Truth (was Destiny)
Neil Rickert
In <5t4oks$20ee$1...@newsxfs02-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>gr...@umich.edu wrote that community and individual truths
>actually exist yet actual truth or truths do not exist. I see his
>point of view and I find it to be correct and proper and yet it is
>bogus and merely obstructive. It sounds good and yet it
>tastes bad and has no apparent nutritional value.
>Suppose you have a cook, a cookbook, and a pudding. One might
>view these components as individual, representation and reality
>respectfully or use insight to view the presence of individual
>truth, community truth and actual truth respectfully where the
>proof is in the pudding. The pudding is a pudding even if all
>humans disappear magically and it is a pudding even if called by
>another name. Puddings existed before they were named. Did
>the Earth not exist until observers arrived to give it a name?
I would say that your example does not work. A pudding is a pudding
by virtue of its role in the community. If a yellow mass exuded from
the side of a volcano, and happened to be chemically identical to a
pudding, would it actually be a pudding? I think not.
So, yes, puddings might have existed before they were named. But
they could not have existed before the community which gave them
their role.
>Science is looking for truth regardless of social posturing.
I would say that they are creating truth.
>Religion and Art and Philosophy are also searching for truth.
I would say that they are often proclaiming truth, not always
convincingly.
>Mr. Stevens would have us accept that all these endeavors are
>doomed to failure and all humans shall ever hold are created
>truths. His suggestion that all truths are created rather
>than found or discovered is obstructive and regressive. He
>is simply wrong and the proof is in the pudding for any and
>all to verify.
I expect that the dispute is really about what we should take truth
to be. If truth is taken to be an attribute of sentences and of
other representations, then there would seem to be nothing
obstructive in pointing out that representations, and the standards
by which they are evaluated, are created. If, however, you take
truth to be an attribute of states of the world then you can claim
that they are independent of human creative acts, but you run into
the problem that they are inaccessible to humans so that 'truth'
becomes a useless concept.
CDJ
> If a yellow mass exuded from
>the side of a volcano, and happened to be chemically identical to a
>pudding, would it actually be a pudding? I think not.
So it's impossible, as a conceptual matter, for it to be a _discovery_ that:
some volcanoes spew pudding?
That doesn't strike me as plausible.
>So, yes, puddings might have existed before they were named. But
>they could not have existed before the community which gave them
>their role.
So you can't, conceptually, understand the claim that a member of this
community, a botanist, reports his discovery of a pudding-producing plant, so
that not only are people-following-various-milk-based-recipes a source of
pudding, but so is this plant ("puddantae", if it needs to be named).
Moreover, this botanist discovered, the fossil record clearly indicates that
puddantae (in various species, or flavors) existed for at least hundreds of
millions of years - long before there was anything that deserves the name
"community" on the planet.
Of course such a story is completely ludicrous; I don't for a minute expect
anyone to believe that such a discovery is likely in the least. I don't
however see what is _unintelligible_ about such an event coming to pass (or
"necessarily false", if one prefers).
>I expect that the dispute is really about what we should take truth
>to be. If truth is taken to be an attribute of sentences and of
>other representations, then there would seem to be nothing
>obstructive in pointing out that representations, and the standards
>by which they are evaluated, are created.
I was under the impression that the created/discovered distinction, as a
hard-and-fast sort of thing, went the way of analytic/synthetic after Two
Dogmas, etc. ?
> If, however, you take
>truth to be an attribute of states of the world then you can claim
>that they are independent of human creative acts, but you run into
>the problem that they are inaccessible to humans so that 'truth'
>becomes a useless concept.
Curious: Is anyone out there (besides Weinstein) familiar with Grover, Camp,
and Belnap's essay "A Prosentential Theory of Truth" ?
CDJ
Neil Rickert
In <5t5597$j...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> cdjo...@pitt.edu (CDJ) writes:
>In article <5t4qne$2...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, ric...@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) said:
>> If a yellow mass exuded from
>>the side of a volcano, and happened to be chemically identical to a
>>pudding, would it actually be a pudding? I think not.
>So it's impossible, as a conceptual matter, for it to be a _discovery_ that:
>some volcanoes spew pudding?
The discovery would be that the spewed a pudding-like substance.
That would not make it pudding, unless people adopted the practice of
using it as pudding.
>>So, yes, puddings might have existed before they were named. But
>>they could not have existed before the community which gave them
>>their role.
>So you can't, conceptually, understand the claim that a member of this
>community, a botanist, reports his discovery of a pudding-producing plant, so
>that not only are people-following-various-milk-based-recipes a source of
>pudding, but so is this plant ("puddantae", if it needs to be named).
One could understand the claim. But one would understand it as a
metaphorical use of "pudding." Possibly, depending on whether it
became a practice to actually eat this as pudding, the metaphorical
meaning of "pudding" might merge with the ordinary meaning.
>>I expect that the dispute is really about what we should take truth
>>to be. If truth is taken to be an attribute of sentences and of
>>other representations, then there would seem to be nothing
>>obstructive in pointing out that representations, and the standards
>>by which they are evaluated, are created.
>I was under the impression that the created/discovered distinction, as a
>hard-and-fast sort of thing, went the way of analytic/synthetic after Two
>Dogmas, etc. ?
Right. And thus a whole and potentially important direction of
investigation has been artificially closed off, because "Two Dogmas"
has become dogma.
>Curious: Is anyone out there (besides Weinstein) familiar with Grover, Camp,
>and Belnap's essay "A Prosentential Theory of Truth" ?
If you can give a reference, I may take a look (although I don't
expect to be impressed).
Lewis Jorgenson
Truth and pudding
gr...@umich.edu wrote that community and individual truths
actually exist yet actual truth or truths do not exist. I see his
point of view and I find it to be correct and proper and yet it is
bogus and merely obstructive. It sounds good and yet it
tastes bad and has no apparent nutritional value.
Suppose you have a cook, a cookbook, and a pudding. One might
view these components as individual, representation and reality
respectfully or use insight to view the presence of individual
truth, community truth and actual truth respectfully where the
proof is in the pudding. The pudding is a pudding even if all
humans disappear magically and it is a pudding even if called by
another name. Puddings existed before they were named. Did
the Earth not exist until observers arrived to give it a name?
The pudding has its own existence apart from the cook or the
cookbook. The cookbook can exist after all the cooks and literate
folks are gone. Cooks can write and/or read cookbooks about
puddings they have known or could know. Puddings can be hot or
cold or warm or dry or wet or thick or thin or sweet or salty
or smooth or lumpy or quite a few ways and yet the puddingness
persists in a Platonic Plane of permanence. Yum.
Irrationality is not a horrible beast to be destroyed. Some folks
have a deep passion to control and to eliminate irrationality
from the process and as usual such deep passions are their own
form of irrationality.
>I fail to understand why you find it necessary to emphasize that
>you and I or anyone are limited to expressing community and/or
>individual truths. Ok. Right. Fine. You are quite properly
>correct. Now, let us move forward and make some progress
>instead of pretending that progress is impossible.
It appears that the pudding in the AI arena is the cook.
We want to create a cookbook to instruct others how to
cook up a cook. It used to be that one needed more
memory and now we have plenty of memory and so that is
not the problem. We can make computers that act like
humans and talk like humans and yet they are no more
human than Richard Burton was actually a king of England.
There is a repetoir of rationality which does not limit
actual humans.
One can take everything into consideration and then the
probability clouds turns everything into mush. Reality takes mush
and cooks up solidity and texture and a balanced diet of chaos and
order called self.
I have said over and over again that depending on the task at
hand one must decide what components are present and must be
considered to determine relationships. One finds components
and must ascertain whether those components were found and
discovered or whether the components are abstract concepts.
Rain is rain and only the most obstructive would argue about
the existence and occurrence of rain. The synonym reign involves
a sociological rain where the tone and the social atmosphere
are defined nearly as completely as the tone and physical
context of a regular rain. This is more subtle than memes
and yet it is the same general idea.
Science is looking for truth regardless of social posturing.
Religion and Art and Philosophy are also searching for truth.
Mr. Stevens would have us accept that all these endeavors are
doomed to failure and all humans shall ever hold are created
truths. His suggestion that all truths are created rather
than found or discovered is obstructive and regressive. He
is simply wrong and the proof is in the pudding for any and
all to verify.
At the risk of being silly,
And I say unto you, Mr. Stevens, turn from your path of
obstructionism and creationism, accept the truth that
actual truths exist. See the correlation between
beauty and truth in math, in physics, in art, in religion,
in computers, in life itself. Jettison your sophomoric
proposals that life is just a dream and engage beauty
where you shall find truth.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>In <5t5597$j...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> cdjo...@pitt.edu (CDJ) writes:
>>In article <5t4qne$2...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, ric...@cs.niu.edu
>>(Neil Rickert) said:
Rickert:
If a yellow mass exuded from the side of a volcano, and happened
to be chemically identical to a pudding, would it actually be a
pudding? I think not.
CDJones:
So it's impossible, as a conceptual matter, for it to be a _discovery_
that: some volcanoes spew pudding?
Rickert:
The discovery would be that the spewed a pudding-like substance.
That would not make it pudding, unless people adopted the practice of
using it as pudding.
Jorgenson:
You are playing word games that obstruct my observation that
actual truths exist. Pudding does exist and pudding like
substances certainly existed prior to human observers giving
a name to such events and exist regardless of what name or
role is later assigned.
Rickert:
So, yes, puddings might have existed before they were named. But
they could not have existed before the community which gave them
their role.
Jorgenson:
What? This is obstructionist word games. Perhaps you are a
creationist where in the beginning there was the word. Prior
to the word nothing existed. That is one valid approach to
looking at the state of affairs and yet hardly presents an
honest evaluation of the actual state of affairs.
CDJones:
So you can't, conceptually, understand the claim that a member of this
community, a botanist, reports his discovery of a pudding-producing plant,
so
that not only are people-following-various-milk-based-recipes a source of
pudding, but so is this plant ("puddantae", if it needs to be named).
Rickert:
One could understand the claim. But one would understand it as a
metaphorical use of "pudding." Possibly, depending on whether it
became a practice to actually eat this as pudding, the metaphorical
meaning of "pudding" might merge with the ordinary meaning.
Jorgenson:
You need to look up the word metaphorical in the dictionary as your
usage is confused. It appears that English is not your mother
language. Research must accomodate reality, reality need not
obey research statements. If a pudding making plant is found
then a pudding making plant has been found. What do you gain
from your approach?
Rickert:
I expect that the dispute is really about what we should take truth
to be. If truth is taken to be an attribute of sentences and of
other representations, then there would seem to be nothing
obstructive in pointing out that representations, and the standards
by which they are evaluated, are created.
CDJones:
I was under the impression that the created/discovered distinction, as a
hard-and-fast sort of thing, went the way of analytic/synthetic after Two
Dogmas, etc. ?
Rickert:
Right. And thus a whole and potentially important direction of
investigation has been artificially closed off, because "Two Dogmas"
has become dogma.
Jorgenson
Mr. Stevens is entirely correct that individuals articulate
individual or community truths. That being the case, all
statements are synthetic and as Mr. Quine states there is
no distinction between analytical/synthetic. However, I
maintain that actual truth does exist and that it can be
discovered by both analytical and synthetic means. I
am talking about truth rather than a pedantic correct/
incorrect/unknown evaluation of statements.
Suppose I am correct. Suppose gravity and light and time
and you and I do actually exist and are not merely
propositions. This being the case we might direct our
priorities towards truth as noted previously for art,
religion, science and philosophy. Suppose education is
not merely a socialization process and that it can actually
provide one with actual critical thinking skills. Suppose
you were not just playing a game and showing off your
word game skills. Actual truth exists and the acknowledgement
of that fact is a matter of wisdom.
CDJones:
>Curious: Is anyone out there (besides Weinstein) familiar with Grover,
Camp,
>and Belnap's essay "A Prosentential Theory of Truth" ?
Rickert:
If you can give a reference, I may take a look (although I don't
expect to be impressed).
Jorgenson:
I can not see your previous post and so I do not know if you
commented on my individual, community, actual truth model.
It is your reasoned opinion, Mr. Rickert, that actual truths
do or do not exist? I know better than to argue with the
old Rickert switch and this was a weak moment.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
In <5t63jr$14ee$1...@newsxfs02-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>Rickert:
>If a yellow mass exuded from the side of a volcano, and happened
>to be chemically identical to a pudding, would it actually be a
>pudding? I think not.
>CDJones:
>So it's impossible, as a conceptual matter, for it to be a _discovery_
>that: some volcanoes spew pudding?
>Rickert:
>The discovery would be that the spewed a pudding-like substance.
>That would not make it pudding, unless people adopted the practice of
>using it as pudding.
>Jorgenson:
>You are playing word games that obstruct my observation that
>actual truths exist. Pudding does exist and pudding like
>substances certainly existed prior to human observers giving
>a name to such events and exist regardless of what name or
>role is later assigned.
The argument is about the nature of language, and the nature of
'truth'.
You want to assume that a word such as 'pudding' refers to a
particular substance, and that natural language is a symbol
manipulating system, where the words are symbols having specific
referents. To point out that the way natural language is actually
used is inconsistent with such a view is hardly playing word games.
>Rickert:
>One could understand the claim. But one would understand it as a
>metaphorical use of "pudding." Possibly, depending on whether it
>became a practice to actually eat this as pudding, the metaphorical
>meaning of "pudding" might merge with the ordinary meaning.
>Jorgenson:
>You need to look up the word metaphorical in the dictionary as your
>usage is confused. It appears that English is not your mother
>language.
You only demonstrate the extent to which your own ideology has misled
you as to the nature of language.
> Research must accomodate reality, reality need not
>obey research statements. If a pudding making plant is found
>then a pudding making plant has been found. What do you gain
>from your approach?
I'll grant that if a pudding making plant is found, then an pudding
making plant has been found. That is a trivial tautology, and was
never in question. What was in question was whether 'pudding' is the
name of a substance.
>Jorgenson
>Mr. Stevens is entirely correct that individuals articulate
>individual or community truths. That being the case, all
>statements are synthetic and as Mr. Quine states there is
>no distinction between analytical/synthetic.
The second sentence does not follow from the first. If anything, the
first sentence is an argument for the possibility of analytic truths
which express relations between individual or community meanings.
>Suppose I am correct. Suppose gravity and light and time
>and you and I do actually exist and are not merely
>propositions.
I was not questioning whether you or I or light exist. What I
question, is whether there could be such things as propositions.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5t5c59$2...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
|In <5t5597$j...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> cdjo...@pitt.edu (CDJ) writes:
|
|>>the side of a volcano, and happened to be chemically identical to a
|>>pudding, would it actually be a pudding? I think not.
|
|>some volcanoes spew pudding?
|
|That would not make it pudding, unless people adopted the practice of
|using it as pudding.
I wonder if this divergence of intuitions stems from a difference
between American and British English? American usage, I expect,
represents pudding as a type or family of substance on a par with, say,
"gum" regardless of whether it happens to be served for eating as part
of a meal. It is only in British usage that "pudding" means dessert.
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Rickert:
The discovery would be that the spewed a pudding-like substance.
That would not make it pudding, unless people adopted the practice of
using it as pudding.
Jorgenson:
>You are playing word games that obstruct my observation that
>actual truths exist. Pudding does exist and pudding like
>substances certainly existed prior to human observers giving
>a name to such events and exist regardless of what name or
>role is later assigned.
Rickert:
The argument is about the nature of language, and the nature of
'truth'.
Jorgenson:
You are wrong and that is why I say you are playing word games.
Words are arbitrary while truth is set. The pudding is a
pudding regardless of what language is present or not present.
Rickert:
You want to assume that a word such as 'pudding' refers to a
particular substance,
Jorgenson:
You are wrong and I specifically addressed the myriad of
forms that fit into the arbitrary word pudding. Must a
pudding be wet or dry, hot or cold, sweet or sour? Yet
a finger stuck in a pudding can be describe and felt as
a pudding. We are getting back to raw feels here with
an intellectual understanding of the limitations of
raw feels.
Rickert:
and that natural language is a symbol manipulating system,
where the words are symbols having specific referents.
Jorgenson:
You are wrong and have assigned a limited relationship
between words and reality. Words are arbitrary rather
than concrete. Hence your misuse of the word metaphorical.
Rickert:
To point out that the way natural language is actually used
is inconsistent with such a view is hardly playing word games.
Jorgenson:
You are wrong. What is the name and role of the sun as felt by
dogs, plants, and the ocean? It does not require a name
or recognized role or any other of the formal representation
processes that you are demanding. The change of seasons
is a 'natural' language revealing the behavior of the Earth
around the Sun if you must discuss 'natural' languages.
Rickert:
>One could understand the claim. But one would understand it as a
>metaphorical use of "pudding." Possibly, depending on whether it
>became a practice to actually eat this as pudding, the metaphorical
>meaning of "pudding" might merge with the ordinary meaning.
Jorgenson:
>You need to look up the word metaphorical in the dictionary as your
>usage is confused. It appears that English is not your mother
>language.
Rickert:
You only demonstrate the extent to which your own ideology has misled
you as to the nature of language.
Jorgenson:
You are entitle to your opinion and I think you are wrong.
Metaphors are figures of speech while an accurate description
is an accurate description. The windmills of your mind is
a metaphor where no non-obstructionist would imagine that
you have windmills in your skull. The moist, pliable nature
of your brain and the brains of other mammals have been
and can be honestly described as puddings.
> Research must accomodate reality, reality need not
>obey research statements. If a pudding making plant is found
>then a pudding making plant has been found. What do you gain
>from your approach?
Rickert:
I'll grant that if a pudding making plant is found, then an pudding
making plant has been found. That is a trivial tautology, and was
never in question. What was in question was whether 'pudding' is the
name of a substance.
Jorgenson:
You are wrong as the word pudding is a word and not just a name.
Thus the word pudding can be used to 'name' various and sundry
substances.
>Mr. Stevens is entirely correct that individuals articulate
>individual or community truths. That being the case, all
>statements are synthetic and as Mr. Quine states there is
>no distinction between analytical/synthetic.
Rickert:
The second sentence does not follow from the first. If anything, the
first sentence is an argument for the possibility of analytic truths
which express relations between individual or community meanings.
Jorgenson:
You are wrong as community truths are simply a matter of
social events where an individual articulates consensual
truths by agreement or lying. Once again, all words are
arbitrary and so all articulated statements are synthetic
which indicates that the second sentence indeed follows from
the first sentence.
>Suppose I am correct. Suppose gravity and light and time
>and you and I do actually exist and are not merely
>propositions.
Rickert:
I was not questioning whether you or I or light exist. What I
question, is whether there could be such things as propositions.
Jorgenson:
I was discussing truth. I do not know why you failed to
answer whether actual truths exist or not and/or comment
on my categories of truth. I have addressed your position
and fail to understand why you choose to directly ignore
my position. You often switch the debate to some area
where you feel comfortable instead of directly addressing
the major topic.
With regard to your proposition concerns I think you are
being silly. I propose that Mr. Rickert is still playing
word games instead of being honest. Perhaps I am lying
or perhaps I am telling the truth. What leads you to
question the existence of propositions? Are you
proposing that propositions do not exist? It may
certainly be the case that my key board is mostly
empty space with a few statistical clouds of quanta
providing me the illusion of solidity. I propose
that the key board is solid and that everyone should
act as if the key board is solid. My approach is
pragmatic rather than logical as logic is certainly
a dead end street. This is partially because words
are arbitrary.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Chris Hooley
On 17 Aug 1997 21:37:14 GMT, ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote:
>
>I wonder if this divergence of intuitions stems from a difference
>between American and British English? American usage, I expect,
>represents pudding as a type or family of substance on a par with, say,
>"gum" regardless of whether it happens to be served for eating as part
>of a meal. It is only in British usage that "pudding" means dessert.
This isn't a universal American usage. "Pudding" means dessert to me also.
I've never heard it used to mean a substance of gummy texture.
I rather think that this thread once again straddles the uncomfortable
chasm between the meaningful models of experience (expressed through
socialized symbols) and the self-defining, ever-exfoliating, meaningless
single instant of reality.
All models, in my opinion, are fatally flawed because the modeller
unavoidably, through attention directed toward maintaining the conceptual
model, falls "behind" the self-authorizing reality.
Luckily AI doesn't need our models except to talk to us.
Regards
Chris
Neil Rickert
In <5t7qua$o...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5t5c59$2...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>|The discovery would be that the spewed a pudding-like substance.
>|That would not make it pudding, unless people adopted the practice of
>|using it as pudding.
>I wonder if this divergence of intuitions stems from a difference
>between American and British English? American usage, I expect,
>represents pudding as a type or family of substance on a par with, say,
>"gum" regardless of whether it happens to be served for eating as part
>of a meal. It is only in British usage that "pudding" means dessert.
British usage allows Yorkshire pudding, which is not a dessert. It
is still an edible food. Perhaps there is indeed a difference of
usage, though.
CDJ
>>I wonder if this divergence of intuitions stems from a difference
>>between American and British English?
>British usage allows Yorkshire pudding, which is not a dessert. It
>is still an edible food. Perhaps there is indeed a difference of
>usage, though.
Certainly I had in mind examples such as Jell-O brand as paradigmatic. Didn't
even know there _was_ another usage...
Maybe I should go to the UK sometime. Nah... life is soooooo much easier
pretending that there are only Americans, and American usages in the world
CDJ
Jan Sand
In article <5t63jr$14ee$1...@newsxfs02-int.news.prodigy.com>,
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
#Jorgenson:
#What? This is obstructionist word games. Perhaps you are a
#creationist where in the beginning there was the word. Prior
#to the word nothing existed. That is one valid approach to
#looking at the state of affairs and yet hardly presents an
#honest evaluation of the actual state of affairs.
Although I had rather not get enmeshed in pudding, of whatever origin,
there is something in the above paragraph that should be clarified.
Whoever translated the creation statement obviously had difficulties.
Cinderella ended up with a glass slipper because the translator
mistranslated the French word for fur. Thus the original biblical
statement probably was meant to say that in the beginning there was
the void, which makes it more congruent with accepted cosmology. The
mispronunciation of the word "word" of course led the translator to
substitute word for void and thus we are now in a fine mess, as
Mr. Hardy would say.
Watch out for puddings. Sometimes they end up on your nose!
JS&C
#
#Lewis Vance Jorgenson
#
#
Lewis Jorgenson
I saw the responses before I could see this
original post. I have snipped and trimmed
to address points in the original.
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>In <5t4oks$20ee$1...@newsxfs02-int.news.prodigy.com>
>LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
Jorgenson:
gr...@umich.edu wrote that community and individual truths
actually exist yet actual truth or truths do not exist. I see his
point of view and I find it to be correct and proper and yet it is
bogus and merely obstructive. It sounds good and yet it
tastes bad and has no apparent nutritional value.
Suppose you have a cook, a cookbook, and a pudding. One might
view these components as individual, representation and reality
respectfully or use insight to view the presence of individual
truth, community truth and actual truth respectfully where the
proof is in the pudding. The pudding is a pudding even if all
humans disappear magically and it is a pudding even if called by
another name. Puddings existed before they were named. Did
the Earth not exist until observers arrived to give it a name?
Rickert:
I would say that your example does not work. A pudding is a pudding
by virtue of its role in the community.
Jorgenson:
What becomes of the pudding if all humans magically disappear?
Would not insects and dogs and the Sun and gravity act upon the
pudding? The pudding has a role in nature and not just a role
assigned by the community.
>Science is looking for truth regardless of social posturing.
Rickert:
I would say that they are creating truth.
Jorgenson:
As with Mr. Stevens I agree and yet your emphasis denigrates
the actual state of affairs where actual truths do exist
and can be discovered. When physicians discovered the
internal organs of the human body did they create that
truth or discover that truth? In a manner of speaking
one can say that truth was created and yet that manner
of speaking is weird.
>Religion and Art and Philosophy are also searching for truth.
Rickert:
I would say that they are often proclaiming truth, not always
convincingly.
Jorgenson:
What exactly is your distinction between creating and proclaiming?
>Mr. Stevens would have us accept that all these endeavors are
>doomed to failure and all humans shall ever hold are created
>truths. His suggestion that all truths are created rather
>than found or discovered is obstructive and regressive. He
>is simply wrong and the proof is in the pudding for any and
>all to verify.
Rickert:
If, however, you take truth to be an attribute of states of the
world then you can claim that they are independent of human
creative acts, but you run into the problem that they are
inaccessible to humans so that 'truth' becomes a useless concept.
Jorgenson:
Pinch yourself or go without food and see if you can find truth.
Think without thinking if it is not truth that you must think
to think. What are you babbling about? I fail to understand
the incredible effort to insist that humans are fallible and
true communication is impossible and the like. The entire
human condition is ad hoc where we are not provided manuals
and schematics and such to proceed. Why do you resist my
suggestion that we ad hoc hold that truth exists? What is
gained by obstructionism such that you persist in announcing
that truth is inaccessible to humans when truth is independent
of human creative acts? Any and all statements are by
definition and actuality 'creative acts' and so access to
truth is assured. I need not and a plant need not articulate
the presence of the Sun yet it is truth that the Sun and
plant and I experience truth.
Your contention that nothing occurred or existed prior to
the 'arrival' of articulate observers is preposterous and
at odds with the obvious. I readily admit that your
approach is a valid and useful understanding for research
and yet your approach is clearly not the actual state
of affairs. My proposal that truth exists is ad hoc
with full recognition of the theoretical problems you
have presented. I am not prepared to jettison truth
or knowing or free will due to scientific verification
concerns just as I am not prepared to jettison solidity
and smoothness and such due to quantum statements of
the nature of physical objects. Perhaps the entire
shebang is just an energy pudding and yet that does
address real concerns such as putting food in my tummy.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5ta2mq$4...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5t9ur1$25r8$1...@newsxfs02-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>'Truth' is a human concept, invented by humans and used by humans for
>conducting their affairs and for evaluating their representations
>(for example, their sentences). Cats, dogs, and sundry other
Actually, I would say one doesn't so much need the explicit concept
of truth as an implicit ability to make judgments, assertions, and
inferences. A small child might be able to say "that's red" and another
can express a disagreement on the matter by saying "that's blue"
or, later, "no it's not", without either being able to wield an explicit
concept of truth. They are still operating within the logical space of
judgment and justification.
Saying "that's true" might just be a device enabling indirect effecting
of assertions. In that it would be like dereferencing a pointer in a
programming language or calling "eval" recursively on a cons-ed up
expression. But the beef is in the first-order discursive practice, the
making of contentful assertions and judgments and inferences.
>non-linguistic animals manage to make their way around with
>presumably no concept of 'truth'.
That just shows some animals can make their way around the world
without knowing it. Perhaps we should give up on judgment and
justification and just emulate the cockroaches, on the belief that they
will out-perform us as survival machines.
>Some people (perhaps most people) try to idealize this concept of
>truth into something metaphysical, and thus make it into something
>human independent. But it doesn't idealize. Attempts to idealize
Whether or not this is the case, when we formulate a theory, we apply it
to past states of affairs in which there were no human beings. E.g. we
say that there was a solar eclipse or a comet collision at
such and such a date before the dawn of humanity.
You are in a tangle, it seems to me, if you both assert such things and
go on to assert the human-dependence of reality. That is trying to be
both inside and outside of what you belief, a kind of bad faith, it
seems to me. Within the world as represented, the moon was orbiting the
sun and blocking its rays even before we were around to represent it.
Of course. That is part of the content asserted in our claims.
A plausible claim is that while the moon does not depend on human
practices, "the moon" -- i.e. a phrase containing the meaningful
English symbols -- does. For it is only in the context of human
practice that shaped marks could take on that particular significance,
in other contexts, the marks could be used to denote something else or
nothing at all.
But still the reality they describe is not therefore human dependent, only
the fact that these marks have such and such a meaning.
Without the mystification of the Platonist ontology, it seems we can
still say: that shaped marks take on such and such a content is of
course human dependent. And the marks function in human activities,
down here on the surface of the Earth. But truth or falsity is
primarily a property of the content taken on. And in the case of
contents concerning the non-human world, this is inflicted on the
content by the world in an objective way, one that is not dependent on
human practices.
Compare Frege's claims of the objectivity of propositions about "The
North Sea" in his Grundlagen (_Foundations of Arithmetic_), in spite of
the fact that the boundaries depend on convention. The conventions
determine the content of the claim, but not its truth or falsity.
We can't change the human-independent world just by changing our
thinking about it -- its most salient feature might be its potential
recalcitrance, the way it can obtrude as a barrier to our plans or
expectations. Certainly new facts about the human-independent world
can show up for us when we change our concepts or understandings. But,
as in the Gestalt shift experience, what shows itself when this happens
always shows up *as having been there all along*, albeit concealed from
view.
I would say it falsifies the rich phenomenological content of this
experience as a *dis-covery* to suggest it involves any making of
non-human reality. And when I say that, I hope I am speaking from
a human point of view, about the resistant, human-independent world
considered as it figures in our practical and cognitive life.
