The End of Science?
Michael Feldhake
http://www.csicop.org/si/9703/end.html
I chuckled during reading this article. It seams somewhat skeptic of
science although there are an uncounted amount of success stories out
there about the thing that this article easily dismisses as flawed.
But, in light of AI's problems and this group's current list of
debates, I thought it might be interesting to get some feedback.
Furthermore, I suggest the following theory:
The real proof of any AI system is not in its theories but its
operation. Thus, if we concentrate on finding measurable properties
then these properties become the quality control measures that we can
use to establish successes.
Mike
Stephen Harris
"Michael Feldhake" <mfel...@ccoreinnovations.com> wrote in message
news:bef59aa8.03081...@posting.google.com...
> See attached article:
>
>
> Furthermore, I suggest the following theory:
>
> The real proof of any AI system is not in its theories but its
> operation. Thus, if we concentrate on finding measurable properties
> then these properties become the quality control measures that we can
> use to establish successes.
>
> Mike
I prefer not to see progress claimed by stretching the meaning
of words so that accomplishments result from redefining life
words so as to encompass the inanimate-->conscious thermostats.
Science used to have an implicit promise that a Theory of Everything
would soon unite an understanding of all the physical processes. That
hope seems to have languished with the limits of discovery imposed
by an "inability to measure initial conditions".
Unless one believes in a Higher Design, there is little reason to
assume that information which was created 13.7 billion years ago,
is now available for our discovery. Recognizing that information is
an artifact that arose with the evolution of human abstract thinking
utilizing a common meaning reinforced by the same physical substrate
avoids anthropomorphizing "data" as a conflation into information.
There is no doubt that a computer can usefully manipulate data.
I can compute a sum in my head and write it on a piece of paper.
I can compute a sum on an adding machine and it will print to a
piece of paper. I can use Excel to add numbers and print a result.
To my way of thinking, the sums may well be identical using
all three methods, but that doesn't mean both the calculator and
the computer with its Excel program have minds. Only the human
has a mind with a sense of self which creates purposes rather
than only fulfilling external purposes. Without a belief in Higher
Design, there is no external entity which has created a purpose
for us, that we merely fulfill, unlike tools which serve our purpose.
The strong AI idea that if a tool serves a purpose then it has an
autonomous mind is called "Computationalism". : Daryl McCullough:
"First of all, we can suppose that the most naive form of computationalism
is
behaviorism: if a system behaves as if it had a mind, then it has a mind. Or
more generally, all mental properties are ultimately properties of behavior.
There are numerous arguments against this position, for example the
possibility
of "perfect actors" who pretend to think something other than what they
appear
to, and the possibility of a humongous lookup table: in principle, you could
imagine a machine that were made to appear human in conversations by just
looking up the appropriate response in a huge table (many people's
intuitions
is that such a machine would not have mental properties, although it would
appear to.)" ... (snipped)
I think 'serving a purpose' has a consequence of providing observed
behavior,
at least for point I'm making. Without the supposition of Higher Design
creating the universe with a purpose for humanity... then there is no reason
to suppose that at the Big Bang there was information, and this information
had a pattern contained within it that would act like a blueprint unfolding
in
time and space until the purpose of realizing human consciousness was
attained.
Proponents of computationalism sometimes argue that a computer program
which can pass the Turing Test has a mind or is a mind, based upon observing
and evaluating its behavior. Critics complain that the program is a result
of
human design so that the program is not exhibiting the volitional aspects of
mind that we do attribute to humans (which organizes around a sense of
self).
Then the Computationalists respond that the program is dependent upon the
human programmer in much the same way that human volition depended
on evolutionary constraints for existence, constraints and boundary
definition.
This analogy doesn't work if information isn't construed as having a
physical
objectivity at the creation and unfolding of the universe-- information
instead
is a subjective relationship imposed by human observers who possess higher
symbolic consciousness and patterns are perceived and communicated
because there are like minds which can apprehend the same range of
abstractions. Perhaps bonobos have flashes of human future representation.
Thus the redefinition of meaningful information into 'information is just
data' is
necessary to philosophically support measurement by objective
quantification.
I think the ubiquity of the scientific presumption that everything is
capable of
being objectified and measured by using formal mathematical means has been
challenged by Chaitin, and this relects upon the perceived worth of science:
Gregory Chaitin...has proved the ultimate in undecidability
theorems..., that the logical structure of arithmetic can be
random...The assumption that the formal structure of arithmetic
is precise and regular turns out to have been a time-bomb, and
Chaitin has just pushed the detonator." Ian Stewart in "Nature".
Regards,
Stephen
Mr Michael Bibby
i emphatically agree. i should like to futher say that perhaps *the* biggest
scandle in science today is that although theoretical entities and their
properties are defined as invariants of measuring devices (i.e., in
observational terms using operational definitions and theoretical constructs
like units of measurement), they are 'explained' and 'described' in terms which
are indenpendent of our means and ways of measuring them. its funny how
scientists love to forget that although science only deals with the
commensurate: "man is the measure of all things".
its that simple. scientific realism is dogmatic.
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>See attached article:
>
><a href="http://www.csicop.org/si/9703/end.html">http://www.csicop.org/si/9703/end.html</a>
all though there are many undertones to this text which i myself diss-agree with
i should like to say that scientific realism is every bit as dogmatic as the
church that predated it, i.e., feyerband said that "scientific 'facts' are being
taught in schools much like religous facts where taught less than a hundred
years ago".
science is perhaps the biggest innovation of recent years in human technology,
no doubt about it, however, the results that science produce cannot be taken as
evidence to the conclusion that scientific theories approximate reality (as you
yourself seem to *believe*- believe being the operative word). other reasons can
and have been given to account for the viability of our theories. i would
replace the title with 'the end of science as we know it' or 'the end of
scientific realism'. something has got to change sooner or latter as scientific
realism is rationally indefensible and is as dogmatic as the religion it
replaced. Kant pointed this out 200 years ago, but each new generation of
scientists comes to feel that science *is* the royal road to immutable truth.
this is nothing short of a leap of faith, and a big leap indeed, especially when
one considers the 'privaliged access' which science has secured for itself in
most industrialized societies who have a stake in it!
i am sure that so long as radical empiricism or 'scientific realism' reigns
without checks and balances we will be seeing more articles such as
this(hopefully better written i might add) in the mainstream literature. i
personally am severly dissappointed at the lack of critical thinking in
science.
you think that 'success' should be the yardstick against which we should measure
the viability and instrumentality of our theories, of course, what else is
there? the instrumentality of our theories is not so much a function of their
ability to 'approximate reality' but rather a function of their ability to be
instrumental! this is obviously a tautology. but as for the idea of using the
'success' of our theories as the yardstick against which to measure their
'degrees of truth'- that is absurd!
mickeyd
dan michaels
> But, in light of AI's problems and this group's current list of
> debates, I thought it might be interesting to get some feedback.
>
Mike, I didn't read the article cited, but regards the end of
anything, some people rather think that it's really all about to
explode, like nothing we have ever seen before. Take a look at ideas
about the singularity - projected to "occur" in maybe 20-50 years time
- supposed to make everything as we presently know it totally
obsolete:
"According to Vernor Vinge ("The Singularity") and Broderick Damien
("The Spike"), around about 2050, there will be a fundamental change
to life as we know it - due to the cumulative effects of increasing
rates of progress in technology, computing, nanotech, biotech,
anti-aging, augmented intelligence, DNA sequencing, artifical
intelligence, etc. The "Singularity" occurs where the rate of growth
of these influences goes near-vertical, and we today cannot portend
what the world will be like after that point in time"
http://www.tor.com/samplethespike.html
http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html
Michael Feldhake
beliefs that I do. Therefore I offer this theory that offers an
explanation;
The Mind is not a Computer that computes some values but acts more
like an Instrument that "gauges" values. Because of this, we can
never achieve a computational equivalent of our situation but at best
only a value that represents some interpretation. These
interpretations are valued based on teachings and experience and our
subject to interpretations of others. Therefore, we (and any solution
we develop) lack the perfection of a hard equation.
Comments,
Mike
David Longley
Feldhake <mfel...@ccoreinnovations.com> writes
We have digital versions of every other "gauge" - and ANNs as function
approximators tend to be quite good at settling on 'equations' which
nobody can really explicate. We even have robots which can learn by
being taken through the motions required rather than being explicitly
programmed.
But ask yourself - how did you arrive at your theory of "mind"?
--
David Longley
Mr Michael Bibby
suonds like a theory of 'cognitive operators' to me (of which there already
exists many different versions). you seem to be saying that we compare one
phenomena with another that is already assigned a dimension, i like this idea
and agree that a simulation of what we do is secondary to our finding ourselves
in the doing of what we do.
mickeyd
Michael Feldhake
> Mike, I didn't read the article cited, but regards the end of
> anything, some people rather think that it's really all about to
> explode, like nothing we have ever seen before. Take a look at ideas
> about the singularity - projected to "occur" in maybe 20-50 years time
> - supposed to make everything as we presently know it totally
> obsolete:
>
the fact the our "view" of science will change. Currently, we see
science as a de facto system that produces facts. But the article is
pointing out that Science is not generating facts but beliefs. If we
stop to consider his point for a moment, we can easily generate facts
that are undeniable in simple systems. As complexity grows (i.e. in
A.I. systems), facts become less explicit and more judgmental and
presumptuous. You should read the article, its very interesting,
although a little off base.
Mike
Michael Feldhake
and more presumptuous?
> But ask yourself - how did you arrive at your theory of "mind"?
Using my belief that the peices I choose would work. I supported
these through intense investigations and deliberate reckoning.
Mike
dan michaels
> >
OK, I'll take a look, but I imagine it is a misinterpretation, regards
the statement ... "Science is not generating facts but beliefs". This
is the usual argument you get from creationists regarding the
shortcomings of evolutionary science, as well as many other scientific
debates, etc, etc.
This point of view stems from (a) which "assumptions" are made at the
beginnings of the argument in the first place, plus (b) the
mis-application of the scientific method, and (c) whether people
decide they have "all" of the information necessary on a subject.
Different groups err in at least one of these ways [and there maybe
others]. Basically, hokum.
I think you will find idea of the "The Singularity" of much more
interest.
Mr Michael Bibby
the belief that scientists are the cartographers of reality is just that, a
belief. the belief that our theories approximate reality is just that, a belief.
the belief that science is the royal road to the truth is just that, a belief.
the belief that sceince has 'privaliged access' to reality, through its methods
and methodologies, is just that, a belief. the basis of all fact is hypothesis,
a fact is a fact within a theoretical framework. the distinction between 'theory
neurtral observational langauge' and 'theory' cannot be supported, even Karl
Popper acknowledges that (i.e., in a lecture he once gave he asked everybody to
take pen to paper and 'make an observation' to demonstrate that observations are
heavily theory laden). the belief that the instrumentality of our theories is a
function of their ability to approximate onitc reality, that is, a reality that
exists independently of what we think and do, is just that, a belief, a leap of
faith, nothing more and nothing less. scientific realism (radical empiricism) is
dogmatic and invites incontrovertible scepticism of the most pervasive kind,
i.e., "how do you *know* that you *know*?"
mickeyd
Acme Debugging
Not to repeat myself too often, but it has been at least a month.
