On 10/24/2021 9:55 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2021-10-23 23:09, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/23/2021 10:14 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>> On 2021-10-23 21:01, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/23/2021 9:32 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
>>>>> On 2021-10-23 19:03, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/23/2021 6:10 PM, Dan Christensen wrote:
>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 23, 2021 at 6:15:15 PM UTC-4, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 10/23/2021 4:58 PM, Dan Christensen wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 23, 2021 at 3:31:36 PM UTC-4, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 10/23/2021 1:44 PM, Dan Christensen wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, October 23, 2021 at 12:42:41 PM UTC-4, olcott
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If we want to have actual correct reasoning then we get rid
>>>>>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Material conditional
>>>>>>>>>>>> p q p → q
>>>>>>>>>>>> T T T
>>>>>>>>>>>> T F F
>>>>>>>>>>>> F T T
>>>>>>>>>>>> F F T
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> and replace it with if-then
>>>>>>>>>>>> if P then q
>>>>>>>>>>>> p q if p then q
>>>>>>>>>>>> T T T
>>>>>>>>>>>> T F F
>>>>>>>>>>>> F T undefined
>>>>>>>>>>>> F F undefined
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Here is a formal proof of ~A => [A =>B], the basis for the
>>>>>>>>>>> last two lines of the truth table for A => B. To prevent this
>>>>>>>>>>> derivation, somehow you will also have to ban or restrict the
>>>>>>>>>>> application of one more of the rules of inference used here.
>>>>>>>>>>> Which will it be?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I am saying for symbolic logic is defined incorrectly when
>>>>>>>>>> symbolic
>>>>>>>>>> logic is required to be the basis for correct reasoning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You haven't answered the question. Which line(s) in the above
>>>>>>>>> proof would be invalid in your proposed alternative system of
>>>>>>>>> logic? Somehow, you want to make it impossible to derive
>>>>>>>>> ~A=>[A=>B].
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The => implication operator is tossed out on its ass, thus
>>>>>>>> unavailable
>>>>>>>> for any proof.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let's start with something REAL easy. How would you prove A & B
>>>>>>> => B & A?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I reject material implication and the principle of explosion.
>>>>>
>>>>> You do realize that even if you "eliminate" material implication
>>>>> and replace it with your version (whatever that might be), you'd
>>>>> still be able to prove anything from (A & ¬A). The principle of
>>>>> explosion is usually illustrated using implication but it isn't
>>>>> actually tied to implication.
>>>>>
>>>>> André
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I reject material implication and the principle of explosion
>>>> separately.
>>>
>>> Unless you plan on rejecting ∧, ∨ and ¬, you're not going to be able
>>> to get rid of the principle of explosion since it is a direct
>>> consequence of the logical definitions of these operators.
>>>
>>
>> We simply forbid any syntactic entailment that is contradicted by
>> semantic entailment. We put the semantic relevance back into logic
>> that was removed from Aristotle's syllogism.
>
> How exactly do you 'forbid' something which follows directly from the
> rules of the system without ending up with an inconsistent system?
>
We adapt symbolic logic so that the semantic meaning of propositional
variables is specified. Aristotle's syllogism does this with Categorical
propositions:
In logic, a categorical proposition, or categorical statement, is a
proposition that asserts or denies that all or some of the members of
one category (the subject term) are included in another (the predicate
term).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_proposition
> And unless you can provide some actual *rules* which allows us to decide
> whether or not something is contradicted by 'semantic entailment', the
> above is worthless. Note that giving examples of things which you think
> do or do not involve 'semantic entailment' is not the same thing as
> providing actual explicit rules. So far, any time I've asked you about
> your notion of 'semantic relatedness' or other things you've responded
> by giving one or two examples of things you consider related or
> unrelated, but no actual rule which would allow us to decide whether two
> arbitary things count as related.
>
>>>> I am not sure how to best express the set of changes that are required.
>>>>
>>>> A good heuristic might be that when semantic values are assigned to
>>>> propositional variables and then when rules of logic are applied to
>>>> these variables derive semantic nonsense then this is a rule that
>>>> must be discarded.
>>>
>>> There are only two semantic values that can be assigned to
>>> propositional variables: true and false. I have no idea what you can
>>> derive from these two values that could possibly objectively count as
>>> 'semantic nonsense'.
>>>
>>> André
>>>
>>
>> That is not exactly true. Truth conditional semantics is anchored in
>> true and false yet has a whole additional supporting infrastructure.
>
> That 'supporting architecture', if I understand what you are claiming is
> *not* part of logic.
>
>> It is true that an X is a Y is the propositional level.
>> When we plug semantics in the we get truth conditional semantics.
>> It is true that a dog is an animal.
>
> What your referring to here isn't 'semantics'. The only semantic values
> available to logic are 'true' and 'false'. What you are referring to is
> 'content'.
>
> The entire point of formal logic is that it looks exclusively at the
> form which an argument takes while ignoring the content altogether.
>
> Formal logic has no knowledge whatsoever about dogs or animals, nor
> should it.
>
> André
>
--
Copyright 2021 Pete Olcott
"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre
minds." Einstein