to (1)
>> or the consequences of (2).         // like sound deduction
>
> WRONG.
>
> There are only two possible ways that they can be ANALYTICALLY true.
>

Should I capitalize my use of ANALYTICALLY too so that you can see that
I already specified this? (I capitalized it, above)

>>
>> Analytic truth includes every expression of language that can be
>> completely verified as totally true entirely on the basis of its
>> meaning without requiring any sense data from the sense organs.
>
> And there are other truths besides Analytic Truth. That is implied by
> the need of the adjective.

All of math and logic is exclusively ANALYTICAL.

>>
>> Empirical expressions of language also require sense data from the
>> sense organs to verify their truth.
>
> Nope, things can be empirically true even without the sense data.
> Without the sense data they are not KNOWN to be true, but might be.
>

to verify their truth.
to verify their truth.
to verify their truth.

>>
>> This means that if there are no connected set of semantics meanings
>> (sound deduction) that make an analytical expression of language true
>> then then it cannot possibly be true unless it was stipulated as true.
>
> WRONG. You are again confalating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH.

Counter-examples are categorically impossible because ALL ANALYTIC
expressions of language ONLY derive their truth value from semantic
connections to other ANALYTIC expressions of language that are known to
be true, AKA sound deduction.


>>
>> The conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis and mind is that if G is
>> unprovable in F then G is simply untrue in F.
>> Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)).
>
> WRONG.
>
> Makes the erroneous assumption that Truth requires proof, and becomes a
> circular argument.

It is not a circle it is a tree of sound deduction.
The conclusion is linked backwards (sound deduction in reverse) to every
expression of language that derives it.

>
>>
>> Even though F does meet the erroneous mathematical definition of
>> Incomplete(F) that F was ever construed as incomplete is simply
>> incorrect because it does not screen out expressions of language that
>> are simply not truth bearers.
>
> Except that the expression of language WAS a Truth Bearer, as a given
> statement MUST be either Provable or not. This comes because you of
> course can't prove an statement that can't be true, like a non-sense
> sentence.
>

As recently as 1974, people were still clueless about the issue of the
liar paradox.It is the simplest of all self-reference paradoxes so I
bought the domain name liarparadox.org for my work.

Tarski based his whole proof on the liar paradox and proved in his
metatheory that it is not provable in his theory, same result as Godel.

> Unless you are willing to define that Provability isn't a Truth Bearer,
> which since you are then defining Truth as Provable, the Truth of a
> statement isn't a Truth Bearer, you have a problem. You whole logic
> system collapses as it can no longer talk about itself.
>

True(F, x) is implemented as Provable(F, x) through sound deduction on
the basis of premises known to be true. In a reverse sound deduction
(same thing as Prolog back-chaining inference) know truths (AKA Prolog
facts) are sought on the basis of Prolog rules.

https://www.google.com/search?q=prolog+back+chainikng&rlz=1C1GCEJ_enUS813US813&oq=prolog+back+chainikng&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i10i160.4658j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8


>
>>
>> Tarski made this same mistake with a much simply yet comparable proof
>> to the Gödel 1931 incompleteness theorem:
>> Tarski undefinability theorem 1936
>> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>>
>>     "the sentence x which is undecidable in the original theory
>>     becomes a decidable sentence in the enriched theory."
>>
>> It is not that Tarski's metatheory is smarter than his theory.
>> It is that Tarski's x (the liar paradox) is not provable or true in
>> his theory because it is not a truth bearer in his theory in the same
>> way that Gödel's G is not a truth bearer in F.
>>
>>> This make the "appeal" to him as an authority to rebut Godel
>>> incorrect, as he never stood as an authority to make such a claim, he
>>> just investigated it in private notes.
>>>
>>> Perhaps he realized that his argument to try to prove that Truth can
>>> be proven rested on the assumption of a definition that Truth was
>>> Provable and thus is just a circular argument.
>>>
>>> As I have put to you, PROVE that Truth must be Provable, or by your
>>> own logic the statement isn't true. We KNOW (if we have any
>>> intelligence) that there are Truths that we do not know about, so it
>>> is established that some truths are at least unknown for now. What is
>>> the basis for saying that there can't be an aspect that happens to be
>>> true even though we can not prove it?
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> You aseem to be refering to writings published post-humously about
>>>>> a his comments on a paper he hadn't yet actually read, and that he
>>>>> never repeated after actually reading the paper.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, that is very good basis for claiming your idea have to be right.
>>>>>
>>>>> You have shown ZERO understanding for the rules of logic, and that
>>>>> your opinions are basically worthless.
>>>>>
>>>>> If you want to try to ACTUAL PROVE something, based on REAL
>>>>> ESTABLISHED rules of logic, go ahead and give a try.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note, this means NOT just falling back to "the meaning of the
>>>>> words" except when you are actually QUOTING the accepted meaning of
>>>>> those words in the field and showing how they apply.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't know if I have ever seen you put together a string of logic
>>>>> more that one or two steps before you go off on a "this must be
>>>>> true" side track, and never actually use any of the fundamental
>>>>> definitions. (You may quotes some of them, but then never actually
>>>>> use that definition in your nest step of the proof).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>