Neil Rickert
In <5tackp$1...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5ta2mq$4...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>Some people (perhaps most people) try to idealize this concept of
>>truth into something metaphysical, and thus make it into something
>>human independent. But it doesn't idealize. Attempts to idealize
>Whether or not this is the case, when we formulate a theory, we apply it
>to past states of affairs in which there were no human beings. E.g. we
>say that there was a solar eclipse or a comet collision at
>such and such a date before the dawn of humanity.
Sure. But it is humans who do the applying.
>You are in a tangle, it seems to me, if you both assert such things and
>go on to assert the human-dependence of reality.
But I am not asserting the human dependence of reality, except in the
obvious sense that human activities (such as using a posthole digger)
can have effects on reality. I am asserting only the human
dependence of the language we use to describe reality.
>A plausible claim is that while the moon does not depend on human
>practices, "the moon" -- i.e. a phrase containing the meaningful
>English symbols -- does. For it is only in the context of human
>practice that shaped marks could take on that particular significance,
>in other contexts, the marks could be used to denote something else or
>nothing at all.
>But still the reality they describe is not therefore human dependent, only
>the fact that these marks have such and such a meaning.
I have not said that the reality is human dependent. But the phrases
we use to describe that reality are human dependent, and the
evaluations of whether those descriptions are to be counted as 'true'
are human dependent.
>Without the mystification of the Platonist ontology, it seems we can
>still say: that shaped marks take on such and such a content is of
>course human dependent. And the marks function in human activities,
>down here on the surface of the Earth. But truth or falsity is
>primarily a property of the content taken on.
No, you are describing an idealization of 'truth' and 'falsity',
rather than the actual use of those terms. I don't believe it can be
so idealized.
>Compare Frege's claims of the objectivity of propositions about "The
>North Sea" in his Grundlagen (_Foundations of Arithmetic_), in spite of
>the fact that the boundaries depend on convention. The conventions
>determine the content of the claim, but not its truth or falsity.
The problem is that the conventions are themselves implicit in human
activity. You often cannot get agreement between two people as to
what those conventions are. And even where the conventions are
explicitly written down, the written document turns out to depend on
words which are not explicitely definable. Thus all such conventions
are human dependent, and so therefore is the 'content' of these
mythical propositions. So I suggest that your 'content' is itself an
untenable idealization.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5t8cfv$25u$1...@gte2.gte.net>, Chris Hooley <cho...@idnsi.net> wrote:
>On 17 Aug 1997 21:37:14 GMT, ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote:
>
> >represents pudding as a type or family of substance on a par with, say,
> >"gum" regardless of whether it happens to be served for eating as part
> >of a meal. It is only in British usage that "pudding" means dessert.
>
>I've never heard it used to mean a substance of gummy texture.
I admit that particular analogy was off, since certainly it's not just
any stuff of a certain texture, and the paradigm cases are prepared
foodstuffs typically served as desserts. "Ice cream" is probably a
better analogy. (Couldn't a volcano be found to spew ice cream? )
The main conjecture was that in American usage, "pudding" is used as a
mass term and therefore the substance aspect of the meaning seems
central. That explains why Jones could so readily envision that a
volcano might be found to spew pudding. Rickert's "using this stuff
as a pudding" makes no sense to my American ear -- and note CDJ never
used the indefinite article with the term.
My Webster's lists the usage for "dessert" as British. Of course there
may be American dialects such as yours in which that usage is common.
Isn't this fun? I bet one could go on for some time on the metaphysics
of pudding.
Neil Rickert
>Jorgenson:
>>Science is looking for truth regardless of social posturing.
>Rickert:
>I would say that they are creating truth.
>Jorgenson:
>As with Mr. Stevens I agree and yet your emphasis denigrates
>the actual state of affairs where actual truths do exist
>and can be discovered.
This so-call denigration is your own invention.
'Truth' is a human concept, invented by humans and used by humans for
conducting their affairs and for evaluating their representations
(for example, their sentences). Cats, dogs, and sundry other
non-linguistic animals manage to make their way around with
presumably no concept of 'truth'.
Some people (perhaps most people) try to idealize this concept of
truth into something metaphysical, and thus make it into something
human independent. But it doesn't idealize. Attempts to idealize
'truth' either lead to serious inconsistency (i.e. paradox) or are
afflicted hopeless vagueness, presumably in the hope that if you
don't say anything you won't be caught in a paradox.
>Rickert:
>If, however, you take truth to be an attribute of states of the
>world then you can claim that they are independent of human
>creative acts, but you run into the problem that they are
>inaccessible to humans so that 'truth' becomes a useless concept.
>Jorgenson:
>Pinch yourself or go without food and see if you can find truth.
Pinching myself is hardly independent of human acts.
>Jorgenson:
>Your contention that nothing occurred or existed prior to
>the 'arrival' of articulate observers is preposterous and
>at odds with the obvious.
I have made no such contention. I have merely denied the possibility
of idealizing 'truth' into something beyond its use in human
affairs.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5takpc$5...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tackp$1...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5ta2mq$4...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>Whether or not this is the case, when we formulate a theory, we apply it
>>to past states of affairs in which there were no human beings. E.g. we
>>say that there was a solar eclipse or a comet collision at
>>such and such a date before the dawn of humanity.
>
>Sure. But it is humans who do the applying.
A truism from which nothing very exciting follows.
>>You are in a tangle, it seems to me, if you both assert such things and
>>go on to assert the human-dependence of reality.
>
>But I am not asserting the human dependence of reality, except in the
>obvious sense that human activities (such as using a posthole digger)
>can have effects on reality. I am asserting only the human
>dependence of the language we use to describe reality.
Again, I would say that to be either a truism from which nothing much
follows or it is untenable. As long as we're in agreement that the
moon was orbiting the planet before we came on the scene, and will
continue to do so after we die out, we have all the realism or human
independence we need.
>I have not said that the reality is human dependent. But the phrases
>we use to describe that reality are human dependent, and the
>evaluations of whether those descriptions are to be counted as 'true'
>are human dependent.
The last part looks dicey to me.
I would say we evaluate "The moon goes around the Earth" by judging if
the moon goes around the Earth. And so on. I seems to me there can be
no non-circular explanation of what it is to evaluate a description as
true. In general, because you have to repeat the content being
evaluated on the right-hand side in any adequate description of the
process of evaluating. For on my view we do not apply our concepts to
more basic sense-data (or to "information") but to the objects themselves.
In that way, you can never get at meaning or content as if from a point
outside your own grasp of meaning or content. But from the inside, it
can be something accessible.
>>Without the mystification of the Platonist ontology, it seems we can
>>still say: that shaped marks take on such and such a content is of
>>course human dependent. And the marks function in human activities,
>>down here on the surface of the Earth. But truth or falsity is
>>primarily a property of the content taken on.
>
>No, you are describing an idealization of 'truth' and 'falsity',
>rather than the actual use of those terms. I don't believe it can be
>so idealized.
I don't actually see where what I said made any such idealization. I
thought I *was* talking about the human use of concepts of
truth or falsity.
Frege perhaps did demand such an idealization, since he could not
tolerate vagueness or lack of sharp boundaries in ordinary language.
>>Compare Frege's claims of the objectivity of propositions about "The
>>North Sea" in his Grundlagen (_Foundations of Arithmetic_), in spite of
>>the fact that the boundaries depend on convention. The conventions
>>determine the content of the claim, but not its truth or falsity.
>
>The problem is that the conventions are themselves implicit in human
>activity. You often cannot get agreement between two people as to
>what those conventions are. And even where the conventions are
Frege would have said that then there is no common content being
evaluated.
>explicitly written down, the written document turns out to depend on
>words which are not explicitely definable. Thus all such conventions
Agreed that writing them down just gives us more words.
>are human dependent, and so therefore is the 'content' of these
Don't see how you get the "thus" here. Their having significance may
depend on our sharing a common background that is not, perhaps cannot
be, made explicit in words. But if you think the moon in the sky does
not depend on that background, it is hard to see how the truth or
falisty of statements *about* the moon could so depend, for the claims
answer to the moon itself for their correctness, not to
representations. And it may be that the pre-conditions for our
grasping words as having the meanings they do are not themselves part
of the semantics of the words.
>mythical propositions. So I suggest that your 'content' is itself an
>untenable idealization.
You have not shown me where the idealization lies. I think the
objective contents I mention are features that have a role in human
life here on Earth, in our life with signs.
Compare Aristotle vs Plato on universals: Plato depicted universals as
existing in a separated realm. But for Aristotle, abstractions like the
canine species were immanent in nature, informing in a way in each
particular concrete animal. I want to think of objective contents not
as separated but similarly as immanent in human practices with signs.
Why can't one have both the Fregean objectivity of the contents *and*
the immanence of meaning in concrete human activity such as
Wittgenstein's simple language-games?
Neil Rickert
In <5tb5md$4...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5takpc$5...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>But I am not asserting the human dependence of reality, except in the
>>obvious sense that human activities (such as using a posthole digger)
>>can have effects on reality. I am asserting only the human
>>dependence of the language we use to describe reality.
>Again, I would say that to be either a truism from which nothing much
>follows or it is untenable. As long as we're in agreement that the
>moon was orbiting the planet before we came on the scene, and will
>continue to do so after we die out, we have all the realism or human
>independence we need.
I can't rule out the possibility that some cosmic event which knocks
the moon out of orbit will also cause us to die out. But I take it
that such a possibility does not threaten realism. However, since it
is humans who are agreeing to this, it cannot be said to provide
evidence for human independence of 'truth'.
>I would say we evaluate "The moon goes around the Earth" by judging if
>the moon goes around the Earth.
Fair enough. Now let's try to make that human independent. To do
so, we construct a robot, using the methods available to us today.
We provide it with telescopes and other sorts of apparatus. Using
all of its sensory equipment, the robot can answer the question of
whether the moon is going around the earth. It provides the answer
in a human independent way. If there are such things as
propositions, then the robot comes about as close as possible to
being able to answer to the truth of such a proposition.
Now it happens that, 5 years later, a large asteroid ventures close
to the earth. It throws the moon out of orbit and sends it crashing
into the sun. The asteroid is left behind in an orbit somewhat
similar to that which was occupied by the moon. As it happens, the
asteroid has a similar size and similar reflectivity to the moon. We
go to our robot, power it up. Lo and behold, it tells us that the
moon is still going around the earth.
I think you will be faced with this sort of problem whenever you try
to mechanize the evaluation of 'truth', so as to remove the human
element. You might be able to avoid the problem if you can construct
a cognizing robot. But then the cognizing robot would be such that
the meanings of its sentences were not fixed, but could change over
time and on the basis of experience. So we would have no basis for
asserting that the cognizing robot represented propositional truth.
We have a good basis for claiming that the earlier non-cognizing
robot represents propositional truth, but it does not represent what
we humans would take to be truth.
> And so on. I seems to me there can be
>no non-circular explanation of what it is to evaluate a description as
>true.
If there can be no non-circular explanation, then there ain't no such
thing as propositions, and 'truth' is highly dependent on humans.
>In that way, you can never get at meaning or content as if from a point
>outside your own grasp of meaning or content. But from the inside, it
>can be something accessible.
But that sounds like the type of solipsistic position which you claim
to oppose.
>Frege perhaps did demand such an idealization, since he could not
>tolerate vagueness or lack of sharp boundaries in ordinary language.
If you are willing to make idealizations, then you can have all of
the propositions you like, but they are propositions about a
idealized world created in the minds of humans. If you want to deal
with reality, you must put up with some degree of vagueness, and with
the impossibility of demonstrating that there are such things as
propositions that describe that reality.
>>>Compare Frege's claims of the objectivity of propositions about "The
>>>North Sea" in his Grundlagen (_Foundations of Arithmetic_), in spite of
>>>the fact that the boundaries depend on convention. The conventions
>>>determine the content of the claim, but not its truth or falsity.
>>The problem is that the conventions are themselves implicit in human
>>activity. You often cannot get agreement between two people as to
>>what those conventions are. And even where the conventions are
>Frege would have said that then there is no common content being
>evaluated.
But then there is no evidence in support of the claim that what is
being evaluated are human independent propositions.
>Don't see how you get the "thus" here. Their having significance may
>depend on our sharing a common background that is not, perhaps cannot
>be, made explicit in words.
And therefore they are not human independent.
>Why can't one have both the Fregean objectivity of the contents *and*
>the immanence of meaning in concrete human activity such as
>Wittgenstein's simple language-games?
You can that, provided that you don't pretend that they are human
independent, or that they are propositional truth.
Chris Hooley
On 18 Aug 1997 20:51:37 GMT, ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote:
>In article <5ta2mq$4...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu>
wrote:
>>non-linguistic animals manage to make their way around with
>>presumably no concept of 'truth'.
>
>That just shows some animals can make their way around the world
>without knowing it. Perhaps we should give up on judgment and
>justification and just emulate the cockroaches, on the belief that they
>will out-perform us as survival machines.
It's worth considering a proven pattern like cockroaches for AI.
If a specific instance of AI, say a physical colony of mechanisms w/
AI, performed as well as cockroaches, wouldn't we be pleased?
Our epiphenomenal modelling hasn't been proven yet. Perhaps we are out
of balance, perhaps we will choke on our own effluence. The curious monkey
method hasn't stabilized yet.
At any rate, Rickert's statement stands: Truth is a human concept which
cannot be idealized.
This is only hard because it admits of a seperation between all things
conceivable and reality. So, the curious monkey is limited. Closure only
comes through declaring it so. We examine our own artifacts.
This doesn't bother me. Nor do I think that it hinders science in the
slightest.
Yet, it does seem to draw fire. :-)
Regards
Chris
>
>>Some people (perhaps most people) try to idealize this concept of
>>truth into something metaphysical, and thus make it into something
>>human independent. But it doesn't idealize. Attempts to idealize
>
>Whether or not this is the case, when we formulate a theory, we apply it
>to past states of affairs in which there were no human beings. E.g. we
>say that there was a solar eclipse or a comet collision at
>such and such a date before the dawn of humanity.
>
>You are in a tangle, it seems to me, if you both assert such things and
>go on to assert the human-dependence of reality. That is trying to be
>both inside and outside of what you belief, a kind of bad faith, it
>seems to me. Within the world as represented, the moon was orbiting the
>sun and blocking its rays even before we were around to represent it.
>Of course. That is part of the content asserted in our claims.
>
>A plausible claim is that while the moon does not depend on human
>practices, "the moon" -- i.e. a phrase containing the meaningful
>English symbols -- does. For it is only in the context of human
>practice that shaped marks could take on that particular significance,
>in other contexts, the marks could be used to denote something else or
>nothing at all.
>
>But still the reality they describe is not therefore human dependent,
only
>the fact that these marks have such and such a meaning.
>
>Without the mystification of the Platonist ontology, it seems we can
>still say: that shaped marks take on such and such a content is of
>course human dependent. And the marks function in human activities,
>down here on the surface of the Earth. But truth or falsity is
>primarily a property of the content taken on. And in the case of
>contents concerning the non-human world, this is inflicted on the
>content by the world in an objective way, one that is not dependent on
>human practices.
>
>Compare Frege's claims of the objectivity of propositions about "The
>North Sea" in his Grundlagen (_Foundations of Arithmetic_), in spite of
>the fact that the boundaries depend on convention. The conventions
>determine the content of the claim, but not its truth or falsity.
>
Lewis Jorgenson
Truth and obstructionism
I proposed that actual truth and truths exist and
can be discovered and shared. Certainly all statements
that claim to be true remain open to questioning and do not
automatically achieve the claim of absolute truth.
I are amenable to clarifying my proposal regarding truth.
How about there are 4 kinds of truth? Most folks
accept the categories of individual and community
truths and some day I may be permitted to explore
these topics after the ground work or foundation
does not cause such consternation. Let us divide
my previous actual truth into two sorts. The
first sort shall retain the label actual truth
and include statements that have been verified.
I care not whether the verification is by empirical
and/or theoretical standards. The situation where
a statement is truth according to the theory is
reasonably as valid as the situation where something
is truth according to an experiment. Tests of light
to display quanta or photon effects reveal what was
tested for. Similarly the mathematical representation
cares not whether light is a quanta or a photon. A
theory that addresses historical events that cannot
be verified by traveling back in time to observe the
event is a reasonable ad hoc approach given the limitations.
The novel fourth category of truth shall be philosophical
truth. This is the metaphysical, idealist, pure, hardcore,
timeless, absolute, god given, no doubts about it sort
of truth. The kernel of all kernels and the meaning
behind all meaning, the absolutely, completely total
actual state of affairs truth. Even if some poor sap
actually held philosophical truth, the sap would only
be able to articulate it as an individual truth and
the lowest obstructionist could demand that any word
of the statement be fuller defined.
This approach confuses the correlation I offered between
the sorts of truth and the cook, cookbook, pudding or
individual, representation, reality models. I suppose
that philosophical truth of the tremendous nature I
have proposed must be matched with equally tremendous
concepts in the other models. There is no concept
as powerful or meaningful and so I will simply add
on philosophical truth to the other models. That will
work just fine. For example suppose we have a cook,
a cookbook, a pudding and the entire truth regarding
all aspects and relationships between those components.
Similarly, picture the philosophical model that includes
the individual, representation, reality and the whole
complete truth about those components and how they
interact.
The four sorts of truth can be seen to be CAIP which
is the acronym of this newsgroup. This unlikely
occurrence assures me that I am retaining my ability to
write nonsense.
It was not my intent to announce the existence of truth
and then start announcing that my statements were truth.
I have stated to all comers that all statements are
individual truths at the best or individual lies to
affect community truth at the worst.
Mathematics contains certain aspects that can be
revealed and are inherent in the system. Series
act according to their own inclination as it were
rather than our expectations. Is mathematics
created or discovered? Why does the double integral
of an event match the actual event and why do
some electrical circuits act as double integrals
to reveal the event? Why do mechanical systems
mimic the mathematical formula? Is this because
of some underlying truth or simply due to pure
dumb accident? Is the hidden, curious center of
momentum of an object real or just accidently
match where it was calculated to be? I am amazed
that obviously intelligent persons can be so dense
and I am not amazed that they can be so stubborn.
How can someone propose that a center of momentum
only holds meaning to a human? That center is
a truth and the behavior of the object is led
by the role of that center regardless of having
someone ascertain the veracity of the center.
I knew better than to argue with an obstructionist
who does not use their sense of humor often. The
proof is in the pudding where both the cook and
the cookbook are only in relation to an actual pudding.
Discussing the sort or type of pudding is an
obstruction to grasping the entire meal I offered.
Now I propose that all 4 sorts of truth exist as
evident by the description of philosophical truth
I provided for the individual, cook, representation,
cookbook, pudding, reality models. There is a
complete and total truth that holds all the
components and all the relationships. There is
probably some mathematical or set or topography
theory to address this situation and I leave
the examination of that theory as an exercise.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
ray scanlon
Anders N Weinstein <ande...@pitt.edu> wrote in article
<01bcac94$5d0b7320$f67a61ce@asdf>...
> In article <5ta2mq$4...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert
> <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
> >In <5t9ur1$25r8$1...@newsxfs02-int.news.prodigy.com>
LSV...@prodigy.com
> (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
> >'Truth' is a human concept, invented by humans and used by humans
for
> >conducting their affairs and for evaluating their representations
> >(for example, their sentences). Cats, dogs, and sundry other
>
> Actually, I would say one doesn't so much need the explicit concept
> of truth as an implicit ability to make judgments, assertions, and
> inferences. A small child might be able to say "that's red" and
another
> can express a disagreement on the matter by saying "that's blue"
> or, later, "no it's not", without either being able to wield an
> explicit
> concept of truth. They are still operating within the logical space
of
> judgment and justification.
IMVHO The notion of TRUTH may be traced to the activity of the
reticular nucleus of the thalamus. This is just an opinion, don't ask
for references. Wilder Penfield was of the opinion that there are only
ten to a dozen basic feelings (he said ten, he listed a dozen): things
are coming closer, things are moving away, things are friendly. things
are hostile, things are familar, things are unfamilar...and so on. If
these feelings are the result of activity in particular areas of the
basal ganglia then why not an area for the feeling of truth. I nominate
the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. When it is active our motor
output is halted. When it is quiet, motor output proceeds.
ray
--
email: rsca...@wsg.net
If you are interested in how the brain works, visit
http://www.wsg.net/~rscanlon/brain.html
Lewis Jorgenson
ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote in part:
Weinstein:
Compare Aristotle vs Plato on universals:
Plato depicted universals as existing in a separated realm. But
for Aristotle, abstractions like the canine species were immanent
in nature, informing in a way in each particular concrete animal.
I want to think of objective contents not as separated but
similarly as immanent in human practices with signs.
Why can't one have both the Fregean objectivity of the contents *and*
the immanence of meaning in concrete human activity such as
Wittgenstein's simple language-games?
Jorgenson:
I try to keep my presentations in a plain manner in a
Bergsonian framework with a touch of Toulminium.
Suppose I post a recipe for a pudding. Everyone who
participates gathers up the ingredients and cooks
a batch of pudding.
Each participant brings that pudding to near their keyboard
and we begin to discuss our puddings. Someone will announce
that the ingredients I provided were obviously incorrect
and that they made pudding the proper way and the rest
of us may have something near our keyboards and yet it
is not pudding. Someone else will announce they could
not get all the ingredients in their country and so
the made substitutions and have a different sort of
pudding. Another might announce that they burned their
pudding but is still pudding and they want to participate.
We obviously have various and sundry actual puddings before
us and the question is whether there is a actual essence of
pudding before us or is that essence within us. I think
you are correct that that essence is in both locations
such that we can have our pudding and eat it too.
Weinstein:
I want to think of objective contents not as separated but
similarly as immanent in human practices with signs.
Jorgenson:
Go ahead and do so. I was struck by an Aristotle cartoon
of hands reaching out from the eyes to touch and feel
what was being seen. The shapes and textures were grasped
rather than transmitted by light rays in the modern view.
One must gather and process the various ingredients in
a specific manner to make a pudding. The process is as
important as the components and so the essence must
be in both locations. There is essence in the concrete
components and also in the abstract process. Having
only one ingredient tells you nothing about pudding
and having only one letter tells you nothing about a
word. Similarly, an imaginary or pictured pudding has
no nutritional value and some personal word in a personal
language has no community value.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
"ray scanlon" <rsca...@wsg.net> wrote:
Scanlon:
IMVHO The notion of TRUTH may be traced to the activity of the
reticular nucleus of the thalamus.
Jorgenson:
It could just be those sodium ions fooling around at a protein
gate again. I have told those ions to stay away from that gate
and free float somewhere else.
Scanlon:
This is just an opinion, don't ask
for references. Wilder Penfield was of the opinion that there are only
ten to a dozen basic feelings (he said ten, he listed a dozen): things
are coming closer, things are moving away, things are friendly. things
are hostile, things are familar, things are unfamilar...and so on.
Jorgenson:
Neato. Soon we shall be able to quantify all feelings and then
we are getting some place.
Scanlon:
If these feelings are the result of activity in particular areas of the
basal ganglia then why not an area for the feeling of truth. I nominate
the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. When it is active our motor
output is halted. When it is quiet, motor output proceeds.
Jorgenson:
I think my notion of truth is drifting away. I felt Truth was a
friendly, familiar thing. Now truth has turned around and it is
hostile and it is moving closer. Run. Run from the Truth.
Now does the activity of recicular mucleus of the thalmamus result
from an encounter with Truth or simply emit a feeling that in
English is called Truth? When you spill your cup of coffee,
God damn gremlins, and you have all the basic feelings involved
with watching gravity and entropy and such act upon your cup
of coffee, what is the testicular nucleus of the halamus up to?
Scanlon:
If you are interested in how the brain works, visit
http://www.wsg.net/~rscanlon/brain.html
Jorgenson:
At the macro level, would you say that the human
brain is like a pudding? Would you like a pudding?
I could post a recipe.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
ray scanlon
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote in article
<01bcad97$c4bcb660$e47a61ce@asdf>...
> "ray scanlon" <rsca...@wsg.net> wrote:
>
> Scanlon:
> IMVHO The notion of TRUTH may be traced to the activity of the
> reticular nucleus of the thalamus.
>
> Jorgenson:
> It could just be those sodium ions fooling around at a protein
> gate again. I have told those ions to stay away from that gate
> and free float somewhere else.
(snip)
> At the macro level, would you say that the human
> brain is like a pudding? Would you like a pudding?
> I could post a recipe.
The brain is not a bowl of porridge, not a pudding. Brains are
precisely wired by the genome with a randomness only in the smallest
connections. This is descriptive of all brains, not just vertebrate
ones. The nuclei (in the vertebrate brain) have been well described. If
you don't know the geography, stay out.
It is popular to suppose an homunculus in the brain. The homunculus is
the little man who sits in the center of the head watching a TV and
punching buttons. Some subscribe
to a more sophisticated version. Their homunculus is a mind that
selects from the data proffered by the brain, manipulates that data,
reaches a decision, and forwards that decision to the brain for
execution. Some (including me) have an even more sophisticated
homunculus, they have a mind (soul) that merely observes the operation
of the brain. Their brain thinks and they are aware of the thoughts.
A subjective emotion is the mind (soul) observing the activity of
neurons in the brain. Even as we are aware of vision because we are
aware of the activity of certain neurons so we are also aware of Truth
because of the activity (or inactivity) of certain neurons. Truth,
fear, hunger, love, it is all one. We are aware of the activity of
neurons.
We have difficulty in specifying the particular neurons that are
responsible for a given emotion. Unfortunately only humans can describe
emotions and the tract tracing techniques of neuroscience are invasive
and cannot be applied to humans. If a dog would talk we should have no
trouble in tracking down the culprit neurons.
I say again that in my opinion it is the neurons of the recticular
nucleus of the thalamus that are responsible for the feeling of Truth.
When they become inactive they cease to inhibit the ventral
anterior-ventral lateral complex of the thalamus and the pending motor
program proceeds to the motor and pre-motor cortex. We have decided, we
know Truth.
Ray
--
email: rsca...@wsg.net
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tcgeq$6...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tb5md$4...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5takpc$5...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>I can't rule out the possibility that some cosmic event which knocks
>the moon out of orbit will also cause us to die out. But I take it
>that such a possibility does not threaten realism. However, since it
>is humans who are agreeing to this, it cannot be said to provide
>evidence for human independence of 'truth'.
Hmm. As I see it, what humans agree on is that whether the moon goes
around the sun or not does not depend on humans. So you have a
difficulty making this argument. For we agree that this is a matter
that is independent of our agreement on it insofar as the grammar of
"true" ensures it makes sense to say: everyone could agree that p but
p not be true.
I believe this point requires careful distinction between different
levels of "human dependence". Something like Kant's distinction between
empirical realism and transcendental realism. Or perhaps like Tarski's
object-language meta-language distinction.
Recall Kant rejected what he took to be Berkeley's "empirical
idealism", indeed claimed to have a decisive disproof. For Kant, our
consiousness necessarily involves immediate awareness as if of
objective, re-identifiable non-mental objects in space outside us. That
is, objects whose esse is not percipi, hence things that are not
subjective ideas (those would be objects of *inner* sense regarding
what is within our minds). On the other hand, he nevertheless asserted
that these phenomena were transcendentally ideal or mind-dependent.
Loosely speaking, one might say empirical realism involves
human-indpendence asserted as one element *within* our story or picture
of the world. That is, it is a feature within our story that the moon
was orbiting the Earth before the narrators (human beings) entered the
story. Just as within the world of Shakespeare's play, Yorick existed
before Hamlet did. Then transcendental idealism tries to remind us that
we are the authors of the story, and the empirically independent
objects merely characters in it nevertheless.
I only want to insist with Kant on empirical realism. To me, the rest
seems like a straining after the god's eye view, some vantage point
from which to articulate the dependence of reality on our activity. But
one might instead say the main tendency of the Kantian view is rather
that there is no such vantage point. Hence the very thesis of
human-dependence is itself unsayable (or sayable but simply false)
within the system, something beyond the conditions of intelligible
discourse which Kant himself tried to articulate.
At any rate I would recommend the need for a distinction of levels.
>>I would say we evaluate "The moon goes around the Earth" by judging if
>>the moon goes around the Earth.
>
>Fair enough. Now let's try to make that human independent. To do
>so, we construct a robot, using the methods available to us today.
It is not obvious to me why the human independence *I* was speaking of
should depend on whether we can make a robot that can grasp
propositional contents. It looks to me as if we can't currently make
robots that can understand much of anything. It seems likely that only
something with a life very much like our own in crucial respects could
grasp such contents. But that does not impugn the objectivity of the
truth of what is claimed. It goes to understanding, not truth.
>whether the moon is going around the earth. It provides the answer
>in a human independent way. If there are such things as
>propositions, then the robot comes about as close as possible to
>being able to answer to the truth of such a proposition.
I don't see this. Why not say the proposition or statement made is what
we human beings assert with the words. That is, try to understand "proposition"
as a fairly neutral label for such things as:
what "the moon goes around the Earth" says in our language (i.e.
when we have a discussion over the matter)
Or, to take into account context-dependence of significance of
word-forms, say the proposition is what is expressed by the sentence on
a particular occasion of use.