In context of all existence, there is general agreement that science
and/or empiricism is a belief, an act of faith. But if you define it
in terms of "things that apparently work" then you have a very nice
separation. Science results in things that work, whereas faith or
belief never does except by random chance. And nobody really cares if
it is "apparent" or not, as long as it apparently keeps the beer cold
enough to be apparently refreshing.
Larry
David Longley
<s403...@student.uq.edu.au> writes
In all your posts you seem to be reacting to the notion of absolute
truth.
The position which I think most scientists actually subscribe to is one
which is pretty much as the Quine-Duhem holistic 'web of belief' thesis
suggests - ie a web of pragmatic web, based on our experience in the
world. It's sometimes described as Neurath's or Theseus's boat, being
repaired and redesigned as needs be, but still supporting its mariners.
The criteria - prediction and control of sensory stimulation. How does
it proceed - by finding out some things don't work as one expects, and
testing more and more risky conjunctions of observation categoricals.
In my view, (FWIW) you run the risk of getting distracted by all sorts
of metaphysical concerns by focussing on absolute truth (even as
anathema). What matters is relations, but this is not a commitment to
relativism, just enlightened empiricism.
--
David Longley
Gordon Joly
Hmmm.....
The End of Science and the First AI?
Gordo
--
This is not my sig nature....
gordo AT loop zilla.org......
Neil W Rickert
(Longley was responding to Bibby)
>In all your posts you seem to be reacting to the notion of absolute
>truth.
>The position which I think most scientists actually subscribe to is one
>which is pretty much as the Quine-Duhem holistic 'web of belief' thesis
>suggests - ie a web of pragmatic web, based on our experience in the
>world. It's sometimes described as Neurath's or Theseus's boat, being
>repaired and redesigned as needs be, but still supporting its mariners.
>The criteria - prediction and control of sensory stimulation. How does
>it proceed - by finding out some things don't work as one expects, and
>testing more and more risky conjunctions of observation categoricals.
That's not bad.
I suggest you take the time to explain it to the other David
Longley -- the one who keeps preaching his own radical behaviorist
brand of absolute truth in this newsgroup.
Mr Michael Bibby
i dont agree that this is the position held by most scientist, the idea that our
knoweledge structures are somewhat like a web held together by its mutual
relations with experience at its peripheries. there are many who actually
believe in 'universality', either implicitly or explicitly, and rhetorically
undermine 'non-scientific' claims on the grounds that they are 'unscienitific'.
sure, there are many out there who believe in this 'non-representional' notion
of scientific true and believe that 'truth' is a function of mutual relations
amoung various the elements (i.e., the 'floating boat' analogy is probably the
best one) but they still use rhetorics like 'truth' to authoratize their claims
and rhetorically undermine the claims of others. i dont know how many times i
have heard others say 'its unscientific, therefore its bullshit'- this is a very
common attitude amoungst pratictioners of science, students of science,
lecturers who teach science and those who read about the results of science or
who are effected by them in some way. from my personal experience, most
practictioners maintain a 'accumalative fragmentalist' ideology, and believe
that with each theory that is thrown upon the ever growing scrap heap of
discarded theories we are taking one small step towards immutable truth.
>In my view, (FWIW) you run the risk of getting distracted by all sorts
>of metaphysical concerns by focussing on absolute truth (even as
>anathema). What matters is relations, but this is not a commitment to
>relativism, just enlightened empiricism.
>--
>David Longley
>
i am not at all sure of what is implied by 'enligtened empiricism'.
mickeyd
Acme Debugging
>
>
> >
> > In context of all existence, there is general agreement that science
> > and/or empiricism is a belief, an act of faith. But if you define it
> > in terms of "things that apparently work" then you have a very nice
> > separation. Science results in things that work, whereas faith or
> > belief never does except by random chance. And nobody really cares if
> > it is "apparent" or not, as long as it apparently keeps the beer cold
> > enough to be apparently refreshing.
> >
> > Larry
>
>
> of assuming we can individually make "repeatable" and "consistent"
> measurements on the natural world around us, and that others can
> "repeat" them in a similar manner. 1000s of repetitions helps. That's
> why it's called the scientific method. It seems that, every 800 years
> or so, we have to re-invent Roger Bacon.
>
> By definition, classical belief has nothing to do with actually making
> measurements, or esp in trying to find consistent and repeatable ones.
> That's why it's called belief - you believe it, regardless of anything
> else.
>
> You can spend your life in interminable navel gazing, or just out and
> simply do the job at hand. From the looks of it, engineers have about
> a million times more fun than philosophers.
Roger all of that.
Larry
Michael Feldhake
> d...@oricomtech.com (dan michaels) wrote in message news:<4b4b6093.03081...@posting.google.com>...
> >
> > You can spend your life in interminable navel gazing, or just out and
> > simply do the job at hand. From the looks of it, engineers have about
> > a million times more fun than philosophers.
>
> Roger all of that.
>
> Larry
We do, thank you.
Mike
David Longley
michaels <d...@oricomtech.com> writes
>mfel...@ccoreinnovations.com (Michael Feldhake) wrote in message
>news:<bef59aa8.03081...@posting.google.com>...
>> >
>basically it's a useless, strawman oriented article. The ideas in it
>were apparently advocated by philosophers who never got off of their
>asses, and actually tried to go out and do something constructive, as
>in building the world as we have it. As soon as you actually try to
>"do" something, then the limitations of theory and logic become
>obvious.
>
>The rise of pseudoscience in today's world - especially outside the
>realm of science - is definitely a problem. However, if the do-ers
>were to worry about endless philosophical quagmires, we'd still be
>living in the dark ages and making incantations to get rid of disease.
>
>I think maybe EVERY philosopher, as an undergraduate, should:
>
>(a) be given a dog so they can learn something about consciousness and
>intelligence in other species, and (b) be given a hammer and a saw,
>and made to build a house for the dog to live in ["... ummm, this
>called a right-angle, in case you didn't know ..."]. Then, they
>should: (c) be made to walk 20 miles in their own shoes on a hot and
>rainy day. Then, they might actually learn something about the world
>they inhabit, and about the limitations of too much navel gazing. In
>some circles, this is called physical grounding.
>
>Once you actually try "doing" anything, then you learn something
>beyond theory and logic. Every engineer learns this ... just as soon
>as he or she actually tries to "apply" the theories they learned in
>school. Somehow, I seriously doubt that the people who built the
>pyramids and the cathedrals would be much impressed by the type of
>philosophical argument in the article - nor would have Galileo.
>
>From a logical viewpoint, at the end I think the guy who wrote the
>article fell into the same trap he accused science of falling into -
>ie, apologetics - but it's not worth discussing any further.
>
>Bertrand Russell had the best solution for this kind of thinking ...
>"external discipline is the only road to happiness for those
>unfortunates whose self-absorption is too profound to be cured in any
>other way ...". BR was a saint.
No - he was a philosopher.
--
David Longley
Eray Ozkural exa
> I think the ubiquity of the scientific presumption that everything is
> capable of
> being objectified and measured by using formal mathematical means has been
> challenged by Chaitin, and this relects upon the perceived worth of science:
>
Well, that was in fact challenged by quantum mechanics as it showed
how fundamental statistical behavior of the matter was (it wasn't just
*behavior*, it was the essence)
> Gregory Chaitin...has proved the ultimate in undecidability
> theorems..., that the logical structure of arithmetic can be
> random...The assumption that the formal structure of arithmetic
> is precise and regular turns out to have been a time-bomb, and
> Chaitin has just pushed the detonator." Ian Stewart in "Nature".
That sounds to me an inaccurate description of his work.
The correct paraphrasing is: "Chaitin showed that there are
uncertainties in mathematics just like in physics, he has even
purported a conjecture that mathematics and physics are in fact the
same thing." I could also talk about the space of mathematical
theorems being disconnected, there are islands... Which means it's
possible to discover an entirely new island. :)
Cheers,
__
Eray Ozkural
Stephen Harris
"Eray Ozkural exa" <er...@bilkent.edu.tr> wrote in message
news:fa69ae35.03081...@posting.google.com...
Nearly all of your posting has one or more inaccurate comments
ranging up to bizarre pronouncements. That was why I was glad
to see you go as an excellent description of you is crackpot.
Nearly all your knowledge is superficial and distorted.
I am not willing to spend much time in correcting your misconceptions,
so will just comment on your (EOe) beginning sentences:
"That sounds to me an inaccurate description of his work.
The correct paraphrasing is: "Chaitin showed that there are
uncertainties in mathematics just like in physics, he has even
purported a conjecture that mathematics and physics are in
fact the same thing."
Compare this to the statement by Ian Stewart that you criticized:
> > Gregory Chaitin...has proved the ultimate in undecidability
> > theorems..., that the logical structure of arithmetic can be
> > random...
Now compare this to what Gregory Chaitin actually wrote:
http://www.cs.umaine.edu/~chaitin/cmu.html
"Physicists feel comfortable with randomness, but this is the
black or white world of pure mathematics --- how is this
possible, how can it be? Each of these bits is well-defined,
it's a specific 0 or a 1, because W is a specific real number
once I fix the universal Turing machine or the programming
language that I'm dealing with. But it turns out that the right
way to think about each bit is that it's not black or white, it's
not that it's a 0 or a 1, it's so well balanced, it's so delicately
balanced, that it's grey!
Here's another way to put it. Let's go back to Leibniz.
What's the idea of mathematics? The normal idea is that if
something is true, it's true for a reason --- Leibniz! --- if
something is true it's true for a reason. Now in pure math,
the reason that something is true is called a proof, and the
job of the mathematician is to find proofs, to find the reason
something is true. But the bits of this number W, whether
they're 0 or 1, are mathematical truths that are true for no
reason, they're true by accident! And that's why we will
never know what these bits are.
In other words, it's not just that Hilbert was a little bit wrong.
It's not just that the normal notion of pure mathematics is a
little bit wrong, that there are a few small holes, that there are
a few degenerate cases like ``This statement is unprovable''.
It's not that way! It's much, much worse than that! There are
extreme cases where mathematical truth has no structure at all,
where it's maximally unknowable, where it's completely accidental,
where you have mathematical truths that are like coin tosses,
they're true by accident, they're true for no reason. That's why
you can never prove whether individual bits of W are 0 or are 1,
because there is no reason that individual bits are 0 or 1! That's
why you can't find a proof. In other words, it's so delicately
balanced whether each bit is 0 or 1 that we're never going to know.
