Define intentionality
Julian Moore
upload (well, more than usual ;) Could anyone supply me with their
best/most concise definition of intentionality?
TIA - Julian
--
jul...@tiger2.demon.co.uk | 100112,34...@compuserve.com
Domus - | "Reality is the rocks beneath the river of
Thinking about Thinking | illusion"
Anthony B Dardis
1. Searle's is the one I use:
that feature of many of our mental states by which they are
directed at, or about states of affairs in the world
(this appears in his "The Problem of Consciousness" in
Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 1993 (December).
2. Here's one from Brentano, quoted by Roderick Chisholm:
Psychological phenomena, according to Brentano, are characterized "by what
the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (also
the mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not
quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content,
direction upon an object (which is not here to be understood as a
reality), or immanent objectivity."
My quote is from Chisholm, _Perceiving_ (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1957) pp.168-9. His quote is from Brentano, _Psychologie vom
empirischen Standpunkte_ (Leipzig, 1924), I, 124-5.
3. There are several marks of intentionality which revolve around logical
features of sentences. Chisholm discusses these in Chapter 11 of the book
just mentioned. Maybe the most discussed is "semantic opacity", that
feature of some sentences such that substitution of coreferring
expressions is not guaranteed to preserve truth. Searle has a good
description of the relation between these marks and intentionality in his
book _Intentionality_ (Cambridge: CUP, 1983).
Stanley Friesen
Anthony B Dardis <phiabd@clark> wrote:
>Here are some descriptions and marks of intentionality.
>
>1. Searle's is the one I use:
>
>that feature of many of our mental states by which they are
>directed at, or about states of affairs in the world
Well, in that case SHRDLU running a real robot has intentionality.
[Actually, since the Blocks World is part of the world, I
do not think that a real robot is really necessary].
--
NAMES: sar...@netcom.com s...@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com
May the peace of God be with you.
Adam Constabaris
: In article <1994Jun9.1...@vaxa.hofstra.edu>,
: >Here are some descriptions and marks of intentionality.
: >1. Searle's is the one I use:
: >that feature of many of our mental states by which they are
: >directed at, or about states of affairs in the world
: Well, in that case SHRDLU running a real robot has intentionality.
: [Actually, since the Blocks World is part of the world, I
: do not think that a real robot is really necessary.
Searle distinguishes between what he calls "intrinsic" intentionality and
"derived" intentionality. Genuine intentional systems made with grade A
biological stuff have intrinsic intentionality -- it is because of their
own construction that their states are directed at or about things in the
world. Those second-class silicon-types, on the other hand, have only
derived intentionality. Their states are about something only because
those of us with *true* intentionality consider their internal states to
be about things in the world.
From my understanding of his position, systems such as SHRDLU lack intrinsic
intentionality because the fact that SHRDLU's states are about objects in the
block world is dependent upon the further fact that SHRDLU's creators
designed SHRDLU to manipulate those objects. Since SHRDLU doesn't really
"understand" what a block is or why he's realy moving it, SHRDLU lacks
intrinsic intentionality.
Mind you, this is just a report. I do *not* endorse this view.
AC
Brent Allsop
Wow, there is some great information here! Anyone mind If I
submit this info, as included below, to the IFAQ server? Any other
improvement suggestions?
Brent Allsop
P.S. The notes hub that the IFAQ server automatically posts
its monthly FAQ postings too for some reason has stopped accepting the
posts. It'll resume the monthly posting when I find the solution to
this problem.
P.P.S. For more information on the c.a.p IFAQ server e-mail
the 'Help:' command (don't forget the ':') to ai-phi...@fc.hp.com .
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Submit-Question:
Supporter: (Brent Allsop) <all...@fc.hp.com>
Question-Text:
What is intentionality?
End-Text:
Response-Text:
-------- Posted to c.a.p by Anthony B Dardis <phiabd@clark>: --------
Here are some descriptions and marks of intentionality.
1. Searle's is the one I use:
that feature of many of our mental states by which they are
directed at, or about states of affairs in the world
(this appears in his "The Problem of Consciousness" in
Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 1993 (December).
2. Here's one from Brentano, quoted by Roderick Chisholm:
Psychological phenomena, according to Brentano, are characterized "by
what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional
(also the mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although
with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a
content, direction upon an object (which is not here to be understood
as a reality), or immanent objectivity."