[robot fails to track the moon after it is replaced by an asteroid]
>I think you will be faced with this sort of problem whenever you try
>to mechanize the evaluation of 'truth', so as to remove the human
I have no belief that it can be mechanized. As an anti-reductionist, I
don't at all believe in "Mechanism" if that means that all forms of
explanation can be reduced without remainder to explanations in the
broadly "mechanical" (i.e. physical) fahsion. Mechanizability of
understanding should not be the criterion of the human-independence of
truth.
If you could make something that could actually do what we do in the
contexts in which we judge truth or falsity you would have to make
something that was no longer just a machine at all (as animals are not
just machines in virtue of being alive). Rather you would have created
a living thing that had become a rational agent, a subject of
vital and psychological explanation in addition to explanation of
the operation of its parts in mechanical terms.
>element. You might be able to avoid the problem if you can construct
>a cognizing robot. But then the cognizing robot would be such that
>the meanings of its sentences were not fixed, but could change over
>time and on the basis of experience. So we would have no basis for
>asserting that the cognizing robot represented propositional truth.
I don't follow. This seems based on a false, highly theory-laden
conception of "propositional truth". From my point of view you gave an
example of a robot that never did grasp the concept of "the moon" as
denoting an objective, persistent re-identifiable individual. A
fortiori, it never had any propositional attitudes about the moon.
To grasp "the moon" as expressing a sense whereby it refers to an
object, the robot would have to have a quite general ability to track
persistent re-identifiable individuals in space and evaluate claims
about them by reference to the objects. Check out PF Strawson's
_Individuals_ and the elaboration of Strawson's views in Gareth Evans
_Varieties of Reference_.
But this does not show that the reality cognized is human-dependent.
Quite the opposite, it shows it is conceived of by us as objective.
Of course, there is no reason to suppose a robot could not do this.
More to the point, I don't see why objectivity or human-independence
has to attach to what your second-rate robot can do. It clearly did not
grasp what is meant. I can imagine other cases where meanings are
indeterminate because in flux. These might better support your point.
>We have a good basis for claiming that the earlier non-cognizing
>robot represents propositional truth, but it does not represent what
>we humans would take to be truth.
I would never say the earlier robot represents propositional truth.
It seems to be just a simple measuring device, not a conceptual thinker.
>> And so on. I seems to me there can be
>>no non-circular explanation of what it is to evaluate a description as
>>true.
>
>If there can be no non-circular explanation, then there ain't no such
>thing as propositions, and 'truth' is highly dependent on humans.
Don't see this. Explanation has to come to an end somewhere. In one
sense, we hit bedrock at concepts, propositions, judgment, and truth,
for these cannot be reductively defined in terms available from outside
a grasp of, well, concepts, propositions, judgment and truth. All
explanations of meaning must go in a circle because concepts must be
used in the explanation.
On the other hand, from within our grasp of concepts as it were, we can
reflect upon the context in which alone such things as grasp of
concepts are found, namely, embodied human practical activity in a
material and social environment.
For me, the point of that reflection is not to question the ideal of
objectivity in judgment, it is rather to ensure it is understood as
situated in an essentially human context. And not hidden from view
in the unseen brain or mind.
>>In that way, you can never get at meaning or content as if from a point
>>outside your own grasp of meaning or content. But from the inside, it
>>can be something accessible.
>
>But that sounds like the type of solipsistic position which you claim
>to oppose.
I never understand your charges of solipsism. I take it our grasp of
content is collective or at least potentially so -- it is shared or
shareable by *us* and creatures like us. It is not just me and my inner
world alone.
>But then there is no evidence in support of the claim that what is
>being evaluated are human independent propositions.
How about this dilemma: You say people have divergent implicit
conventions. But either these divergences can (in principle) be brought
to light or they can't. When they can, then the divergence is shown to
be a merely contingent and removable difficulty, for one can in fact
elucidate the divergent contents that the speakers were implicitly
using and so show that they were talking past one another. So you have
not refuted Frege's picture.
On the other hand, if there is some reason in principle why the
differences cannot be brought to light, then you have undermined the
intelligibility of your original claim, for you are now positing a
difference that can never be known.
I gather your position is the first one, that achieving common
understanding is extremely hard in practice, given divergences in
background, but not impossible in principle.
>>Don't see how you get the "thus" here. Their having significance may
>>depend on our sharing a common background that is not, perhaps cannot
>>be, made explicit in words.
>
>And therefore they are not human independent.
But my point was aimed at distinguishing the obvious human-dependence
of "this mark has expresses a claim with such and such a content" from
the alleged human-dependence of "what this claims (the content) is
true".
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5til0m$d...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5ti4h3$o...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5tcgeq$6...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>
>have not claimed. Can we stick to the question of whether 'truth' is
>human dependent?
Not if I don't acknowledge that they can be separated. Why not say
reality is what true propositions describe; in Frege's terms the
propositions are the senses and reality consists of the referents of
the true ones. In that sense there are not two separable things,
reality and truth of propositions about reality.
Doesn't the equivalence condition P <-> True(p) licencse valid
inferential transitions in either direction between judgments about
reality and judgements about truth of propositions?
Don't you see the difficulty? If you are going to tell me anything about this
reality you are going to have to use language, make assertions, employ
your concepts. If you are going to tell me what reality was like millions
of years ago near the surface of the Earth, you are going to make assertions
like, perhaps, that there was a solar eclipse or something. But that
is the same as saying "there is a solar eclipse" was true at T.
"The same thing is for thinking as for being" (Parmenides)
>I did not require any ability for the robot to grasp anything. I
>merely required that it have the ability to make observations
>(perhaps automated observations) and report on the truth or falsity
>of the specific claim about the moon.
It is a strained usage to say it makes reports about the moon if it doesn't
understand the concept of the moon.
>> It looks to me as if we can't currently make
>>robots that can understand much of anything.
>
>We can't make a voltmeter understand much of anything, but the
>voltmeter can still report whether a battery is flat.
Nonsense, voltmeters can't make reports. People can incorporate
voltmeters in their reporting practices. Unless you think a
voltmeter understands something or is alive.
You should check out Sellars and Brandom on the distinction between
making a report and merely reacting to stimuli in a differential way.
From their point of view, the voltmeter doesn't make reports because
it is not a player in the game of giving and asking for reasons,
voltages have no inferential significance in the thought or reasoning
of the voltmeter. From my more naturalistic point of view, one might
add that its environment does not even have any vital significance to
the supposed life of a voltmeter. But for anything to be recognizable
as "making a report" of a contentful claim, or even simply "noticing
something in the environment" to occur, it would have to be one element
in these larger patterns of activity.
At any rate, it is about the first step of the philosophy I favor
to distinguish sharply between making a report and merely reacting
to stimuli.
>>>whether the moon is going around the earth. It provides the answer
>>>in a human independent way. If there are such things as
>>>propositions, then the robot comes about as close as possible to
>>>being able to answer to the truth of such a proposition.
>
>>I don't see this. Why not say the proposition or statement made is what
>>we human beings assert with the words. That is, try to understand "proposition"
>>as a fairly neutral label for such things as:
>
>Ok. Then let's see what we have. We have a proposition as a
>completely human independent claim about the state of the world.
>However, whether this proposition is true or not can only be
>evaluated by a human.
Or something that resembles a human being in sufficient ways.
> And it is best to only use one human to do the
>evaluation, for two different humans might disagree. Furthermore,
This does not follow at all, and I never said anything to imply it.
>the human we consult will admit that the proposition could be false
>even though he claims it is true.
I also did not imply this. I said there will be a general appreciation
that truth and justification at a time are distinct. I did not mean
that people walk around holding this schizoid attitude to their beliefs.
I recently saw the point nicely put along the following lines: there is
a singularity at the point of the first person present tense assertion.
The distinction between truth and justifiction in thinking that p has
no application at that point: If you do in fact really believe
something, then you assert it, ie take it to be true, and cannot go on
to say it might be false. (Compare "Moore's paradox" that one cannot
significantly claim "it's raining but I don't believe it's raining",
even though the conjuncts are logically consistent.)
And yet one understands in general that it makes sense to say that x
believes that p and yet p is not true, or that in the past one oneself
believed that p when p was not true. And so that quite generally one is
oneself the same sort of entity that can be a value of x in these
statements.
(One might object that I am leaving out degrees of credence here, but I
do want to set that aside for the present point about the
"singularity").
>I cannot think of a better demonstration of the human dependence of
>'truth' and of the incoherence of such a notion of 'proposition.'
>
Neil Rickert
In <5tj172$r...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5til0m$d...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>You keep raising objections to "reality is human dependent", which I
>>have not claimed. Can we stick to the question of whether 'truth' is
>>human dependent?
>Not if I don't acknowledge that they can be separated.
Presumably you are caught up in an ideological position which you are
unable to question.
> Why not say
>reality is what true propositions describe;
That would sentence me to something like Berkeley's idealism, since I
cannot make sense of propositions except as describing a non-existent
idealized world.
> In that sense there are not two separable things,
>reality and truth of propositions about reality.
Sure, if you like living in an imaginary reality.
>Doesn't the equivalence condition P <-> True(p) licencse valid
>inferential transitions in either direction between judgments about
>reality and judgements about truth of propositions?
As a mathematician, I might describe that as being vacuously true,
given that there are no such things as propositions.
>Don't you see the difficulty? If you are going to tell me anything about this
>reality you are going to have to use language, make assertions, employ
>your concepts.
That is clearly false. Parents manage to communicate with their
pre-linguistic children, without reliance on language.
> If you are going to tell me what reality was like millions
>of years ago near the surface of the Earth, you are going to make assertions
>like, perhaps, that there was a solar eclipse or something. But that
>is the same as saying "there is a solar eclipse" was true at T.
That does not make it a proposition. At best it is a summary of a
model created by humans to account for contemporary evidence. After
all, I might also tell you that I cannot be certain that the world
even existed yesterday. It might have come into existence this
morning with our memories intact.
>>We can't make a voltmeter understand much of anything, but the
>>voltmeter can still report whether a battery is flat.
>Nonsense, voltmeters can't make reports. People can incorporate
>voltmeters in their reporting practices. Unless you think a
>voltmeter understands something or is alive.
In that case we are all condemned to solipsism. For our eyes do not
understand the world, and if they cannot report to our brains we are
disconnected from the world.
Your claim is inconsistent with ordinary usage of 'report.'
>At any rate, it is about the first step of the philosophy I favor
>to distinguish sharply between making a report and merely reacting
>to stimuli.
Clearly Weinstein is reacting to stimuli.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tj74b$d...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tj172$r...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5til0m$d...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>> Why not say
>>reality is what true propositions describe;
>
>cannot make sense of propositions except as describing a non-existent
>idealized world.
I guess for you the proposition expressed by an ordinary sentence in
context like "there's a C++ book on the desk in my office" must
describe a non-existent idealized world. For me it describes a world in
which a C++ book (not an idea of a book) is on a table (not an idea of
a table). It does not involve applying abstractions to organize sensory
information, it involves appliying a concept to books and tables in
public space.
I can't make any sense of your constant references to Berkeley. As I
see it, there's very little to be gotten out of Berkeley except an
illustration of what happens if you confuse concepts and propositions
expressed in a public language -- Frege's "ideas in the objective
sense" -- with representational vehicles construed as private
mental images ("ideas in the subjective sense").
Why shouldn't one say that there basically are no such things as
"ideas" as Berkeley used the term, becuase his conception of "ideas"
was confused. Berkeley raised such issues as that an "idea" of a
triangle must have a determinate shape, e.g. be scalene, obtuse,
whatever. But the concept of a triangle as embodied in our operating
with the word "triangle" is not a mental particular like an image, so
the issue doesn't arise.
You will no doubt still be exercised about idealization.
But one should always ask the question: if all propositions necessarily
involve idealizations, then what is the reality that the idealizations
are applied to? What is the process by which idealizations are applied,
what are the two sides of the relationship? Is the reality to which
our spatial concepts apply itself something non-spatial, for example?
But how could that work? Such application of standards as measuring
according to conventions requires actually moving one's body around
*in* space, e.g. carrying the rulers from place to place. One could
not apply such a measuring procedure merely in one's own mind. As we
might put it, applying standards of measurement is a form of
being-in-the-world, not something private in the individual mind.
(It might also be that scientific theorizing involves idealization and
construction of fictional worlds, but that common sense awareness does not.
Then you could at least say that the idealizations of science are applied
to the macro-world of common sense, and both sides of the application
relation would be thinkable.)
BTW I would highly recommend Gregory McCulloch's book _The Mind and Its
World_ (or some title like that) for a very nice intro to this sort of
perspective on intentionality, i.e. one that completely eliminates
mental representational vehicles such as Berkeley's ideas as
intermediates standing between the knowing subject and the object
known.
>> In that sense there are not two separable things,
>>reality and truth of propositions about reality.
>
>Sure, if you like living in an imaginary reality.
Right now, the objects of my conscious awareness (i.e. my intentional
states or propositional attitudes) are mostly the surrounding
paraphernalia in my office. Are you saying I ought to conclude the
office is imaginary? So I never really have to get back to work?
Who is living in an imaginary world here?
>>Doesn't the equivalence condition P <-> True(p) licencse valid
>>inferential transitions in either direction between judgments about
>>reality and judgements about truth of propositions?
>
>As a mathematician, I might describe that as being vacuously true,
>given that there are no such things as propositions.
You deny even that equivalence condition, then? (and not because of
self-reference?) Most people regard it as neutral ground, i.e. even if
you think in terms of justification by standards or criteria, still
the idea is that in any context p and True(p) get the same value.
>>Don't you see the difficulty? If you are going to tell me anything about this
>>reality you are going to have to use language, make assertions, employ
>>your concepts.
>
>That is clearly false. Parents manage to communicate with their
>pre-linguistic children, without reliance on language.
They don't tell them things about reality that way.
>In that case we are all condemned to solipsism. For our eyes do not
>understand the world, and if they cannot report to our brains we are
>disconnected from the world.
This is badly confused. You might say our eyes may do something
analagous to making reports to our brains. But of course our eyes
don't see, they are blind and incomprehending. And our brains don't
see, for the same reasons. *We* see. But as you indicate,
our eyes do not make any reports at all to *us*.
Can't you grasp the logical distinction between levels of description
here? Sure the sub-personal functioning of eyes and brain is a
necessary condition for the person to see. But the eyes cannot send
outputs to be inputs to the person.
*Heartily* recommended on the crucial mportance of this point: John
McDowell, "The Content of Perceptual Experience", Phil Quarterly 44
(1994) p 190.
As McDowell sees it, at the person level, the input is intentional
content or information concerning the world. Person states are as it
were all semantics, no syntax, pure positional consiousness of the
world unmediated by representations. These events are elements in a
level of description that supervenes upon events at the former level,
as, say, statements about nations and world wars supervene upon
statements about individual actions without being reducible to them. No
individuals means no nations or wars, but still the levels are
distinct.
>Your claim is inconsistent with ordinary usage of 'report.'
"My colleague made a report to the funders on the progress of the
project, and my multitester made a report on the voltage across these
leads". Does "report" really mean the same sort of thing in both cases?
Perhaps you could say there is a family resemblance.
Even if so, I see no reason we can't introduce a distinction in the way
Sellars does, according as the reporter does or does not have an
understanding of what is reported. Or do you think a voltmeter has an
understanding of voltages, simply because its outputs are correlated
with them?
I would have thought even you distinguish between simple measuring
devices that merely react to their inputs, and those sophisticated ones
that have an "understanding" in that they functioning by applying the
rules of a representation system. That's *analagous* to the Sellarsian
distinction, between "reporting" and merely reacting, although you
might favor different terminolgy.
Daryl McCullough
ande...@pitt.edu says...
>
>Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>You keep raising objections to "reality is human dependent", which I
>>have not claimed. Can we stick to the question of whether 'truth' is
>>human dependent?
>
>Not if I don't acknowledge that they can be separated.
But they can. Truth is a property of sentences in some language. A sentence is
true if it corresponds to reality (according to a particular interpretation).
Without language, there is no truth. But language is definitely not necessary
for reality---the world existed long before any language-users evolved.
I know that one way to attempt to make a language-independent notion of truth is
to go from sentences to propositions. However, it seems to me that a proposition
is just an abstract kind of sentence (possibly with a built-in interpretation).
It depends on a particular language, in the sense of a choice of abstract
properties.
>Doesn't the equivalence condition P <-> True(p) licencse valid
>inferential transitions in either direction between judgments about
>reality and judgements about truth of propositions?
I agree that a judgement about reality is essentially the same as a judgement
about the truth of a sentence. But I don't think that a "judgement" is possible
independent of language.
>Don't you see the difficulty? If you are going to tell me anything about this
>reality you are going to have to use language, make assertions, employ
>your concepts. If you are going to tell me what reality was like millions
>of years ago near the surface of the Earth, you are going to make assertions
>like, perhaps, that there was a solar eclipse or something. But that
>is the same as saying "there is a solar eclipse" was true at T.
Right. Discussing reality requires language, and as soon as you have a language
with an interpretation (some way of connecting with reality) you can have a
notion of truth.
>It is a strained usage to say it [a hypothetical robot observer] makes reports
>>about the moon if it doesn't understand the concept of the moon.
I don't think so. If you have a language with an interpretation, then you can
have a notion of a "report" about something.
>>We can't make a voltmeter understand much of anything, but the
>>voltmeter can still report whether a battery is flat.
>
>Nonsense, voltmeters can't make reports. People can incorporate
>voltmeters in their reporting practices. Unless you think a
>voltmeter understands something or is alive.
No, I don't think that the understanding of the voltmeter is relevant. The
voltmeter has a very specific output language, which has a very specific
interpretation. That's all that's needed for there to be a report.
>You should check out Sellars and Brandom on the distinction between
>making a report and merely reacting to stimuli in a differential way.
My approach is, rather than ask whether there is a distinction, ask when and for
what the distinction matters. Where the distinction doesn't matter, there is no
reason to make it.
>At any rate, it is about the first step of the philosophy I favor
>to distinguish sharply between making a report and merely reacting
>to stimuli.
I think that it's highly theory-dependent. Human beings can be described as
"merely reacting to stimuli" as well. I would prefer to use terminology that
does not presuppose a particular set of philosophical beliefs.
Daryl McCullough
CoGenTex, Inc.
Ithaca, NY
Neil Rickert
In <5tkc1f$d...@drn.zippo.com> da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>ande...@pitt.edu says...
>>Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>>You keep raising objections to "reality is human dependent", which I
>>>have not claimed. Can we stick to the question of whether 'truth' is
>>>human dependent?
>>Not if I don't acknowledge that they can be separated.
>But they can. Truth is a property of sentences in some language. A sentence is
>true if it corresponds to reality (according to a particular interpretation).
>Without language, there is no truth. But language is definitely not necessary
>for reality---the world existed long before any language-users evolved.
That's fine with me. And as long as we stick to that, I have no
problem with there being propositions. In practice, however,
philosophers such as Weinstein not only refuse to specify the
correspondence with reality which gives the interpretation, but
insist that in principle no correspondence could be specified.
That philosophers refuse to specify the correspondence between
natural language statements and reality does not particulary concern
me. I think it clear that there is no fixed correspondence which
works for natural language. But in that case, the prerequisites for
counting natural language statements as propositions are not met, and
the prerequisites for saying that natural language expressions of
'truth' are human independent are not met.
>>>We can't make a voltmeter understand much of anything, but the
>>>voltmeter can still report whether a battery is flat.
>>Nonsense, voltmeters can't make reports. People can incorporate
>>voltmeters in their reporting practices. Unless you think a
>>voltmeter understands something or is alive.
>No, I don't think that the understanding of the voltmeter is relevant. The
>voltmeter has a very specific output language, which has a very specific
>interpretation. That's all that's needed for there to be a report.
That is exactly the point I was making. With the voltmeter, the
correspondence with reality is specified by the physical structure of
the voltmeter. In such circumstances, I have no difficulty in saying
that there can be propositions and a human-independent 'truth'. But
voltmeter 'truth' is not the same as human 'truth', even when
restricted to statements about voltages.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <01bcaeed$fa477340$e17a61ce@asdf>,
ray scanlon <rsca...@wsg.net> wrote:
>IMVHO Anders takes the position of the Logical Positivists (and others)
>that the predicate calculus is an all encompassing description of
>reality and that the manipulative algebra of the predicate calculus
>partakes of Truth.
No, I was emphatically not talking about formal systems like the
predicate calculus.
>If all there is to thinking and mental life in general is the activity
>of neurons then we may ask, "The activity of which neurons leads to the
>feeling of Truth, to the experience of Truth".
"all there is" here is meaningless. Its like saying all there is
when people pay a debt by check is a making of marks on paper.
In some sense, perhaps, but you do not explain why they constitute
paying of a debt by reference to the structure of the marks alone.
Possibly there is a sense in which thinking is realized in brain activity,
although even that seems a highly problematic idea.
But you could not explain why goings on among neurons constitute
thinking by reference to the neurons alone. Making marks only constitutes
payment in a certain context. Neural activity only constitutes significant
thinking (if that even makes sense) in a certain context.
If I tell you what I "believe in my heart", would you expect a cardiologist
to find it? Our talk about what we "do in our heads" can be equally
non-literal.
>Perhaps we may have recourse to the homunculus, a very sophisticated
>homunculus that is only aware of the machinations of the brain without
>any causal powers. Maybe this homunculus may know of Truth. Now we are
>very close to the soul and to God.
If you meet the homunculus on the road, slay him.
Daryl McCullough
ande...@pitt.edu (Anders Weinstein) says...
>Daryl McCullough <da...@cogentex.com> wrote:
>>Without language, there is no truth. But language is definitely
>>not necessary for reality---the world existed long before any
>>language-users evolved.
>
>If I accept the second I can say: before there was any actual language
>in use, rain often fell on the Earth. That is, before there was any
>actual language in use, it was true that rain fell on Earth.
No, I think that is incorrect. The correct version would be this:
It is true [present tense] that before there was any actual language
in use, rain fell on earth.
>That is, before there was language, what "rain often falls on the Earth"
>means in our language was true. (Note tense shifts -- perhaps we should
>look into formalization of the interactions between temporal operators and
>the truth predicate to get clearer here.)
I agree.
>Perhaps we are talking past each other here, but doesn't that give a
>sense to there being truth before there was language? We just showed
>that what that sentence means was true before there was language.
I think that's a complicated issue. If, ten million years ago, there
happened to be scratches on some cave wall that looked like the English
words "It sometimes rains", I don't think those marks could properly
be called true. Today we have an interpretation of those marks, and
according to that interpretation, the marks are true, but I don't think
that it makes sense to say they were true ten million years ago, because
the interpretation that makes them true did not exist. Unless, of course,
you want to say that, in the Platonic universe of forms, the interpretation
existed, even if no living being constructed the interpretation yet.
I don't think that anyone doubts that there was a world ten million years
ago (well, maybe creationists doubt it). But it seems to me that truth is
not the same thing as reality, it is a relationship between language and
reality.
>Your realistic statements above suggest you are happy to think of say
>moon as orbiting the Earth before there any languge in which to express
>this fact had been actualized. Doesn't that realism get "inherited up" to
>propositions that express these facts?
I'm not exactly sure. When I've seen attempts to formalize the notion of
"proposition" independent of any language, it seems to me that it is nothing
but an abstract form of the language. I think what you want to say is this:
Sentences express propositions.
Propositions are either true or false, according to whether they reflect
reality.
But I really don't see the advantage to the middle step, propositions. What
advantage is there over just saying that sentences are either true or false
according to whether they reflect reality? What, exactly, is a proposition?
>I'm afraid this is too sketchy for me to understand. I don't have a
>heavyweight theory of propositions to offer, just the belief that
>truth bearers can't be uninterpreted word-forms for the usual reasons.
I'm not suggesting that *uninterpreted* sentences can have truth values.
I am suggesting that sentences + an interpretation can have truth values.
>Neither do I. On the other hand, I think the relation is one of expression:
>judgeable contents are *expressible* in language. That leaves it open
>that the contents are one thing, the sentences another. Of course our
>only theoretical handle on them comes via their expressions.
Well, I haven't seen an account of "contents" that I found acceptable.
>>...If you have a language with an interpretation, then you can
>>have a notion of a "report" about something.
>
>The telegraph emits tokens in a language with an interpretation, but
>it does not itself make reports. Certainly it matters whether the
>interpretation is imposed by external observers.
Why?
>You might take it as stipulative here that we are using "making
>a report" for the case where the reporter has some understanding.
I disagree. I think that we can make a good account of language
use that doesn't require any assumptions about the understanding
of the participants. "Understanding" is a *harder* concept to get
a good handle on, so I definitely think it is a mistake to make
it the primary concept.
>Would you say that iron makes a report on the oxygen content of
>its environment when it rusts? It is only a report for *we* who
>can so take it.
I believe that it is possible to give an account of language use
that does not require that we first give an account of understanding.
For me, an organized collection of robots that gather data, communicate
it in some format, and use it to plan their future activities can be
an example of language use, regardless of whether the robots are
"smart" enough to understand what they are "talking about".
I'm not going to make a judgement about "iron rusting". I believe that
human use of language is ultimately due to natural processes as simple
and "unintelligent" as iron rusting. The reason we consider it language
as opposed to chemistry is simply its complexity---it is more informative
(for most purposes) to describe it in terms of language use than it is
to describe it in terms of chemistry. That's not the case with iron rusting.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tkmv7$e...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tkc1f$d...@drn.zippo.com> da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>
>>But they can. Truth is a property of sentences in some language. A sentence is
>>true if it corresponds to reality (according to a particular interpretation).
>>for reality---the world existed long before any language-users evolved.
>
>problem with there being propositions. In practice, however,
>philosophers such as Weinstein not only refuse to specify the
>correspondence with reality which gives the interpretation, but
>insist that in principle no correspondence could be specified.
Why do you say that? In Fregean terms, sense ("intension") determines
reference ("extension"). If I say "The evening star is a planet" then
I have expressed a certain complex sense or proposition. "the evening
star" portion expresses a singular sense which refers to the planet
Venus in a certain manner. The "is a planet" bit expresses a
predicative sense which determines a function from objects to truth
values. If were to say "the morning star is a planet", the singular
bit would refer to the same object but via a different sense.
So what's the problem about "not specifying the correspondance"?
Singular senses are modes or manners by which objects are presented to
a cognitive subject.
Perhaps it arises here: If I say "Vulcan is a planet", the singular bit
"Vulcan" refers to nothing at all. How to analyze this is a source of
much controversy. On the view of Gareth Evans which I favor, this
reference failure means that this sentence fails even to express a
sense -- something which could be true or false -- for there is no
saying what in the world could make it true if the singular bit is not
anchored to anything real.
It might of course have a pseudo-sense, i.e. it might appear to express
a sense and be taken seriously by inquirers for a time, until they
discover that there is no Vulcan, in which case the term is withdrawn
from circulation.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tklkb$e...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tkj6f$8...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5tj74b$d...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>
>>I guess for you the proposition expressed by an ordinary sentence in
>>context like "there's a C++ book on the desk in my office" must
>>describe a non-existent idealized world.
>
>proposition. That is to say, it specifies something in accordance
Can't I say that what that sentence as uttered in context claims is
a proposition?
> That is to say, it specifies something in accordance
>with human conventions, and is thus not a human-independent claim
>about the state of reality.
As always, my idea is that what the sentence means depends on conventions,
but given what it means, the truth or falsity of the claim
is not human-dependent or a matter of convention, but depends on whether
there is a suitable book on my desk.
>> For me it describes a world in
>>which a C++ book (not an idea of a book) is on a table (not an idea of
>>a table). It does not involve applying abstractions to organize sensory
>>information, it involves appliying a concept to books and tables in
>>public space.
>
>We use language as a form of expression for making representations
>about reality. A sentence such as "there's a C++ book on the desk in
>my office" is an expression of relations between representations.
This is really patent nonsense. On its face, it asserts a
relation between a book (not a representation) and a desk (not a
representation). And metal desks are not representations, are they?
I am wondering what the confusion is that leads you to say this.
You can say the sentence *is* a representation. But isn''t
it clearly false to say it is *about* representations? It is about
represent*ed*s, the referents of the representation.
>For that matter, everything to which the standard of 'truth' or
>'falsity' can be applied is a representation.
I am not sure what this means. It may be that I do not see a reason
one ought to believe it. (Is it a dogmatic ideological claim? If
not, then what goes wrong if I reject it?)
I think "representation" can ambigous as applied in these contexts.
Mental states, for example, are characterized by intentional contents
as in Searle's account. So in some sense, if I tell you that John
thinks a C++ book is on my desk, I have told you how John is
representing the world. And I have used an embedded sentence in English
to do so. But I have not described any representational *vehicle*, that
is, any token of any representation.
Perhaps person-level mental states should be understood as vehicle-less
relations to contents or senses or propositions, contents that are
*expressible* in public language vehicles, but are not themselves
syntactic objects. At any rate, I see nothing wrong with such an idea.