> > Gregory Chaitin...has proved the ultimate in undecidability
> > theorems..., that the logical structure of arithmetic can be
> > random...
compare this to the Eray comment:
"That sounds to me an inaccurate description of his work.
The correct paraphrasing is: "Chaitin showed that there are
uncertainties in mathematics just like in physics, ...
later on ...
On the other hand, physicists think this is delightful! Because
they remember well the crisis that they went through in the
1920's about randomness at the foundations of physics, and
they say, it's not just us, we're not the only people who have
randomness, pure math has it too, they're not any better than
we are!" [SH: AIT randomness in mathematics is 40 years later.
And it is not the same as Goedel and Turing in the 30's. Nor
does "not any better than we are!" mean that Chaitin thinks
mathematics and physics are the same thing.]
EOe writes: "he has even purported a conjecture that
mathematics and physics are in fact the same thing."
SH: Just what is this conjecture?? Do you mean where Chaitin
says both math and physics have randomness in their foundation?
That does not mean: "mathematics and physics are in fact the same
thing." Can you provide evidence that Chaitin has made such a
conjecture?
Anybody who reads Chaitin's comments and arrives at the conclusion
that your "paraphrasing" is superior or more on target than Ian Stewart
is more than simply ignorant, they are delusional. This is characteristic
of nearly all your posting, Eray. I don't doubt that you have gone to
college. But you must have missed a lot of classes. Because your ideas
have the organization and interconnection of a comic book with many
of its pages torn out.
Sincerely yours,
Stephen
See You Later:
Stephen Harris wrote:
> That is really excellent news! I hope you find reasons
> to extend your vacation. Don't hurry back, don't let
> the door bump you in the butt while you are leaving.
Eray wrote:
What? You got to stab me in the back because I said your
interpretation of Turing formalism was inaccurate? Was that the
discussion?
SH: Your reading comprehension is abysmal. One of your
posts in that thread was so incoherent I had no idea what you
meant. One of those ideas that people say it was so wrong
that it is not correct to call it wrong.
I don't see the value of your posts. More typically they
misinform, like the current post to which I am replying .
Eray Ozkural exa
I didn't say my paraphrasing is superior, although it surely is. :) I
said it is more accurate, because your terminology and expression was
not precise enough. I think your understanding of theory of
computation isn't sufficient to fully grasp the significance of
Chaitin's theory as I know your posts that said "TMs can compute
infinitely more problems than ordinary computers can". You do seem to
have understood some part of ramifications of unknowability, however.
I do not object to that.
Nevertheless, Chaitin does have a new conjecture that mathematics and
physics might be much closer than we think they are:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/theory-edge/message/8174
Abstract: The information-theoretic point of view proposed by Leibniz
in 1686 and developed by algorithmic information theory (AIT) suggests
that mathematics and physics are not that different. This will be a
first-person account of some doubts and speculations about the nature
of mathematics that I have entertained for the past three decades, and
which have now been incorporated in a digital philosophy paradigm
shift that is sweeping across the sciences.
You have spoken in very inappropriate tone, so I will not be kind to
you any longer. I suggest you to keep your mouth shut about what you
don't know.
I also wrote a long reply detailing your incompetence in theory of
computation as evidenced by "...Cognitive Closure" thread, but it is
for later. Thanks to IE, the msg went away.
__
Eray Ozkural
"Stephen Harris" <stephen....@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message news:<0uk0b.105042$3o3.7...@bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net>...
Eray Ozkural exa
intensional idioms such as belief. What web of belief? There is no
mind. There is no belief. There is no emotion. There is no
consciousness. There is nothing except what we can measure with
primitive instrumentation and make a fortune from by fooling others
into thinking this is science! There, God is hanging out with Quine
and the gang, they are right now crafting the logical sentences with a
truth value of 1 in FOL, for FOL is the only sound and complete
logical language. Did you notice just how sexy all those quantifiers
look?
Long live absolute truth! Death to intensional logic!
Longley is the messiah! :)
(Uh, does that make me the anti-christ?)
David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<4ILF9lHX$hP$Ew...@longley.demon.co.uk>...
David Longley
Ozkural exa <er...@bilkent.edu.tr> writes
>I protest this post of yours because it refers to unscientific
>intensional idioms such as belief. What web of belief? There is no
>mind. There is no belief. There is no emotion. There is no
>consciousness. There is nothing except what we can measure with
>primitive instrumentation and make a fortune from by fooling others
>into thinking this is science! There, God is hanging out with Quine
>and the gang, they are right now crafting the logical sentences with a
>truth value of 1 in FOL, for FOL is the only sound and complete
>logical language. Did you notice just how sexy all those quantifiers
>look?
>
>Long live absolute truth! Death to intensional logic!
>
>Longley is the messiah! :)
>
>(Uh, does that make me the anti-christ?)
No, just an immature hysteric.
>
>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:<4ILF9lHX$hP$Ew...@longley.demon.co.uk>...
>> In all your posts you seem to be reacting to the notion of absolute
>> truth.
>>
>> The position which I think most scientists actually subscribe to is one
>> which is pretty much as the Quine-Duhem holistic 'web of belief' thesis
>> suggests - ie a web of pragmatic web, based on our experience in the
>> world. It's sometimes described as Neurath's or Theseus's boat, being
>> repaired and redesigned as needs be, but still supporting its mariners.
>> The criteria - prediction and control of sensory stimulation. How does
>> it proceed - by finding out some things don't work as one expects, and
>> testing more and more risky conjunctions of observation categoricals.
>>
>> In my view, (FWIW) you run the risk of getting distracted by all sorts
>> of metaphysical concerns by focussing on absolute truth (even as
>> anathema). What matters is relations, but this is not a commitment to
>> relativism, just enlightened empiricism.
--
David Longley
David Longley
scientists using his boat too!
Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
again.
Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
empirical. It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
In article <fa69ae35.03081...@posting.google.com>, Eray
Ozkural exa <er...@bilkent.edu.tr> writes
--
David Longley
Stephen Harris
"Eray Ozkural exa" <er...@bilkent.edu.tr> wrote in message
news:fa69ae35.03081...@posting.google.com...
>
> I didn't say my paraphrasing is superior, although it surely is. :) I
> said it is more accurate, because your terminology and expression was
> not precise enough.
And "Eray Ozkural exa" also wrote:
> That sounds to me an inaccurate description of his work.
> The correct paraphrasing is: ...
SH:
I said an Ian Stewart's reading/interpretation of the thesis
statement in this portion of a Chaitin quote was correct
and that it did not support your interpretation whatsoever.
Ian Stewart: "Gregory Chaitin...has proved the ultimate
in undecidability theorems..., that the logical structure of
arithmetic can be random..."
Eray: "The correct paraphrasing is: "Chaitin showed that there are
uncertainties in mathematics just like in physics, ..."
SH: I am quite willing to let the forum draw their own conclusion
about which paraphrase captures the theme of Chaitin's paper:
On the other hand, physicists think this is delightful! Because
they remember well the crisis that they went through in the
1920's about randomness at the foundations of physics, and
they say, it's not just us, we're not the only people who have
randomness, pure math has it too, they're not any better than
we are!" [end of quote]
Eray writes:
"That sounds to me an inaccurate description of his work.
The correct paraphrasing is: "Chaitin showed that there are
uncertainties in mathematics just like in physics,
he has even purported a conjecture that mathematics and
physics are in fact the same thing."
SH: I challenged Eray's "correct" paraphrasing of the
major thrust of the paper quoted above. More accurately
I said it was absurd. I completely denied that he/Chatin
conjectured that "mathematics and physics are in fact the
same thing".
So Eray responded by quoting a recent Chaitin paper:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/theory-edge/message/8174
Chatin writes:
"And from this new information-theoretic point of view, math and
physics do not seem too different. In both cases understanding is
compression, and is measured by the extent to which empirical
data and mathematical theorems are respectively compressed into
concise physical laws or mathematical axioms, both of which are
embodied in computer software." ...
And from the same paper Chaitin writes:
"So this point of view would seem to suggest that while math and
physics are admittedly different, perhaps they are not as different
as most people usually believe."
Eray's purported "correct" paraphrase:
"he has even purported a conjecture that mathematics and
physics are in fact the same thing."
SH: If one compares the original "correct" paraphrase with
what Chaitin actually writes, "math and physics are admittedly
different", I think most people will find (to be charitably polite)
that Eray's original reading, 'Chatin conjectures that math and
physics are in fact the same thing', is extremely superficial, and
is not supported at all, even in the newer paper.
SH: Eray apparently recognizes the statements are
incongruous because he amends his previously "correct"
paraphrasing.
Eray writes:
"Nevertheless, Chaitin does have a new conjecture that
mathematics and physics might be much closer than we
think they are":
SH: So this is better, as it is merely superficial. The conjecture
is not "new" just because the paper is recent because he has
mentioned this earlier. It is actually new to you because you
haven't read Chaitin's previous papers. You superficially
skipped over his references to Experimental Mathematics,
and seemingly ignored Chaitin's mention of responding
to criticisms of his point of view that previously appeared
in the AMS which means his idea is not "new".
There was a quarterly journal "Experimental Mathematics"
existing about 10 years ago and I'll quote their blurb:
"Experiment has always been, and increasingly is, an
important method of mathematical discovery. Yet this
tends to be concealed by the tradition of presenting only
elegant, well-rounded and rigorous results."
Chaitin speaks from the paper I cited:
"Well, I think it's fair to say that the only people who like what
I'm doing are physicists! This is not surprising, because the idea
came in a way from physics. I have a foreign idea called
randomness that I'm bringing into logic, and logicians feel very
uncomfortable with it. You know, the notion of program size,
program-size complexity is like the idea of entropy in thermo-
dynamics. So it turns out that physicists find this nice because
they view it as ideas from their field invading logic.
But logicians don't like this very much."
SH: Although an implication of his findings is that mathematics
should be done more like an empirical science (Physics) once
again it is not the major point of this newer paper either, because
that presumption is a consequence established by the accidental/
random nature of the foundation of mathematics and this is still
the primary theme of this newer paper.
When Chaitin points out that mathematicians should be more
experimental like physicists, he is talking about ought to be,
because of the implication of omega on certainty in mathematics.
The present situation is that mathematicians are not so very
experimental. This is a _difference_ between the methods
of the two fields and does not support your (Eray) "correct"
paraphasing since it points out a disunity between the fields.
"he has even purported a conjecture that mathematics and
physics are in fact the same thing."
SH: Nope, even this paper with philosophical emphasis
devotes about 40% to AIT, 40% to Leibniz and the Digital
Paradigm shift and maybe 20% to the importance of:
"Nevertheless, Chaitin does have a new conjecture that
mathematics and physics might be much closer than we
think they are" which is your amended "correct" paraphrase.