--
Copyright 2022 Pete Olcott

"Talent hits a target no one else can hit;
Genius hits a target no one else can see."
Arthur Schopenhauer

[Richard Damon]

WRONG. Again you conflate Analytic truth with truth.

The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't
eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no possible
"non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.

Thus either the statement "Collatz is True", or "Collatz is False", must
be true, and there is no known proof or refutation for either, While
this doesn't prove that no proof exists, it does point out a flaw with
your statement, until you have actually proved or refuted a statement,
you don't even know if it could be a truth bearer.

Thus we have a, at least possible, counter-example when you claim none
exist. You can only refute this as a possible counter-example by actualy
proving that a proof or refutation actually exists.

>
>> If needs to be taken as an assumption, it is not something that IS
>> unconditionally true.
>>
>>>
>>> There are only two possible ways that any ANALYTICALLY expression of
>>> language can possibly be true:
>>> (1) It is stipulated to be true. // like an axiom
>>> (2) It is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to (1)
>>> or the consequences of (2).         // like sound deduction
>>
>> WRONG.
>>
>> There are only two possible ways that they can be ANALYTICALLY true.
>>
>
> Should I capitalize my use of ANALYTICALLY too so that you can see that
> I already specified this? (I capitalized it, above)

Except then it points out that you erroeous omit it in your other
statements.

>
>>>
>>> Analytic truth includes every expression of language that can be
>>> completely verified as totally true entirely on the basis of its
>>> meaning without requiring any sense data from the sense organs.
>>
>> And there are other truths besides Analytic Truth. That is implied by
>> the need of the adjective.
>
> All of math and logic is exclusively ANALYTICAL.

That is part of your error. Math and Logic use analytical methods to
prove its ideas, but not all Truth in math and logic is Analytical.

>
>>>
>>> Empirical expressions of language also require sense data from the
>>> sense organs to verify their truth.
>>
>> Nope, things can be empirically true even without the sense data.
>> Without the sense data they are not KNOWN to be true, but might be.
>>
>
> to verify their truth.
> to verify their truth.
> to verify their truth.

Truth doesn't need to be "Verified" to be True. It only needs to be
verified before its Truth can be used to create other Truths in a Proof.

>
>>>
>>> This means that if there are no connected set of semantics meanings
>>> (sound deduction) that make an analytical expression of language true
>>> then then it cannot possibly be true unless it was stipulated as true.
>>
>> WRONG. You are again confalating KNOWLEDGE with TRUTH.
>
> Counter-examples are categorically impossible because ALL ANALYTIC
> expressions of language ONLY derive their truth value from semantic
> connections to other ANALYTIC expressions of language that are known to
> be true, AKA sound deduction.
>

Thus, the circular definition.

You only show that ANALYTIC Truth must be proven, not Truth.

Analytics accept that not all Truth is Analytically proven. You make a
category error assuming all Truth must be Analytically True.

Note, An Analytical Statement might be True but not Analytically ture.

>
>>>
>>> The conclusion of Wittgenstein's analysis and mind is that if G is
>>> unprovable in F then G is simply untrue in F.
>>> Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)).
>>
>> WRONG.
>>
>> Makes the erroneous assumption that Truth requires proof, and becomes
>> a circular argument.
>
> It is not a circle it is a tree of sound deduction.
> The conclusion is linked backwards (sound deduction in reverse) to every
> expression of language that derives it.

Nope. Give the NON-CIRCULAR proof.

Your failure to show what you claim is evidence that you don't actually
have a real proof.

Your statement that "Something is True only if it is Provable" is itself
a contradiction unless you can ACTUALLY prove it, and until you do, you
can not use it.

Without such a proof, the statement says it can not be true, so you can
not use it.