There may be vehicles at the sub-personal level, but then again, there
may not, that's an open question.
>To say that X is a representation of reality, is to say that there is
>some mapping from reality to the space of representations. Then 'X
>is true' is equivalent to saying that the representation X was
>properly formed using the procedures of that mapping. In ordinary
This also seems badly off, since a statement can be properly formed
according to the procedures but be false, e.g. if circumstances
are illusory.
Also, I am not sure what the "procedures" here refer to.
The procedure for using the word "desk" might be: apply it to
desks, or things that look like desks. That is vacuous but true.
Beyond that, the idea of a "procedure" for applying a concept may be a
mythical notion. After all, the procedure could only involve application
of more basic concepts. The regress would have to stop with some primitive
concepts that can just be applied without further criteria. Is there
any good reason we can't stop the regress very early, with most
concepts themselves? Then the concepts *are* criteria themselves.
>human affairs, we are continually modifying our mapping procedures,
>for example by adding new words to our vocabulary and by changing the
>meanings of existing words. To say that X is human independent,
But I can say we add new words and change the meanings of existing words
without buying the rest of the story about what this involves.
>would be to say that the mapping procedure used for X has some
>specification which does not depend on the unpredictable variability
>we see with human practices. A voltmeter or the output of a robot
>would meet that standard of human independence. So we can have
OK, but that is not at all the standard I was working with.
>propositions if we are willing to tie them to non-human mapping
>systems such as voltmeters. But as long as 'truth' is measured by
>human activity, then it has nothing to do with propositions.
What if the human measuring activity *is* activity with propositions?
For example, a human being who understands "there is a C++ book on the
desk in my office" is a "measuring device" whose output scale is just
the space of propositions he or she understands? So that among
the things they can measure is: that there is a C++ book on a desk?
>If you are willing to specify the mapping between a reality, and the
>representation space used for assertions of 'truth', then you can
>have propositions, and the reality involved is that which was used in
>the mapping. However, when you talk of propositions in the absence
>of any clear identification of a mapping, then your propositions are
>idealizations, and it is not clear that there is any reality at all
>to which they refer.
Since sense determines reference, propositions have the mapping already
built into them, it does not need to be added to something
uninterpreted. What "bill clinton is in the White House" claims
certainly stands in a relation to a house in Washington DC, doesn't it?
So why do you say I am leaving out the "mapping"? In this system, "bill
clinton" is used as a name of an individual, and "the White House" as a
name of a building. "Is in" is a subtle concept, those words have many
uses, but as long as we are allowed to *use* our language, we can say:
the sentence expresses a proposition that is true iff the former is in
the latter.
>> Is the reality to which
>>our spatial concepts apply itself something non-spatial, for example?
>
>The reality to which our spatial concepts apply is the reality to
>which our spatial concepts apply. But the spatial relations that we
>express are relations between the representations we form of that
>reality.
I can't fathom this usage. You are telling me that spatial relations
are relations between representations. Why isn't that an internal
contradiction? Of course our representations might themselves stand in
spatial relations. But they need not have the same spatial relations
as the representeds, only an isomorphic one.
Again your formulation seems to trample on the distinction between
the representations and the representeds. What you mean, perhaps,
is that spatial relations among representations can be used to
represent spatial relations among objects in the reality represented.
> Whenever you fix a mapping between reality and our
>representation systems, then you can say that a spatial relation
>between representations is the projection of a relation in reality.
You can represent spatial relations in reality by non-spatial relations
among representations too, e.g. temporal ones. Perhaps an A followed in
time by a B in represents that some object Ref(A) is located to the
west of Ref(B).
>I don't know that it is important whether that relation in reality
>should be described as 'spatial.' However our ordinary use of
>natural language is not based on any fixed mapping between reality
>and our representation system, and that is why I reject the idea that
>sentences can be considered to be propositions.
In general, I am skeptical of the mapping idea. That is appropriate
to the use of representational vehicles. But it is not clear to me that
mental states involve the mediation any representational vehicles.
If I deny that, where do I go wrong?
I think this is most obvious for perceptual intentional states. Suppose
I am concious of the book on my desk. Perhaps this involves, among much
else, being consious *that* [as I would express it] that book is on my
desk. Thus I am in an intentional content-bearing state, for that is
what a "that-clause" expresses.
In that sense *the person-state itself* is a "representation", for it
has a content. But it need not be conceived to involve anything with a
syntax, any vehicle. Certainly, if we talk about what is present to my
consciousness, there is *no* representational vehicle to be found. What
is before consciousness is only the visible surface of the book, and
not a representation of a book.
I would also recommend considering this conceptual possibility: perhaps
my brain has godelized all my representations. As well as sets of my
present representations constituting a psychological configuration.
Inside my brain there is just one single numerical counter with the
code of my total representational state. As I move through the world,
my beliefs and other states evolve, and the machinery makes the digits
change like those on a pinball machine.
I guess that numeral might be a representation. But its manifest
structure does not have to map in any natural way onto that of reality.
The only way one could find out what the relevant "syntactic"
structure is would include looking at the public language sentences I
issue to express my beliefs.
Neil Rickert
In <5tq4s2$o...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5tkmv7$e...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>In <5tkc1f$d...@drn.zippo.com> da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>>>But they can. Truth is a property of sentences in some language. A sentence is
>>>true if it corresponds to reality (according to a particular interpretation).
>>>Without language, there is no truth. But language is definitely not necessary
>>>for reality---the world existed long before any language-users evolved.
>>That's fine with me. And as long as we stick to that, I have no
>>problem with there being propositions. In practice, however,
>>philosophers such as Weinstein not only refuse to specify the
>>correspondence with reality which gives the interpretation, but
>>insist that in principle no correspondence could be specified.
>Why do you say that? In Fregean terms, sense ("intension") determines
>reference ("extension").
In other words, all truth is to be determined by counting angels
dancing on heads of pins.
> If I say "The evening star is a planet" then
>I have expressed a certain complex sense or proposition.
You have specified a relation between representations. You have not
connected that to reality, nor could you without examining the neural
processes that are involved in making such claims.
>So what's the problem about "not specifying the correspondance"?
Well, if you are a solipsist, I suppose we could claim that as a
specification of the correspondence. But, apart from the case of
solipsism, you have not specified any correspondence at all.
Neil Rickert
In <5tqdoh$p...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5tklkb$e...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>>I guess for you the proposition expressed by an ordinary sentence in
>>>context like "there's a C++ book on the desk in my office" must
>>>describe a non-existent idealized world.
>>Not at all. But then such a sentence is a sentence, not a
>>proposition. That is to say, it specifies something in accordance
>Can't I say that what that sentence as uttered in context claims is
>a proposition?
You can say that, but of course I would disagree. Perhaps it can be
counted as a proposition in some world of the speaker's creation.
>> That is to say, it specifies something in accordance
>>with human conventions, and is thus not a human-independent claim
>>about the state of reality.
>As always, my idea is that what the sentence means depends on conventions,
>but given what it means, the truth or falsity of the claim
>is not human-dependent or a matter of convention, but depends on whether
>there is a suitable book on my desk.
To say that the truth is not human dependent would be to say that
there is (or could be) a non-human mechanism to determine whether the
conventions were properly followed. But no such mechanism seems to
work.
>>> For me it describes a world in
>>>which a C++ book (not an idea of a book) is on a table (not an idea of
>>>a table). It does not involve applying abstractions to organize sensory
>>>information, it involves appliying a concept to books and tables in
>>>public space.
>>We use language as a form of expression for making representations
>>about reality. A sentence such as "there's a C++ book on the desk in
>>my office" is an expression of relations between representations.
>This is really patent nonsense. On its face, it asserts a
>relation between a book (not a representation) and a desk (not a
>representation). And metal desks are not representations, are they?
The words you used are representations. If you don't want it to be a
statement about represenations, try stating your claim without any
words. And don't try to get by with pointing, for then your pointing
activity is a representation.
>I am wondering what the confusion is that leads you to say this.
>You can say the sentence *is* a representation. But isn''t
>it clearly false to say it is *about* representations? It is about
>represent*ed*s, the referents of the representation.
No doubt a word has a referent by virtue of the activity of the
pineal gland.
>This also seems badly off, since a statement can be properly formed
>according to the procedures but be false, e.g. if circumstances
>are illusory.
Ah, yes, the pineal gland might fail. But that would not be an
example of what you want, for then the failure would be because the
procedures of the mapping were not properly used.
>Also, I am not sure what the "procedures" here refer to.
>The procedure for using the word "desk" might be: apply it to
>desks, or things that look like desks. That is vacuous but true.
If vacuous, then it is not a procedure. You would have to look at
the procedures followed by the neurons, something which you always
refuse to do. But then, as a solipsist, I suppose you are allowed to
skip the realities of how neurons work.
>Beyond that, the idea of a "procedure" for applying a concept may be a
>mythical notion. After all, the procedure could only involve application
>of more basic concepts. The regress would have to stop with some primitive
>concepts that can just be applied without further criteria. Is there
>any good reason we can't stop the regress very early, with most
>concepts themselves? Then the concepts *are* criteria themselves.
There is no reason at all if you are a substance dualist.
>>human affairs, we are continually modifying our mapping procedures,
>>for example by adding new words to our vocabulary and by changing the
>>meanings of existing words. To say that X is human independent,
>But I can say we add new words and change the meanings of existing words
>without buying the rest of the story about what this involves.
No doubt the pineal gland manages to maintain truth, even when
concepts change.
>What if the human measuring activity *is* activity with propositions?
>For example, a human being who understands "there is a C++ book on the
>desk in my office" is a "measuring device" whose output scale is just
>the space of propositions he or she understands? So that among
>the things they can measure is: that there is a C++ book on a desk?
I have no problem with that approach. It would allow us to start
examining how the neurons are measuring the world. Of course much of
what is written by philosophers would have to be abandoned.
>>If you are willing to specify the mapping between a reality, and the
>>representation space used for assertions of 'truth', then you can
>>have propositions, and the reality involved is that which was used in
>>the mapping. However, when you talk of propositions in the absence
>>of any clear identification of a mapping, then your propositions are
>>idealizations, and it is not clear that there is any reality at all
>>to which they refer.
>Since sense determines reference, propositions have the mapping already
>built into them, it does not need to be added to something
>uninterpreted.
That may be so when we discuss propositions. Indeed, I would say it
is vacuously true, since there are no propositions. But explanations
based on 'sense' and 'reference' do not fit natural language.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tqj1q$h...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tq4s2$o...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>Why do you say that? In Fregean terms, sense ("intension") determines
>>reference ("extension").
>
>In other words, all truth is to be determined by counting angels
>dancing on heads of pins.
In other words, you are perversely incapable of comprehension?
>> If I say "The evening star is a planet" then
>>I have expressed a certain complex sense or proposition.
>
>You have specified a relation between representations. You have not
Oh really? Which relation is that?
Could I ever manage to say something that is not really "about"
representations, but about non-representations, like a planet?
Or do you mean just because I did not explain what language I was using?
>connected that to reality, nor could you without examining the neural
>processes that are involved in making such claims.
The details concerning what happens among the neurons could hardly be very
relevant to the *semantic* level description. At the semantic level we
can establish "the Evening star" is used by human beings to refer to a
certain heavanly body. We can do that by looking at how the words
are used, and abstracting from the neural details, which are
transparent as far as this claim is concerned. And the claim answers to
Venus for its truth, not to neurons.
Is there some problem with the idea of a semantic level?
Is your beef that it is not physicalistic enough because it leaves
out reference to the neurons? Elsewhere you seem to understand that
we can employ many levels of description, not all reducible to a single
base. So what is it, why can't I help myself to an autonomous semantic or
phenomenological level?
I find it hard to see how neuroscience could be very relevant to
philosophy of mind as I understand it. After all, it is logically
possible that our heads could be empty but our words would mean exactly
the same things they do now in virtue of the public standards governing
their proper use. I think the semantic level description has got to
abstract from everything literally inside the head, since that stuff
doesn't go to determining intersubjective significance at the semantic
level.
>>So what's the problem about "not specifying the correspondence"?
>
>Well, if you are a solipsist, I suppose we could claim that as a
>specification of the correspondence. But, apart from the case of
No, I am an extreme "externalist", if that tag means anything.
>solipsism, you have not specified any correspondence at all.
Well I have to repeat the question: why can't I say that meaning
depends on use and use requires semantic vocabulary to characterize?
In English, the words "the Evening Star" is standardly used to *refer* to a
certain object, namely the planet Venus.
The sense of the words constitute a mode of presentation of the
referent. For example, you can think of the planet Venus in many ways,
as the planet Venus, as the morning star, as the evening star, etc.
How can you you say that a broadly Fregean account of mental
representation in terms of sense and reference leaves out the
correspondence between mental states and reality? What do
you think reference is? But sense is a mode of presentation of the
referent.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tql1q$i...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tqdoh$p...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5tklkb$e...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>
>>>We use language as a form of expression for making representations
>>>about reality. A sentence such as "there's a C++ book on the desk in
>>>my office" is an expression of relations between representations.
>
>>This is really patent nonsense. On its face, it asserts a
>>relation between a book (not a representation) and a desk (not a
>>representation). And metal desks are not representations, are they?
>
>The words you used are representations. If you don't want it to be a
Of course
>statement about represenations, try stating your claim without any
^^^^^
>words. And don't try to get by with pointing, for then your pointing
>activity is a representation.
"Every claim *uses* words. Therefore every claim is really *about* words."
I'm sorry to say so, but where I come from that's an exceedingly
dim sophomoric fallacy. Have you never heard of "use vs mention"?
If I say "bill clinton is president of the us" I have *used* the words
(representations) to refer to (mention) a rather solid human being (who
is not a representation). Of course the sentence is in words, but it
is not about any words.
"s is about y" has lots of uses, but I would say that in one paradigm
case a singular predicative sentence is *about* the referent of the
singular term. Do you disagree with that?
Of course words are objects of a special kind, and sentences can be
used to say things about words too. Logicians often mark this through
careful use of quotation marks; in ordinary language it is usually
clear from context. But no one would say that that sentence was
making a claim *about* words merely because it is (of course) made
up of words.
>>I am wondering what the confusion is that leads you to say this.
>>You can say the sentence *is* a representation. But isn''t
>>it clearly false to say it is *about* representations? It is about
>>represent*ed*s, the referents of the representation.
>
>No doubt a word has a referent by virtue of the activity of the
>pineal gland.
That seems about as far-fetched as saying it has a referent by the
activity of neurons.
Words have referents by virtue of the activity of human beings.
>>This also seems badly off, since a statement can be properly formed
>>according to the procedures but be false, e.g. if circumstances
>>are illusory.
>
>Ah, yes, the pineal gland might fail. But that would not be an
>example of what you want, for then the failure would be because the
>procedures of the mapping were not properly used.
On my view there are not in general any "procedures" of the mapping.
Wittgenstein used the example of the simple "Slab" language- game to
make some of his points. In that case, I guess, the "procedure of the
mapping" is this: when one person says "Slab!" the other is supposed to
bring a slab. Neurons, pineal glands, mental representations even,
don't enter this account. For it is at the social behavioral level that
the words are put to use and have their significance, the whole human
being with certain acquired skills constitutes the engine whose
activity connects the words with their referents.
That's too simple for all we do in language, but in general, why can't
one take that line for most or all semantic reference? The procedures
are not, absurdly, carried out inside the brain by neurons, they are
carried out publicly by people.
And anyway your claim still has the problem that the "procedures" can be
carried out correctly while the claim is false, doesn't it?
>>Also, I am not sure what the "procedures" here refer to.
>>The procedure for using the word "desk" might be: apply it to
>>desks, or things that look like desks. That is vacuous but true.
>
>If vacuous, then it is not a procedure. You would have to look at
>the procedures followed by the neurons, something which you always
>refuse to do. But then, as a solipsist, I suppose you are allowed to
Why can't I look at the procedures manifestly followed by the man?
For heaven's sake, why does it have to be *neurons*?
> But then, as a solipsist, I suppose you are allowed to
>skip the realities of how neurons work.
As the most extreme anti-solipsist imaginable, I am obliged to skip the
details of how the neurons work.
I am interested in meanings or contents that are communicable,
shareable, public. If I had to look at neurons I would conclude the
communication was impossible, and any attempt at rational dialogue
necessarily folly. (Of course it sometimes seems that way on Usenet,
but not in general)
>There is no reason at all if you are a substance dualist.
Oh all right then, have it your way, I'm a substance dualist. So what?
Is there some problem with my form of "substance dualism" that I
haven't heard about? (I am not a Cartesian dualist, after all.)
Is it really inconceivable that physical science could be largely
irrelevant to meaning and intentionality? It *is* clearly largely
irrelevant to an account of how cultural objects like dollar bills get
their significance, after all, in the sense that that could be
accounted for at the level of social behavioral norms.
>>What if the human measuring activity *is* activity with propositions?
>>For example, a human being who understands "there is a C++ book on the
>>desk in my office" is a "measuring device" whose output scale is just
>>the space of propositions he or she understands? So that among
>>the things they can measure is: that there is a C++ book on a desk?
>
>I have no problem with that approach. It would allow us to start
>examining how the neurons are measuring the world. Of course much of
Why do we need to ask if or how the *neurons* are "measuring the world"
when we can perfectly well observe how whole people are measuring the
world?
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tsfkr$j...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tqooh$q...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>>In article <5tqj1q$h...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>
>>The details concerning what happens among the neurons could hardly be very
>>relevant to the *semantic* level description. At the semantic level we
>>can establish "the Evening star" is used by human beings to refer to a
>>certain heavanly body.
>
>reinterpretation of language. Using that radical reinterpretation,
>we take all of what you have said to express what you claim is the
>correspondence map between language and reality. As we do so, we
>notice that your correspondence map description still works
>perfectly. Nothing in it is changed, even though what used to map
>into 'cat' now maps into 'cherry.' The clear conclusion is that your
>description of the correspondence map didn't describe it at all. It
>was completely empty.
This is confused. What I said was simply incompatible with that
mapping. I said the word "The Evening Star" referred to the planet
Venus. That is incompatible with its referring to cats or cherries.
>Now you could not pull that switcheroo without changing what is the
>neural activity.
This is even more confused. IF you accept Putnam's re-interpretatoin
argument, it goes through unchanged even if you add reference to causal
processes in the neurons (he certainly claims as much, i.e. he claims
adding causal connections doesn't change anything). But if you think
adding reference to causal connections suffices to block Putnam's
argument, then there is no reason at all the relevant causal
connections can't extend out to the objects of world.
Let me take a simpler case. John is standing in the living room, points
to a dog, Fido, and says "that dog is asleep". I can see the dog and I
can see John and I can see the pointing gesture and hear the words
hanging in the air. Provisionally, I say that the words he uttered
express his thoughts about that dog in the world Fido, since that is
what it appears he was pointing at.
Now that is a correspondence. It depends on a relation between the dog
in the world and the behavior of pointing and saying (or the thought it
expresses). What's wrong with that? Is that inaccessible somehow? Why
can't I think of the link between dogs and dog-statements as
transparent, the way I think of the software in my modem as
transparent? No doubt its complex, but functionally, the details don't
matter in recognizing whether it is getting the bits unchanged from A
to B. Any causal process between things in the world and judgments
about things in the world is similarly transparent as far as the theory
of meaning is concerned.
I certainly have not had to look at his neurons to establish this
connection. Looking at his neurons would not really add anything. I
only have to look at the way his expressive behavior is oriented
towards the dog on the floor. (Compare, btw, recent Quine on the public
situation in which people are trained in the use of perceptual verbs, I
believe in _Stimulus to Science_. The learner sees the other subject
and the object both.)
Now I might have to investigate further, of course, to establish that
this is not just a Disneyland robot. I might have to probe further
details of his practice with the term "dog", such as: his general
ability to pick out and track and re-identify objects, to use the term
"dog" in inferences, to conceive of himself as a fallible observer such
that some things can seem to be dogs but not be dogs, his tacit
recognition of experts in biology who have some authority over what is
really a dog, perhaps even his ability to join in a question over
whether such and such really is a dog and so on.
But I can do even this further probing without looking in his brain.
For example, if I say "would you say *this* is a dog?" I do not in
general have to look inside his brain to determine his verdict. But
these things all concern relations between claims and things in the
world.
>>>Well, if you are a solipsist, I suppose we could claim that as a
>>>specification of the correspondence. But, apart from the case of
>
>>No, I am an extreme "externalist", if that tag means anything.
>
>That tag means that you attach the label "external" to your internal
>solipsistic world.
You seem to be blinkered here by what strikes me as one of the most
bizarre conceptions I have ever encountered. As far as I can tell, you
seem to think that language use as such *must*, necessarily, be
something conceived to take place entirely in a hermetically sealed
self-contained domain, something that could exist as formal symbol
manipulation without any intrinsic connection to things in the world.
At least that would explain why you think it could only get its
connection via an external relation to *neural processes*.
But from my point of view that is completely backwards. There is
*no reason at all* to adopt this conception of language use. The question
that really needs answering is why you are so convinced it is mandatory,
so that you are ideologically blinded to the perfectly viable,
common-sensical alternative.
From my point of view, meaningful and expressive language use should
*not* be conceived of as taking place primarily in some kind of
detached or disconnected mental sphere in the first place. This is very
clear if you take due account of demonstrative reference, for only a
creature embodied in the world can employ demonstrative refrerring
devices. A computer by itself can't point and say "that", only a robot
that can act and perceive in the world could. That is why robots can
have thoughts with empirical content but disconnected computers
cannot, since content of abstract non-indexical thought of objects
is imbibed through the empirical "ground floor" of demonstratively
expressible thoughts.
So on my view, we must connect abstract thoughts to demonstratively
expressible perceptual contents for them to have meaning. But we do not
have a further step of connecting the perceptual contents to the things
in the world, beyond what we can discern from attention to the
situations in which they are expressed.
I would say there is really no problem about the connection for
neuroscience to solve, *unless* you presuppose at the outset the idea
of two separated realms standing in need of a connection.
For me, language use expressive of thought takes place *in* the spatial
and temporal world, employing, among other, things material vehicles.
For example, when someone standing in the living room points at a dog
on the floor. Their claim is already connected to the world in part
because of the way the claimer is situated in the world, not because of
what happens in some sphere of representations in the mind. Indeed, if
you try to explain its connection only by connecting it to neurons, I
would say you never really get any connection to the dog at all.
On a milder note, I really can't see why you would object to the idea
of a causal account of the connection between thought and the world in
which the neural details that implement the causal links are treated as
transparent. Some people have called this "broad" functionalism, as
opposed to "narrow" functionalism that looks only to what's inside the
head. What would be wrong with an account of the connection that
appeals only to the causal link between the dog on the living room
floor and the deployment of the representation "Fido"? That is not
exactly my view, but mine is certainly located in that direction.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tsmt2$j...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5tskp6$2...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>
>>Let me take a simpler case. John is standing in the living room, points
>>to a dog, Fido, and says "that dog is asleep". I can see the dog and I
>>can see John and I can see the pointing gesture and hear the words
>>hanging in the air. Provisionally, I say that the words he uttered
>>express his thoughts about that dog in the world Fido, since that is
>>what it appears he was pointing at.
>
>"that dog is asleep", then the problem of AI is completely solved.
Um, I believe I included a followup that alluded to the rest of the
battery of skills required for this to be a meaningful utterance and not the
emission of a Disneyland robot.
But to reiterate, no computer could do this since computers as such don't have
senses with which to perceive, a body to move and track objects with,
limbs with which to point. You must mean a robot could do it.
>>Now that is a correspondence.
>
>And therefore if the computer can emit the same sentences, the AI
>problem is also solved.
If a robot could emit the same sentences in the context of the
same background of skillful activity, yes the problem would be solved.
But computers are the wrong sort of thing to solve this problem since
*computers* as such don't have bodily skills.
Why do you keep bringing up computers? I do not think a computer is the
right sort of thing at all to be a psychological subject. You might as
well say the number two is thinking as that a computer is thinking (or,
for that matter, that a brain is thinking). I have said many times that
I think only an artificial creature that could perceive and behave
could have thought with empirical content, i.e. consciousness of the
world around them.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5tsmrs$q...@drn.zippo.com>,
Daryl McCullough <da...@cogentex.com> wrote:
>
>The abstract form of this is Object A has relationship R to
>Object B, where A=earth, B=sun, R=orbits. Right off the bat,
>I think we run into problems: In order for there to be a
>human-independent meaning to this proposition, we have to
>presuppose that there is a human-independent partitioning
>of the universe into objects. Such partitioning is an act
>of modeling, it is not a fundamental fact about the
>universe.
Why can't it be a fundamental fact about the universe?
What would it be like to make a universe that is not "partitioned
into objects"? Could God himself do such a thing?
Of course it is true that human beings partition regions of the surface
of the Earth into nations, counties, boroughs and the like. These are
conventionally imposed boundaries. But any reflection on the process by
which we impose conventional boundaries on the natural world requires
that both sides of the process be intelligible. If we say we impose
conventional boundaries on landmasses, we are taking it that the
landmasses were there anyway, independent of the petty disturbances of
man.
The mistake comes when one tries to extend this intuition from
imposition of human boundaries on the natural world, to imposition of
the concepts of natural objects on ... what, exactly? Some amorphous
goo? The qualityless substratum, the void, the receptacle, the
unconceptualized thing-in-itself, the pre-conceptual given, the bloomin
buzzin confusion, the flux of experience?
The only world that could ever show up as an object for us is a world
articulated into objects, properties, and relations. Talk of anything
else is hankering after some transcendental vantage point outside of
our concepts (the "god's eye view") from which to catch us imposing
form on some unknowable substratum as a source of constraint.
Because I reject the intelligibility of the god's eye view I have to
reject that sort of imposition. From the human point of view, nature is
something that was as it was before rational human beings who could
cognize it emerged. I mean that reminder as a phenomenological
statement about nature as we conceive it, not about a thing-in-itself.
Neil Rickert
In <5tsv72$4...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5tsmt2$j...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>In that case, if we can get computers to emit expressions such as
>>"that dog is asleep", then the problem of AI is completely solved.
>Um, I believe I included a followup that alluded to the rest of the
>battery of skills required for this to be a meaningful utterance and not the
>emission of a Disneyland robot.
>But to reiterate, no computer could do this since computers as such don't have
>senses with which to perceive, a body to move and track objects with,
>limbs with which to point. You must mean a robot could do it.
These could not possibly be relevant on the Weinstein view, for you
routinely claim to describe how 'truth' works using only language,
and you refuse to allow the relevance of what the perceptual neurons
are doing.
Chris Hooley
On 25 Aug 1997 12:36:28 -0700, da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
>In order for there to be a
>human-independent meaning to this proposition, we have to
>presuppose that there is a human-independent partitioning
>of the universe into objects. Such partitioning is an act
>of modeling, it is not a fundamental fact about the
>universe.
Thank you.
Sometimes the most important issues get obscured.
Though you've blown away the smoke for a moment, Daryl, it'll return
because of the confusions concerning conscious experience and reality.
IMHO, as long as the model of a seperate self in a pre-existing external
reality dominates, that's not going to change.
How do distinctions arise? What seperates the observing system from its
observation? These questions lead to gaping holes and therein lies an
answer.
The social, transferable models are two generations removed from reality;
they'll always fall short.
That's because reality isn't conceptual at all. It is not subject to any
of the divisions of our modelling, which arises only as a rationalization
microseconds after the fact. Reality can be experienced but not
communicated. That isn't due to some esoteric, metaphysical quality, but
rather to the physics of the thing. Reality "precedes", logically, not
temporally, the severance of space and time. No model can duplicate that
"efficiency!" :-)
So, good science starts at home, inside one's own experience. That's the
common sense of it, though it contradicts the socio-scientific myth.
Accepting the logical authority (not correctness) of immediate experience
is, I believe, the only way to keep one's feet on the ground.
Rather obviously, the exact opposite can be claimed from the
weight-in-the-world view. That is, even mild solipsism is unstable,
science works in part because it is a cumulative socially verified process,
etc.
It's one person at a time. Like popcorn.
Regards
Chris
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5u1fd6$slc$1...@usenet01.srv.cis.pitt.edu>,
CDJ <cdjo...@pitt.edu> wrote:
>I didn't, and don't say that there are not a lot of such issues. What I did do
>was (attempt to) move attention away from the locution "What is a ...".
>Abstractly, the reason to move heavy-philosophical attention away from
>locutions of that sort is Grunlagen-Fregean: such locutions treat the
>concept-word as though it were the important thing. Frege and Russell taught
>us to think in terms of sentences, and Quine and Davidson (among others) teach
>us to think in terms of languages
An inquiry into the individuation of a *sort* of thing can be viewed as
an inquiry into the logic of sortal predicates or common nouns -- as
distinct from characterizing predicates (adjectives). Classical logic
such as Frege's appears to do away with this distinction. I believe it
is explicitly claimed by Quine that it is a benefit of the modern
logical point of view. On the other hand, Dummett points out that
criteria of individuation determine with sortal terms in the course his
_Frege_ book (chapter on Identity as I recall).