From Chaitin's newer paper:
"theory = program --> Computer --> output = experimental data
So this led me to a theory of randomness based on program-size
complexity [1], whose *main application turned out to be not in
science,* [SH: emphasis mine] but in mathematics, more
specifically, in meta-mathematics, where it yields powerful new
information-theoretic versions of Godel's incompleteness theorem.
Ideas from theoretical physics and theoretical computer science
are definitely leaking across the traditional boundaries between
these two fields. And this holds for AIT too, because its two
central concepts are versions of randomness and of entropy,
which are ideas that I took with me from physics and into
mathematical logic.
Hilbert was to assume that a fixed formal axiomatic theory
could encompass all of mathematics. And if you have to extend
the foundations of mathematics by constantly adding new axioms,
new concepts and fundamental principles, then mathematics
becomes much more tentative and begins to look much more like
an empirical science. At least I think so, and you can even find
quotes by Godel that I think point in the same direction.
These ideas are of course controversial; see for example a
highly critical review of two of my books in the AMS Notices [17].
I discuss the hostile reaction of the logic community to my ideas in
more detail in an interview with performance artist Marina
Abramovic [18]. Here, however, I prefer to tell why I think that
the world is actually moving rather quickly in my direction. In fact,
I believe that my ideas are now part of an unstoppable tidal wave
of change spreading across the sciences!"
SH: So Chaitin is saying how he would like it to be. Not what is.
Eray writes:
"he has even purported a conjecture that mathematics and
physics are in fact the same thing."
This quote is what I vehemently objected to. This paraphrase
is a terrible representation of Chaitin's views in any of his papers.
Your revised paraphrase,
Eray writes:
"Nevertheless, Chaitin does have a new conjecture that
mathematics and physics might be much closer than we
think they are":
is considerably less ugly if you only read Chaitin's abstract:
"The information-theoretic point of view proposed by
Leibniz in 1686 and developed by algorithmic information
theory (AIT) suggests that mathematics and physics are
not that different."
This is a meta-level grouping and is balanced within the paper by:
"So this point of view would seem to suggest that while math and
physics are admittedly different, perhaps they are not as different
as most people usually believe."
So while this relative statement is true, one must have a crooked
agenda to evaluate 'math and physics are closer than usually
thought" and construe it as the major purpose of the paper so
that is justified as being described as 'the "correct" paraphrase
or summary of Chaitin's work.
Ian Stewart said:
> > Gregory Chaitin...has proved the ultimate in undecidability
> > theorems..., that the logical structure of arithmetic can be
> > random...The assumption that the formal structure of arithmetic
> > is precise and regular turns out to have been a time-bomb, and
> > Chaitin has just pushed the detonator." Ian Stewart in "Nature".
This describes the theme of 95% of Chaitin's published works.
Your paraphrase "The correct paraphrasing is: "Chaitin showed
that there are uncertainties in mathematics just like in physics, he
has even purported a conjecture that mathematics and physics
are in fact the same thing."
is based upon the reading of one highly philosophcial paper
and interpreting it incorrectly. The paper which was published
recently is a biased sample while Stewart's paraphrase is
representative. Stewart's paraphrase does contain some colorful
journalism: he describes the importance of Chaitin's result as
Chaitin would like to have it regarded. You don't mention an
undecidability theorem. Your writing tends to equate the
uncertainties of physics to Omega. Quantum Mechanics
employs randomness as a fundamental feature of the physical
universe. Comparing it to the randomness of a theorem proven
as a formalism in mathematics applies to an abstract universe,
so of course there will be controversy about physicality.
Eray writes:
"Chaitin showed that there are uncertainties in mathematics
just like in physics," is a big stretch for "just like".
You criticized Ian Stewart's description due to your own
superficial knowledge of the topic and your penchant to
comment on topics acting as an expert when in truth you
have only dabbled.
Your hubris in regarding yourself as capable of providing
a "superior" summary of Chaitin in comparison to Ian Stewart
is a monstrously feeble joke. Your first "correct" version
Eray writes:
"he has even purported a conjecture that mathematics and
physics are in fact the same thing."
to which I strongly reacted, as it was thousands of times more
inaccurate than Stewart's embellishment which *did not
factually misrepresent Chaitin's viewpoint* as yours *did*.
And then you escalate a factual error into the most accurate
description of Chaitin's viewpoint. I think your brain has a
chemical imbalance; your opinion was really bizarre.
One redeeming feature of your post was to point toward
the recent Chaitin paper which included something about
compression, so here is something interesting Michio Kaku,
an M theory founder said:
"That helped to unleash the Electric Age, and the Information Age,
which have changed all of human history. Now it's hard to believe,
but Newton's equations and Einstein's equations are no more than
about half an inch long.
Maxwell's equations are also about half an inch long. For example,
Maxwell's equations say that the "four-dimensional divergence of
an antisymmetric, second-rank tensor equals zero." That's Maxwell's
equations, the equations for light. And in fact, at Berkeley, you can
buy a T-shirt which says, "In the beginning, God said the four-
dimensional divergence of an antisymmetric, second rank tensor
equals zero, and there was Light, and it was good."
Today, we physicists are embarking upon the greatest quest of all,
which is to unify all four of these forces into a single comprehensive
theory. The first force, gravity, is now represented by Einstein's
General Theory of Relativity, which gives us the Big Bang,
black holes, and expanding universe. It's a theory of the very large;
it's a theory of smooth, space-time manifolds like bedsheets and
trampoline nets.
The second theory, the quantum theory, is the exact opposite.
The quantum theory allows us to unify the electromagnetic, weak
and strong force. However, it is based on discrete, tiny packets
of energy called quanta, rather than smooth bedsheets, and it is
based on probabilities, rather than the certainty of Einstein's
equations. So these two theories summarize the sum total of all
physical knowledge of the physical universe.
Any equation describing the physical universe ultimately is
derived from one of these two theories. The problem is these
two theories are diametrically opposed. They are based on
different assumptions, different principles, and different mathematics.
Our job as physicists is to unify the two into a single, comprehensive
theory. Now, over the last decades, the giants of the twentieth
century have tried to do this and have failed."
A parsimonious failure,
Stephen
Neil W Rickert
>I suppose Otto Neurath must have been very concerned about all the
>scientists using his boat too!
>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
>again.
>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
>empirical.
Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
Mathematical truth is a priori.
> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
Quine was wrong about that.
David Longley
Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
>>I suppose Otto Neurath must have been very concerned about all the
>>scientists using his boat too!
>
>>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
>>again.
>>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
>>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
>>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
>>empirical.
>
>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
>
That may well, be so - but it's as irrelevant as pointing out Godel's,
Post's or Nash's problems surely? History is full of such cases.
>Mathematical truth is a priori.
I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention to
*you*.
>
>> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
>
>Quine was wrong about that.
>
Sounds dogmatic, and elf-serving again.
So, you disagree with Quine. Saying so isn't really very informative -
unless you really do wish to appear as if you believe you a source of
absolute truth.
--
David Longley
Neil W Rickert
>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
>>>again.
>>>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
>>>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
>>>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
>>>empirical.
>>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
>That may well, be so - but it's as irrelevant as pointing out Godel's,
>Post's or Nash's problems surely? History is full of such cases.
In this case it is relevant.
>>Mathematical truth is a priori.
>I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
>anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention to
>*you*.
As written, it was presented as my view. I think you will find
that the overwhelming majority of mathematicians agree.
>>> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>>>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
>>Quine was wrong about that.
>Sounds dogmatic, and elf-serving again.
The philosophy of mathematics is a tad off topic here. But if
somebody wants to defend Quine's view, I am willing to debate.
Note that our campus usenet server is having problems, so my access
to usenet is a tad iffy at present.
David Longley
>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
>>>>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
>>>>again.
>>>>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
>>>>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
>>>>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
>>>>empirical.
>
>>>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
>
>>That may well, be so - but it's as irrelevant as pointing out Godel's,
>>Post's or Nash's problems surely? History is full of such cases.
>
>In this case it is relevant.
How is it relevant in Chaitin's case?
>
>>>Mathematical truth is a priori.
>
>>I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
>>anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention to
>>*you*.
>
>As written, it was presented as my view. I think you will find
>that the overwhelming majority of mathematicians agree.
For all practical purposes it *can* be treated as true - just as laws of
logic, physics and chemistry *can*.
>
>>>> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>>>>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
>
>>>Quine was wrong about that.
>
>>Sounds dogmatic, and elf-serving again.
>
>The philosophy of mathematics is a tad off topic here. But if
>somebody wants to defend Quine's view, I am willing to debate.
>
>Note that our campus usenet server is having problems, so my access
>to usenet is a tad iffy at present.
>
You said he was wrong - I said that's not enough. If you think him
wrong, you should explain why. Quine's treatment of the truths of
mathematics
as core empirical truths is a consequence of his rejection of
analyticity.
If you have an original argument which refutes Quine's "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism" why have you not published it? If you have no wish to
publish, by all means let us see it here.
--
David Longley
David Longley
<Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes
For others following this, the paper is on-line:
http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
--
David Longley
Constantinople
news:e931b.10525$Ih1.3...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com:
>>>Mathematical truth is a priori.
>
>>I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
>>anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention
>>to *you*.
>
> As written, it was presented as my view. I think you will find that
> the overwhelming majority of mathematicians agree.
I have some hope you might help clear up a question I have about "a
priori". A lot of the definitions I see amount to something like:
A statement is a priori if it is knowable independent of, or "prior
to", sense experience and perception.
http://www.panix.com/~squigle/sva/glossary.html
Of course we can't do much math without paper and pencil or chalk and
board. On what basis are these interactions excluded from the "sense
experience". I'm not trying to argue that they should be included, I'm
just suggesting one of two points:
1) I don't understand the concept of "sense experience" since I feel
that lookin at the chalk marks on a blackboard involves sense
experience, and in fact somehow this is not true, somehow when we see
chalk marks on the board this is not sense experience.
2) "A priori" is poorly formulated when it is formulated in terms of
sense experience.
I am sure that mathematical truth really is in some way fundamentally
different from truths of physics, in that we also use pencil and paper
and chalk and board in physics, but we ALSO use laboratories and
instruments. At least one difference is that the phenomena that physics
is about are actually occurring in the laboratory; whereas in contrast,
mathematics isn't really about chalk marks on the board any more than
physics is about chalk marks on the board (and we use chalk for both
math and physics).
Stephen Harris
> In article <8mAkGfMDFNR$Ew...@longley.demon.co.uk>, David Longley
> <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes
> >In article <e931b.10525$Ih1.3...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>, Neil W
> >Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
> >>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >>>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
> >>>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >>
> >>>>>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
> >>>>>again.