>
>>
>>>
>>> Even though F does meet the erroneous mathematical definition of
>>> Incomplete(F) that F was ever construed as incomplete is simply
>>> incorrect because it does not screen out expressions of language that
>>> are simply not truth bearers.
>>
>> Except that the expression of language WAS a Truth Bearer, as a given
>> statement MUST be either Provable or not. This comes because you of
>> course can't prove an statement that can't be true, like a non-sense
>> sentence.
>>
>
> As recently as 1974, people were still clueless about the issue of the
> liar paradox.It is the simplest of all self-reference paradoxes so I
> bought the domain name liarparadox.org for my work.
>
> Tarski based his whole proof on the liar paradox and proved in his
> metatheory that it is not provable in his theory, same result as Godel.
>
>> Unless you are willing to define that Provability isn't a Truth
>> Bearer, which since you are then defining Truth as Provable, the Truth
>> of a statement isn't a Truth Bearer, you have a problem. You whole
>> logic system collapses as it can no longer talk about itself.
>>
>
> True(F, x) is implemented as Provable(F, x) through sound deduction on
> the basis of premises known to be true. In a reverse sound deduction
> (same thing as Prolog back-chaining inference) know truths (AKA Prolog
> facts) are sought on the basis of Prolog rules.
>
> https://www.google.com/search?q=prolog+back+chainikng&rlz=1C1GCEJ_enUS813US813&oq=prolog+back+chainikng&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i10i160.4658j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
>
>

And Prolog doesn't define logic, but is just a programming languge to
handle simple rule sets.

Note, Prolog doesn't provide a well implemented "Not" operator, in part
BECAUSE it defines a statement that is unprovable as false.

If you want to limit your logic to what Prolog can handle, be my guess,
but then stay out of things beyond its capability, like Compuation Theory.

I don't think you are smart enough to understand the limitation of
Prolog (or even simple logic) and thus make enormous errors not
understanding the limited domain of your tools.

You just don't see that you logic system has become horribly
inconsistent because you close your eyes to those errors and say that
logic must be wrong, but you can't actually define WHAT is wrong with
the logic, because it actually does follow the rules you propose.

[olcott]

I am ALWAYS only talking about ANALYTIC TRUTH, the only time I ever talk
about EMPIRICAL TRUTH, is to say that I am not talking about that.

> The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
> sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't
> eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no possible
> "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
>

If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of
semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
found in finite time.

[Richard Damon]

Then stop talking about things that aren't analytically true.

For instance, Godel's G is NOT 'Analytically True' in F, because you
can't prove it, but it IS 'True' because you can show via a meta-logical
proof in a higher system that it actually is True.

Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.

It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in the
systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically True", but
it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.

The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True, or
Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth Bearer.

Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically True
or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of KNOWLEDGE,
and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE.
Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are talking about
ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field
understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.

Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True that
are outside knowledge.

>
>> The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
>> sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't
>> eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no possible
>> "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
>>
>
> If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
> derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of
> semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
> found in finite time.

But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at least
by the normal definitions of a proof.

[olcott]

OK great this is a key agreement between us.

> Collatz Conjecture IS either True or False, but it may not be
> Analytically True or False until someone can prove or refute it.
>

Analytically True or False is the same as True or False, except that is
excludes expressions of language dealing with sense data from the sense
organs.

> It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in the
> systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically True", but
> it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
>

If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic meanings
proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.

I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can be
found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite search to
find.

> The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True, or
> Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth Bearer.
>
> Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically True
> or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of KNOWLEDGE,
> and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE.
> Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are talking about
> ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of the field
> understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to do that.
>
> Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
> Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True that
> are outside knowledge.
>
>
>
>>
>>> The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
>>> sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even doesn't
>>> eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is no
>>> possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
>>>
>>
>> If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
>> derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of
>> semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
>> found in finite time.
>
> But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at least
> by the normal definitions of a proof.
>

I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.

[Richard Damon]

FALSE. Where is the Collatz conjecture being True in that? (If it is)

>> It is possible that it is True, but totally unprovable, at least in
>> the systems it is definied in, so it can NEVER be "Analytically True",
>> but it is still True, and the conjure has ALWAYS been a Truth Bearer.
>>
>
> If it is true then there must be a connected set of semantic meanings
> proving that it is true otherwise it is not true.
>
> I don't think that it matters whether or not this connected set can be
> found, thus is still would exists even if it took an infinite search to
> find.

Unless you make the finite sequence from axioms to the result, you don't
have a Proof.