My quote is from Chisholm, _Perceiving_ (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1957) pp.168-9. His quote is from Brentano, _Psychologie vom
empirischen Standpunkte_ (Leipzig, 1924), I, 124-5.
3. There are several marks of intentionality which revolve around
logical features of sentences. Chisholm discusses these in Chapter 11
of the book just mentioned. Maybe the most discussed is "semantic
opacity", that feature of some sentences such that substitution of
coreferring expressions is not guaranteed to preserve truth. Searle
has a good description of the relation between these marks and
intentionality in his book _Intentionality_ (Cambridge: CUP, 1983).
-------- Posted to c.a.p by Stanley Friesen <sar...@netcom.com> --------
Anthony B Dardis <phiabd@clark> wrote:
>Here are some descriptions and marks of intentionality.
>
>1. Searle's is the one I use:
>
>that feature of many of our mental states by which they are
>directed at, or about states of affairs in the world
Well, in that case SHRDLU running a real robot has intentionality.
[Actually, since the Blocks World is part of the world, I do not think
that a real robot is really necessary].
------- Posted to c.a.p by Adam Constabaris <con...@unixg.ubc.ca> --------
Stanley Friesen (sar...@netcom.com) wrote:
: Anthony B Dardis <phiabd@clark> wrote:
: >Here are some descriptions and marks of intentionality.
: >1. Searle's is the one I use:
: >that feature of many of our mental states by which they are
: >directed at, or about states of affairs in the world
: Well, in that case SHRDLU running a real robot has intentionality.
: [Actually, since the Blocks World is part of the world, I
: do not think that a real robot is really necessary.
Searle distinguishes between what he calls "intrinsic" intentionality
and "derived" intentionality. Genuine intentional systems made with
grade A biological stuff have intrinsic intentionality -- it is
because of their own construction that their states are directed at or
about things in the world. Those second-class silicon-types, on the
other hand, have only derived intentionality. Their states are about
something only because those of us with *true* intentionality consider
their internal states to be about things in the world.
From my understanding of his position, systems such as SHRDLU lack
intrinsic intentionality because the fact that SHRDLU's states are
about objects in the block world is dependent upon the further fact
that SHRDLU's creators designed SHRDLU to manipulate those objects.
Since SHRDLU doesn't really "understand" what a block is or why he's
really moving it, SHRDLU lacks intrinsic intentionality.
Mind you, this is just a report. I do *not* endorse this view.
AC
End-Text:
Andre Hopper (YRL) 061 474 8836
First, a note. Here, we are seeking a definition of intentionality
and NOT an explanation.
Second, another note. For all those wanting a first-level
explanation, try reading Piaget's "Origins of Intelligence", because,
believe me, if you read it CAREFULLY enough, the answer is there (and
please pass this bit on to "Chinese Room" Searle, for whom I have much
respect but I despair of his ignorance of Piaget).
The Definition (attempt of):-
Intentionality IS a mode of causality where, like determinism,
the cause precedes the event, but where the event is brought
about in order to satisfy the cause.
Explanation of the Definition (not an explanation of Intentionality):-
The "cause" is thus a goal to be attained and this is where
intentionality begs teleology which appears to be at odds with
determinism. Since the cause is pre-assigned as a goal, the event to
be brought about is the MEANS towards the goal. Thus, intentionality
is synonymous with a true differentiation of the means-ends
relationship. This differs from mechanistic ("billiard ball")
causality in which events do continue on from each other, one after
the other, not as a means towards an ends, but simply as a chain of
successive events. It also differs from causality found in biology
(or rather physiology), which though more dynamic and continuous than
simple mechanistic causality, still does not have the power to chose
its means towards satisfying a pre-assigned goal or ends. [NB: Kant
saw biology as teleological, despite certain cautions, precisely
because of the "purposiveness" one perceives in biological systems.]
If replies to this note are forthcoming, please post publically them to the
internet rather than to me personally because it could be a lively
discussion (if you're up it!). And is J.Searle is contactable, I
would really appreciate knowing how to contact him.
Andre.
Oliver Sparrow
an...@yrsk.demon.co.uk "Andre Hopper (YRL" writes:
> The Definition (attempt of):-
>
> Intentionality IS a mode of causality where, like determinism,
> the cause precedes the event, but where the event is brought
> about in order to satisfy the cause.
on again.
