On 4/21/2023 7:00 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/20/23 12:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>> It turns out that the only reason that Gödel’s G is not provable in F is
>> that G is contradictory in F.
>>
>> When Gödel’s G asserts that it is unprovable in F it is asserting that
>> there is no sequence of inference steps in F that derives G.
>>
>> *A proof of G in F requires a sequence of inference steps in F that*
>> *proves there is no such sequence of inference steps in F, a*
>> *contradiction*
>>
>> *This is like René Descartes saying*
>> “I think therefore thoughts do not exist”
>>
>> The reason why G cannot be proved in F is that the proof of G in F is
>> contradictory in F, thus Gödel was wrong when he said the reason is that
>> F is incomplete. No formal system is ever supposed to be able to prove a
>> contradiction.
>>
>> Now we can see both THAT G cannot be proved in F and perhaps for the
>> first time see WHY G cannot be proved in F. The “incompleteness”
>> conclusion has been refuted.
>>
>> To be honest we would have to rename Gödel’s “incompleteness” theorem to
>> Olcott’s “can’t prove a contradiction” theorem.
>>
>
> But you keep using the wrong statement for G, ikely because you just
> don't understand the proof.
>
> G does NOT assert that it is unprovable in F, that is just a conclusion
> derived from G in Meta-F.
>
Gödel sums up his own G as simply:
"...a proposition which asserts its own unprovability." 15 (Gödel
1931:39-41)
Thus this summary is accurate.
*G asserts its own unprovability in F*
When you simply hypothesize that it is an accurate representation
of the essence of Gödel's G then it is easy to see that
*G asserts its own unprovability in F*
The reason that G cannot be proved in F is that this requires a
sequence of inference steps in F that proves no such sequence
of inference steps exists in F.
Since we already have the reason why G cannot be proved in F
(the proof of G is F is contradictory)
and Gödel said it was another different reason then Gödel was incorrect.
Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
> G is actually a statement that there does not exist a whole number that
> satisfies a property expressed as a primitive recursive relationship.
>
> Such a statement CAN'T be "contradictory" as either such a number exists
> or it doesn't.
>
> Of course, since you are too stupid to understand that statement, you
> mix up which system you are talking in and what statement you are
> working on.