> >>>>>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as
giving a
> >>>>>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
> >>>>>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
> >>>>>empirical.
> >>
> >>>>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
> >>
This recent paper by Chaitin seemed a bit odd to me.
. http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0306303
Since he and Calude are buddies I checked and found
that Calude also recently publsihed a paper.
http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0305213
"In this paper we propose a new perspective on the
evolution and history of the idea of mathematical proof.
Proofs will be studied at three levels: syntactical,
semantical and pragmatical. Finally, in a highly
speculative part, we will anticipate the evolution of
proofs under the assumption that the quantum computer
will materialise. We will argue that there is little `intrinsic'
difference between traditional and `unconventional'
types of proofs."
SH: Part of this paper deals with whether proofs
which are completed by a computer which has
parts not understandable by a human is a real
proof, for instance the proof of 4CT. I think
reducing the standards for proof are a step
in the experimentalist direcection
Regards,
Stephen
Stephen Harris
arXiv:quant-ph/0205093 v2 18 Nov 2002
Quantum Principles and Mathematical Computability
Tien D Kieu ,
Abstract http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/0205093
"Taking the view that computation is after all physical, we
argue that physics, particularly quantum physics, could help
extend the notion of computability. Here, we list the important
and unique features of quantum mechanics and then outline a
quantum mechanical "algorithm" for one of the insoluble
problems of mathematics, the Hilbert's tenth and equivalently
the Turing halting problem. The key element of this algorithm
is the computability and measurability of both the values of
physical observables and of the quantum-mechanical
probability distributions for these values."
D. Deustch, A. Ekert and R. Lupacchini [1]
"The fact is that quantum computers can prove theorems by
methods that neither a human brain nor any other Turing-
computational arbiter will ever be able to reproduce. What
if a quantum algorithm delivered a theorem that it was
infeasible to prove classically. No such algorithm is yet
known, but nor is anything known to rule out such a possibility,
and this raises a question of principle: should we still accept
such a theorem as undoubtedly proved? We believe that the
rational answer ot this question is yes, for our confidence in
quantum proofs rests upon the same foundation as our
confidence in classical proofs: our acceptance of the physical
laws underlying the computing operations."
Neil W Rickert
>In article <e931b.10525$Ih1.3...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>, Neil W
>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
>>>>>again.
>>>>>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
>>>>>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
>>>>>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
>>>>>empirical.
>>>>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
>>>That may well, be so - but it's as irrelevant as pointing out Godel's,
>>>Post's or Nash's problems surely? History is full of such cases.
>>In this case it is relevant.
>How is it relevant in Chaitin's case?
The idea that the truths of mathematics are empirical is eccentric,
and borders on crackpottery.
>>>>Mathematical truth is a priori.
>>>I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
>>>anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention to
>>>*you*.
>>As written, it was presented as my view. I think you will find
>>that the overwhelming majority of mathematicians agree.
>For all practical purposes it *can* be treated as true - just as laws of
>logic, physics and chemistry *can*.
The major laws of physics *are* analytic (or a priori). See C. I.
Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori". Haugeland's "Truth
and Rule-Following" is also relevant here, as is Hanson's "Patterns
of Discovery: an Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of
Science".
>>>>> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>>>>>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
>>>>Quine was wrong about that.
>>>Sounds dogmatic, and elf-serving again.
>>The philosophy of mathematics is a tad off topic here. But if
>>somebody wants to defend Quine's view, I am willing to debate.
>>Note that our campus usenet server is having problems, so my access
>>to usenet is a tad iffy at present.
>You said he was wrong - I said that's not enough. If you think him
>wrong, you should explain why. Quine's treatment of the truths of
>mathematics
>as core empirical truths is a consequence of his rejection of
>analyticity.
Quoting Putnam: "That Quine is wrong I have no doubt". That's from
his article "The analytic and the synthetic", in which he discusses
"Two Dogmas". Where he particularly says that Quine is wrong, is in
denying the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Incidently, Quine's view that mathematical truth is empirical
dates at least from his 1936 article "Truth by convention". That
is considerably earlier than "Two Dogmas."
>If you have an original argument which refutes Quine's "Two Dogmas of
>Empiricism" why have you not published it? If you have no wish to
>publish, by all means let us see it here.
I don't much disagree with Putnam's view on this.
Making it an issue of philosophy is silly. You should ask the
mathematicions. Try comp.sci.math -- it is just around the
corner.
You could also look at Hempel's "On the nature of mathematical
truth", published in "The American Mathematical Monthly" (1945).
David Longley
Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>In article <e931b.10525$Ih1.3...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>, Neil W
>>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>>>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
>>>>>>Regarding God and Quine etc - you should read the Chaitin's article
>>>>>>again.
>>>>>>Apart from being a tribute to Leibniz, Chaitin cites Wolfram as giving a
>>>>>>number of examples in support of the notion that mathematics is
>>>>>>contingent, not necessary, ie that the truths of mathematics are
>>>>>>empirical.
>
>>>>>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
>
>>>>That may well, be so - but it's as irrelevant as pointing out Godel's,
>>>>Post's or Nash's problems surely? History is full of such cases.
>
>>>In this case it is relevant.
>
>>How is it relevant in Chaitin's case?
>
>The idea that the truths of mathematics are empirical is eccentric,
>and borders on crackpottery.
But that's how most interesting statements or theories seem to start
with, abusing their originators by describing what often MUST be the
case given the nature of originality is just naive.
A large number of innovators describe themselves as "crackpots" in order
to communicate the experience.
My point is, it is irrelevant to the merits of what they contribute. To
dismiss on these grounds is not only empirically very unsound, it's also
logically unsound - cf. the genetic fallacy.
>
>>>>>Mathematical truth is a priori.
>
>>>>I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
>>>>anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention to
>>>>*you*.
>
>>>As written, it was presented as my view. I think you will find
>>>that the overwhelming majority of mathematicians agree.
>
>>For all practical purposes it *can* be treated as true - just as laws of
>>logic, physics and chemistry *can*.
>
>The major laws of physics *are* analytic (or a priori). See C. I.
>Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori". Haugeland's "Truth
>and Rule-Following" is also relevant here, as is Hanson's "Patterns
>of Discovery: an Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of
>Science".
>
Fine, so you are persuaded otherwise - and with your background and
interests, that's interesting - but please tell us what it is that makes
you so sure that these are not empirical relations.
>>>>>> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>>>>>>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
>
>>>>>Quine was wrong about that.
>
>>>>Sounds dogmatic, and elf-serving again.
>
>>>The philosophy of mathematics is a tad off topic here. But if
>>>somebody wants to defend Quine's view, I am willing to debate.
>
>>>Note that our campus usenet server is having problems, so my access
>>>to usenet is a tad iffy at present.
>
>>You said he was wrong - I said that's not enough. If you think him
>>wrong, you should explain why. Quine's treatment of the truths of
>>mathematics
>>as core empirical truths is a consequence of his rejection of
>>analyticity.
>
>Quoting Putnam: "That Quine is wrong I have no doubt". That's from
>his article "The analytic and the synthetic", in which he discusses
>"Two Dogmas". Where he particularly says that Quine is wrong, is in
>denying the analytic/synthetic distinction.
You've misrepresented the full context of what is being said.
Putnam is one of the few philosophers I have read who requires careful
reading and who has changed his position over time. He is interesting
and infuriating to read for his commentaries on Quine and his
elaborations. He is particularly worth reading for his self-criticism
with respect to the philosophical foundations he gave to machine
functionalism in the 1960s. I've cited his work a number of times in the
context of what I have had to say about the blight which Cognitive
Science is responsible for. I've referred to "Representation and
Reality" 1986 in this context where he basically does a volte face.
Putnam's papers and books are very much in the Quinean mould. The
classic paper you refer to is in the second volume of his collected
papers MIND, LANGUAGE and REALITY published in 1975. But, even there, in
his introduction to that volume written in 1974, he wrote "In 'the
analytic and the synthetic' I undertook the double task of defending
Quine's insight with the aid of examples from the history of physics and
geometry, and of clarifying the nature of the analytic-synthetic
distinction itself." p xvi 1974.
That alone should have made you stop and think.
Let's take what you quote:
oOo
"The analytic-synthetic distinction in philosophy
It should not be supposed that the axe I have to grind here is that
Quine is wrong. That Quine is wrong I have no doubt. This is not a
matter of philosophical argument: it seems to me there is as gross a
distinction between 'All bachelors are unmarried' and 'There is a book
on this table' as between any two things in the world, or, at any rate,
between any two linguistic expressions in the world; and no matter how
long I might fail in trying to clarify the distinction, I should not be
persuaded that it does not exist. In fact, I do not understand what it
would mean to say that a distinction between two things THAT different
does not exist.
Thus I think that Quine is wrong. There are analytic statements: 'All
bachelors are unmarried" is one of them. But in a deeper sense I think
Quine is right; far more right than his critics. I think there is an
analytic-synthetic distinction, but a rather trivial one....."
P36
oOo
Putnam says all of this in the context of answering Quine's crititics!
He then goes on to explain why the paper is such an important paper and
why Quine's critique and the analytic-synthetic distinction is so
important.
This is even more clearly brought out in his later papers in volume 3,
e.g. "Two Dogmas Revisited" p 87-97 "Realism and Reason" 1983. You can
read those for yourself.
You might also read ch 12 "Rethinking Mathematical Necessity" p245-263
"Words & Life" H. Putnam 1994.
>
>Incidently, Quine's view that mathematical truth is empirical
>dates at least from his 1936 article "Truth by convention". That
>is considerably earlier than "Two Dogmas."
>
I appreciate that - but for all intents and purposes, the 1951.1961
paper is the classic reference.
>>If you have an original argument which refutes Quine's "Two Dogmas of
>>Empiricism" why have you not published it? If you have no wish to
>>publish, by all means let us see it here.
>
>I don't much disagree with Putnam's view on this.
>
But you have misrepresented Putnam on this.
>Making it an issue of philosophy is silly. You should ask the
>mathematicions. Try comp.sci.math -- it is just around the
>corner.
This *is* a philosophical issue, or do you think we should just count
heads?
>
>You could also look at Hempel's "On the nature of mathematical
>truth", published in "The American Mathematical Monthly" (1945).
>
This tells me why you hold your views perhaps, but this was written
before Two Dogmas, and what I have read of Hempel (e.g. the end of "A
logical appraisal of operationism" 1954;1965 where he seems sympathetic
to Quine's position).
The "Two Dogmas" paper was seminal. Whether one accepts that
mathematical and logical truths are empirical or not is likely to be
related to ones disposition towards enlightened empiricism and all that
it entails.
--
David Longley
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in
>news:e931b.10525$Ih1.3...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com:
>>>>Mathematical truth is a priori.
>>>I take it that's your (as it stands, dogmatic) view? It doesn't tell
>>>anybody very much given the context. It tends just to draw attention
>>>to *you*.