_________________________________________________
Oliver Sparrow
oh...@chatham.demon.co.uk
Brent Allsop
Andre,
Great bit of information!
> The Definition (attempt of):-
>
> Intentionality IS a mode of causality where, like determinism,
> the cause precedes the event, but where the event is brought
> about in order to satisfy the cause.
I really like this concise definition! It's something I can
understand and see utility in.
So, I'm wondering... If a bunch of chemicals and stuff are
bouncing around like billiard balls and they happen to bounce in such
a way that they eventually form an entity that can utilize energy and
stuff to reproduce itself; can this goal (final cause right?) of
reproduction mean that the billiard ball like chemicals have
"intentionality"?
If I am looking for a cure for Diabetes I don't know for sure
if one exists, or if it does where it exists. Does this cure, if it
exists, influence me? My goal can be considered to be finding the
cure right? Couldn't a computer be set up to intelligently do work in
an effort to fulfill a similar goal and thus have intentionality?
Sure we must teach the computer about the goal but then again some one
had to tell me that I have diabetes and also someone had to teach me
that we can find cures to diseases, and we all learned (genetically at
least) stuff from the early life that sprang up from the primordial
oooz, all searching for something better right? The final causes...
I looked up "teleology" in the dictionary but somehow I think
you are implying more than is said there the way you used the word.
The dictionary used the words: "toward a final end", this is the same
thing as "final cause" right? These "final causes" are what are
driving us (including computers and nature...) all. It all has to do
with the search or pursuit of that which is better. Survival is
necessarily and logically better isn't it?
Can anyone give me a good reference to a more detailed, yet
still concise, definition of this word "teleology" and the surrounding
philosophy? Would it be right to say a cure for Diabetes is a
"teleological" cause of my donation of money to the American Diabetes
Association?
Thanks
Brent
Stanley Friesen
Adam Constabaris <con...@unixg.ubc.ca> wrote:
>Stanley Friesen (sar...@netcom.com) wrote:
>
>Searle distinguishes between what he calls "intrinsic" intentionality and
>"derived" intentionality. Genuine intentional systems made with grade A
>biological stuff have intrinsic intentionality -- it is because of their
>own construction that their states are directed at or about things in the
>world. Those second-class silicon-types, on the other hand, have only
>derived intentionality. Their states are about something only because
>those of us with *true* intentionality consider their internal states to
>be about things in the world.
Hmm, interesting, I am not entirely sure what the significance of
this distinction is! Exactly what predictions does it allow one to
make about actual observables? What *difference* does it make
if intentionality is "intrinsic" versus "derived"?
Another, related question: since *our* intentionality was programmed
into us by natural selection, would a computer program with *evolved*
(rather than designed) intentionality have the intrinsic or derived
subtype? In short, is it the evolutionary origin that makes our
intentionality intrinsic, or is it something else?
>From my understanding of his position, systems such as SHRDLU lack intrinsic
>intentionality because the fact that SHRDLU's states are about objects in the
>block world is dependent upon the further fact that SHRDLU's creators
>designed SHRDLU to manipulate those objects.
Obviously, given those definitions.
> Since SHRDLU doesn't really
>"understand" what a block is or why he's realy moving it, SHRDLU lacks
>intrinsic intentionality.
Hmm, but I do not see why a program must be limited in this way,
even if SHRDLU is.
What particular process actually *constitutes* "really understanding"
why one is doing somehting?
Adam Constabaris
: In article <2u4g5m$4...@nnrp.ucs.ubc.ca>,
: Adam Constabaris <con...@unixg.ubc.ca> wrote:
: >Stanley Friesen (sar...@netcom.com) wrote:
: >
: >Searle distinguishes between what he calls "intrinsic" intentionality and
: >"derived" intentionality. Genuine intentional systems made with grade A
: >biological stuff have intrinsic intentionality -- it is because of their
: >own construction that their states are directed at or about things in the
: >world. Those second-class silicon-types, on the other hand, have only
: >derived intentionality. Their states are about something only because
: >those of us with *true* intentionality consider their internal states to
: >be about things in the world.
: Hmm, interesting, I am not entirely sure what the significance of
: this distinction is! Exactly what predictions does it allow one to
: make about actual observables? What *difference* does it make
: if intentionality is "intrinsic" versus "derived"?
