A WARNING : UVIRA AND RWANDA’S DE FACTO ANNEXATION OF EASTERN DRC

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A WARNING : UVIRA AND RWANDA’S DE FACTO ANNEXATION OF EASTERN DRC

Washington DC, 10 December 2025.

Theogene RUDASINGWA

Co-Founder, Rwanda Truth Commission

Former Ambassador of Rwanda to United States

The capture of the town of Uvira by the Rwanda-backed M23 movement in December 2025 should end any lingering illusions about the nature of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. This was not an accident of war, a local rebellion gone awry, or a temporary violation of a fragile peace. It was a strategic act in a long-running project of de facto annexation by proxy, carried out in plain sight and met with little more than ritual expressions of concern.

Uvira is not an obscure outpost. Located on Lake Tanganyika, bordering Burundi and connected to Tanzania and Zambia, it is a commercial, logistical, and administrative hub. Its fall effectively dismantles what remained of Congolese state authority across much of South Kivu. That this occurred days after Rwanda and the DRC signed yet another U.S.-brokered agreement should not surprise anyone. For years, diplomacy has marched forward on paper while territory has been lost on the ground.

To understand why Uvira matters, one must look beyond the immediate headlines. Congo’s vulnerability did not begin with M23. It has deep historical roots—beginning with King Leopold II’s violent appropriation of the Congo, continuing through Belgian colonial extraction, and later through the Cold War dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, sustained by Western powers in the name of stability. Over decades, the Congolese state was hollowed out, its institutions weakened, and its sovereignty reduced to form rather than substance.

The post-1994 era added a new and decisive layer. The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was a monumental failure of the international community. In the aftermath, Western governments sought redemption by embracing the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its leader, Paul Kagame, as indispensable partners. Rwanda received sustained military, diplomatic, and financial support, often insulated from rigorous scrutiny. Over time, that protection extended beyond Rwanda’s borders.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Rwanda intervened repeatedly in eastern Congo—sometimes directly, more often through armed proxies. United Nations experts documented these interventions and their links to illicit mineral networks. Yet accountability remained elusive. From this permissive environment emerged M23, no longer a transient insurgency but an organized force that occupies territory, collects taxes, administers populations, and integrates captured areas into cross-border economic systems aligned with Kigali.

Seen in this context, Uvira’s capture is not incidental. It is consolidation. It confirms that what is unfolding in eastern Congo is no longer merely instability but territorial reconfiguration by force, carried out incrementally and denied rhetorically.

The implications reach far beyond Congo. Eastern DRC has entered a condition of permanent humanitarian emergency. Civilians are displaced repeatedly, not episodically. Aid agencies substitute for governance while insecurity makes recovery impossible. Over time, suffering becomes normalized. Violence loses its capacity to shock.Regionally, the consequences are profound. The East African Community’s promise of integration and collective security rings hollow when a member state can dismantle a neighbor’s territory with impunity. African continental institutions—the African Union and SADC—lose moral authority when they reaffirm sovereignty without enforcing it. The United Nations, after decades of peacekeeping through MONUSCO, must confront an uncomfortable truth: neutrality in the face of asymmetric aggression increasingly resembles passivity.

Western powers, particularly the United States, also face a growing credibility gap. The contrast between the robust defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and the restrained response to Congo is difficult to justify. In both cases, borders are being altered by force. Yet only one has triggered sanctions, massive security assistance, and unequivocal political clarity. This selectivity undermines claims of a universal rules-based order.

Restoring Congolese sovereignty will not be easy, but it is possible. It requires moving beyond managing conflict toward enforcing consequences. Targeted sanctions against individuals and networks enabling proxy warfare, conditioning military cooperation, enforcing conflict-mineral regulations, and strengthening Congolese defensive capacity under strict oversight are necessary first steps. Peacekeeping mandates must be reoriented to restore state authority rather than freeze rebel gains.

Constraining Rwanda’s regional aggression does not require regime change in Kigali by foreigners. Overcoming dictatorship in Rwanda is primarily the responsibility of Rwandan citizens. The international community can change the dynamics and incentives that fuel Kagame’s impunity and aggression. Political repression at home and military adventurism abroad are mutually reinforcing. Targeted sanctions, legal accountability mechanisms, protection of exiled dissidents from transnational repression, and conditional engagement tied to concrete human rights improvements can raise the cost of continued aggression.

Uvira is more than a town lost. It is a warning. If de facto annexation by proxy is allowed to continue unchecked in Congo, Africa’s foundational norm against changing borders by force will erode further. And if the international community continues to manage instability instead of confronting it, Congo will not remain an exception—it will become the precedent.