>> As written, it was presented as my view. I think you will find that
>> the overwhelming majority of mathematicians agree.
>I have some hope you might help clear up a question I have about "a
>priori". A lot of the definitions I see amount to something like:
> A statement is a priori if it is knowable independent of, or "prior
> to", sense experience and perception.
> http://www.panix.com/~squigle/sva/glossary.html
>Of course we can't do much math without paper and pencil or chalk and
>board. On what basis are these interactions excluded from the "sense
>experience". I'm not trying to argue that they should be included, I'm
>just suggesting one of two points:
>1) I don't understand the concept of "sense experience" since I feel
>that lookin at the chalk marks on a blackboard involves sense
>experience, and in fact somehow this is not true, somehow when we see
>chalk marks on the board this is not sense experience.
I agree that this is all confusing. One has to go by the usage
of the terminology in the literature. I recommend
C. I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori".
It is in The Journal of Philosophy 1923, but it is probably easier to
find the 1987 book "A Priori Knowledge" by Paul K. Moser which
reprints that article.
The general usage seems to allow that you may make some definitions
on the basis of sense experience. But once you have those definitions,
whatever can be derived purely from the definitions themselves
is a priori.
The requirement is not that there has never been sense experience.
Rather, it is that the particular truth in question can be determined
with reliance on sense experience.
You could go out and measure the ratio of the perimeter of a
particular circle to its diameter. But that would have no bearing on
the truth of the assertion that the ratio is pi. If the measured
ratio were not pi, we would conclude that either the figure used was
not an exact circle, or that the measurement was done badly. That's
just an illustration of the irrelevance of sense experience (in this
case, the taking of measurements) to the truth of the question at
issue.
>2) "A priori" is poorly formulated when it is formulated in terms of
>sense experience.
I agree.
Neil W Rickert
>Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> writes
>>David Longley <Da...@longley.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>>>Wolfram and Chaitin are both eccentrics.
>>>>>That may well, be so - but it's as irrelevant as pointing out Godel's,
>>>>>Post's or Nash's problems surely? History is full of such cases.
>>>>In this case it is relevant.
>>>How is it relevant in Chaitin's case?
>>The idea that the truths of mathematics are empirical is eccentric,
>>and borders on crackpottery.
>But that's how most interesting statements or theories seem to start
>with, abusing their originators by describing what often MUST be the
>case given the nature of originality is just naive.
>A large number of innovators describe themselves as "crackpots" in order
>to communicate the experience.
>My point is, it is irrelevant to the merits of what they contribute. To
>dismiss on these grounds is not only empirically very unsound, it's also
>logically unsound - cf. the genetic fallacy.
I was not arguing:
Chaitin is eccentric; therefore his statement is false.
I agree that would be poor reasoning.
My point was, rather
Chaitin is eccentric, so his specific claims cannot be
assumed to represent the concensus of mathematicians.
Or, in other words, you would need more that Chaitin's say so to
support your view.
>>The major laws of physics *are* analytic (or a priori). See C. I.
>>Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori". Haugeland's "Truth
>>and Rule-Following" is also relevant here, as is Hanson's "Patterns
>>of Discovery: an Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of
>>Science".
>Fine, so you are persuaded otherwise - and with your background and
>interests, that's interesting - but please tell us what it is that makes
>you so sure that these are not empirical relations.
Depending on what you mean by "empirical relations", they could
possibly be both a priori and empirical relations.
>>>>>>> It is in this way that mathematics is like physics. A point
>>>>>>>made also by Quine in the context of "Two Dogmas".
>>>>>>Quine was wrong about that.
>>>>>Sounds dogmatic, and elf-serving again.
>>>>The philosophy of mathematics is a tad off topic here. But if
>>>>somebody wants to defend Quine's view, I am willing to debate.
>>>You said he was wrong - I said that's not enough. If you think him
>>>wrong, you should explain why. Quine's treatment of the truths of
>>>mathematics
>>>as core empirical truths is a consequence of his rejection of
>>>analyticity.
>>Quoting Putnam: "That Quine is wrong I have no doubt". That's from
>>his article "The analytic and the synthetic", in which he discusses
>>"Two Dogmas". Where he particularly says that Quine is wrong, is in
>>denying the analytic/synthetic distinction.
>You've misrepresented the full context of what is being said.
Two Dogmas is not about mathematics.
Putnam's view, in more detail, was that
(a) Quine was wrong on the specific point about the
analytic/synthetic distinction.
(b) Quine was right about the overall position that the use
of the analytic/synthetic distinction if philosophy of
language was confused and erroneous.
However, the context of our discussion was with respect to
mathematical truth, not philosophy of language. Thus (a) is the only
relevant aspect of Putnam's article to the question of mathematical
truth.
>>Incidently, Quine's view that mathematical truth is empirical
>>dates at least from his 1936 article "Truth by convention". That
>>is considerably earlier than "Two Dogmas."
>I appreciate that - but for all intents and purposes, the 1951.1961
>paper is the classic reference.
Wrong. "Two Dogmas" is not about mathematics. For questions of
mathematical truth, "Truth by convention" is the proper reference to
Quine's position.
>>>If you have an original argument which refutes Quine's "Two Dogmas of
>>>Empiricism" why have you not published it? If you have no wish to
>>>publish, by all means let us see it here.
>>I don't much disagree with Putnam's view on this.
>But you have misrepresented Putnam on this.
No I haven't. See above.
I don't much disagree with Putnam's view as expressed in the full
article. That is, I largely agree on issues about the way the
analytic/synthetic distinction has been used in philosophy of
language. But that doesn't have much bearing on what we were
discussing.
>>Making it an issue of philosophy is silly. You should ask the
>>mathematicions. Try comp.sci.math -- it is just around the
>>corner.
>This *is* a philosophical issue, or do you think we should just count
>heads?
Citing "Two Dogmas" as relevant to questions of mathematical
truth is bullshit. It may be good philosophy, but it isn't
about mathematical truth *at all*.
>>You could also look at Hempel's "On the nature of mathematical
>>truth", published in "The American Mathematical Monthly" (1945).
>This tells me why you hold your views perhaps, but this was written
>before Two Dogmas, and what I have read of Hempel (e.g. the end of "A
>logical appraisal of operationism" 1954;1965 where he seems sympathetic
>to Quine's position).
It was written well after "Truth by Convention", which is the
relevant reference to Quine.
>The "Two Dogmas" paper was seminal.
Maybe it was seminal in philosophy. It doesn't say anything of
significance to mathematicians (or to physicists for that matter).
Constantinople
$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com:
> C. I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori".
Thanks for the explanation and the pointer. I'll look for this.
Acme Debugging
<snip>
(on definition of "a priori")
>The general usage seems to allow that you may make some definitions
>on the basis of sense experience. But once you have those
definitions,
>whatever can be derived purely from the definitions themselves
>is a priori.
>
>The requirement is not that there has never been sense experience.
>Rather, it is that the particular truth in question can be determined
>with reliance on sense experience.
>
<snip>
May I have an opinion? I have said: "It is an a priori assumption in
science that flying saucers do not exist." Now after reading your
post, I question if that is correct. Which of the four statements
below would you consider correct or best?
1. "It is an a priori assumption of science that something not in
evidence does not exist."
2. "It is a default assumption in science that something not in
evidence does not exist."
3. "It is a basic assumption of science that something not in evidence
does not exist."
4. "It is a common assumption in science to assume that something not
in evidence does not exist."
My AI reasoner definition says, "The reasoner will adjust facts
depending on the a priori assumptions of various fields." Your advice
might help improve this statement.
- - - - -
In another post you included this Putnam quote:
>(b) Quine was right about the overall position that the use
> of the analytic/synthetic distinction if philosophy of
> language was confused and erroneous.
Is there a typo in that sentence?
Thanks,
Larry
David Longley
Well, that in itself is a little naive. It's about empiricist
epistemology and the classic problem for empiricists was the status of
analytical statements, specifically, those of logic and mathematics. .
>
>Putnam's view, in more detail, was that
>
>(a) Quine was wrong on the specific point about the
> analytic/synthetic distinction.
No, he clearly makes the point that Quine is wrong on a trivial point.
There are several papers where he makes this very clear. I've referenced
them for you.
>
>(b) Quine was right about the overall position that the use
> of the analytic/synthetic distinction if philosophy of
> language was confused and erroneous.
>
Modern empiricist philosophy moved from ideas -> words -> language as
the subject matter for epistemological investigation - this includes all
languages, natural and artificial - hence the concern with the
foundations of mathematics. It is not *just* philosophy of language.
>However, the context of our discussion was with respect to
>mathematical truth, not philosophy of language. Thus (a) is the only
>relevant aspect of Putnam's article to the question of mathematical
>truth.
This is a false distinction.
>
>>>Incidently, Quine's view that mathematical truth is empirical
>>>dates at least from his 1936 article "Truth by convention". That
>>>is considerably earlier than "Two Dogmas."
>
>>I appreciate that - but for all intents and purposes, the 1951.1961
>>paper is the classic reference.
>
>Wrong. "Two Dogmas" is not about mathematics. For questions of
>mathematical truth, "Truth by convention" is the proper reference to
>Quine's position.
More nonsense - and you are a master at promulgating it. In "Truth by
convention" (1935) Quine was still trying to work within the Carnap
programme. He still makes use of analyticity until 1947 when he
abandoned the idea that there are analytic truths. Over that twelve
years, Quine parted company with Carnap. "Two Dogmas of Empircism"
(1951) is Quine's public statement of a break with Carnap's empiricism.
>
>>>>If you have an original argument which refutes Quine's "Two Dogmas of
>>>>Empiricism" why have you not published it? If you have no wish to
>>>>publish, by all means let us see it here.
>
>>>I don't much disagree with Putnam's view on this.
>
>>But you have misrepresented Putnam on this.
>
>No I haven't. See above.
You have, and anyone who has read any Putnam beyond your poor sampling
will know that you have. They can check the papers for themselves.
>
>I don't much disagree with Putnam's view as expressed in the full
>article. That is, I largely agree on issues about the way the
>analytic/synthetic distinction has been used in philosophy of
>language. But that doesn't have much bearing on what we were
>discussing.
>
Yes it does - and the issue is not whether you "agree" it is whether you
*understand*.
>>>Making it an issue of philosophy is silly. You should ask the
>>>mathematicions. Try comp.sci.math -- it is just around the
>>>corner.
>
>>This *is* a philosophical issue, or do you think we should just count
>>heads?
>
>Citing "Two Dogmas" as relevant to questions of mathematical
>truth is bullshit. It may be good philosophy, but it isn't
>about mathematical truth *at all*.
Really? I don't suppose the facts of the matter really count here do
they? You keep telling me and everyone else what you (mis)understand and
I keep pointing out where you misunderstand and why.
