In article <
2024Jan2...@mips.complang.tuwien.ac.at>,
an...@mips.complang.tuwien.ac.at (Anton Ertl) wrote:
>
j...@cix.co.uk (John Dallman) writes:
> > The timeline doesn't work. DEC decided to adopt MIPS in 1989,
> > because they were loosing market share worryingly quickly.
> > NVAX was released in 1991, and they'd have had real trouble
> > developing it without the cash from MIPS-based systems.
>
> I forgot that in this alternative reality DEC would have killed the
> VAX 9000 project early, leaving them lots of cash for developping
> NVAX. Still, it could easily have been that they would have lost
> customers to the RISC competition until they finally managed to do
> the OoO-VAX.
>
> For developing an OoO-VAX the relevant time is 1985-1995 (HPS wrote
> their papers on OoO (with VAX as example) starting in 1985, the
> Pentium Pro appeared in 1995). Of course, for OoO-VAXes to succeed
> in the market, the relevant timespan was 1995-2005. Intel dropped
> the 64-bit IA-32 successor ball and AMD picked it up with the 2003
> releases of Opteron and Athlon64.
This requires DEC to take notice of those papers and start developing OoO
quite quickly. They did not do that historically, and they seem to have
been confident that their way of working would carry on being effective,
until RISC demonstrated otherwise. This is the timeframe where IBM gave
up on building mainframes with competitive compute power, and settled for
them being capable data-movers.
If DEC go OoO and build an OoO Micro-VAX CPU by about 1988, they can get
somewhere. The MicroVAX 78032 of 1985 was 125K transistors; the 80386 was
275K transistors the same year, the 40486 was 1.2M transistors in 1989,
so the transistor budget could be there.
> Would they have gotten those customers back, or would they have lost
> to IA-32/AMD64 anyway? Probably the latter, unless they found a
> business model that allowed them to milk the customer base that was
> tied to VAX while at the same time being cheap enough to compete
> with Intel.
I had experience from two different market segments of dealing with DEC.
In the early 1990s, I was working for a company based around MS-DOS
software. That was running pretty fast on 486 and Pentium machines. We
had contact with DEC because one of our large customers had DEC as their
primary IT supplier, and one of our managers had bought a DEC PC, from a
company who realised he was ignorant and unloaded obsolete hardware on
him at high prices.
If you weren't a major DEC customer, they were hell to deal with. They
just didn't do things, even after agreeing to do so. They charged
ludicrous prices for minor things. We needed a replacement key for the
anti-tamper lock on DEC PC, because the chap had lost it. They were free,
but the delivery charge was about $60, by cab. Getting them to just post
it took a lengthy argument.
Getting a replacement Pentium for one that had the FDIV bug required
compiling a log of weeks of broken promises from the parts centre and
faxing it to DEC's personnel department, asking for it to be placed on
the relevant manager's file and considered at his next performance review.
We couldn't just get one from Intel: the necessary heat sink was
permanently bonded to the old chip, so we needed a new one with DEC's
specific heatsink.
At the customer who had DEC as an IT supplier, DEC staff didn't know
anything about PCs or MS-DOS. They only knew VMS, which seemed weird and
arcane to us, but the DEC staff were sure it was infinitely superior, and
could not explain why. They really did not make DEC seem attractive as a
supplier.
Then I changed jobs in 1995 to a company that supplied software for VAX
VMS, Alpha VMS, OSF/1 on Alpha and Windows on Alpha. Dealing with DEC
from there was much better. They were capable, helpful and efficient. But
they still didn't understand PCs, and Windows NT was effective at running
complex software and was far cheaper and more attractive to PC users than
VMS.
The OoO VAX alternate history changes a lot of things. It means PRISM
doesn't start, and the multiple-personality OS concept that became MICA
may or may not happen. The lack of a PRISM+MICA cancellation means Dave
Cutler probably doesn't move to Microsoft, and then Windows NT doesn't
happen, at least not in the same way.
The Mac still causes a shift to GUIs. If DEC can come up with, or buy in,
a good one then they may do very well, and Microsoft may not become
nearly so important. That would reduce the importance of Intel, which
might mean IA-64 never happens.
> They tried to go for that on the Alpha: they used firmware for
> market segmentation between VMS/Digital OSF/1 on the one hand and
> Linux/Windows on the other; and they also offered some relatively
> cheap boards, e.g. with the 21164PC, but those were probably too
> limited to be successful.
Producing software for Alpha Windows was reasonably straightforward, if
you had well-behaved software written in a HLL that there were compilers
for. This meant that people who were coming down from the Unix world
didn't have much trouble. Going upwards from the MS-DOS/Windows world was
harder: you couldn't hit the hardware, you had to rewrite any assembler
code, and FX!32 wasn't quite as good as it was cracked up to be. Alpha
Windows software was worth producing until about 1998, when its
performance advantage evaporated.
> VAX would have been extended to 64 bits some times in the early
> 1990s in the alternative timeline, and DEC would have been tempted
> to use the 64-bit extension for market segmentation, which again
> could have resulted into DEC painting itself into a niche.
Yup. Really, you have to get the traditional DEC management to all retire
before 1990, and the new management need to be brave /and/ lucky.
John