>
>> The key point is that just because something isn't Analytically True,
>> or Analytically refuted doesn't mean that the statement isn't a Truth
>> Bearer.
>>
>> Note also, There are true statements that are neither Analytically
>> True or Emperically True. Those are distinctions made in fields of
>> KNOWLEDGE, and only relate to catagorizing KNOWN Truths, or KNOWLEDGE.
>> Epistemology, as you seem to like describing what you are talking
>> about ISN'T about studying Truth, but KNOWLEDGE. A proper student of
>> the field understands the difference, but you don't seem to be able to
>> do that.
>>
>> Epistemology does NOT define what is "True", only what is "Known". A
>> Proper Epistemolist understand that there are things that are True
>> that are outside knowledge.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> The Collatz conjecture, that there exist no number N such that the
>>>> sequence of progreesing to 3N+1 for N odd, and N/2 for N even
>>>> doesn't eventually reach 1, MUST be either True of False. There is
>>>> no possible "non-answer", as math doesn't allow for such things.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If the answer requires an infinite search then this answer cannot be
>>> derived in finite time. None-the-less there exists a connected set of
>>> semantic meanings that make it true or false even if they cannot be
>>> found in finite time.
>>
>> But a non-finite chain of reasoning is NOT considered a proof, at
>> least by the normal definitions of a proof.
>>
>
> I am referring to correct reasoning that differs somewhat from logic.
>

Then why are you talking about fields of LOGIC?

Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning in
that Formal System.

You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
begining of that Formal System.

I have pointed this out many times.

If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.

People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that something
is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the power of the
logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.

I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area, because
it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to where you
want to get to.

In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the great
mistakes of the past.

[olcott]

So this is where correct reasoning and logic diverge on terminology.
When I refer to a set of connected semantic meanings this seems not
exactly the same thing as a proof. If this set does not exist, then the
expression is not true. If the set exists yet is impossible to find then
it is still true.

So that I can correct its mistakes. It has mistakes (incoherence and
inconsistency) baked right into the definitions of its terms of the art.

>
> Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning in
> that Formal System.
>
> You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
> begining of that Formal System.
>
> I have pointed this out many times.
>
> If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
> the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
>

Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.

> People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that something
> is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the power of the
> logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
>
> I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area, because
> it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to where you
> want to get to.
>

Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into the
definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with correct
reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.

> In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the great
> mistakes of the past.

[Richard Damon]

So something can be "Provable" yet no "Proof" actually be findable or
expressable?

That means you might not know if you have Proven Something.

So, again, your are at the wrong end. If you want to change the
fundamental definitions, you need to be talking about the Core Logic
rules that you think need to be changed, not try to change them in a
derived logic system, when such a change is NOT allowed.

>
>>
>> Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning
>> in that Formal System.
>>
>> You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
>> begining of that Formal System.
>>
>> I have pointed this out many times.
>>
>> If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
>> the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
>>
>
> Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.

So start with your new logic system and see what you can get to in your
limited time left, Sounds like you have wasted decades of time by
working at the wrong end of the stick.

>
>> People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that
>> something is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the
>> power of the logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
>>
>> I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area, because
>> it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to where you
>> want to get to.
>>
>
> Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into the
> definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with correct
> reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.

So YOU say. Then start at the base and see how far you can get based on
your new idea.

Probably only a few decades of work for someone who knows what they are
doing.

Starting at the wrong end is like trying to stop a mile long freight
train by dragging a bucket out the back of the caboose.

[olcott]

We cannot correctly label any analytical expression of language as true
unless and until:
(1) It has been stipulated to be true.

(2) a connected set of semantic meanings back-chain to expressions of
language that have been stipulated to be true.
This is the same system that Prolog uses.

The reason that I keep referring to the Tarski proof is it essentially
the exact same proof Gödel after Gödel has been simplified 100,000-fold.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

Tarski simply uses the liar paradox which

Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof

Thus making Tarski's simpler proof equivalent to Gödel's, even though
Tarski's whole proof is only two pages long.

>>
>>>
>>> Formal Logic STARTS with its definition of what is correct reasoning
>>> in that Formal System.
>>>
>>> You can not change that definition without needing to restart at the
>>> begining of that Formal System.
>>>
>>> I have pointed this out many times.
>>>
>>> If you want to change the ground rules of logic, you need to start at
>>> the other end, and begin with a NEW Formal Logic with your new rules.
>>>
>>
>> Same idea as logic, created to correct the errors of logic.
>
> So start with your new logic system and see what you can get to in your
> limited time left, Sounds like you have wasted decades of time by
> working at the wrong end of the stick.
>
>>
>>> People HAVE looked at this idea of inserting the conditon that
>>> something is only True if it can be proven, and it greatly limits the
>>> power of the logic system, in particular, it can't handle much math.
>>>
>>> I get the feeling that you haven't really looked at that area,
>>> because it seems too much "learn by rote", and says you can't get to
>>> where you want to get to.
>>>
>>
>> Logic has mistakes (incoherence and inconsistency) baked right into
>> the definitions of its terms of the art. When we contrast logic with
>> correct reasoning then we might see that these are mistakes.
>
> So YOU say. Then start at the base and see how far you can get based on
> your new idea.
>

I started this "new idea" in 1997.