The univocity of identity is also relevant, as some, notably Geach,
have claimed that identity is relative to a sort. Interestingly,
Quine sides with Dummett against Geach on this.
As always, I would say David Wiggins' _Sameness and Substance_ is
absolutely essential reading for anyone interested in these issue. The
treatment in that book is heavily informed by philosophical logic but
takes it to support a kind of neo-Aristotelian view of individual
substances, essentialism and all. Which is very different than what
you get in Quine or Davidson.
ray scanlon
CDJ <cdjo...@pitt.edu> wrote in article
<5tv0ck$pk7$3...@usenet01.srv.cis.pitt.edu>...
> In article <01bcafe6$94bec380$f37a61ce@asdf>, "ray scanlon"
<rsca...@wsg.net> said:
>
> >> >IMVHO Anders takes the position of the Logical Positivists (and
> >> others)
> >> >that the predicate calculus is an all encompassing description of
> >> >reality and that the manipulative algebra of the predicate
calculus
> >> >partakes of Truth.
> >>
> >> I guess this gets the weekly Most Asinine Statement Award....
> >
> >Seems to me to be a clear enough description of what passes for
> >philosophy these days.
>
> (a) I am definitely the last person to defend philosophical practice.
>
> (b) Nonetheless, your statement betrayed not the slightest glimmer of
> understanding what Weinstein has been saying. I don't think I ever
heard him
> say anything that reminded me in any significant way of the
positivists (and
> I've heard him more than you have, I'll wager).
No contest. I use "Logical Positivist" to refer to the whole motley
crew of logic choppers. I know they distinguish among themselves but I
am not a member of their shared lexicon community.
> >> Maybe someday I'll understand why people can't quite grasp the
fact
> >> that,
> >> e.g., brains don't see anything - people (and various other
animals)
> >> do. But
> >> not today.
> >
> >Are you saying that a person is something more than a body that
> >includes a brain? Do you refer to the soul?
>
> DID I say that? No. Souls don't see. Fingers don't see. Eyes don't
see. Brains
> don't see. People see.
There is body and there is soul. You wish to say there is something
else called people. That is your privilege. Soul (mind, intellect,
self) is my choice.
ray scanlon
CDJ <cdjo...@pitt.edu> wrote in article
<5tv0ck$pk7$3...@usenet01.srv.cis.pitt.edu>...
> In article <01bcafe6$94bec380$f37a61ce@asdf>, "ray scanlon"
<rsca...@wsg.net> said:
>
> >> >IMVHO Anders takes the position of the Logical Positivists (and
> >> others)
> >> >that the predicate calculus is an all encompassing description of
> >> >reality and that the manipulative algebra of the predicate
calculus
> >> >partakes of Truth.
> >>
> >> I guess this gets the weekly Most Asinine Statement Award....
> >
> >Seems to me to be a clear enough description of what passes for
> >philosophy these days.
>
> (a) I am definitely the last person to defend philosophical practice.
>
> (b) Nonetheless, your statement betrayed not the slightest glimmer of
> understanding what Weinstein has been saying. I don't think I ever
heard him
> say anything that reminded me in any significant way of the
positivists (and
> I've heard him more than you have, I'll wager).
No contest. I use 'logical positivist' as a name for the whole bunch of
analytic philosophers. You have a perfect right to object to my usage,
it comes with the territory.
> >> Maybe someday I'll understand why people can't quite grasp the
fact
> >> that,
> >> e.g., brains don't see anything - people (and various other
animals)
> >> do. But
> >> not today.
> >
> >Are you saying that a person is something more than a body that
> >includes a brain? Do you refer to the soul?
>
> DID I say that? No. Souls don't see. Fingers don't see. Eyes don't
see. Brains
> don't see. People see.
There is soul and there is body. If you wish to say there are also
people, I may only agree. There are also dogs, cats, and rats. And
there are octopi who have a better eye design. (Vertebrate eyes are
inside out. The eye of the octopus is right side to.) However in my
book it is either body or soul that sees.
ray
ray scanlon
Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in article
<01bcb3a6$a647d600$e67a61ce@asdf>...
> In <01bcaeed$fa477340$e17a61ce@asdf> "ray scanlon" <rsca...@wsg.net>
> writes:
>
> >IMVHO Anders takes the position of the Logical Positivists (and
> others)
> >that the predicate calculus is an all encompassing description of
> >reality and that the manipulative algebra of the predicate calculus
> >partakes of Truth.
>
> I think that position is wider than logical positivism. It infects
> most analytic philosophy. Anders would probably deny that he is a
> logical positivist.
I am not a member of their shared lexicon community, I tend to use
'logical positivism' as a classifier for the whole bunch.
> >Neil has a slightly jaundiced view of axiom systems.
>
> Not so. As a mathematician, I value them. What I reject as invalid,
> is the way that those systems are used within philosophy.
As a mathematician (retired), I share your views. You have used better
words to say what I attempted to suggest with 'jaundiced'. As you
correctly point out it is not axiom systems but the use of them that
leads to complaint.
> >Suppose we say that neuroscience has given us yet another view of
> >reality. The neuron is the basic element of the thinking brain and
the
> >neuron is reducible to physics. They look at the brain on the
> >dissecting table and say, "That's all there is."
>
> >How Nice!
>
> >Now we are looking at a brain that is looking at the world. An
endless
> >regression presents itself.
>
> Self reference need not lead to a problem of infinite regression.
> Mathematics is enriched by self-referential systems.
Of course. But we observe a brain (not ours) that observes the world.
> >If all there is to thinking and mental life in general is the
activity
> >of neurons then we may ask, "The activity of which neurons leads to
> the
> >feeling of Truth, to the experience of Truth".
>
> I don't agree with your premise, or with your innatist views of the
> brain such as you recently expressed.
My premise is only a position taken for discussion. Assume the premise,
then it becomes reasonable to ask exactly what neural activity we
experience as 'truth'.
I feel that this is a useful premise for discussing materialism. I feel
that we may indeed specify the neurons involved (the reticular nucleus
of the thalamus). When we retreat from the premise we shall know we are
doing it. On this point, I say we should use the premise to work out
the implications of the physical world (INCLUDING the brain). When this
is done we may well say it was only in fun.
Ray
CDJ
In article <01bcb3d6$71474280$ed7a61ce@asdf>, "ray scanlon" <rsca...@wsg.net> said:
>There is soul and there is body. If you wish to say there are also
>people, I may only agree. There are also dogs, cats, and rats. And
>there are octopi who have a better eye design. (Vertebrate eyes are
>inside out. The eye of the octopus is right side to.) However in my
>book it is either body or soul that sees.
I have had occasion to count many things in my 26 year lifespan. Souls are not
among them. I walk into a party, I might be interested in how many girls are
there. I look in the refrigerator, I might want to know how many beers there
are. If I were a minister giving a sermon on Sunday, I may well ask one of my
assistants how many people showed up. I have yet to think of a case where I
would want or need to know how many souls satisfy a given predicate.
And then, if I were to need to know this, I would have no idea how to begin
counting? How many souls are in that doorway over there? Are there more
fat souls than thin? I can tell you quite reliably how many people, dogs,
cats, rats, octopi, and octopi eyes are in that doorway. I don't take myself
to have any such ability with souls. Perhaps you differ, but I don't take most
English-speaking people to differ from me in that way.
I am completely comfortable saying "Fletcher saw a bus coming. That's why he
left the coffee shop so quickly.".
I am completely uncomfortable saying "Fletcher's soul saw a bus coming. That's
why he left the coffee shop so quickly.".
Perhaps you differ.
Let ENGLISH be that fragment of English which is deprived of "soul" and its
various variants. Does English permit more to be said, in the language
ENGLISH than ENGLISH itself does? Or is English "richer" ONLY in the trivial
sense that soul-talk is expressible in it?
CDJ
CDJ
In article <5u4ffm$q...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, ric...@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) said:
>I don't recall using the term 'slave'. I do consider philosophy (as
>practiced by professional philosophers) to be a kind of religion.
You quite possibly didn't. Just practicing a little harmless demonizing of the
enemy.... :)
CDJ
Paul M. Johnson
CDJ wrote:
>
<snip>
> Contrariwise, I (think I) can speak perfectly well without mentioning
> souls. Never once have I been called upon to count souls. Or do anything else
> with them. They don't add anything to any of the languages I speak, though
> they might form part of an autonomous language game themselves (where said
> autonomy is precisely the problem with them).
>
> What the hell is a soul, anyway? (Perry's "Dialogue on Personal Identity and
> Immortality is good on this crap.)
>
> I ain't afraid of no soul...
If matters hadn't taken such an odd turn since Aristotle's _De Anima_,
talk about the soul might have remained relatively unproblematic.
I take it that he conceived it--the soul (psuche)--as falling on the
property side of the thing/property divide, as simply being a set of
capacities to do certain things (reproduce, take in nutrients, move,
perceive, think). Had this straightforward usage not been corrupted,
soul talk would be no more suspect than talk about the capacity (power,
ability, potentiality) to play the trumpet.
But somewhere along the way the soul became a *thing*. Damned if I
know why.
Paul J.
>
> And Rickert calls Weinstein (and me, I would imagine) a slave to some sort of
> religion...
>
> CDJ
CDJ
In article <340641...@micron.net>, aug...@micron.net said:
>CDJ wrote:
>>
><snip>
>> Contrariwise, I (think I) can speak perfectly well without mentioning
>> souls
>talk about the soul might have remained relatively unproblematic.
>I take it that he conceived it--the soul (psuche)--as falling on the
>property side of the thing/property divide, as simply being a set of
>capacities to do certain things (reproduce, take in nutrients, move,
>perceive, think)
>DJ
I think the concept described above is a very important concept and becomes
better once some of its constituents are described in more detail, and some of
their interconnections made explicit.
I would name this concept “person”, and would think that someone using “soul”
for this concept would have no need of the word “person”.
I take it that there is clearly a need for competent speakers of our language
to have a concept of _person_ (generically, we need to know who we can talk to
and who we can't). I thought what was in question was whether or not there
was, in addition, a need for _another_ concept, viz, _soul_. I fail to see
what lack this concept removes. Your Aristotelian suggestion does not address
the question one way or another; rather, it gives me the concept _person_
under a (misleading, I think) new name, "soul".
(There is something of an oddity in what I said here. Possibly further
discussion will force me to come clean.)
CDJ
CDJ
ray scanlon
Anders N Weinstein <ande...@pitt.edu> wrote in article
<01bcb462$adccb500$fe7a61ce@asdf>...
> In article <01bcb3c4$fb92e000$f87a61ce@asdf>,
> ray scanlon <rsca...@wsg.net> wrote:
> >There is body and there is soul. You wish to say there is something
> >else called people. That is your privilege. Soul (mind, intellect,
> >self) is my choice.
>
> There are many perfectly innocent ways of using the word "soul". For
> example, Wittgenstein said something like: my attitude towards him is
> an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a
> soul.
Whenever I see the word 'mind' or 'intellect' or 'self' or
'consciousness', I replace it with 'soul'. This is my innocent way of
marking up philosophical discussion. Then I remove the possessive. "I
have a mind" becomes "I am a soul". "I am conscious" becomes "I am a
soul".
ray
ray scanlon
CDJ <cdjo...@pitt.edu> wrote in article
<01bcb463$b5038500$fe7a61ce@asdf>...
> In article <01bcb3d6$71474280$ed7a61ce@asdf>, "ray scanlon"
> <rsca...@wsg.net> said:
>
> >There is soul and there is body. If you wish to say there are also
> >people, I may only agree. There are also dogs, cats, and rats. And
> >there are octopi who have a better eye design. (Vertebrate eyes are
> >inside out. The eye of the octopus is right side to.) However in my
> >book it is either body or soul that sees.
(snip)
> I am completely comfortable saying "Fletcher saw a bus coming. That's
> why he
> left the coffee shop so quickly.".
>
> I am completely uncomfortable saying "Fletcher's soul saw a bus
coming.
> That's
> why he left the coffee shop so quickly.".
This is 'doing philosophy in the new way' of sixty years ago.
Fletcher's brain (body) responded to the approaching bus. That is, the
neurons of his brain did by initiating a motor program that set his
legs moving. Fletcher, as a soul, was aware of the neural activity in
his brain.
> Let ENGLISH be that fragment of English which is deprived of "soul"
and
> its
> various variants. Does English permit more to be said, in the
language
> ENGLISH than ENGLISH itself does? Or is English "richer" ONLY in the
> trivial
> sense that soul-talk is expressible in it?
ENGLISH will not do for the next century. Natural science will be
pretty much played out when the neuroscientists have finished with the
brain. When we see that consciousness (soul) has no place in the
natural world we will turn to talk of soul and God. Chalmers hopes for
a resolution. McGinn says that even if there is one we shall not be
able to understand it. In any event dualism will be ascendant in the
21st century.
CDJ
In article <01bcb49d$9a75ae40$f27a61ce@asdf>, "ray scanlon" <rsca...@wsg.net> said:
> When we see that consciousness (soul) has no place in the
>natural world we will turn to talk of soul and God. Chalmers hopes for
>a resolution. McGinn says that even if there is one we shall not be
>able to understand it. In any event dualism will be ascendant in the
>21st century.
Okay. Freak.
CDJ
CDJ
In article <01bcb494$f2607b20$f27a61ce@asdf>, "ray scanlon" <rsca...@wsg.net> said:
>> Though semantically there's no problem with it, it seems that
>>socially, to use a phrase which traditionally has one connotation
>>with some other connotation seems dishonest to me.
>
>There is no authority. Every man has his own grammer, the finer points
>of which are denoted 'style'. He has his own lexicon, his own
>pronuciation.
Wow. And here I thought that there were rules, of some sort or another,
concerning the use of language (say, spelling). Thank you for setting me
straight, babykiller. (Don't get upset; I use "babykiller" to refer to anyone
claiming that there is no authority.)
> Since I am two generations older, you should expect
>expect my usage to differ.
(a) Two generations older than _what_ ?
(b) I have spent a goodly amount of time with many folks two generations older
than me recently. Their usage does not differ.
>(much talk of how cdj is not a soul - snip)
I have yet to hear what a soul is. Are you going to make answer, or will you
just go the way of Hubey?
>. How can there be a God who would allow your two
>older brothers and fifteen of your male relatives to fall on the Somme?
Good question.
>Nevertheless, it is body and soul. The body is part of the exterior or
>natural universe, the soul is not.
I must've missed the part where you told me what a soul was.
>> And Rickert calls Weinstein (and me, I would imagine) a slave to some
>> sort of religion...
>
>'Slave' is too strong a word. But materialist philosophy, as taught in
>American universities, is an evangelical religeon.
While you're telling me what a soul is, could also include a description of
"materialist philosophy", please? As I and everyone else I know use it, it
means something like _line of thought according to which physical objects are
all that exist_. I don't believe that. I have never said anything which
implied or suggested that I believe that. I believe that there are all sorts
of non-physical things (numbers, emotions, etc.; generally, anything that can
be counted).
OTOH, now that I am familiar with your 2-generation-older-non-rule-governed
use of language, I have no reason to believe that you mean anything of the
sort by "materialist philosophy". Possibly you mean "blind carpentry", I
dunno.
CDJ
Paul M. Johnson
CDJ wrote:
>
> In article <340641...@micron.net>, aug...@micron.net said:
>>CDJ wrote:
>>>
>><snip>
>>> Contrariwise, I (think I) can speak perfectly well without mentioning
>>> souls
>
>>talk about the soul might have remained relatively unproblematic.
>>I take it that he conceived it--the soul (psuche)--as falling on the
>>property side of the thing/property divide, as simply being a set of
>>capacities to do certain things (reproduce, take in nutrients, move,
>>perceive, think)
>>
>
> better once some of its constituents are described in more detail, and some of
> their interconnections made explicit.
>
> I would name this concept “person”, and would think that someone using “soul”
> for this concept would have no need of the word “person”.
>
> I take it that there is clearly a need for competent speakers of our language
> to have a concept of _person_ (generically, we need to know who we can talk to
> and who we can't). I thought what was in question was whether or not there
> was, in addition, a need for _another_ concept, viz, _soul_. I fail to see
> what lack this concept removes. Your Aristotelian suggestion does not address
> the question one way or another; rather, it gives me the concept _person_
> under a (misleading, I think) new name, "soul".
No. We need "person" for the thing (the organized body) which *has*
these
capacities. A person is not a set of capacities; it's the thing which
has 'em.
The soul is functional organization (not a *what* at all, but a *how*--a
how-
organized, as it were), the person is the so-organized living body.
So we still need both concepts, don't we? Or maybe you're working with
some
bundle-theory metaphysics of particulars?
Paul J.
Lewis Jorgenson
cho...@idnsi.net wrote in part:
Chooley:
At any rate, Rickert's statement stands: Truth is a human concept which
cannot be idealized.
Jorgenson:
You and Mr. Rickert are mistaken and/or dishonest. Please tell
me which human you are referring to. Are you referring to an
8 year old humans concept of truth or an 80 year old? Do
you include psychotics and humans under the influence of
drugs or dreams when they relate the truth? Please refer to a
dictionary for the everyday definition of 'idealized' and then
explain to everyone why Truth or anything else cannot be
'idealized'. What nonsense are the two of you babbling about?
Chooley:
This is only hard because it admits of a seperation between all things
conceivable and reality. So, the curious monkey is limited. Closure
only
comes through declaring it so. We examine our own artifacts.
Jorgenson:
The ants and worms and oxygen will act upon your personal
artifacts once you are departed and they shall make no declarations.
Your suggestion that one must have an observer before there is
something to be observed is at odds with the actual state of
affairs. Go without food for awhile and then tell everyone
whether truth exists or not. Must humans eat to survive?
If you think that determination is a judgement call then
your logic is beneath consideration.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
In <5u8367$13e0$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>cho...@idnsi.net wrote in part:
>Chooley:
>At any rate, Rickert's statement stands: Truth is a human concept which
>cannot be idealized.
>Jorgenson:
>You and Mr. Rickert are mistaken and/or dishonest. Please tell
>me which human you are referring to.
Jorgenson's mistake and/or dishonesty is already apparent. Neither
Hooley nor I have suggested problems with an individual human's
assertions of 'truth'. Our objection has been to claims of an
idealization of that 'truth' which makes it human independent. Thus
the asking of "which human .." misses the point entirely.
CDJ
> Or maybe you're working with
>some
>bundle-theory metaphysics of particulars?
Thankfully, it's been years since I spent time thinking of silly answers to
silly questions of that paticular sort.
CDJ
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>cho...@idnsi.net wrote in part:
Chooley:
At any rate, Rickert's statement stands: Truth is a human concept which
cannot be idealized.
Jorgenson:
You and Mr. Rickert are mistaken and/or dishonest. Please tell
me which human you are referring to.
Chooley:
Jorgenson's mistake and/or dishonesty is already apparent. Neither
Hooley nor I have suggested problems with an individual human's
assertions of 'truth'.
Jorgenson:
Just as I have acknowledged that your view is a valid and
proper approach for purposes of research. It is intuitively
obvious that your approach is not the actual state of affairs.
Does an actual state of affairs exist or does it not? Is
there Truth or not? How do the laws of physics and other
actual state of affairs depend upon humans at all?
Chooley:
Our objection has been to claims of an idealization of that 'truth'
which makes it human independent. Thus the asking of "which human
." misses the point entirely.
Jorgenson:
I am an idiot. If truth is human dependent then certainly
there must be some attributes that constitute being a human
to fit in with that dependency. You can pronounce that we
all know what humans are and expect me to swallow it. I
thought we all knew what truth was and expected you to
swallow it.
Does red exist or is red just an idealized color? There
is nothing with a red color until a human names the color?
Your logic is pure and correct and proper and it is useless
with regard to the actual state of affairs. The word
truth is arbitrary and is different in other languages
and yet there is a concrete basis for the abstract
concept truth just as there is a concrete basis for
the abstract concept of the color red.
Try this: Why do we teach young humans that Truth
exists? Are we just providing a myth as a matter of
social control or are we providing a foundation for
the creation of critical thinking skills where
searching for the Truth is promoted as a worthwhile
endeavor?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Neil Rickert
In <5u9bmv$qoo$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>>cho...@idnsi.net wrote in part:
>Chooley:
>At any rate, Rickert's statement stands: Truth is a human concept which
>cannot be idealized.
>Jorgenson:
>You and Mr. Rickert are mistaken and/or dishonest. Please tell
>me which human you are referring to.
[The following attribution is wrong - I wrote that paragraph.]
>Chooley:
>Jorgenson's mistake and/or dishonesty is already apparent. Neither
>Hooley nor I have suggested problems with an individual human's
>assertions of 'truth'.
>Jorgenson:
>Just as I have acknowledged that your view is a valid and
>proper approach for purposes of research. It is intuitively
>obvious that your approach is not the actual state of affairs.
>Does an actual state of affairs exist or does it not? Is
>there Truth or not? How do the laws of physics and other
>actual state of affairs depend upon humans at all?
We can talk of 'states of affairs' or 'facts' or 'truths' as much as
we like. But we always apply those designations to representations,
typically to sentences. We can even prepend the word "actual", but
what we refer to is still a representation, typically a sentence.
There is a widespread tendency to use such descriptions in a
hand-waving manner, with the pretence that what is designated 'true'
or 'a fact' or 'a state of affairs' is not merely a representation.
But no convincing argument has been given which could persuade us
that this is more than a pretence.
[Again, the following attribution is wrong.]
>Chooley:
>Our objection has been to claims of an idealization of that 'truth'
>which makes it human independent. Thus the asking of "which human
>." misses the point entirely.
>Jorgenson:
>I am an idiot. If truth is human dependent then certainly
>there must be some attributes that constitute being a human
>to fit in with that dependency. You can pronounce that we
>all know what humans are and expect me to swallow it. I
>thought we all knew what truth was and expected you to
>swallow it.
The claim that we all know what a human is, is a fair enough claim.
So is the claim that we all know what truth is. But some people,
particularly philosophers, want to go beyond what we all know as to
'truth', and use their own distinct idea of 'truth' as a foundation
for elaborate and sometimes absurd theories. When they do that, it
is appropriate to point out that their use of 'truth' goes way beyond
what could be supported by common knowledge. Thus they incur an
obligation to define what they mean by 'truth', an obligation which
they have failed to meet. Likewise, if someone presents an elaborate
theory of being 'human', that goes beyond what can be supported by
common knowledge, then they too should be challenged to meet the
obligation they incur to define their terms.
>Does red exist or is red just an idealized color?
The question seems silly.
> There
>is nothing with a red color until a human names the color?
You are using the term beyond what can be supported by common
knowledge. You thus owe us some sort of definition if you expect an
answer.
>Your logic is pure and correct and proper and it is useless
>with regard to the actual state of affairs.
On the contrary, there is no difficulty with regard to "the actual
state of affairs", since that too is a human concept and cannot be
made human independent.
>with regard to the actual state of affairs. The word
>truth is arbitrary and is different in other languages
>and yet there is a concrete basis for the abstract
>concept truth just as there is a concrete basis for
>the abstract concept of the color red.
>Try this: Why do we teach young humans that Truth
>exists?
The question seems silly, particularly with the capitalization of
'Truth.' As far as I can tell, the only reason we would teach people
that 'Truth' exists, would be that we were religious idealogues,
intent on indoctrination.
> Are we just providing a myth as a matter of
>social control or are we providing a foundation for
>the creation of critical thinking skills where
>searching for the Truth is promoted as a worthwhile
>endeavor?
You are missing the point that the word 'truth' is not one concept,
but many concepts. There is the subjective concept of 'truth', as
the opposite of lying, used as a claim that a statement is made in
accordance with beliefs, and not with the intention to mislead. Then
there is a consensus notion of 'truth', as determined by juries in
deliberation. And there is a formal notion of truth, used in formal
logic. Problems only arise with the claim that there is some single
metaphysical notion of 'truth' which encompasses the best of all of
these, but without their associated problems.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <3407C7...@micron.net>,
Paul M. Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>
>of soul and person are distinct. But, I take it, CDJ's objection
>could just be modified to: why, then, "rational soul" is just
>another name for "person," to which the reply again is--no, since
>we want to distinguish between those capacities the possession of
>which is constitutive of personhood, and the person which has
>them. Another way to put it--we want to distinguish between the
That seems to fit Ryle or Strawson. I think it is more controversial
how to interpret Aristotle's theory. Your reading is certainly one
reasonable way, but I am not sure it is obviously the best.
The trick is knowing how to interpret the reifying idiom Aristotle
often uses when speaking about soul or form, i.e. using substantives to
refer to it. He suggests in the Metaphysics that primary substance
(ousia, thing that has being) is form, not matter (soul of course is
form). That also seems deifferent than simply saying that one and the
same substance has both formal and material aspects (although he
suggests that too -- saying it is as senseless to ask whether the soul
and the body are one). And later followers certainly raised the
question of whether it was intelligible that there be souls without
bodies (e.g. angels) on Aristotle's metaphysics.
>in that way. I assume that CDJ doesn't think that a person *is*
>a "way." Well, that's what souls *are*.
Sure, but since that since that idiom makes no literal sense, we cannot
say this in any logically perspicuous language. Rather, like Frege's claim
that concepts are not objects, it has to be taken with
several grains of salt.
You might just as well put it as "there are no such *things* as souls",
i.e. all apparent reference to souls as *objects* are dispensable. Which
seemed to be CDJ's idea.
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
[The following attribution is wrong - I wrote that paragraph.]
>Chooley:
>Jorgenson's mistake and/or dishonesty is already apparent. Neither
>Hooley nor I have suggested problems with an individual human's
>assertions of 'truth'.
Jorgenson:
What are you talking about? According to you there is no
actual state of affairs and so you only think that you wrote
that paragraph. In all honesty you can only write that you
think the attribution is wrong and that you think the paragraph
was written by you. Who in their right mind would desire such
a state of affairs? Have you evidence to prove that you wrote
the paragraph and would such evidence be acceptable to a jury
of your peers? You announce that it is impossible to get to
the truth of some matter as any such truth will only be a
representation. Your position is ludicrous and I admire
your credible and valid tenacious attachment to a useless
proposal.
One of the early American politicians noted that he could find
his way home in the dark of night thanks to the light provided
by his constituents who were burning him in effigy. An effigy
is a representation, his body was his actual body.
Rickert: (Right?)
We can talk of 'states of affairs' or 'facts' or 'truths' as much as
we like. But we always apply those designations to representations,
Jorgenson:
Incorrect. The center of momentum of an object is not a
matter of opinion or belief or representation and truthfully
occurs as the actual state of affairs.
Rickert:
typically to sentences. We can even prepend the word "actual", but
what we refer to is still a representation, typically a sentence.
Jorgenson:
Your manner of speaking is weird, bizarre and unacceptable.
If I kick you in your leg then I have not kicked a representation
of your leg as I have kicked your leg, your actual leg, your
physically attached, god given, full of your blood and nerves
and such leg. Could some unfortunate person lose their leg?
Did they lose their leg or did they lose a representation of
their leg. Your manner of speaking is at odds with ordinary
reality where the majority of humans operate.
Rickert:
There is a widespread tendency to use such descriptions in a
hand-waving manner, with the pretence that what is designated 'true'
or 'a fact' or 'a state of affairs' is not merely a representation.
But no convincing argument has been given which could persuade us
that this is more than a pretence.
Jorgenson:
Certainly. Some animals do not have enough sense to get in out
of the rain. You don't recognize truth when it makes you eat,
sleep, eliminate waste material, need warmth and so forth.
You pretend all those things are just representations and there
is no actual individual participating in actual reality.
Rickert:
>Our objection has been to claims of an idealization of that 'truth'
>which makes it human independent. Thus the asking of "which human
>." misses the point entirely.
Jorgenson:
>Does red exist or is red just an idealized color?
Rickert:
The question seems silly.
Jorgenson:
You are under no obligation to answer questions that
appear silly to you. I thought your answer would clarify
your position for me.
>There is nothing with a red color until a human names the color?
Rickert:
You are using the term beyond what can be supported by common
knowledge. You thus owe us some sort of definition if you expect an
answer.
Jorgenson:
Gee. I thought I was using the word red as encountered and
expressed by everybody. I have no better definition to offer
you. Is it first or second grade when human children are
supposed to know the names of the colors?
>Your logic is pure and correct and proper and it is useless
>with regard to the actual state of affairs.
Rickert:
On the contrary, there is no difficulty with regard to
"the actual state of affairs", since that too is a human concept
and cannot be made human independent.
Jorgenson:
Weird.
>with regard to the actual state of affairs. The word
>truth is arbitrary and is different in other languages
>and yet there is a concrete basis for the abstract
>concept truth just as there is a concrete basis for
>the abstract concept of the color red.
Yes, there is a concrete basis for many of the abstract
concepts used by humans. One word for the nature of
that concrete basis is Truth.
>Try this: Why do we teach young humans that Truth
>exists?