Here's a heuristic - "don't be so quick to contradict Longley - doing so
is likely to make you post false statements". Try asking questions
instead unless you are sure of your facts.
>
>>>You could also look at Hempel's "On the nature of mathematical
>>>truth", published in "The American Mathematical Monthly" (1945).
>
>>This tells me why you hold your views perhaps, but this was written
>>before Two Dogmas, and what I have read of Hempel (e.g. the end of "A
>>logical appraisal of operationism" 1954;1965 where he seems sympathetic
>>to Quine's position).
>
>It was written well after "Truth by Convention", which is the
>relevant reference to Quine.
>
No.. this is just your peculiar and false perspective on matters - you
seem to have a whole cluster of them.
If you need proof of your error here, read the history (see "Dear
Carnap, Dear Van" by R. Creath (1990)). If you have contrary evidence,
quote it and reference it.
>>The "Two Dogmas" paper was seminal.
>
>Maybe it was seminal in philosophy. It doesn't say anything of
>significance to mathematicians (or to physicists for that matter).
>
It does to those who read and understand it, although I accept that it
shouldn't *trouble* mathematicians or physics. It should, however,
deeply trouble "Cognitive Scientists".
--
David Longley
Stephen Harris
"Acme Debugging" <L.F...@lycos.co.uk> wrote in message
news:35fae540.03082...@posting.google.com...
> Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
news:<buC1b.11540$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>...
>
> science that flying saucers do not exist." Now after reading your
> post, I question if that is correct. Which of the four statements
> below would you consider correct or best?
>
> 1. "It is an a priori assumption of science that something not in
> evidence does not exist."
>
> 2. "It is a default assumption in science that something not in
> evidence does not exist."
>
> 3. "It is a basic assumption of science that something not in evidence
> does not exist."
>
> 4. "It is a common assumption in science to assume that something not
> in evidence does not exist."
>
http://hagar.up.ac.za/cie/bed/modules/rgo700/resource/webscience/index.html
THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE
"First, scientific method defines the domain of science:
Anything to which the scientific method can be applied,
now or in the future, is or will be science; anything to
which the method cannot be applied is not science.
Second, the scientific method defines the aim and purpose
of science: The objective of science is to make and to
use theories. A third important implication is that science
does not make value judgments or moral decisions, and
a fourth implication is that it determines the philosophical
foundation on which scientific pursuits must be based.
Scientific Philosophy
In the course of history, two major answers have been
proposed regarding the governing forces of the universe.
These answers are incorporated in two systems of
philosophy called vitalism and mechanism, respectively.
Vitalism is the doctrine of the supernatural. Thus it is
untestable by experiment and is therefore unusable as
a scientific philosophy of nature. In the mechanistic view,
the prime mover of the universe is a set of natural laws,
that is, the laws of physics and chemistry. Mechanism is
thus a philosophy which is usable in science."
There may be a quibble whether flying saucers are supernatural like
unicorns or fairies but I will assume they are for this discussion. I
think your question is better posed using a natural phenomenon.
"Methodological naturalism" in regard to scientific practice
refers to a view that science can only examine natural
mechanisms producing physical phenomena.
"Ontological naturalism" in regard to scientific practice
refers to a view that science can only examine natural
mechanisms producing physical phenomena for the simple reason
that no non-natural mechanisms exist.
I got to thinking about supernaturalism and the scientific method.
After research it seems that naturalism is the default underlying
assumption of natural sciences employing the scientific method.
Wesley R. Elsberry wrote on Google:
Rob Koons, the organizer of the recent conference on
"Naturalism, Theism, and the Scientific Enterprise", added a
bifurcation within methodological naturalism:
[Quote]
Philosophers love to make distinctions, and I am no exception.
One important distinction that emerged for me in the course of
our discussions is that between dogmatic a ** a priori **
methodological naturalism (DMN) and empirically-based or
conjectural methodological naturalism (EMN). DMN involves the
claim that the very definition or inherent logic of science
demands that it accord with the rule of making use only of
naturalistic explanations (that is, explanations in terms of
events and processes located within space and time). EMN, in
contrast, is the claim that in the long run it will turn out
that all successful scientific research programs are
naturalistic ones, that science will converge upon
methodological naturalism in the long run. EMN is based, not on
the definition of science or on any supposed direct access to
the essence of science, but upon the actual history of science.
A defender of EMN has no objection to the practice of theistic
science, nor to calling it "real science". He merely
conjectures that such scientific enterprises will not in the
end prove successful.
[End quote -- R Koons, conference summary]
Does Koons' terminology form a partition? I think not. In my
view, Koons misses at least a third class of views. Since he
has already taken "empirical" as a qualifier, I'll propose a
"pragmatic methodological naturalism". DMN proceeds in a
top-down fashion from a particular definition of science; EMN
proceeds from a historical analysis of past science; and PMN
proceeds from the basis of how scientists actually get the job
done. In PMN, each scientist working upon physical phenomena
proposes natural mechanisms to be tested as causes of those
phenomena. For PMN, the problems of a supernaturalist stance
appear in the short run. A PMN scientist sees the inclusion of
supernatural causes in science as a problem because of the
pragmatic difficulties encountered in making tests of such
causes, in eliminating confounding natural mechanisms from
consideration, and in the pedagogy of scientific practice due
to confusion engendered over determining when a supernaturalist
stance is warranted and when it is not. PMN differs from DMN
as "descriptive" differs from "prescriptive".
http://www.calvin.edu/~lhaarsma/MethNatHumanBehave.html
Part 1: The natural sciences and "methodological naturalism"
The basic theories and equations of science -- the "laws of nature" -- don't
explicitly refer to God, miracles, or the supernatural. It could be argued,
therefore, that scientific equations and theories are methodologically
naturalistic.
"... There is what we might call methodological atheism, which is by
definition common to all natural science. This is simply the principle that
scientific explanations are to be in terms of natural (not supernatural)
entities and processes. ... It is a fact of history (perhaps an accident of
history) that this is how the institution of natural science is understood
in our era. For better or for worse, we have inherited a view of science as
methodologically atheistic -- meaning that science qua science seeks
naturalistic explanations for all natural processes.
Regards,
Stephen
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<buC1b.11540$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>...
><snip>
>(on definition of "a priori")
>>The general usage seems to allow that you may make some definitions
>>on the basis of sense experience. But once you have those
>definitions,
>>whatever can be derived purely from the definitions themselves
>>is a priori.
>>The requirement is not that there has never been sense experience.
>>Rather, it is that the particular truth in question can be determined
>>with reliance on sense experience.
><snip>
>May I have an opinion? I have said: "It is an a priori assumption in
>science that flying saucers do not exist." Now after reading your
>post, I question if that is correct. Which of the four statements
>below would you consider correct or best?
I agree that the statement is quotes is not correct.
>1. "It is an a priori assumption of science that something not in
>evidence does not exist."
>2. "It is a default assumption in science that something not in
>evidence does not exist."
>3. "It is a basic assumption of science that something not in evidence
>does not exist."
>4. "It is a common assumption in science to assume that something not
>in evidence does not exist."
I don't think any of those are correct.
Getting back to flying saucers, most scientists are skeptical of
their existence. But the skepticism is not simply a matter of lack
of evidence. Rather, it is because what is often said about flying
saucers is contrary to available evidence.
>My AI reasoner definition says, "The reasoner will adjust facts
>depending on the a priori assumptions of various fields." Your advice
>might help improve this statement.
It depends on what you mean by "fact". If you take "fact" to apply
to a string of words (to pure syntax), then a reasoner will "adjust"
those facts to fit the meaning he assigns to those words.
>- - - - -
>In another post you included this Putnam quote:
>>(b) Quine was right about the overall position that the use
>> of the analytic/synthetic distinction if philosophy of
>> language was confused and erroneous.
>Is there a typo in that sentence?
s/if philosophy/in philosophy/
Neil W Rickert
>>>>Quoting Putnam: "That Quine is wrong I have no doubt". That's from
>>>>his article "The analytic and the synthetic", in which he discusses
>>>>"Two Dogmas". Where he particularly says that Quine is wrong, is in
>>>>denying the analytic/synthetic distinction.
>>>You've misrepresented the full context of what is being said.
>>Two Dogmas is not about mathematics.
>Well, that in itself is a little naive. It's about empiricist
>epistemology and the classic problem for empiricists was the status of
>analytical statements, specifically, those of logic and mathematics. .
That does not in any way contradict my point that "Two Dogmas" is not
about mathematics.
For sure, there were serious problems with empiricist epistemology,
and it inability to account for mathematical knowledge was one of
them.
But the problems in epistemology are not problems in mathematics. A
sleight of hand trick (deluding oneself into denying that there are
analytic statements) does not solve the problems of epistemology --
it merely sweeps them under the rug.
>>Putnam's view, in more detail, was that
>>(a) Quine was wrong on the specific point about the
>> analytic/synthetic distinction.
>No, he clearly makes the point that Quine is wrong on a trivial point.
That "trivial point" was the denial that there is a distinction
between analylic and synthetic statements. It is the only "point"
in "Two Dogmas" that could be said to be relevant to mathematics.
>There are several papers where he makes this very clear. I've referenced
>them for you.
>>(b) Quine was right about the overall position that the use
>> of the analytic/synthetic distinction if philosophy of
>> language was confused and erroneous.
>Modern empiricist philosophy moved from ideas -> words -> language as
>the subject matter for epistemological investigation - this includes all
Right. They reduced philosophy to a system of ridiculuous word
games.
> - hence the concern with the
>foundations of mathematics. It is not *just* philosophy of language.
Mathematics can actually do quite well without foundations. In any
case, the "foundation of mathematics" as a branch of mathematics has
only a vague resemblance to the "foundation of mathematics" as a
topic in philosophy.
>>>I appreciate that - but for all intents and purposes, the 1951.1961
>>>paper is the classic reference.
>>Wrong. "Two Dogmas" is not about mathematics. For questions of
>>mathematical truth, "Truth by convention" is the proper reference to
>>Quine's position.
>More nonsense - and you are a master at promulgating it. In "Truth by
>convention" (1935) Quine was still trying to work within the Carnap
>programme. He still makes use of analyticity until 1947 when he
>abandoned the idea that there are analytic truths. Over that twelve
>years, Quine parted company with Carnap. "Two Dogmas of Empircism"
>(1951) is Quine's public statement of a break with Carnap's empiricism.
Disagreements between Carnap and Quine are of little relevance
to mathematics. Mathematical truth is what mathematicians take
it to be, not what Carnap or Quine or Longley take it to be.
>>I don't much disagree with Putnam's view as expressed in the full
>>article. That is, I largely agree on issues about the way the
>>analytic/synthetic distinction has been used in philosophy of
>>language. But that doesn't have much bearing on what we were
>>discussing.