Heh ... you must not be familiar with Searle's philosophical style then =)
Actually, the distinction has application with language; for instance,
"cat" is about certain mammals derivatively, because genuine intentional
systems (us) *use* the word to refer to those animals -- were there no
english speakers with the right kind of intentions, "cat" would not be
about cats.
The observable differences? We'd like to explain intentionality as some
feature of certain kinds of systems; a currently popular sort of view is
that mental states are *about* things in the world because of the
function those states have in mediating behavior and in generating new
states.
: Another, related question: since *our* intentionality was programmed
: into us by natural selection, would a computer program with *evolved*
: (rather than designed) intentionality have the intrinsic or derived
: subtype? In short, is it the evolutionary origin that makes our
: intentionality intrinsic, or is it something else?
I'm going to sound like a broken record here to those who've read my
previous posts. I'd suggest, as an introduction to this sort of stuff
you might read chapter 8 of D.C. Dennett's _The Intentional Stance_
called "Evolution, Error, and Intentionality". THere, Dennett argues
that since the origin of intentionality is biological, we are not
"unmeant meaners", that is, that we do not possess intrinsic
intentionality. Damned if I remember how exactly the argument goes at
this point, however =)
: >From my understanding of his position, systems such as SHRDLU lack intrinsic
: >intentionality because the fact that SHRDLU's states are about objects in
: >the block world is dependent upon the further fact that SHRDLU's creators
: >designed SHRDLU to manipulate those objects.
: Obviously, given those definitions.
I should point out that I was a bit careless: the question of whether a
computer such a ss SHRDLU couldn't or doesn't possess intrinsic
intentionality is up for grabs. It seems to people like Searle that
computer systems can only represent things because humans design them
with specific purposes in mind, and so the computer's states represent
what they represent because humans want it that way. I'd contest this
for a sufficiently complex program.
: > Since SHRDLU doesn't really
: >"understand" what a block is or why he's realy moving it, SHRDLU lacks
: >intrinsic intentionality.
: Hmm, but I do not see why a program must be limited in this way,
: even if SHRDLU is.
That's what Searle's CR argument is designed to show, that no purely
formal system can understand.
: What particular process actually *constitutes* "really understanding"
: why one is doing somehting?
Good question =) The notion is still pretty intuitive: I understand what
I'm doing when I add two and two and get four, my calculator doesn't.
Darned if I know what the connection is between understanding and
intentionality, either =) It seems to be a function of complexity: I can
explain what I'm doing when I add, I can relate the symbols I write down
to other things; calculators can't do these things (yet). So far, then,
I'm pretty much forced into an operational criterion for understanding,
loosely speaking.
AC
Stanley Friesen
Adam Constabaris <con...@unixg.ubc.ca> wrote:
>Stanley Friesen (sar...@netcom.com) wrote:
>
>: Hmm, interesting, I am not entirely sure what the significance of
>: this distinction is! Exactly what predictions does it allow one to
>: make about actual observables? What *difference* does it make
>: if intentionality is "intrinsic" versus "derived"?
>The observable differences? We'd like to explain intentionality as some
>feature of certain kinds of systems; a currently popular sort of view is
>that mental states are *about* things in the world because of the
>function those states have in mediating behavior and in generating new
>states.
Hmm, this still seems to apply to derived intentionality equally
as well as it does to the "intrinsic" variety.
I still see no *practical* difference between "derived" and "intrinsic"
intentionality. Certainly computers, even at the current level of
tecnology, have internal states which are "about" things in the
world by virtue of mediating behavior and generating new states.
>
>: Another, related question: since *our* intentionality was programmed
>: into us by natural selection, would a computer program with *evolved*
>: (rather than designed) intentionality have the intrinsic or derived
>: subtype? In short, is it the evolutionary origin that makes our
>: intentionality intrinsic, or is it something else?
>
>I'm going to sound like a broken record here to those who've read my
>previous posts. I'd suggest, as an introduction to this sort of stuff
>you might read chapter 8 of D.C. Dennett's _The Intentional Stance_
>called "Evolution, Error, and Intentionality". THere, Dennett argues
>that since the origin of intentionality is biological, we are not
>"unmeant meaners", that is, that we do not possess intrinsic
>intentionality. Damned if I remember how exactly the argument goes at
>this point, however =)
I guess that is sort of what I was trying to get at.
