On 9/28/2020 3:09 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
> olcott <
No...@nowhere.com> wrote:
>> On 9/24/2020 3:08 PM, David Kleinecke wrote:
>>> On Thursday, September 24, 2020 at 10:58:05 AM UTC-7, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 9/24/2020 11:42 AM, David Kleinecke wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Yes this is different.
>
>>>>>>>> @MM:? I hope you're not assuming that because PO says something,
>>>>>>>> that he must have a clue what he's talking about - he doesn't.?
>>>>>>>> :)
>
>>>>>>> The key thing to discredit is ad homimen attacks like this one,
>>>>>>> they are specifically named errors of reasoning.
>>>>>>>
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem
>
>>>>>> You are making a very common mistake. MT is not making an
>>>>>> argument, so there is no logical fallacy. He is pointing out that
>>>>>> you don't know what you are talking about. Obviously, that is
>>>>>> essentially an opinion, but he is not trying to refute some
>>>>>> argument of yours by saying it. He is advising someone against
>>>>>> taking your comments at face value.
>
>>>>>> Unless you have finally worked though Mendelson's explanation of
>>>>>> truth, I suspect you still don't know what mathematicians mean by
>>>>>> it, so no one should take what you say about it as in any way
>>>>>> authoritative.
>
>>>>> Speaking as a mathematician the problem with trying to do
>>>>> mathematics in what some philosophers whom PO follows have called
>>>>> "deductive inference" is that one cannot do proofs by
>>>>> contradiction.
>
>>>>> Consider the largest prime theorem. It starts out "Assume there is
>>>>> a largest prime called P". But one cannot reason in the "deductive"
>>>>> manner using P because P is false. And the proof fails.
>
>>>>> Somebody may have contrived a way around this difficulty but I do
>>>>> not claim to know all the literature.
>
>
>>>> To the best of my current knowledge provability remains that same
>>>> under valid deductive inference, the only thing that changes is the
>>>> determination of true conclusions under the sound deductive
>>>> inference model. In this case true(x) and unprovable(x) is
>>>> impossible.
>
>>>> Any reasoning the derives True(X) and Unprovable(X) means that the
>>>> argument having X as a conclusion is both sound and invalid.
>
>>>> We can derive that it is true that (x) is unprovable. What we cannot
>>>> derive under the sound deductive inference model is that expressions
>>>> claiming that they themselves are unprovable are true, even though
>>>> they are provably unprovable because provability is an aspect of
>>>> their truth and without it they are not true.
>
>>> Tell me how I can continue the largest prime theorem proof by "Form
>>> the product of all primes less than P" when P is false and therefore
>>> an illegal argument.
>
>
>> I don't really know jack about any of that.
>
> You really ought to. It is a classic piece of our cultural heritage.
>
> A prime number is one like 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, ..... that cannot
> be evenly divided by anything other than itself or 1.
>
> Euclid proved that there is no largest prime number. His argument went
> as follows:
>
> Suppose there is a largest prime number P. Then we can form the number Q
> = 2 x 3 x 5 x 7 x ... x P + 1. (Note the + 1 on the end). Q is not
> divisible by 2 or 3 or 5 or ... or P, since it has a remainder of 1 when
> divided by any of these primes. Since Q is not divisible by any of the
> primes 2, ... , P, it must either be a prime itself or divisible by a
> prime larger than P. Either of these possibilities contradicts the
> supposition that P was the largest prime. Hence we have a proof by
> contradiction that there is no largest prime.
>
>>> You have a reference or anything like that for your assumption that
>>> provability is the same in a deductive context?
>
>> Consider me an aspiring meta-logician, not a mathematician.
>
>> I only really care about the architectural design of the upper
>> ontology of ontological engineering as this directly pertains to the
>> notion of analytical truth formalized syntactically.
>
>> Tarski got it wrong, Gödel, got it wrong, and I will soon show that
>> Turing got it wrong too.
>
> These things seem unlikely. If these mathematicians had "got it wrong",
> that would have been noticed in the many decades between the publishing
> of their papers and now.
I just proved that the simplest possible version of Gödel's G that he
himself referred to in his own paper both meets the definition of
incompleteness:
A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ such
that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ).
and meets this definition only because it is infinitely recursive, thus
ill-formed:
We are therefore confronted with a proposition which
asserts its own unprovability. page 40
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
This sentence cannot be proved:
G := ~Provable(G)
00 ~
01 Provable (00)
The directed graph is its relations to its constituent parts has an
infinite cycle.
The logical definition operator:
x := y means x is defined to be another name for y
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols
In the same way that the #define of C/C++ can specify self-reference and
thus infinite recursion the logical definition operator can specify
self-reference and thus infinite recursion.
3.10.5 Self-Referential Macros
A self-referential macro is one whose name appears in its definition.
Recall that all macro definitions are rescanned for more macros to
replace. If the self-reference were considered a use of the macro, it
would produce an infinitely large expansion.
...
#define foo (4 + foo)
where foo is also a variable in your program.
Following the ordinary rules, each reference to foo will expand into (4
+ foo); then this will be rescanned and will expand into (4 + (4 +
foo)); and so on until the computer runs out of memory.
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/cpp/Self-Referential-Macros.html