Rickert:
The question seems silly, particularly with the capitalization of
'Truth.' As far as I can tell, the only reason we would teach people
that 'Truth' exists, would be that we were religious idealogues,
intent on indoctrination.
Jorgenson:
> Are we just providing a myth as a matter of
>social control or are we providing a foundation for
>the creation of critical thinking skills where
>searching for the Truth is promoted as a worthwhile
>endeavor?
Rickert:
You are missing the point that the word 'truth' is not one concept,
but many concepts.
Jorgenson:
You are wrong oh bearer of empty fruits. Your logic has blinded
you to the wisdom of the ages. Make the other guy worry about
heaven while you grab all the gold or let the other guy worry
about grabbing all the gold while you find heaven.
Rickert:
Problems only arise with the claim that there is some single
metaphysical notion of 'truth' which encompasses the best of all of
these, but without their associated problems.
Jorgenson:
So metaphysical truth avoids the associated problems of the other
sorts of truth and yet that is when certain problems arise.
If problems are unavoidable in either approach, what is gained
by saying all truths are only representations? You still must
eat, sleep, eliminate waste and keep warm and such. Why not
be pragmatic about the situation instead of going mental?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Rickert:
Firstly I made no assertion that "there is no actual state of
affairs."
Jorgenson:
Whew! That is a load off my mind. I was at a loss as how
to argue with someone who insisted there is no actual state
of affairs (ASOA). Now please instruct me as how I should
refer to the ASOA when I talk about the ASOA. I wanted
to say that the ASOA is Truth and you choose to limit
truth to expressions and representations or statements
or sentences.
I wish I could remember the philosopher who digested
the individual, reality, representation model. I am
in the process of moving and my books are packed away.
Could it be Hemple or Hempel or Poyina or Klinkle?
Posit an individual, who is part of reality, making
representations about reality, including him or herself
and other individuals. Enter Rickert who announces
that the word truth is a representation and as such
can only be applied to representations. One should
not say that rain or atoms or Mr. Sparrow is truth.
I see your point of view and I understand your
position.
However, Reality is doing what it does regardless
of human intervention or intent. The ASOA thing.
There is an independence where reality would be
perfectly content not to have individuals and
representations mucking about. Imagine how
peaceful things were in the infinitely dense
point that expanded into the universe. There is a
theoretical statement that expresses the ASOA. Now
that full statement is unspeakable by humans due to
complexity and time constraints. One attribute of
representations is to bundle up an entire ASOA in a
handy carrying package. Thus one might state that
the Earth and its Solar System are part of the Universe.
The sub-components and size and ongoing relationships
of the Earth and Solar System and Universe are included
in the package. Sort of like when Robinson Carouso saw
other foot prints in the sand. A lot of meaning and extra
baggage is being carried around.
Representation is a poor, limited, flawed shadow of
reality and yet it allows individuals to share
information about how to encounter reality. One
can draw maps and list objects and record recipes
and such that enhance the knowledge base and action
options of other individuals. Scientists knew there
was plenty of power in explosions and had to wait for
materials that could contain and transfer that power
in order for internal combustion machines to appear.
Let us try mixing other stuff into the iron just
like bronze and cook it different ways and see if
we find something good. Steel! Yum.
It comforts me that the ASOA is reality and truth.
The solidity of physical items is not an illusion
and reveals interaction between different items.
So truth may not be speakable and yet it can be
known and echoes of that truth can be expressed.
Truth is not just a pedantic matter of correct or
incorrect statements or sentences. Truth is at the
dead center of the ASOA. Your eccentric refusal
to idealize truth reveals your focus upon representation
rather than individuals and reality. Your approach
and point is well taken and yet why overstate it?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Anders N Weinstein
In article <01bcb49d$9a75ae40$f27a61ce@asdf>,
Has it been sixty years? Whatever, I think it is the right way.
>Fletcher's brain (body) responded to the approaching bus. That is, the
>neurons of his brain did by initiating a motor program that set his
>legs moving. Fletcher, as a soul, was aware of the neural activity in
>his brain.
Gross misuses of language. Fletcher saw the bus, and never saw even one
of his neurons. And Fletcher is the agent who responded because he saw
the bus. I am not sure if one should say Fletcher "initiated" a
response, unless you mean he saw the bus and decided to move. And
Fletcher certainly could not do so by sending motor programs to his
neurons. Rather Fletcher got up and walked away.
What is it makes you scorn the language of the everyday?
Fletcher is a supervenient entity who exists at the person level, and
has his being in the world (i.e. his states are internally related to
those of objects in the world, for example, the approaching bus).
You can look among the neurons if that is your interest, but then Fletcher
and his psychology becomes wholly invisible to your gaze.
There is probably a story to be told at the neural level, although
there need not be. It is not clear apriori there are any laws to be
found at that level, perhaps it is a chaos which only makes sense if we
look at the whole person Fletcher (e.g. a neuroscientist could not give
an informative explanation of why these neurons are firing unless they
know that the man Fletcher has promised to meet me for lunch).
I don't see why there can't be a different story at the person level.
It is like Ryle's university and its colleges. What you can
say at one level may supervene on but is not reducible to the other.
>ENGLISH will not do for the next century. Natural science will be
>pretty much played out when the neuroscientists have finished with the
>brain. When we see that consciousness (soul) has no place in the
You cannot assume a priori there are any laws of human behavior to be
found at that level, beyond a chaos of particular causal sequences.
More likely there are some laws to be found at that level, but not
a science of human behavior. Neuroscience will never tell you that
Fletcher moved because he was late for work.
>natural world we will turn to talk of soul and God. Chalmers hopes for
Surely the Fletcher who became conscious of the the bus and moved is
completely part of the natural world, and the power of sight belongs to
his species by nature.
The problem is equating "natural" with "mechanical" or something like that.
If you take a more Aristotelian view of the natural world these problems
sort of dissolve.
Lewis Jorgenson
rtx...@metronet.com wrote:
>Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
>> ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Wallace:
After watching this thread for sometime I guess I cannot
resist putting in my nickel's worth.
Jorgenson:
Bill Wallace, come on down! You are the next contestant
on the Truth (was Destiny) thread.
Rickert:
> Firstly I made no assertion that "there is no actual state of
> affairs."
Wallace:
Does anybody believe there is no "actual state of affairs"?
Jorgenson:
I have my moments. To requote Robert Frost yet again:
Forgive the little jokes I pull on you God and I will
forgive the great big joke you pulled on me.
Jorgenson:
> I see your point of view and I understand your
> position.
Wallace:
The rest of what you say seems say otherwise.
Jorgenson:
Well, in one sense truth is just another word
and so it is just a human representation device.
I guess that is Rickerts point. In another sense,
to repeat or rephrase my complaint, truth does exist
in concrete form namely Reality or the ASOA thing.
> However, Reality is doing what it does regardless
> of human intervention or intent. The ASOA thing.
Wallace:
No argument.
Jorgenson:
Well, to keep controversy alive, I must admit it
is not that simple. Humans have the power to
act and change reality. There was no water on
the moon until we took some there because we
chose to go to the moon and developed the
means to do so. Your everyday banana is the
result of intensive directed breeding and
cross-breeding performed by humans.
> There is a
> theoretical statement that expresses the ASOA. Now
> that full statement is unspeakable by humans due to
> complexity and time constraints. One attribute of
> representations is to bundle up an entire ASOA in a
> handy carrying package.
Wallace:
But it is a representation isn't it?
Jorgenson:
No. Just as a sculpture is created and added to
reality as it were so too would a complete
articulation of the ASOA alter reality. Designing
and building an artificial leg is not building
a representation. That leg will actually serve
as a leg for many purposes. If you follow a
recipe to cook a dish is that dish real or is
it a representation. Try making some pudding.
> It comforts me that the ASOA is reality and truth.
Wallace:
The last couple of paragraphs indicate (at least to me)
your belief in naive realism. A perfectly honorable
philosohical position. However I find Mr. Rickert's
position more in line with mine.
Jorgenson:
I am attempting to be pragmatic without locking
the valid door of transcendentalism. When you
open that door I just want it understood that
things like ethics and morality and aesthetics
go flying out the window. If one instructs children
there is no such thing as Truth because truth only
applies to representations then it is ivory tower
babble.
Wallace:
For the sake of discussion, I will equate ASOA to God's Eye View in
which case the only possible viewer (observer) of the ASOA is God. We,
non-godlike individuals, are left with only representations of the ASOA.
Jorgenson:
Huh? You only encounter representations of the ASOA?
I am guessing that you and your body encounter the ASOA
and thus Truth constantly. Perhaps you are considering the
complete and total ASOA behind door number 3. In that case,
yes, we only see bits and pieces of the entire puzzle at
any time. This is mostly due to the way space/time keeps
things behind different doors.
Wallace:
In stating that "the ASOA is reality and truth.", I think you are
comparing the ASOA with itself which is a tautology and therefore true.
Jorgenson:
Well I am glad that human formal logic mechanisms support my
observation which I stated as being intuitively obvious.
Now are tautologies a matter of nature and reality or are
tautologies an artifact of human formal logic mechanisms?
In either case, philosophical truth does exist where it
is identical with the ASOA.
Wallace:
Any other comparison becomes difficult because of possible differences
in representations. Science does try to make this task easier, but other
cultures make it nearly impossible.
Jorgenson:
Bill Wallace is our big showcase winner today. Truth exists
and yet one cannot convey truth in a proof or otherwise
undeniable manner. Some sorts of truth have proofs and
are implicit in the assumptions accepted and yet there
is Truth that is and can be encountered. Reasonable,
rational adults share a respect and concern for the
existence of truth. Critical thinking skills are
brought into play where searching for the truth
often over-rides petty personal or community goals.
I wrote this paragraph earlier and it is so much fun
that I will throw it in here:
Rickert et al would have us believe that the Emperor is
wearing a fine, wonderful suit where truth is just
a man-made concept. The Emperor is nekked and that
is the truth. If it is unpopular and irrational
and a religious faith statement to announce that
truth exists then I shall be a leper, mad as a
hatter, screaming fanatic compared to the cool, formal
logic, calm robots. I do hope that wisdom rather
than just logic is incorporated in AI systems.
"Sorry Granny, the accounting indicates we can
help 190 babies survive with the resources to
keep you alive another year. Pull her plug."
Lewis Vance Jorgenson.
Neil Rickert
In <3409A688...@metronet.com> Bill Wallace <rtx...@metronet.com> writes:
(Bill was responding to Lewis Jorgenson).
>The last couple of paragraphs indicate (at least to me) your belief in
>naive realism. A perfectly honorable philosohical position. However I
>find Mr. Rickert's position more in line with mine.
>For the sake of discussion, I will equate ASOA to God's Eye View in
>which case the only possible viewer (observer) of the ASOA is God. We,
>non-godlike individuals, are left with only representations of the ASOA.
>In stating that "the ASOA is reality and truth.", I think you are
>comparing the ASOA with itself which is a tautology and therefore true.
You are right, that your position is close to mine. You summarized
it very well.
Neil Rickert
In <5uc0ui$14ti$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>ric...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
>Rickert:
>Firstly I made no assertion that "there is no actual state of
>affairs."
>Jorgenson:
>Whew! That is a load off my mind. I was at a loss as how
>to argue with someone who insisted there is no actual state
>of affairs (ASOA). Now please instruct me as how I should
>refer to the ASOA when I talk about the ASOA.
I don't have any problem with ordinary talk about ASOA. I only have
problems with philisophical positions that make what I take to be
unsupportable claims.
>I wish I could remember the philosopher who digested
>the individual, reality, representation model. I am
>in the process of moving and my books are packed away.
>Could it be Hemple or Hempel or Poyina or Klinkle?
Those sound like references to Hempel (or perhaps Hegel), Polanyi,
Kripke. I would suppose you are thinking of Kripke.
>Posit an individual, who is part of reality, making
>representations about reality, including him or herself
>and other individuals. Enter Rickert who announces
>that the word truth is a representation and as such
>can only be applied to representations. One should
>not say that rain or atoms or Mr. Sparrow is truth.
Again, I don't have any problems with ordinary talk about 'truth'.
My disagreements are limited to claims such as that 'truth' is human
independent.
>However, Reality is doing what it does regardless
>of human intervention or intent.
Agreed. And reality can perfectly well do its thing without any aid
from humans. So the lack of human-independent notion of 'truth'
causes no problems, except perhaps for philosophers.
>It comforts me that the ASOA is reality and truth.
Right; it is the reality and truth of the representations you are
using.
> Your eccentric refusal
>to idealize truth reveals your focus upon representation
>rather than individuals and reality.
This is an AI forum, after all. If truth cannot be coherently
idealized, then any attempt to use an idealized truth as a basis for
AI is bound to fail. I am not so much being eccentric, as I am
examining what are the requirements for AI.
Bill Wallace
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
>
> to repeat or rephrase my complaint, truth does exist
> in concrete form namely Reality or the ASOA thing.
>
I find no connection between truth and any "ASOA thing". I accept what
you say is what you fervently believe. Do you see why I see your
position as naive realism: "what you sense is what you get."?
> Jorgenson:
> I am attempting to be pragmatic without locking
> the valid door of transcendentalism.
I guess I missed the connection of this discussion with pragmatism
and/or transcendentalism.
>
> Jorgenson:
> Huh? You only encounter representations of the ASOA?
> I am guessing that you and your body encounter the ASOA
> and thus Truth constantly. Perhaps you are considering the
> complete and total ASOA behind door number 3. In that case,
> yes, we only see bits and pieces of the entire puzzle at
> any time. This is mostly due to the way space/time keeps
> things behind different doors.
I, like you, am not privvy to the complete and total ASOA (actual state
of affairs). I, like you, am in in constant touch with whatever fraction
of the ASOA I AM privvy to. In order to communicate about that small
fraction, I must represent somehow. When I compare MY representation
with MY representation I can conclude it is true. But when I compare MY
representation with ANDBODY ELSE's, I may be forced to conclude that one
or the other MAY be false. But my conclusion is only about the
representations.
> Jorgenson:
> Well I am glad that human formal logic mechanisms support my
> observation which I stated as being intuitively obvious.
If X represents something, then X = X, being a tautology, is true
regardless of what X represents.
> Critical thinking skills are
> brought into play where searching for the truth
> often over-rides petty personal or community goals.
Please allow me the courtesy of believing that BOTH of us have used
critical thinking to arrive at our respective positions.
> I wrote this paragraph earlier and it is so much fun
> that I will throw it in here:
> Rickert et al would have us believe that the Emperor is
> wearing a fine, wonderful suit where truth is just
> a man-made concept. The Emperor is nekked and that
> is the truth.
I disagree, your Emperor is just wearing a different suit from mine.
> If it is unpopular and irrational
> and a religious faith statement to announce that
> truth exists then I shall be a leper, mad as a
> hatter, screaming fanatic compared to the cool, formal
> logic, calm robots.
Are you? Then I won't explain to you that you think that "Reality =
Truth" and I think not. That fraction of the ASOA you are privvy to
right now, I am not. I cannot look out my window and have clue about
what is going outside yours. If your Reality ain't my Reality, what is
Truth?
--
Bill Wallace
RTX Services
rtx...@metronet.com
http://www.metronet.com/~rtxserv/
972-462-7237
Neil Rickert
In <5ud33j$n...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
> According
>to what I will call the phenomenological conception of mind, mental
>states are characterized by an intentional content, which determines
>its conditions of satisfaction, the conditions under which it is true.
You write a lot about 'content'. As far as I can tell, it is a term
you use for painting with a wide brush when you want to whitewash all
of the problems.
>This is an intrinsic or individuative feature of the mental act, that
>is, mental states are sorted into kinds by their contents.
>On this view, we need several basic distinctions in speaking of
>intentional mental events. First, the distinction between the act or
>event and its content.
This 'content' is presumably some purely theoretical entity, not
publicly observable, but required as part of a bad theory of
language.
>According to the phenomenological conception of mind, mental states are
>vehicle-less relations to contents or meanings.
To say that they are "vehicle-less" is presumably to say that they
are constituted of an immaterial substance.
> For example, a belief
>that stands in an intentional relation to Bill Clinton does not
>need to be mediated by a little mental image of Clinton before your
>consciousness. Nor does it have to be mediated by an inner occurrence of the
>Bill Clinton symbol in some knowledge base inside your head of which
>you are completely unaware.
But then most of the beliefs philosophers talk about are myths
invented to support a silly theory of knowledge.
>A crucial point is that this apparatus applies even to perceptual
>content as well. In that sense, on the phenomenological conception,
>representational vehicles do not stand in between subject and object.
All of the evidence I have seen from neurology shows that perceptions
are associated with neural activity, which surely looks like a
representational vehicle. But, of course, if you are a substance
dualist you might prefer to say that there is a separate immaterial
substance, and that perception depends only on that, while physical
activity might be traceable to the neural representations.
>Now as to "truth". Rickert represents "true" as though it were just
>another concept on the same level as all the others we use.
Not so, although perhaps that is how Jorgenson characterizes what I
say. Rather, I describe 'truth' as used in the evaluation of
representations.
>Consider: we teach language learners the concepts of "red" and "apple"
>say, and they master these when they can judge in context whether an
>apple is red. We do not have to teach them something further, namely
>the concept of "truth" before they can do this.
Agreed.
>That is why it is silly to seek a criterion for "truth" itself, beyond
>a welter of individual criteria for being red or being an apple.
When I ask for a criterion for "truth", I would be quite satisfied
with that welter of individual criteria. But of course no such
welter of individual criteria is ever given, nor can it be given, and
this is what makes so much of the philosophical talk about 'truth'
and 'propositions' seem silly.
Paul M. Johnson
Anders N Weinstein wrote:
>
>In article <3407C7...@micron.net>,
>Paul M. Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>
>>of soul and person are distinct. But, I take it, CDJ's objection
>>could just be modified to: why, then, "rational soul" is just
>>another name for "person," to which the reply again is--no, since
>>we want to distinguish between those capacities the possession of
>>which is constitutive of personhood, and the person which has
>>them. Another way to put it--we want to distinguish between the
>
>That seems to fit Ryle or Strawson. I think it is more controversial
>how to interpret Aristotle's theory. Your reading is certainly one
>reasonable way, but I am not sure it is obviously the best.
Okay. Didn't think that I'd said anything yet which was not
a consensus view.
>The trick is knowing how to interpret the reifying idiom Aristotle
>often uses when speaking about soul or form, i.e. using substantives to
>refer to it. He suggests in the Metaphysics that primary substance
>(ousia, thing that has being) is form, not matter (soul of course is
>form).
It has been a while, but IIRC, each of the three main candidates
that are being interviewed for the position (matter, form, and
the composite) gets its day in the sun. When he uses the "ultimate-
subject" criterion (that of which other things are predicated,
but which is not itself predicated of anything) as the touchstone
for what is (a) substance, the composite of form and matter gets
the nod. And form obviously does not qualify as being a substance
in that sense, since it *is* predicated of something--namely, it
is predicated of both the composite and also the matter.
It is only when he switches to a different criterion for substance-
hood, or a different sense of "substance," that form gets to be
substance. And that criterion is, I think, something to do with
which one of three is "prior in account" or something along those
lines. (And it turns out that explaining or giving an account
of the composite requires that you mention the form, but not
conversely).
But (whew, I finally got there), that form is ousia in *that*
sense is no reason to take it to be a *thing* (in anything other
than the uninteresting sense of being that which can play the role
of a logical subject in a judgement--the sense in which colors
and angry glances are also "things"). If anything, it's the
ultimate-subject sense of "substance" that gets you things.
Hmmm. There's also that discussion in Theta or Eta about
"thises" and "suches." Form, he says, is not a *this* (tode ti)
but a *such*.
>That also seems deifferent than simply saying that one and the
>same substance has both formal and material aspects (although he
>suggests that too -- saying it is as senseless to ask whether the soul
>and the body are one). And later followers certainly raised the
>question of whether it was intelligible that there be souls without
>bodies (e.g. angels) on Aristotle's metaphysics.
>
>>in that way. I assume that CDJ doesn't think that a person *is*
>>a "way." Well, that's what souls *are*.
>
>Sure, but since that since that idiom makes no literal sense, we cannot
>say this in any logically perspicuous language.
Could you elaborate a bit; that sounds interesting. We do quantify
over "ways," e.g. "There is no way to solve that problem." Or even
"How do I love thee? Let me count the ways."
>Rather, like Frege's claim
>that concepts are not objects, it has to be taken with
>several grains of salt.
>
>You might just as well put it as "there are no such *things* as souls",
>i.e. all apparent reference to souls as *objects* are dispensable. Which
>seemed to be CDJ's idea.
That's cool. But I think his original objection to soul talk went
somewhat farther than that.
Paul J.
Paul M. Johnson
Well that's good. Makes it harder to teach it, is all,
in case that's in your future.
And spending time waiting for the silly is a sign that
all is not well. It should be there whenever you reach
out your hand for it.
Paul J.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5ucqdo$3...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5uc0ui$14ti$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com> LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) writes:
>>Posit an individual, who is part of reality, making
>>representations about reality, including him or herself
>>and other individuals. Enter Rickert who announces
>>that the word truth is a representation and as such
>>can only be applied to representations. One should
>>not say that rain or atoms or Mr. Sparrow is truth.
I would suggest "representation" in this context ambiguous. According
to what I will call the phenomenological conception of mind, mental
states are characterized by an intentional content, which determines
its conditions of satisfaction, the conditions under which it is true.
This is an intrinsic or individuative feature of the mental act, that
is, mental states are sorted into kinds by their contents.
On this view, we need several basic distinctions in speaking of
intentional mental events. First, the distinction between the act or
event and its content. The act has certain intrinsic properties qua
act, for example, location in time. That may be different then the time
represented intentionally within the act, the thing it is of or about.
[Descartes called this the difference between the formal reality and
the objective -- i.e. intentional -- reality of an "idea" or
representational state].
For example, today there may occur to me a thought with the content
"yesterday I was sick". More controversially, if I look at the stars
today, I might be prompted to enjoy contents that are of or about
events millions of years ago. My representational event occurs today.
But the content is of or about the event in the past.
The second distinction is of course between content and object. The
content in the paradigmatic cases is a complete proposition (although there
are other sorts of cases). The object it is of or about in the paradigmatic
cases is the referent of the singular concept in the content.
So my thought that Hesperus is a planet is of or about a certain planet
which is an object in the extra-mental world. But the object is only
given to me under a certain mode of presentation, eg. the way you think
of a planet when one thinks of it as "Hesperus". The thought expessible
by "The Evening Star is a planet" might have the same referent but
different content.
Now in these terms one can say a lot about how someone represents the
world without ever introducing representations as structured vehicles.
For example, if you tell me Jones believes that the Evening Star is a
planet, and I understand these concepts myself, then I know what must
be the case if Jones belief is to be satisfied. But I do not know what
form it is in, if any. You have of course *used* a sentence in your
language, but you have not ascribed a sentential attitude to Jones.
What cognitive scientists and others speak about are representational
*vehicles*, elements that carry these contents in some broadly syntactic
form, like sentences in some language or, more controversially, pictures.
According to the phenomenological conception of mind, mental states are
vehicle-less relations to contents or meanings. For example, a belief
that stands in an intentional relation to Bill Clinton does not
need to be mediated by a little mental image of Clinton before your
consciousness. Nor does it have to be mediated by an inner occurrence of the
Bill Clinton symbol in some knowledge base inside your head of which
you are completely unaware.
(On the other hand, it might need to be *expressed* in the public
symbol "bill clinton" or something synonymous for you to have the concept
at all.)
On this view, mental contents are abstracta. One idea is that they are
used to assess human conduct by reference to a normatively structured
scale. We can still perfectly talk about changes in concepts, and
understandings, the formation of new concepts, the clarification of
concepts, of how you acquired them, and the like. But they are not
exactly representations in the sense of *vehicles*. They are semantics,
not syntax.
A crucial point is that this apparatus applies even to perceptual
content as well. In that sense, on the phenomenological conception,
representational vehicles do not stand in between subject and object. Rather,
contents are modes of presentation by which subjects can be aware of
extra-mental objects. There are represent*ings* -- intentional
mental events -- and of course there may be represent*eds*, like clinton,
but there need be no representations.
I would say you can find elements of the phenomenological conception in
Brentano, Frege, Husserl, John Searle, and the Aristotelian-scholastic
tradition (think of the species as contents). Searle's book gives
a fine introduction to the general idea, I would say, although it
goes astray in some details in my opinion.
Now as to "truth". Rickert represents "true" as though it were just
another concept on the same level as all the others we use. I would
agree that we should certainly look to the role of the concept of truth
as it figures in ordinary human operations with language. But I would
also note that on the phenomenological conception it is not really just
one more ordinary concept on a par with all the others. For on this
view we hit explanatory bedrock at the notion of judgment of
intentional contents as true.
Consider: we teach language learners the concepts of "red" and "apple"
say, and they master these when they can judge in context whether an
apple is red. We do not have to teach them something further, namely
the concept of "truth" before they can do this. If they are judging at
all, then they are recognizing truth of the proposition *implicitly* in
the act of judging *explicitly* that the apple is red. And they
appreciate this content only if they also understand that if someone
else says the apple is green, that there is an incompatibility and both
assertions can't stand together. They may even have practical mastery
of the concepts of lying and deception and error without being able to
wield that concept "true", e.g. by recognizing error when
someone else judges that p when they judge not p.
That can be said to involve applying criteria (in a broad sense) for
"red" and "green" and 'apple". It does not involve having special
further criterion for "true", over and above a criterion for "red".
There are none, true is formal and empty, and all the beef is in "red"
and "apple" and the capacity for judgement, justification, criticism
and debate.
Since all judging on any topic whatsoever is taking true, and the only
thing the understanding can do with concepts is combine them
to judge by means of them (Kant), truth is implicated in every judgement
on every possible topic.
That is why it is silly to seek a criterion for "truth" itself, beyond
a welter of individual criteria for being red or being an apple.
Truth is not one more concept the same level as "red". You might say it
is transcendental, a condition of the possiblity of all other concepts.
Lewis Jorgenson
I know I should have snipped and yet my
denseness and sharpness should be a
matter of record by now.
ande...@pitt.edu wrote:
Anders:
According to what I will call the phenomenological conception of mind,
>mental states
Jorgenson:
So the phenomenological conception of mind involves mental states
while other models of the mind may or may not include those
topographical wonders; mental states.
Anders:
are characterized by an intentional content, which determines its
conditions of satisfaction, the conditions under which it is true.
This is an intrinsic or individuative feature of the mental act, that
is, mental states are sorted into kinds by their contents.
Jorgenson:
Gosh. You have already lost me. Now is that sorting being
done real time by the brain and/or nervous system during
mental state changes or is that sorting being done by some
outside analytical researcher about mental state changes?
Anders:
On this view, we need several basic distinctions in speaking of
intentional mental events. First, the distinction between the act or
event and its content. The act has certain intrinsic properties qua
act, for example, location in time. That may be different then the time
represented intentionally within the act, the thing it is of or about.
[Descartes called this the difference between the formal reality and
the objective -- i.e. intentional -- reality of an "idea" or
representational state].
Jorgenson:
Gotcha.
Anders:
For example, today there may occur to me a thought with the content
"yesterday I was sick". More controversially, if I look at the stars
today, I might be prompted to enjoy contents that are of or about
events millions of years ago. My representational event occurs today.
But the content is of or about the event in the past.
Jorgenson:
I also believe that certain perceptions and certain thoughts
are exchangeable as it were while generally abstract thoughts
are a bit less familiar than perceptions. Your knowledge that
you are looking backwards in time when viewing stars does not
alter your perception of that light. With regard to truth,
should an AI entity 'see' an apparently bent stick halfway
in the water or should it do something that humans cannot
and use knowledge of the behavior of reflected or refracted
light and see a straight stick? With regard to your presentation,
would the content be the seen bent stick or the known straight
stick?
Anders:
The second distinction is of course between content and object. The
content in the paradigmatic cases is a complete proposition (although
there
are other sorts of cases). The object it is of or about in the
paradigmatic
cases is the referent of the singular concept in the content.
So my thought that Hesperus is a planet is of or about a certain planet
which is an object in the extra-mental world. But the object is only
given to me under a certain mode of presentation, eg. the way you think
of a planet when one thinks of it as "Hesperus". The thought expessible
by "The Evening Star is a planet" might have the same referent but
different content.
Jorgenson:
It looks like you are now just pondering instead of perceiving
a content. This is Quines area as Longley will most likely
tell us very shortly. If we were to switch from pondering
to perceiving would the same content/object referent
relationship hold? I assume it would matter what states
are included in those 'mental states'.
Anders:
Now in these terms one can say a lot about how someone represents the
world without ever introducing representations as structured vehicles.
For example, if you tell me Jones believes that the Evening Star is a
planet, and I understand these concepts myself, then I know what must
be the case if Jones belief is to be satisfied. But I do not know what
form it is in, if any.
Jorgenson:
Given similar mental states then the contents and the objects
and the referents are held by both. Certain known referents are
missing and the content they would hold are undetermined.