>Yes it does - and the issue is not whether you "agree" it is whether you
>*understand*.
Naughty, naughty -- there you are using one of those forbidden
intensional words.
>>>>Making it an issue of philosophy is silly. You should ask the
>>>>mathematicions. Try comp.sci.math -- it is just around the
>>>>corner.
>>>This *is* a philosophical issue, or do you think we should just count
>>>heads?
>>Citing "Two Dogmas" as relevant to questions of mathematical
>>truth is bullshit. It may be good philosophy, but it isn't
>>about mathematical truth *at all*.
>Really? I don't suppose the facts of the matter really count here do
>they? You keep telling me and everyone else what you (mis)understand and
>I keep pointing out where you misunderstand and why.
Here we have it folks. Longley has explicitly declared that
mathematics is the wrong place to go if you want to know about
mathematical truth. You should instead ask Longley or Quine.
Apparently mere mathematicians don't know anything about mathematical
truth.
Bah! Humbug.
>Here's a heuristic - "don't be so quick to contradict Longley - doing so
>is likely to make you post false statements". Try asking questions
>instead unless you are sure of your facts.
Longley posts nonsense all the time.
It is bad enough that Longley has appointed himself an authority in
psychology, when in reality he is only an advocate of an extremest
dogmatic cult within psychology.
It is absurd for Longley to appoint himself an authority in
mathematics.
Acme Debugging
> "Acme Debugging" <L.F...@lycos.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:35fae540.03082...@posting.google.com...
> > Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
> news:<buC1b.11540$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>...
Thanks Stephen for a *big* answer to my question. It will take me a
while to sort thru this, but it looks interesting.
In the meantime, I will try to form a better question for Neil to
address my little wording problem. I invite you to comment on that as
well.
Please excuse the top-posting. Just to save you the scroll since I
have no further questions/comments yet.
Larry
Acme Debugging
> L.F...@lycos.co.uk (Acme Debugging) writes:
> >Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<buC1b.11540$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>...
>
>><snip>
>
>>(on definition of "a priori")
>
>>>The general usage seems to allow that you may make some definitions
>>>on the basis of sense experience. But once you have those
>>definitions,
>>>whatever can be derived purely from the definitions themselves
>>>is a priori.
>
>>>The requirement is not that there has never been sense experience.
>>>Rather, it is that the particular truth in question can be
determined
>>>with reliance on sense experience.
>
>><snip>
>
>>May I have an opinion? I have said: "It is an a priori assumption in
>>science that flying saucers do not exist." Now after reading your
>>post, I question if that is correct. Which of the four statements
>>below would you consider correct or best?
>
>I agree that the statement is quotes is not correct.
>
>>1. "It is an a priori assumption of science that something not in
>>evidence does not exist."
>
>
>I don't think any of those are correct.
Thanks. Apologies for asking a poor question, though your answers were
informative as usual. Is this better? "It is an a priori assumption of
science that it is meaningless to judge the probabililty of something
not in evidence." (As in UFO, etc. BTW, I asked the question (ET
actually) in a science group, they unanimously said (within their
flames <g>) it was a meaningless question. Of course anything is up
for grabs, but I'm specifically wondering if a priori could fit.)
>Getting back to flying saucers, most scientists are skeptical of
>their existence. But the skepticism is not simply a matter of lack
>of evidence. Rather, it is because what is often said about flying
>saucers is contrary to available evidence.
Agree, going by much exposure in that field. Like they defy inertia,
etc.
>
>>My AI reasoner definition says, "The reasoner will adjust facts
>>depending on the a priori assumptions of various fields." Your
advice
>>might help improve this statement.
>
>It depends on what you mean by "fact". If you take "fact" to apply
>to a string of words (to pure syntax), then a reasoner will "adjust"
>those facts to fit the meaning he assigns to those words.
I wasn't talking about a string of words. More like Part# A1000
matches one of the Part#'s in the list of Part#'s for warehouse B
according to some computer somewhere. There is a probability of the
"fact" or "assertion" or "opinion" or "data" being correct (actually
found at warehouse B) going by past experience.
>
>>- - - - -
>
>>In another post you included this Putnam quote:
>
>>>(b) Quine was right about the overall position that the use
>>> of the analytic/synthetic distinction if philosophy of
>>> language was confused and erroneous.
>
>>Is there a typo in that sentence?
>
> s/if philosophy/in philosophy/
Thanks for the correction.
A problem I am having is trying to nail down the common usage meaning
of "a priori." (This is in no way to imply criticism of your
discussion of the term for a more noble purpose.) The dictionary
doesn't seem to be much help, as the definitions don't fit the term as
I most frequently see it used, or how it is used if I simply google on
it. The closest I can find is the third definition in my dictionary:
"3. Made before or without examination, not supported by factual
study."
I'm having a great deal of difficulty forming a good question and
finding examples that are not argumentative. I've probably spent more
time than it's worth. Anyway, here's what I've come up with so far,
and don't spend a lot of time, if any. Answer in any way you like.
It's not that good a question.
What I'm ultimately looking for is the most specific choice among
common usage of these terms that fits in the following examples,
especially if "a priori" could fit anywhere. (Note: "belief" won't
work in my AI definition, it is not an option). I won't be the
supplier of facts or "assertions," so I'm not really concerned with
the "truth" of these examples.
X=1. A priori assumption.
X=2. Default assumption.
X=3. Basic assumption
X=4. Common assumption.
It is an X in detective work that consistent dependency proves an
argument (i.e. the story adds up).
It is an X in Christianity that God exists.
It is an X in politics that the end justifies the means.
It is an X in the military that civilian deaths are justafiable.
It is an X in astrology that the positions of the planets can affect
one's job prospects.
It is an X in Democrat philosophy that things are more relative than
in Republican philosophy.
It is an X in Star Trek that faster-than-light arrival at a
destination is possible.
Note: replies from anyone are appreciated. I only asked Neil because
we have some posting history and he was discussing "a priori."
Larry
Neil W Rickert
>Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<cAO1b.12202$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>...
>>I don't think any of those are correct.
>Thanks. Apologies for asking a poor question, though your answers were
>informative as usual. Is this better? "It is an a priori assumption of
>science that it is meaningless to judge the probabililty of something
>not in evidence."
I don't have any problem with that. It might be better to say that
it is a default assumption of scientists.
>>>- - - - -
>A problem I am having is trying to nail down the common usage meaning
>of "a priori."
Like most words, it is use in a variety of ways, depending on
context.
It is a technical term in epistemology, and I was using it in
more-or-less that technical sense. But once you get to normal
informal usage, the range broadens.
A latin expert would probably think that we are all wrong.
>of "a priori." (This is in no way to imply criticism of your
>discussion of the term for a more noble purpose.) The dictionary
>doesn't seem to be much help, as the definitions don't fit the term as
>I most frequently see it used, or how it is used if I simply google on
>it. The closest I can find is the third definition in my dictionary:
>"3. Made before or without examination, not supported by factual
>study."
As used in the kind of discussions typical in c.a.p, that's probably
not too far off. One typically applies "a priori" to an initial
assumption that is made apart from factual evidence, and that is
usually taken to be unchallengable.
>I'm having a great deal of difficulty forming a good question and
>finding examples that are not argumentative. I've probably spent more
>time than it's worth. Anyway, here's what I've come up with so far,
>and don't spend a lot of time, if any. Answer in any way you like.
>It's not that good a question.
Your difficulty is presumably due to the flexibility of language,
which allows a variety of uses for the same term.
>What I'm ultimately looking for is the most specific choice among
>common usage of these terms that fits in the following examples,
>especially if "a priori" could fit anywhere. (Note: "belief" won't
>work in my AI definition, it is not an option). I won't be the
>supplier of facts or "assertions," so I'm not really concerned with
>the "truth" of these examples.
>X=1. A priori assumption.
>X=2. Default assumption.
>X=3. Basic assumption
>X=4. Common assumption.
>It is an X in detective work that consistent dependency proves an
>argument (i.e. the story adds up).
I would be inclined to say X=2 (or 3 or 4). One would hope that the
conclusion is challengable on the basis of evidence, hence not really
a priori.
>It is an X in Christianity that God exists.
I would say that X=1 or X=3 are the only ones that fit here. But
perhaps the "god is dead" school of christianity would disagree.
>It is an X in politics that the end justifies the means.
X=4.
>It is an X in the military that civilian deaths are justafiable.
X=4.
>It is an X in astrology that the positions of the planets can affect
>one's job prospects.
X=1.
>It is an X in Democrat philosophy that things are more relative than
>in Republican philosophy.
None of the above. Perhaps it is a common assumption in republican
accounts of democrat philosophy.
>It is an X in Star Trek that faster-than-light arrival at a
>destination is possible.
X=5 (poetic license).
Acme Debugging
> L.F...@lycos.co.uk (Acme Debugging) writes:
> >Neil W Rickert <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message news:<cAO1b.12202$Ih1.4...@newssrv26.news.prodigy.com>...
>
> >>I don't think any of those are correct.
>
> >Thanks. Apologies for asking a poor question, though your answers were
> >informative as usual. Is this better? "It is an a priori assumption of
> >science that it is meaningless to judge the probabililty of something
> >not in evidence."
>
> I don't have any problem with that. It might be better to say that
> it is a default assumption of scientists.
I think that would be better too. Maybe I was interpreting the
response of those scientists as being too fundamental. Most may have
been using "default case."
>
> >>>- - - - -
>
> >A problem I am having is trying to nail down the common usage meaning
> >of "a priori."
>
> Like most words, it is use in a variety of ways, depending on
> context.
Also perhaps explaining why only the 3rd def. seemed to fit to me. I
feel more comfortable with that now.
>
> It is a technical term in epistemology, and I was using it in
> more-or-less that technical sense. But once you get to normal
> informal usage, the range broadens.
>
> A latin expert would probably think that we are all wrong.
>
I knew one of those, and can vouch for that! <g>
> >of "a priori." (This is in no way to imply criticism of your
> >discussion of the term for a more noble purpose.) The dictionary
> >doesn't seem to be much help, as the definitions don't fit the term as
> >I most frequently see it used, or how it is used if I simply google on
> >it. The closest I can find is the third definition in my dictionary:
> >"3. Made before or without examination, not supported by factual
> >study."
>
> As used in the kind of discussions typical in c.a.p, that's probably
> not too far off. One typically applies "a priori" to an initial
> assumption that is made apart from factual evidence, and that is
> usually taken to be unchallengable.
>
That was my "common" understanding. Unchallengable within the field.
"poetic license" <g>
Thanks for humoring me with the silly game. I especially appreciate
the comments. It is interesting that the only places you chose where
X=1 could fit would be science or religion (or occult). I did learn
something new, and think I have a handle on it sufficient for my task.
I'm sure I'll have a better handle after reading Stephen's material.
Larry