> Probably only a few decades of work for someone who knows what they are
> doing.
>
> Starting at the wrong end is like trying to stop a mile long freight
> train by dragging a bucket out the back of the caboose.
>
>>
>>> In short, your ignorance of the past has doomed you to repeat the
>>> great mistakes of the past.
>>
>>
>

[Richard Damon]

Source for this "Claim". It can not be labeld "Analytically True", yes,
but nothing says it can not be True. (If we can't prove it True we can
not use it to actually directly prove something else, but it can be True).

You seem to be saying that the Collatz conjecture can not have a Truth
Value, because it has not been proven, even though it can be proven that
it must be either True of False?

This is where you claim of working only with "Analytic Truth" breaks
down, because you use statement that only apply to analytic truths to
apply to all truths, and thus you actually LIE.

Until you can actually PROVE that statement (that the analytic statement
can not be "True" (refering to Truth in General) then your are just
LYING in your claims and being a Hypocrit, as you claim the only Truths
you can use are Analytically True, and thus Provable, without actually
Proving your statement.

>
> The reason that I keep referring to the Tarski proof is it essentially
> the exact same proof Gödel after Gödel has been simplified 100,000-fold.
> https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
>
> Tarski simply uses the liar paradox which
>
> Gödel says:
> 14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
> undecidability proof
>
> Thus making Tarski's simpler proof equivalent to Gödel's, even though
> Tarski's whole proof is only two pages long.

And you again assume that True -> Provable which it does not.

Note, Tarski specific restricts himself to field that support
Arithmatic, and it has been proven that such a field does NOT support
the concept that True -> Provable without becoming inconsistent.

The fact that you ignore the incosistancies shows you lack of
understanding of logic.

So what have you done with it? What basic laws of logic have you shown
still hold and which don't?

Have you gotten anywhere near trying to support math under your system?

This is the area that you might be able to make productive work with a
paper, assuming you actually HAVE some new idea that isn't just one of
the old tired theories that either dead ended or created some know
limited logic system.

My first guess is that you haven't studied enough of the work in this
field to even know if your idea is really new, as you keep running into
the same traps that they did a century ago, so you obviously haven't
learned from them. (But of course, they Learned-By-Rote what can't work,
so aren't useful to study).

[olcott]

It can only be declared as having an unknown truth value.

[Richard Damon]

Which means it HAS a truth value of True or False but we don't know which.

That is VERY difffernt then it having neither, which is what you have
been claimiing (or at least what your words meant).

This shows your confusion between Truth and Knowledge.

Truth is about what actually IS

Knowledge is about what we know about what is.

[olcott]

Unless and Until a (possibly unknown) connection exists between an
expression of language back-chained by sound deductive inference steps
to known truth, the expression is not true.

> This shows your confusion between Truth and Knowledge.
>
> Truth is about what actually IS
>
> Knowledge is about what we know about what is.

None-the-less the sequence of inference steps must exist, analytical
truth is parasitic.

[Richard Damon]

Absolutely NOT. There does NOT need to be proof that something is true.

IF you want to claim that, by YOUR definition, you need to actually
PROVE it.

And, you can't do that by assuming it, you need to actually PROVE it
from the accepted axioms.

Since you can't, that just shows your statement isn't TRUE.

It is a fact, that it HAS been proved that if you include such a rule in
your axioms, that you can get an inconsistent system once you allow
certain logical operations to be used, that are needed to support
mathemeatics.

So, your arguement fails.

[olcott]

“Analytic” sentences, such as “Pediatricians are doctors,” have
historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the
meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by
knowing those meanings.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/

Every analytic expression of language (including math and logic) must be
connected to it meaning showing that it is true OR IT IS NOT TRUE.

Expressions of language that are not connected to their meaning are
meaningless thus neither true nor false.

> And, you can't do that by assuming it, you need to actually PROVE it
> from the accepted axioms.
>
> Since you can't, that just shows your statement isn't TRUE.
>
> It is a fact, that it HAS been proved that if you include such a rule in
> your axioms, that you can get an inconsistent system once you allow
> certain logical operations to be used, that are needed to support
> mathemeatics.
>
> So, your arguement fails.

[Richard Damon]

So, how do you use the meaning of the words in "The Square of the
Hypotonuse of a right triangle is equal to the sume of the squares of
the other two sides" to show it is true?

I think you will have problems.