Anders:
You have of course *used* a sentence in your language, but you have
not ascribed a sentential attitude to Jones.
Jorgenson:
This is the first occurrence of the words sentence or language in
your presentation and so I am at a loss as to what you are now
talking about. Perhaps the next paragraph will clear this up.
Anders:
What cognitive scientists and others speak about are representational
*vehicles*, elements that carry these contents in some broadly syntactic
form, like sentences in some language or, more controversially, pictures.
Jorgenson:
What about the senses? Chemical reactions such as fire are not
language events with as sentence or syntax or such. The components
and relationships are fixed unlike language. Heat does cause
damage to tissue and nerve endings where those nerve endings are
simply transducers.
Anders:
According to the phenomenological conception of mind, mental states are
vehicle-less relations to contents or meanings. For example, a belief
that stands in an intentional relation to Bill Clinton does not
need to be mediated by a little mental image of Clinton before your
consciousness. Nor does it have to be mediated by an inner occurrence of
the
Bill Clinton symbol in some knowledge base inside your head of which
you are completely unaware.
Jorgenson:
Ok, now we are really back to pure pondering. The phrase 'mental
states' irritates me and interferes with my following your presentation.
Plus you now have added the word meanings to be a synonym of contents.
Could meanings be a synonym at the object level? I must be
getting tire and I will not interrupr for a bit.
Anders:
(On the other hand, it might need to be *expressed* in the public
symbol "bill clinton" or something synonymous for you to have the
concept
at all.)
On this view, mental contents are abstracta. One idea is that they are
used to assess human conduct by reference to a normatively structured
scale. We can still perfectly talk about changes in concepts, and
understandings, the formation of new concepts, the clarification of
concepts, of how you acquired them, and the like. But they are not
exactly representations in the sense of *vehicles*. They are semantics,
not syntax.
Jorgenson:
Why have you stopped providing examples? You are mixing apples
and love and Bill Clinton and thoughts about stars and thoughts
about being sick yesterday as if they were all just different
colored and different shaped beads on a string. Semantic beads,
not syntax beads. Maybe you could stick to one example and
use it throughout instead of bringing this and throwing out
that so that you have now lost me.
Anders:
A crucial point is that this apparatus applies even to perceptual
content as well. In that sense, on the phenomenological conception,
representational vehicles do not stand in between subject and object.
Rather,
contents are modes of presentation by which subjects can be aware of
extra-mental objects. There are represent*ings* -- intentional
mental events -- and of course there may be represent*eds*, like clinton,
but there need be no representations.
Jorgenson:
Ok, so during perceptual events meanings do occur at the object level.
Anders:
Jorgenson:
This appears to be an elucidation of Being versus Knowing where
truth can be both and so that is why it is deemed transcendental.
My experience with hot and my concept hot are separated in a
manner that truth cannot be separated. Tots can experience
hot and yet hold no mental state or tongue/mouth/wind control
patterns to say 'hot'. The hot and tots are both experiences
and concepts that can be encountered. The folks on the MIR
could physically encounter the concept "absolute vacuum" and
so the sharp line between abstract and concrete is a misnomer as
both are candidates for encounters. One might see a red rock
and/or one might read, hear or imagine the concept red rock.
Does Santa Claus exist?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
rtx...@metronet.com wrote:
>Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
Jorgenson:
> to repeat or rephrase my complaint, truth does exist
> in concrete form namely Reality or the ASOA thing.
Wallace:
I find no connection between truth and any "ASOA thing".
Jorgenson:
Hmmm. So you find no connection between truth and the
actual state of affairs. Do you ever get hungry or
sleepy or need to use the bathroom? Do you think you
are the only entity in the universe that has had or
will have those experiences? I cannot and would not
force you to see a connection that is intuitively
obvious. If it will help AI research to hold that
truth and the actual state of affairs have no
natural connection then by all means hold that view.
Wallace:
I accept what you say is what you fervently believe. Do
you see why I see your position as naive realism: "what you
sense is what you get."?
Jorgenson:
Sure. It is a matter of accepting being rather than
guessing that we know. A lack of sense is non-sense.
> Huh? You only encounter representations of the ASOA?
> I am guessing that you and your body encounter the ASOA
> and thus Truth constantly. Perhaps you are considering the
> complete and total ASOA behind door number 3. In that case,
> yes, we only see bits and pieces of the entire puzzle at
> any time. This is mostly due to the way space/time keeps
> things behind different doors.
Wallace:
I, like you, am not privvy to the complete and total ASOA (actual state
of affairs). I, like you, am in in constant touch with whatever fraction
of the ASOA I AM privvy to. In order to communicate about that small
fraction, I must represent somehow.
Jorgenson:
Say no more. A wink is as good as nod. Know what I mean?
Know what I mean? Say no more.
Wallace:
When I compare MY representation with MY representation I can conclude
it is true.
Jorgenson:
Oops. Some of my compared personal representations are confused.
I think this and I think that and I know that they both can't be
true. Luckily, I posit an actual state of affairs that is the
truth upon which I can bounce my confused representations.
Wallace:
But when I compare MY representation with ANDBODY ELSE's, I may be
forced to conclude that one or the other MAY be false. But my
conclusion is only about the representations.
Jorgenson:
What about the content of your representations? If you represent
and plan and make the chair with 3 legs instead of only 2, will not
there be an actual effect upon the state of affairs?
Wallace:
If your Reality ain't my Reality, what is Truth?
Jorgenson:
How does the limits imposed upon humans by time/space affect/
incur personal realities? You and I are singularities and
there is no reason to expect us to be identical. We do
have remarkably similar physiologies. Does your reality
have laws of physics and the Planet Earth? Does your
reality include access to the Usenet? Gosh, Our
realities have a lot in common and maybe they should
get together for a drink some time. Say no more.
A wink is as good as a nod.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5ude2t$1b26$2...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
>Anders:
>According to what I will call the phenomenological conception of mind,
>>mental states
>
>Jorgenson:
>So the phenomenological conception of mind involves mental states
>while other models of the mind may or may not include those
>topographical wonders; mental states.
I was trying to point at one way of conceiving of the nature of
mental states and events. Most people agree there are the topographical
wonders, they differ on how they map the geography. And a few extremists
say the wonders are mythical.
>Anders:
>are characterized by an intentional content, which determines its
>conditions of satisfaction, the conditions under which it is true.
>This is an intrinsic or individuative feature of the mental act, that
>is, mental states are sorted into kinds by their contents.
>
>Jorgenson:
>Gosh. You have already lost me. Now is that sorting being
>done real time by the brain and/or nervous system during
>mental state changes or is that sorting being done by some
>outside analytical researcher about mental state changes?
I was talking about the sorting implicit in our pyschological concepts.
Not about a real-time process in the brain. In some sense by an
outside analytical researcher.
Actually, this sort of thing is supposed to be an absract preliminary
to a theoretical description of the sorting that is done by ordinary
folks in operating with psychological language. Roughly as grammar
makes explicit a system for classifying utterances that is implicit in
the practice of anyone who manages the trick of speaking prose.
>Jorgenson:
>I also believe that certain perceptions and certain thoughts
>are exchangeable as it were while generally abstract thoughts
>are a bit less familiar than perceptions. Your knowledge that
>you are looking backwards in time when viewing stars does not
>alter your perception of that light. With regard to truth,
I think it does. Or rather, it alters (or perhaps enables)
your perception of stellar events. A "perception of light" would
perhaps be some other experience in which you focus your attention
purely on the sensuous aspects of light rays and not on the stellar
event. Perhaps that is not altered. But it need not occur, and if
it does occur, it need not stand in a crucial relation to the
perception of the stellar event.
>should an AI entity 'see' an apparently bent stick halfway
>in the water or should it do something that humans cannot
>and use knowledge of the behavior of reflected or refracted
>light and see a straight stick? With regard to your presentation,
>would the content be the seen bent stick or the known straight
>stick?
You can have both. It looks to be one way (perceptual content) but
is, on reflection, judged to be another way (known or believed content).
The point is not to deny a distinction between perceptual experience --
how things appear to be -- and judgment -- how they are taken to be.
It is only to assert that how things appear to be itself has an
intentional or conceptual content, a content that is fit to be judged
true or false and involves exercise of an acquired conceptual
repertoire or understanding.
>Jorgenson:
>It looks like you are now just pondering instead of perceiving
>a content. This is Quines area as Longley will most likely
>tell us very shortly. If we were to switch from pondering
>to perceiving would the same content/object referent
>relationship hold? I assume it would matter what states
>are included in those 'mental states'.
I believe so. In fact extending what I grandly called "the phenomenological
conception" to perceptual content is quite a project, and is done
several ways. Searle's book contains one. Gareth Evans' book another.
The catch is that the content of perceptual experience requires
context-dependent elements like demonstratives to express. It appears
to me that *that house* is red while *this house* is blue. Yet that house
and this house might be one and the same, that man making a mess might
be me, and so on.
>Jorgenson:
>Given similar mental states then the contents and the objects
>and the referents are held by both. Certain known referents are
>missing and the content they would hold are undetermined.
Sounds about right.
>Jorgenson:
>This is the first occurrence of the words sentence or language in
>your presentation and so I am at a loss as to what you are now
>talking about. Perhaps the next paragraph will clear this up.
The main point, recall, was to raise an issue for the idea that
truth is always applied to "representations". The idea was that
if "representation" can mean "intentional states" in the sense of
the phenomenological conception, then it may be ok, but
if "representation" means representational *vehicles* like sentences,
it may not be correct.
I.e. to raise a doubt about the representational theory of mind.
On the phenomenological conception mental states have intentionality or
representational content, but without any representations (other than
the states themselves).
>Jorgenson:
>What about the senses? Chemical reactions such as fire are not
>language events with as sentence or syntax or such. The components
>and relationships are fixed unlike language. Heat does cause
>damage to tissue and nerve endings where those nerve endings are
>simply transducers.
I am not sure what the point is, but I don't think I disagree.
Chemical reactions are not language, but they are potential topics
of language. In order to see chemical events knowingly, i.e. *as*
chemical events, you must have some concept of chemical event.
And concepts are capacities whose presence is manifested mainly
in the use of words. One should not be said to have a concept of
a chemical event if one cannot use the relevant words. One must
also have other non-verbal abilities to interact with chemical objects,
but those alone apart from linguistic expression would always be
ambiguous, I think.
Anyway, I want to do justice to the idea that conceptual capacities of
the full-blown sort require language as their medium of expression, but
that still the concepts are one thing and the formal syntactic objects
another.
>Jorgenson:
>Ok, now we are really back to pure pondering. The phrase 'mental
>states' irritates me and interferes with my following your presentation.
Just think about intentional psychological verbs. Some are stative,
like "believes" or "thinks" or "intends".
"Mental state" is just a placholder or variable for the sorts of
phenomena ascribed through the use such words.
>Plus you now have added the word meanings to be a synonym of contents.
>Could meanings be a synonym at the object level? I must be
>getting tire and I will not interrupr for a bit.
In English philosophical usage, "meaning" is generally used in the
manner of Frege's "Sinn" (sense) as opposed to his "Bedeutung"
(reference). Thus Quine on "theory of meaning" vs. "theory of
reference". That is just a convention; ordinary usage does not mark
it.
>Jorgenson:
>Ok, so during perceptual events meanings do occur at the object level.
I am not sure what you are asking. Seeings that p occur, e.g. my
seeing that Jones is out at first base, a state that I can "enjoy" or
undergo because I understand a bit about the game. When I see that p
I am not typically theorizing about it in this high-blown fashion,
of course.
>Jorgenson:
>This appears to be an elucidation of Being versus Knowing where
>truth can be both and so that is why it is deemed transcendental.
I believe Parmenides said "The same thing is for thinking and for
being". What can be thought on this account is always something that
can be the case, be true. So maybe Parmenides was right. Of course
perceiving is not thinking, but it has the same sort of content,
and so is not an alien influence on thinking.
>My experience with hot and my concept hot are separated in a
>manner that truth cannot be separated. Tots can experience
>hot and yet hold no mental state or tongue/mouth/wind control
>patterns to say 'hot'. The hot and tots are both experiences
Try Sellars "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" for a start against
this line of thinking. Of course tots can have a kind of sensation of
heat which is not a cognition or knowledge of heat as heat.
One idea is that judgers and concept users have a categorially
different sort of experience, one that is distinctive by being
*informed* by concepts and understanding. The other key point is that
what the concept users have with the concept of heat cannot really be
*derived* only from sensations of heat, because of a kind of logical
incommensurability between the sensory and the cognitive, the epistemic
(pertaining to justification) and the non-epistemic (pertaining to
causal relations), the propositional and the non-propositional.
Sellars' polemic rests on the idea that a sensation of warmth cannot
stand in a rational or epistemic relation to a propositional attitude
like a belief *that* this thing is warm. And like Wittgenstein,
on the idea that acquiring the concept of heat is not just having
your attention drawn to something already there in your experience.
>and concepts that can be encountered. The folks on the MIR
>could physically encounter the concept "absolute vacuum" and
>so the sharp line between abstract and concrete is a misnomer as
>both are candidates for encounters. One might see a red rock
Well yes, but compare the types of encounter: if a man is blindsided by
a truck and killed, he has had a serious physical encounter with a
massive object. But he would not have had an epistemic or cognitive
encounter with it unless he also had some sort of awareness of it.
The folks planning repairs and such are working with the concept of
near-absolute vacuum, although I would not exactly say they are
encountering the concept itself as if it were an object. The danger
they are worring about is not encountering the *concept* of a vaccum,
which might frighten but is not likely to kill anyone. It is the
vacuum itself, but that is the referent.
> One might see a red rock
>and/or one might read, hear or imagine the concept red rock.
Indeed on the phenomenological conception the same content can occur in
different modes. (one more distinction, but I didnt' bring it up) But
it is better to focus with Frege on the complete proposition: one can
see that a rock is in the road, one can imagine that a rock is in the
road, one can hope or fear that a rock is in the mode.
One would like to say that intentional relations to objects simpliciter
always go by way of complete propositions. That may not work, but it
is the line.
(Fred Dretske takes a different view in his analysis of different
concepts of seeing by the way.)
>Does Santa Claus exist?
I was told not.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <5udg9v$3...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>In <5ud33j$n...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>
>This 'content' is presumably some purely theoretical entity, not
>publicly observable,
I would not say that, actually. One can perceive that Jones was called
out at first base; one can also see that the manager Smith saw that Jones was
called out at first base (and flew into a rage, etc). See that bill
noticed Mary come into the room, and so on.
The content is just what is expressed in the that-clause here. The
content-bearing events can be publicly observable. Of course I would
say that someone is in agony is also publicly observable, as anyone who
confronted a person in obvious pain would know.
There really are very few limits on what is publicly observable, once
you jettison the myth of the given.
These things are not *always* observable of course, and certainly not
infallibly observable. But then neither are people's socks. Yet you
wouldn't raise the same worry about their socks.
But to reiterate, I am not postulating something unseen.
Rather, to say something theoretical about the most conspicuous aspects
of our experience of ourselves and our fellows, that they present
themselves to our gaze *as* creatures with purposes, intentions, and
the like.
>To say that they are "vehicle-less" is presumably to say that they
>are constituted of an immaterial substance.
It is to say they are not constituted of anything, that those
concepts don't apply.
>All of the evidence I have seen from neurology shows that perceptions
>are associated with neural activity, which surely looks like a
>representational vehicle.
OK, but not *for* the conscious subject. In the conscious subject's
body and normally totally outside their ken.
> But, of course, if you are a substance
>dualist you might prefer to say that there is a separate immaterial
>substance, and that perception depends only on that, while physical
>activity might be traceable to the neural representations.
If I say that your net worth is not constituted by anything inside your
body, would you say I was positing an immaterial substance to bear that
property? Why couldn't perceptual states be like net worth, so that you
simply could not determine them from what's inside the body alone?
Yet they might be easily determinable from a wider context. If you
look at a person in the world together with the environment, say the
spectators at the ball game in relation to the game, then the general
difficulty disappears, and only particular ones remain.
>>Now as to "truth". Rickert represents "true" as though it were just
>>another concept on the same level as all the others we use.
>
>Not so, although perhaps that is how Jorgenson characterizes what I
>say. Rather, I describe 'truth' as used in the evaluation of
>representations.
Particular representations or representation systems?
>When I ask for a criterion for "truth", I would be quite satisfied
>with that welter of individual criteria. But of course no such
I should have added, even here, the giving of criteria has to come
to an end, on pain of infinite regress. Where should it come to an
end? It comes to an end with concepts that can just be applied without
criteria. What do you tell someone who asks for the criteria of
"red"? The main thing you have to do is train them in its use through
examples, not give a definition.
Actually the concepts taken as basic criteria in one context can be
put in question in another; but the point about regress remains.
Anders N Weinstein
In article <340A62...@micron.net>,
>>
>>Sure, but since that since that idiom makes no literal sense, we cannot
>>say this in any logically perspicuous language.
>
>Could you elaborate a bit; that sounds interesting. We do quantify
>over "ways," e.g. "There is no way to solve that problem." Or even
>"How do I love thee? Let me count the ways."
I don't see any problem quantifying over ways. If you could explain
how person or soul talk translates into quantifying over manners, that
would be great. For example, Heidegger's existentialia are ways, manners
of conducting oneself in the world, as a carpenter or businessman or
macho or whatever; and some of his metaphysical concepts might be formal
concepts for these manners.
It was stuff like "the university is not a thing but
a way things are organized" (I recall something like that from Ryle)
that threatens to be unintelligible; its like saying there are some
things that are not things and this thing is one of them.
Neil Rickert
In <5udqg7$p...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) writes:
>In article <5udg9v$3...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>This 'content' is presumably some purely theoretical entity, not
>>publicly observable,
>I would not say that, actually. One can perceive that Jones was called
>out at first base; one can also see that the manager Smith saw that Jones was
>called out at first base (and flew into a rage, etc). See that bill
>noticed Mary come into the room, and so on.
>The content is just what is expressed in the that-clause here.
What is publically observable in a 'that-clause', is pure syntax. If
one goes beyond that, it turns out that different people will take
different meanings from the same statement, although the difference
may sometimes be small. The meaning a person takes from a statement
is not publicly observable, although it is often observable that
there are differences, leading to miscommunication.
>These things are not *always* observable of course, and certainly not
>infallibly observable. But then neither are people's socks. Yet you
>wouldn't raise the same worry about their socks.
I don't raise worries about socks, because you are not using socks as
an evasion in the same way you are using 'contents.' Of course,
people's socks are sometimes publically observable, which is more
than can be said of this mythical 'content.'
>>To say that they are "vehicle-less" is presumably to say that they
>>are constituted of an immaterial substance.
Well, if they don't exist, why are you talking about them. I do
think the claim that perceptions don't exist is a little radical,
though.
>>All of the evidence I have seen from neurology shows that perceptions
>>are associated with neural activity, which surely looks like a
>>representational vehicle.
>OK, but not *for* the conscious subject. In the conscious subject's
>body and normally totally outside their ken.
Neuroscientists often do these investigations with conscious
subjects.
>> But, of course, if you are a substance
>>dualist you might prefer to say that there is a separate immaterial
>>substance, and that perception depends only on that, while physical
>>activity might be traceable to the neural representations.
>If I say that your net worth is not constituted by anything inside your
>body, would you say I was positing an immaterial substance to bear that
>property? Why couldn't perceptual states be like net worth, so that you
>simply could not determine them from what's inside the body alone?
Well, I am quite happy to agree that my perceptual states are not
constituted by anything within my file cabinet. But if I don't place
silly restrictions on the location of the material, then your example
fails.
>>>Now as to "truth". Rickert represents "true" as though it were just
>>>another concept on the same level as all the others we use.
>>Not so, although perhaps that is how Jorgenson characterizes what I
>>say. Rather, I describe 'truth' as used in the evaluation of
>>representations.
>Particular representations or representation systems?
I had in mind particular representations. I suppose people do
occasionally say of a defective lens, that it is not true. I guess
you could take that as applying 'truth' to a representation system,
although I would tend to call that usage metaphoric.
>>When I ask for a criterion for "truth", I would be quite satisfied
>>with that welter of individual criteria. But of course no such
>I should have added, even here, the giving of criteria has to come
>to an end, on pain of infinite regress.
Sure. It ends with human judgement. And that is why 'truth' is a
human concept, which cannot be made human independent.
Lewis Jorgenson
ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote:
Before I jump in I noticed that I used Anders rather
than your last name as is my fashion for the attributions.
I am a creature of habit and so speak now if your
preference is for me to use Weinstein rather than Anders.
Since some points have been cleared up I have also freely trimmed.
Anders:
In article <5ude2t$1b26$2...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
Jorgenson:
So the phenomenological conception of mind involves mental states
while other models of the mind may or may not include those
topographical wonders; mental states.
Anders:
I was trying to point at one way of conceiving of the nature of
mental states and events. Most people agree there are the topographical
wonders, they differ on how they map the geography. And a few extremists
say the wonders are mythical.
Jorgenson:
I automatically connect mental states to physical and chemical
states which might explain some of your confusion with my previous
response. I wonder if wonder and the content of that wonder do
have a location as it were or if it is a emergent affect that is
the result of mostly chaotic activity? I think you said that in
another thread with regard to mental states in general.
Anders:
Actually, this sort of thing is supposed to be an absract preliminary
to a theoretical description of the sorting that is done by ordinary
folks in operating with psychological language. Roughly as grammar
makes explicit a system for classifying utterances that is implicit in
the practice of anyone who manages the trick of speaking prose.
Jorgenson:
I think the hope that the brain has 'a' syntax is wishful thinking.
The syntax may be reduceable like quadratic equations and yet the
transforms must be quite beyond my pre-school knowledge of transforms.
Anders:
The point is not to deny a distinction between perceptual experience --
how things appear to be -- and judgment -- how they are taken to be.
It is only to assert that how things appear to be itself has an
intentional or conceptual content, a content that is fit to be judged
true or false and involves exercise of an acquired conceptual
repertoire or understanding.
Jorgenson:
Ok. I was going to bicker about using the word acquired and
yet acquired includes both innate and imposed repertoires.
>This is the first occurrence of the words sentence or language in
>your presentation and so I am at a loss as to what you are now
>talking about.
Anders:
The main point, recall, was to raise an issue for the idea that
truth is always applied to "representations". The idea was that
if "representation" can mean "intentional states" in the sense of
the phenomenological conception, then it may be ok, but
if "representation" means representational *vehicles* like sentences,
it may not be correct.
I.e. to raise a doubt about the representational theory of mind.
On the phenomenological conception mental states have intentionality or
representational content, but without any representations (other than
the states themselves).
Jorgenson:
Ok. I am being squeezed between acknowledging mental states as
valid or mental sentences as valid. Mental sentences is obviously
too strong formally to be correct and I think mental states may
also be too strong a structure to be correct. Both approaches
are valid and may reveal insight at various levels and of various
relationships. Once again it depends on the task at hand of
which approach might be appropriate. The actual state of affairs
is going to be above both levels as an emergent level of
complexity. We may have to develop several models and
climb as it were to the actual state of affairs regarding
the manipulations of the brain. Minksy has done this with
his society of mind and what is above society as a level
of complexity?
>What about the senses? Chemical reactions such as fire are not
>language events with as sentence or syntax or such. The components
>and relationships are fixed unlike language. Heat does cause
>damage to tissue and nerve endings where those nerve endings are
>simply transducers.
Anders:
I am not sure what the point is, but I don't think I disagree.
Jorgenson:
That makes two of us.
Anders:
Chemical reactions are not language, but they are potential topics
of language. In order to see chemical events knowingly, i.e. *as*
chemical events, you must have some concept of chemical event.
And concepts are capacities whose presence is manifested mainly
in the use of words. One should not be said to have a concept of
a chemical event if one cannot use the relevant words. One must
also have other non-verbal abilities to interact with chemical objects,
but those alone apart from linguistic expression would always be
ambiguous, I think.
Jorgenson:
Actually my point was relating chemical/physical states to mental
states. The former are fixed while the latter are free. There
is a specific dance or equation or formula that describes the
chemical/physical states that we encounter. Descriptive words
do not describe a mental state, they name the mental state.
H20 at a given temperature and pressure is either a gas or
a liquid or a solid or possibly all three or some combination
there of. There are steam tables that tell us, for a given pressure
and temperature what the state will be. The number of parameters
and dimensions in a mathematical psychology make thermodynamics
look like childs play. Sure one can have actors where a novelist
imbues their character with certain traits and follows a syntax
and yet humans grow and lose innocence and forget. What the
heck was I going to say next? Oh yah, sensations constantly
compete for attention, to be the content, and the setting of
priorities becomes paramount.
I need to finish unpacking and buy a bed and washer and dryer
for my new home hoping to get a good Labor Day deal. I must
cut short my response for now and try to control my truth
addiction.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
CDJ
In article <340A62...@micron.net>, aug...@micron.net said:
[Weinstein]
>>You might just as well put it as "there are no such *things* as souls",
>>i.e. all apparent reference to souls as *objects* are dispensable. Which
>>seemed to be CDJ's idea.
>That's cool. But I think his original objection to soul talk went
>somewhat farther than that.
Not really, though Weinstein's discussion of Frege, concepts, and objects
seems to miss the point to me.
To put it quasi-technically, I think that regular English is a conservative
extension of regular English minus soul-talk. And contrary to the impression
that might be had from philosophical discussions of conservative extensions
(Prior-Belnap, Dummett, Brandom), one doesn't, in general, want an extension
to language to be conservative (intuitively, because nothing genuinely _new_
is being added).
I find English minus dog-talk to be lacking. I find English without
lettuce-talk to be lacking. I do NOT find English without soul-talk to be
lacking.
Or better: I either find English minus soul-talk adequate, OR adding soul-talk
is nonconservative in a bad way (which disjunt is true depends on just what
soul-talk consists in; for your "set of capacities", the former disjunct, for
fire-and-brimstone boy's notion, the latter).
CDJ
Lewis Jorgenson
ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote:
Anders:
Anyway, I want to do justice to the idea that conceptual
capacities of the full-blown sort require language as their medium
of expression, but that still the concepts are one thing and the
formal syntactic objects another.
Jorgenson:
Wait a minute. Music and sculpture and painting and such
certainly involve full-blown conceptual capacities that
may hold depth beyond language. I see that any language
worth having the label language must be artificial in the sense
that the choosing of words and syntax are arbitrary rather than
set by nature.
>Ok, now we are really back to pure pondering. The phrase 'mental
>states' irritates me and interferes with my following your
presentation.
Anders:
Just think about intentional psychological verbs. Some are
stative, like "believes" or "thinks" or "intends". "Mental state"
is just a placholder or variable for the sorts of phenomena
ascribed through the use such words.
Jorgenson:
Ok. As long as it is acknowledged that It is a reduction or
simplification rather than the actual state of affairs.
>Plus you now have added the word meanings to be a synonym of
>contents. Could meanings be a synonym at the object level?
Anders:
In English philosophical usage, "meaning" is generally used in the
manner of Frege's "Sinn" (sense) as opposed to his "Bedeutung"
(reference). Thus Quine on "theory of meaning" vs. "theory of
reference". That is just a convention; ordinary usage does not
mark it.
Jorgenson:
Ok, so during perceptual events meanings do occur at the object
level.
Anders:
I am not sure what you are asking. Seeings that p occur, e.g. my
seeing that Jones is out at first base, a state that I can "enjoy"
or undergo because I understand a bit about the game. When I see
that p I am not typically theorizing about it in this high-blown
fashion, of course.
Jorgenson:
I did not intend that meanings occur consciously at the object
level during perception events. I was guessing that the
content/object/referent process for pondering or thinking or
believing was matched for perception events where part of
the process in handled subconsciously. When I itch, I just
itch with not much theorizing involved at all. Now if the
process is matched then the 'theorizing' portion must be
absent or masked. I flipped a coin and guessed that it was
masked. If it is absent then perception processing might
be a different process from the pondering process.
Anders:
One idea is that judgers and concept users have a categorially
different sort of experience, one that is distinctive by being
*informed* by concepts and understanding.
Jorgenson:
Hmmm. My first intent was to disagree and I retain that feeling.
However, I cannot think of a valid reason for disagreeing. Let
me hold this as content for awhile.
Anders:
The other key point is that what the concept users have with the
concept of heat cannot really be *derived* only from sensations of
heat, because of a kind of logical incommensurability between the
sensory and the cognitive, the epistemic (pertaining to
justification) and the non-epistemic (pertaining to causal
relations), the propositional and the non-propositional.
Jorgenson:
Whoa. There certainly may be logical incommensurability between
the various components and yet the human brain can interchange
those 'contents' at will. I can think about scratching my
chin and scratch my chin and feel my chin being scratched and
I can do that and more simultaneously.
Anders:
Sellars' polemic rests on the idea that a sensation of warmth
cannot stand in a rational or epistemic relation to a
propositional attitude like a belief *that* this thing is warm.
And like Wittgenstein, on the idea that acquiring the concept of
heat is not just having your attention drawn to something already
there in your experience.