If this is so, then there are *no*instances of "intrinsic"
intentionality now known. This makes the distinction even
*less* useful.
>
>That's what Searle's CR argument is designed to show, that no purely
>formal system can understand.
At which purpose it is inadequate. It seems to only "convince"
those that already feel that to be the case.
>: What particular process actually *constitutes* "really understanding"
>: why one is doing somehting?
>
>Good question =) The notion is still pretty intuitive: I understand what
>I'm doing when I add two and two and get four, my calculator doesn't.
>Darned if I know what the connection is between understanding and
>intentionality, either =) It seems to be a function of complexity: I can
>explain what I'm doing when I add, I can relate the symbols I write down
>to other things; calculators can't do these things (yet). So far, then,
>I'm pretty much forced into an operational criterion for understanding,
>loosely speaking.
>
Hmm, this is beginning to sound as if some of the more sophisticated
math assistant programs (perhaps Mathematica?) may approach
"understanding" addition then, as at least some of them they can
explain what they are doing.
Adam Constabaris
: >: Hmm, interesting, I am not entirely sure what the significance of
: >: this distinction is! Exactly what predictions does it allow one to
: >: make about actual observables? What *difference* does it make
: >: if intentionality is "intrinsic" versus "derived"?
: > ...
: >The observable differences? We'd like to explain intentionality as some
: >feature of certain kinds of systems; a currently popular sort of view is
: >that mental states are *about* things in the world because of the
: >function those states have in mediating behavior and in generating new
: >states.
: Hmm, this still seems to apply to derived intentionality equally
: as well as it does to the "intrinsic" variety.
I can't remember whether I pulled in the considerations about language,
or how well I expressed them. A popular and reasonably plausible view is
that words are about things in the world (i.e. "cat" refers to cats)
because of the intentionality of the mental states of the people that use
them (i.e. English speakers). Nothing about "cat" itself determines that
it is *about* certain kinds of organisms -- in particular, cats are only
related to "cat"s (utterances of the word) via the causal mediary of the
minds of English speakers. The doctrine that mental states have
intrinsic intentionality thus amounts to the claim that the explanatory
buck stops in the brain/nervous system of certain kinds of creatures.
: I still see no *practical* difference between "derived" and "intrinsic"
: intentionality. Certainly computers, even at the current level of
: tecnology, have internal states which are "about" things in the
: world by virtue of mediating behavior and generating new states.
The practical difference lies in what one looks at if one wishes to study
intentionality. Nothing about things with derived intentionality makes
it the case that they are about anything. Examine "cat" as much as you
want in isolation from human linguistic practices, you will never be
able to say that it is about cats. On the other hand, if there are
things which possess intrinsic intentionality, we should (in principle,
at least) be able to discover some facts about those things which make
it the case that they are about other things.
: I guess that is sort of what I was trying to get at.
: If this is so, then there are *no*instances of "intrinsic"
: intentionality now known. This makes the distinction even
: *less* useful.
Mind you Dennett's "result" is predicated upon the claim that some
evolutionary/teleological account of intentionality is the way to go.
This view does have its detractors. One problem is precisely the one
you raised: the functions of a computer's internal states are not
determined by evolution. Therefore, the teleological story seems to
rule out *by fiat* that computers can't have intentional states.
: >That's what Searle's CR argument is designed to show, that no purely
: >formal system can understand.
: At which purpose it is inadequate. It seems to only "convince"
: those that already feel that to be the case.
Agreed.
: >: What particular process actually *constitutes* "really understanding"
: >: why one is doing somehting?
: >to other things; calculators can't do these things (yet). So far, then,
: >I'm pretty much forced into an operational criterion for understanding,
: >loosely speaking.
: >
: Hmm, this is beginning to sound as if some of the more sophisticated
: math assistant programs (perhaps Mathematica?) may approach
: "understanding" addition then, as at least some of them they can
: explain what they are doing.
Perhaps. But, if Mathematica (f'rinstance) can't explain some of the
words and phrases it uses to "explain" what it's doing, then I'd be
less than willing to say it understands. Producing a set of "canned"
responses (as I would imagine programs like this do) is not sufficient.
AC