Jorgenson:
I must have missed something as both points appear to overstate
the separation. Formal logic seems to do that on a regular basis.
The focus is too sharp and directed and erases nuances that in
my opinion are often salient. Perhpas this explains while formal
logic is unable to get the job done.
>[Physical objects] and concepts can be encountered.
Anders:
Well yes, but compare the types of encounter: if a man is
blindsided by a truck and killed, he has had a serious physical
encounter with a massive object. But he would not have had an
epistemic or cognitive encounter with it unless he also had some
sort of awareness of it.
Jorgenson:
Sort of like you never hear the bullet that gets you. Why
did you kill the poor man? A physical encounter generally
does also involve an epistemic or cognitive encounter. To
be physical aware of something without being mentally
aware of something is curious. Once again perhaps the
subconscious is feeling the chair under you and the floor
under your feet and the sound of the air conditioner and
you ignore it as it were unless you direct your attention
to it. Now many things can be added to your cognitive
map without needing physical encounters. I thought physics
had already torn down the fence between the concrete and
the abstract and philosophers can do the same without
going mental.
>The folks on the MIR could physically encounter the concept
>"absolute vacuum" and so the sharp line between abstract and
>concrete is a misnomer as both are candidates for encounters.
Anders:
The folks planning repairs and such are working with the concept
of near-absolute vacuum, although I would not exactly say they are
encountering the concept itself as if it were an object.
Jorgenson:
Sure they did. It was just like personal debt is a wolf at
the door. Sure, literally they know and you know and I know
that a vacuum is not an object as objects go and yet it was a
thing, a big thing to be concerned about due to 'physical' reasons
of risk. I blame the English language where a vacuum as in a
Hoover vacuum is indeed a object as objects go.
Anders:
The danger they are worring about is not encountering the
*concept* of a vaccum, which might frighten but is not likely to
kill anyone. It is the vacuum itself, but that is the referent.
Jorgenson:
Well, keep going. One can say that a long fall does not kill
you, it is the sudden stop at the end. The use of
'representations' in the form of mental states or mental
sentences is a lot of sudden stops rather than the entire
flow that is contained in any mental event. The MIR folks
are in a risky situation and death was on their minds.
It gets messy very quickly where the concepts are all
connected rather than nicely spaced and ordered as in
sentences or states or societies. It is anarchy perhaps
with only an outward appearance of order. Look at a
friend with their face turned to an awkward angle and
explore, as Picasso did, the bizzare image that we
somehow alter into a familiar view of a friend. Look
at the color of your hand now and look at it under a
regular light and look at it under a fluorescent light
and look at it outside and look at it under the sun. What
color is your hand? Now what has changed? Your perception
apparatus and brain and hand are unaltered and yet the
physical input has slightly altered your experience.
Now that is just your hand and 4 or 5 light sources.
How many different parameters and inputs does the
human body deal with and keep it all an ordinary and
everyday experience? I think that right track or wrong
track, the level of complexity shall keep AI folks
busy for quite awhile.
>One might see a red rock and/or one might read, hear or imagine
>the concept red rock.
Anders:
Indeed on the phenomenological conception the same content can
occur in different modes. (one more distinction, but I didnt'
bring it up) But it is better to focus with Frege on the complete
proposition: one can see that a rock is in the road, one can
imagine that a rock is in the road, one can hope or fear that a
rock is in the mode.
Jorgenson:
Ok. I tend to write long sentences that ramble on and on
just like James Joyce and Abraham Lincoln apparently and
does that mean that I have longer thoughts than other
folks. Now is such a behavior negative laziness or is
it a positive enhancement where my brain can express itself
without too much conscious filtering? I think this area
is a case by case basis where discretion might be the
proper avenue in certain situations. I blurt often and
am left having to explain myself.
Anders:
One would like to say that intentional relations to objects
simpliciter always go by way of complete propositions. That may
not work, but it is the line.
Jorgenson:
It is certainly a valid approach for purposes of research
regardless of whether or not it is the actual state of affairs.
Anders:
(Fred Dretske takes a different view in his analysis of different
concepts of seeing by the way.)
Jorgenson:
I was amused to find out that the eyes are actually extensions
of the brain/nervous system. I always wondered why eyes and
teeth were left out of health insurance.
>Does Santa Claus exist?
Anders:
I was told not.
Jorgenson:
NASA provides reports of his Christmas Eve travels and
the Post Office accepts his mail. He has more imitators
during that time of year than Elvis has all year. I
have seen his picture and I can name his reindeer. I
used to be able to name his reindeer. Yes, he is a
figment of imagination, a myth. Is he anymore a myth
than the English Language? These words are arbitrary
and there is no reason that fish are called fish or
snow is snow or whatever is whatever. These symbols
are meaningless to a non-English reading person until
they learn and believe what English reading persons
learn and believe. We need better not less myths.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
ray scanlon
Anders N Weinstein <ande...@pitt.edu> wrote in article
<01bcb6cd$562d6de0$e67a61ce@asdf>...
> In article <5udg9v$3...@ux.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert
> <ric...@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
> >In <5ud33j$n...@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu> ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N
> Weinstein) writes:
(snip)
> >>Now as to "truth". Rickert represents "true" as though it were just
> >>another concept on the same level as all the others we use.
> >
> >Not so, although perhaps that is how Jorgenson characterizes what I
> >say. Rather, I describe 'truth' as used in the evaluation of
> >representations.
>
> Particular representations or representation systems?
The subjective aspect of "truth" has been investigated at great length.
In my opinion, not much has been said about the objective aspect of
"truth".
All feelings and emotions may be hypothesized to be the subjective
aspect of the activity of certain neurons in the brain. As for
instance, the feeling that the milieu is threatening could be the
result of particular neural activity in the amygdala. The feeling that
the milieu is friendly could be traced to the activity of a different
neural combination in the amygdala.
I would feel that "truth" is an emotion and is traceable to quietude
among the neurons of the reticular nucleus of the thalamus.
These things may be investigated in the laboratory.
I think it time we recognize that neuroscientists have moved to a point
where their
findings impinge on psychology and philosophy.
ray
--
email: rsca...@wsg.net
If you are interested in how the brain works, visit
http://www.wsg.net/~rscanlon/brain.html
Bill Wallace
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
>
> >Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
>
> Jorgenson:
> > in concrete form namely Reality or the ASOA thing.
>
If you and I were in a room together with a chair between us and we were
discussing it you could say: "That is a chair." I would agree. You could
say: "That chair is real." I would agree. If you believe that I agreed
with you because it is intuitively obvious that the chair is there, then
further discussion is pointless because our frames of reference are so
vastly different as to defy communication. By frame of reference I mean
ALL that we use to interpret and make meaningful about the world
presented to us, regardless of the medium. How the world is made
meaningful to me is different from the way it is made meaningful to you.
How the world is made meaningful to a computer/program is totally
different from either of us.
By the way, when interpreted, "That is a chair." yields the same meaning
as the interpretion of the information presented to me by my senses. It
is the equivalence of the two meanings that can be said to be true (or
false).
Good luck
Lewis Jorgenson
ande...@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein) wrote:
Anders:
One idea is that judgers and concept users have a categorially
different sort of experience, one that is distinctive by being
*informed* by concepts and understanding.
Jorgenson:
>Hmmm. My first intent was to disagree and I retain that feeling.
>However, I cannot think of a valid reason for disagreeing. Let
>me hold this as content for awhile.
Ok. If I peel away the reasons in your presentation I am left
with the proposal that there are categorically different sorts
of experiences. For the moment I will ignore the fact that
this proposal was discovered by comparing judgers and concept
users to non-judgers and non-concept users. You must mean
that the content/object/referent process is not constant.
It would be trivial to announce that different contents
or different objects/referents would yield different
sorts of experiences. Similarly, it is trivial to announce
that judgers and concept users are making judgements and
using concepts. I think the content/object/referent process
is constant and so I need to account for categorically different
results from the same process. Now I am confused and yet...
I think that the quantity of object/referents available to
the processor would have the observed result. To use
my hand example, there would be more light sources with
which to cast light upon the content. I have worked it
through at least for this feebled old brain and now I
can feel good about agreeing with your paragraph. The
judgers and concept users use the exact same process as
the other folks and the experiences are categorically
different sorts due to excess objects/referents available.
The washer and dryer came today and I get cable for the tv
(rabbit ears? Some people still use rabbit ears?) tomorrow
and a bed on thursday. I'll put these personal asides aside
shortly.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Lewis Jorgenson
Truth and what
I have been instructed that there is no human independent
Truth and so Truth is subjective. I have told that reality
may not be real and in any case humans only encounter a
representation of reality.
Such ivory tower pronouncements are invaluable and cause
me to reflect upon the error of my ways. It appears that
I am claiming that I and all other humans are in touch with
reality. The ivory tower brains are certain that they
and all humans are out of touch with reality. I propose
that AI entities should be designed to be in touch with
reality. The ivory tower experts hold that everything
occurs within the brain and all the nerves and nerve
bundles and nerve endings of the nervous system are
secondary or tertiary concerns if concerns at all.
I like obstructionists up to a point. Obstructionists
force the topic to be clarified until the bone of
contention is laid bare. However, if valid reasons
are presented that tilt the argument one way and
the obstructionists continue to obstruct then it
becomes a matter of personality rather than reason.
This is why intermediaries are required especially
when vested interests are involved. Then again
some people, like myself, are simply hardheaded
and stubborn and will stand on our god given
ability and capacity to speak our own mind.
Just for fun, for kicks, for entertainment, for
intellectual shenanigans, let us assume there
are 4 sorts of Truth namely: Community, Actual,
Individual, and Philosophical.
Is everybody happy such that I may proceed?
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Chris Hooley
LJ>Just for fun, for kicks, for entertainment, for
LJ>intellectual shenanigans, let us assume there
LJ>are 4 sorts of Truth namely: Community, Actual,
LJ>Individual, and Philosophical.
LJ>
LJ>Is everybody happy such that I may proceed?
Of course you may proceed but I know that the assumptions which you import
to the topic are different from mine. For instance, I like these four
categories but they mean something else to me.
I sense that "truth" = "reality" for you so I will use that term.
Community: Most common denominator reality. Two generations removed from
actual reality and useful mainly for approximations in communications.
Developed as a quick and dirty signalling system. Community truth includes
every instance of shared reality, even science.
Actual: The only non-representation reality in the group. It can be
experienced, in a way is all that can be experienced, but precisely because
it is more original than any meanings, it has no attributes. As soon as we
make it meaningful, it ain't it.
Individual: Solipsistic experience of reality. One step removed from
actual reality. This is the experiential sphere in which we live.
Everything outside this reality is unprovable; all such extensions involve
faith or belief.
Philosophical: The farthest removed, I suppose, from actual reality
because it examines the community's truth.
You propose that AI should be released from the quagmire of community and
philosophical truth. I agree totally. I'd go the other mile, though, and
say that *all* meaningful reality statements are inextricably part of the
whole cummulative *human* reality structure and that the greatest progress
is possible if we keep them (as much as we can) out of AI.
So, I'd say that there is a reality and that we are *always* in it, but
that as soon as we speak about it, we clothe it from our own unique
wardrobe. By this I mean to include sub-conceptual meanings-of-reality like
those of our cells.
I'm surprised that scientists are so reluctant to drop the human
perspective on reality. This is AI afterall and it's a call to move toward
greater objectivity.
As long as we arrange the truth (reality) hierarchy this way, we can
proceed usefully, in my opinion:
Actual
Individual
Community
Philosophical
So, do proceed! :-)
Regards
Chris
Neil Rickert
>I have been instructed that there is no human independent
>Truth and so Truth is subjective.
The conclusion may not follow from the premise, depending on what you
mean by "subjective."
> I have told that reality
>may not be real and in any case humans only encounter a
>representation of reality.
I don't think you have been told that. But you have used that as an
interpretation (or misinterpretation) of what others have said.
>Such ivory tower pronouncements are invaluable and cause
>me to reflect upon the error of my ways. It appears that
>I am claiming that I and all other humans are in touch with
>reality.
I wouldn't vouch for "all other humans", but would agree with that
for most humans.
> The ivory tower brains are certain that they
>and all humans are out of touch with reality.
I haven't seen that claim made.
> I propose
>that AI entities should be designed to be in touch with
>reality.
That sounds like a good plan.
> The ivory tower experts hold that everything
>occurs within the brain and all the nerves and nerve
>bundles and nerve endings of the nervous system are
>secondary or tertiary concerns if concerns at all.
I can't say that I have seen that claim either.
>I like obstructionists up to a point. Obstructionists
>force the topic to be clarified until the bone of
>contention is laid bare. However, if valid reasons
>are presented that tilt the argument one way and
>the obstructionists continue to obstruct then it
From the perspective of some participants, valid reasons have been
given that tilt the argument in the direction of truth being human
dependent. I guess that makes you the obstructionist, since you
insist on sticking to your own views.
>Just for fun, for kicks, for entertainment, for
>intellectual shenanigans, let us assume there
>are 4 sorts of Truth namely: Community, Actual,
>Individual, and Philosophical.
You would need to say a little more about what you had in mind.
>Is everybody happy such that I may proceed?
Since when has everybody's happiness been a prerequisite for your
proceeding?
Seth Russell
Lewis Jorgenson wrote:
> Just for fun, for kicks, for entertainment, for
> intellectual shenanigans, let us assume there
> are 4 sorts of Truth namely: Community, Actual,
> Individual, and Philosophical.
>
> Is everybody happy such that I may proceed?
Oh please do! If there is any path out of this morass of words, then
lead the way.
Perhasps I have stumbeled on the wrong group, but i can't find any group
named comp.ai.let's-make-it-work-now .
Seth
Jim Balter
Seth Russell wrote:
> Perhasps I have stumbeled on the wrong group, but i can't find any group
> named comp.ai.let's-make-it-work-now .
If you want to make things that work, eschew philosophy. In this case,
comp.ai.philosophy^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H
I.e., try comp.ai
--
<J Q B>
Lewis Jorgenson
cho...@idnsi.net (Chris Hooley) wrote:
Hooley:
Of course you may proceed but I know that the assumptions which
you import to the topic are different from mine. For instance, I
like these four categories but they mean something else to me.
Jorgenson:
Don't start with me. I can get mean if you get my meaning.
Hooley:
I sense that "truth" = "reality" for you so I will use that term.
Jorgenson:
Maybe I do. I had not viewed it that way and so maybe I really
am naive. Perhaps I really am equating reality and truth. How
about a new thread: Reality and Truth (was Destiny)?
Hooley:
Community: Most common denominator reality. Two generations
removed from actual reality and useful mainly for approximations
in communications. Developed as a quick and dirty signalling
system. Community truth includes every instance of shared
reality, even science.
Actual: The only non-representation reality in the group. It can
be experienced, in a way is all that can be experienced, but
precisely because it is more original than any meanings, it has no
attributes. As soon as we make it meaningful, it ain't it.
Jorgenson:
Yes, well. Generally I do not consciously think ahead and
just let my subconscious ponder topics for a while and then
type and see what flows out. Once again I will have to wait
and see if I agree. There is a different tilt to it than I
expected and so it will take me a while to get my frame of
reference.
Hooley:
Individual: Solipsistic experience of reality. One step removed
from actual reality. This is the experiential sphere in which we
live. Everything outside this reality is unprovable; all such
extensions involve faith or belief.
Philosophical: The farthest removed, I suppose, from actual
reality because it examines the community's truth.
Hooley:
You propose that AI should be released from the quagmire of
community and philosophical truth. I agree totally. I'd go the
other mile, though, and say that *all* meaningful reality
statements are inextricably part of the whole cummulative *human*
reality structure and that the greatest progress is possible if we
keep them (as much as we can) out of AI.
Jorgenson:
Once again the focus is funny and here at least I can say why.
Intelligence, rather than calculation, involves what I have
called individual truth where a self encounters all 4 sorts
of truth. Computer AI must be able to differentiate the
sorts of truth. Even dead end streets teach you not to
take that street again.
Hooley:
So, I'd say that there is a reality and that we are *always* in
it, but that as soon as we speak about it, we clothe it from our
own unique wardrobe. By this I mean to include sub-conceptual
meanings-of-reality like those of our cells.
Jorgenson:
Careful about setting up your own haberdashery business as
believing so does not make it so.
Hooley:
I'm surprised that scientists are so reluctant to drop the human
perspective on reality. This is AI afterall and it's a call to
move toward greater objectivity.
Jorgenson:
You have lost me. Computers already perform standard logic
and mathematics. I remember where some computers actually
add 5 to 5 five times to calculate 5*5 which is what
multiplication and division are based on. They are wonderful
with those sorts of truth. I was talking about the truth
of an itch or urge that cannot be denied, or not denied for
very long anyway.
Hooley:
As long as we arrange the truth (reality) hierarchy this way, we
can proceed usefully, in my opinion:
Actual, Individual, Community, Philosophical. So, do proceed! :-)
Jorgenson:
Let me see what Mr. Rickert has to say first. He may put
a cabosh on the whole effort.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Chris Hooley
On 5 Sep 1997 23:37:17 GMT, LSV...@prodigy.com (Lewis Jorgenson) wrote:
LJ>Hooley:
LJ>So, I'd say that there is a reality and that we are *always* in
LJ>it, but that as soon as we speak about it, we clothe it from our
LJ>own unique wardrobe. By this I mean to include sub-conceptual
LJ>meanings-of-reality like those of our cells.
LJ>
LJ>Jorgenson:
LJ>Careful about setting up your own haberdashery business as
LJ>believing so does not make it so.
I don't think that we have a choice. In a sense we (and all other centers
of awareness) are meaning makers. It's what we do. We *are* the membrane
of meaning in-between.
There's a vitality in the direct experience of reality which is absent from
the accultured, filtered consensus world. So, this truth, as something
more real than third generation models of it, is worth fighting for.
But metaphysics bores me to tears. Initiating robust AI doesn't.
So, my argument has been that experience, before it has been tagged with
any meaning, is the truth. It is not a truth that we can code into AI. It
is not a truth that we can communicate to each other. It is available as
experience every instant of our lives ....
and it will be for AI also.
LJ>Jorgenson:
LJ>Let me see what Mr. Rickert has to say first. He may put
LJ>a cabosh on the whole effort.
I've been wondering how that worked. :-)
Regards,
Chris
Lewis Jorgenson
I suppose the following is in response to
someone that asked me to lead this group
out of the morass of words. Nope. Not me.
I like words. I like playing in the morass
of words. To paraphrase Groucho Marx:
I do not want anybody who would follow someone
like me to follow me. The following words
are totally without redeeming social or
philosophical or scientific value as I shall
not lead.
Verily I say unst to you, that you shall
know the truth and the truth shall set
you free. They came upon an AI entity
and it was good. It was very good. It
was so good that they came upon it again
and again. Such are the strange and mysterious
ways of science. If something is not found or
something is found and lost then later someone
else can find it anyway. History is replete
with stories of simultaneous scientific
discoveries whenst credit is given to he
that can turn a profit. This is called
the finders fee and scientists around the
globe are reaching for the brass ring of
success. Truth you ask? What about truth?
I just made and ate a pudding and it was
good. Instead of a huge spoonful I dabbed
at the poor pudding and ate it little by
little savoring each portion. The sugar
and eggs and milk fat and even salt melted
upon my tongue and palate in a decadent,
delicate deliciousness. The non-artificial
vanilla held a richness and depth beyond
what I have found in the artificial vanillas.
Some artificial flavors are fine and artificial
colors standardizes appearance remarkably well.
The artificial flavors I dislike are fakes and
taste like fakes as if the manufacturer assumed
that my tongue was dumb. It is not quite an
accurate description and yet the major fake
sugar makes my tongue foam. I consider the diet
drinks and food prepared with that junk inedible
unless I am starving. Some people like the
taste of that chemical and fine, good for them.
MSG makes me sweat at the brow. I do not sweat
all over or feel uncomfortable and yet I know
when MSG has been used to accent the flavors.
The point you ask? There is no point to this
post except to deny any leadership status. I
am just a sap who likes thinking and writing
about the next greatest advancement and
achievement of humanity namely AI. If it
has not already been done then it is very close
indeed. You think electricity or automobiles
or computers have changed the world? We have
not seen anything yet. If the planning mechanism
is complete then even wisdom is dispensable. I
want to keep free will and selfhood and truth around
to keep all the options available just in case.
Hey, all my followers should send me money now.
There is a following fee that must be paid or
you are not allowed to follow.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Jan Sand
In article <5ut5v5$1018$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
#Hey, all my followers should send me money now.
#There is a following fee that must be paid or
#you are not allowed to follow.
#
#Lewis Vance Jorgenson
#
#
Aah, Lewis, what comes next? Ten addresses to which we may send five
dollars and await the avalanche of postal riches? TANSTAFL.
JS&C
Lewis Jorgenson
js...@walrus.megabaud.fi wrote:
>In article <5ut5v5$1018$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
>Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
Jorgenson:
>Hey, all my followers should send me money now.
>There is a following fee that must be paid or
>you are not allowed to follow.
JSand:
Aah, Lewis, what comes next? Ten addresses to which we may send five
dollars and await the avalanche of postal riches? TANSTAFL.
Jorgenson:
Let me see. So JSand has been following me from thread to
thread and thought to thought and hmmpf to hmmpf. I have
not yet received your check Mr. JSand. I see that Charley
has a domesticated cat discount account. Aja must have handled
that transaction as I do not remember getting the cash. In
any event, to get to the butt of the matter, you, Mr. JSand,
are in arrears and you need to back out of this thread and
watch out for the other posts on your way. If on my other
hand you would like to clean up your debt then we can make
arrangements. I understand that money is tight in Stockholm
or Moscow or whatever foreign city you live in due to
outrageous phone bills and I tell yah what I'm going to do.
I can get you in on the ground floor of the greatest money
making scheme ever. It is completely legal and it is so
legal that I will call you Mr. Dole from now on and you
must call me Mr. Clinton. Ok Mr. Dole? Now, send me a
signed blank check and a copy of your most recent bank
statement. This is just a paperwork technical matter
that I must have for my records to keep the scheme
perfectly legal. If you have multiple bank accounts,
do the same for all the accounts. If you have a savings
account that does not have checks, I guess I could accept
a signed withdrawal slip instead of a check. I wouldn't
do that for anybody but you Mr. Dole. Once I have
checked your paperwork I will get to work and I assure
you without doubt or hesitation that the money will
begin to flow. Don't wait. Do it now. I guarantee that
you will become my follower for life.
What does TANSTAFL mean after you translate it from the
Finish. Durn furrinners.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Jan Sand
In article <5uucde$2010$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
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#
#
#
Sorry about all those # that jumped into your post...blame that on the
system which is controlled by Murphy. It certainly not due to me or Charley
(who has just, apparently, been joined by Diana). I had assumed, due
to the fact that you seemed more adept at spelling than the majority
of other people who post on the net, that you were well read...sorry
for over estimating your acquaintance with English literature.
TANSTAFL is the acronym invented by the classical author Robert
Heinlein (now sadly passed away) for There Aint No Such Thing As Free
Lunch.
The rest of your post is obviously typical of the machinations of
members of the Republicans whose saint, R.Nixon boldly claimed where
no-one had claimed before that he was not a crook. Of course, the
Democrats, in self defense, have soiled their hands also, but as we
all know, money is evil, so the Republicans who are richer than the
Democrats are obviously shadowier characters.
So, you would suck me into the ditch with you, would you?
Circumstance and inbuilt high morality (not having any free will)
dictates otherwise.
Faw!
JS&C
Lewis Jorgenson
js...@walrus.megabaud.fi wrote:
JSand:
Sorry about all those # that jumped into your post...blame that on
the system which is controlled by Murphy. It certainly not due to
me or Charley (who has just, apparently, been joined by Diana).
Jorgenson:
Yes, Aja and Sister Teresa and actually many others have shaken
off the dusty coil.
JSand:
I had assumed, due to the fact that you seemed more adept at
spelling than the majority of other people who post on the net,
that you were well read...sorry for over estimating your
acquaintance with English literature. TANSTAFL is the acronym
invented by the classical author Robert Heinlein (now sadly passed
away) for There Aint No Such Thing As Free Lunch.
Jorgenson:
Some of his writings were very good and I was put off by
his tone sometimes. If I had ever knew TANSTAFL I had
forgotten it. I had ROTFL or rolling on the floor laughing
in mind and could not make sense of TANSTAFL in that context.
Gee, Mr. JSand. I am sorry I dropped your literary reference.
Can you buy another one? I can save up my allowance and give
it to you.
JSand:
The rest of your post is obviously typical of the machinations of
members of the Republicans whose saint, R.Nixon boldly claimed
where no-one had claimed before that he was not a crook.
Jorgenson:
Now, Tricky Dick got his start on Senator's McCarthys famous
UnAmerican Activities TV show and so the American citizens
knew we would get marvelous entertainment by electing Milhouse
as president. The same with Reagan and Clinton. The Bush
show was very good and yet it went too smoothly, desert storm
and the fall of the USSR and the Berlin wall went without a
hitch. Clinton has many ongoing investigations and suicides
and his wife is controversial. It is a very good show.
JSand:
Of course, the Democrats, in self defense, have soiled their hands
also, but as we all know, money is evil, so the Republicans who
are richer than the Democrats are obviously shadowier characters.
Jorgenson:
The only problem with politics is that it is about politics.
There is no Republican or Democratic party as it were in
America and you basically have one party and the opposition
where the name is almost irrelevant. Many New York Republicans
would be called Democrats in Texas. Many Florida Democrats
would be called Republicans in California. The groups
cannot ignore the will of the people if they want to
get elected and so various issues will shift sides.
The Democrats used to be for low taxes as a popular
movement. Similarly the Republicans used to stand
for a stronger central government. These are not
single issue groups where one issue sets the agenda
regarding all issues unlike the pluristic systems with
4-30 different squads scrambling for influence on their
main concern.
JSand:
So, you would suck me into the ditch with you, would you?
Jorgenson:
Cash, no checks. Half now, half in the ditch.
JSand:
Circumstance and inbuilt high morality (not having any free will)
dictates otherwise. Faw!
Jorgenson:
It is my understanding that the correct spelling is faugh.
You did pronounce it correctly as it does not rhyme with
laugh. I have too many boxes of books to unpack to locate
my dictionary and I have not yet determined where I want
to put the bookcases. I am pondering whether to put them
in one room for a library or study or scatter the bookcases
about for easy access. You no lika me posts? I double
your money back ok? Ok.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson
Jan Sand
In article <5uunp2$dl2$1...@newssvr03-int.news.prodigy.com>,
Lewis Jorgenson <LSV...@prodigy.com> wrote:
>
>js...@walrus.megabaud.fi wrote:
>JSand:
>Circumstance and inbuilt high morality (not having any free will)
>dictates otherwise. Faw!
>
>Jorgenson:
>It is my understanding that the correct spelling is faugh.
>You did pronounce it correctly as it does not rhyme with
>laugh. I have too many boxes of books to unpack to locate
>my dictionary and I have not yet determined where I want
>to put the bookcases. I am pondering whether to put them
>in one room for a library or study or scatter the bookcases
>about for easy access. You no lika me posts? I double
>your money back ok? Ok.
>
>Lewis Vance Jorgenson
>
>
Divergent as this has become from AI, I must, I am afraid,
take the faw as you have observed. But befaugh that, I must admit
a certain affection for your posts. I enjoy sticking pins into
balloons full of hot air.
JS&C
Lewis Jorgenson
js...@walrus.megabaud.fi wrote:
JSand:
Divergent as this has become from AI,
Jorgenson:
If these posts are not examples of artificial intelligence
then I don't know what they are. Real intelligence would
stay above the mucky morass and not stoop to sticking
full puns on to hotter ball Lew'ns.
JSand:
I must, I am afraid,
Jorgenson:
Be brave little bear.
JSand:
take the faw as you have observed.
Jorgenson:
It gives me a guffaw when you can take the faw and go faw.
JSand:
But befaugh that, I must admit a certain affection for your posts.
Jorgenson:
All you finlinder guys like posts. I have always thought of
you as sort of a faux faw pa.
JSand:
I enjoy sticking pins into balloons full of hot air.
Jorgenson:
Yes. The compressed air emerges forcefully through the
created orifice tearing it larger and larger while
emitting a strange and unique sound called the big bang.
The balloon itself rushes here and there in a 'random'
frantic search for peace and emits a new unique sound.
The darting movements and sound intensifies to a fever
pitch just before the balloon collapses, into a soggy,
tiny, pile of soft rubber. The balloon is spent. Never
again shall it soar to the ceiling or know the joy of
pretending to be a volley ball. Never again will static
electricity charm the balloon with its mysterious charge
of attraction. The balloon lived a full life. I come
not to bury or praise the balloon. I come to pick up
the used balloon and aim it like a rubber band at your
great big behind and cause you to have a start at the
large snap and sting that you have encountered. As you
rub your rear and turn around to engage the culprit,
you shall find my madly grinning face saying "Neener,
neener, neener." Faugh in deed.
Lewis Vance Jorgenson