Re: Section 80 Kendrick Download
Mirthe Luria
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The cover art shows a bird's-eye view from Google Maps of Drake's Toronto residence, known as "The Embassy", with markers supposedly representing the locations of sex offenders. On Google Maps, fans of Lamar reacted to the song by tagging Drake's residence with labels, including "Owned by Kendrick".
The security guard line from the Impact section has been removed since it did not comply with the requirements to be included in the "impact" section. That must have definitely been a stan who added that.
Not shook on the fact that there is an impact section to the Wiki article. Any action, event, trend, etc. that is heavily or prominently influenced by an album, song, or artist goes into the Impact section on its/their respective article.
Motorists can expect 15 months of construction work on Bagby Avenue now that the $10.1 million project is underway to reconstruct it from H-E-B on South Valley Mills Drive to Kendrick Elementary School.
Crews with contractor Knife River began work last week on a section of Bagby near the supermarket. The project will result in a full-width reconstruction of the aging roadway, new sidewalks, new drainage infrastructure, replacement of city utilities and relocation of private utilities.
Knife River is working with Waco-based engineering firm BGE Inc. on the road construction. Meanwhile, Waco Independent School District is preparing to raze Kendrick Elementary and replace it by fall 2025 with a $47 million school.
WATCH NOW: Kendrick Elementary School turned 71 on Monday, and former students, their friends and family and well-wishers turned out en masse to wish the old place goodbye and best wishes before it is replaced. (November 2023)
One of the office managers of those businesses said she has not seen an actual reduction in clients due to the street being closed. Many clients are late for their appointments, she said. But that is easier to work around than losing clients.
The project will be staged to rebuild half the width of the roadway at a time, leaving enough room for traffic to flow in both directions, then switching over to the other half, Reed said previously. Some full-lane closures may be unavoidable, but a key goal is to produce the least disturbance for people living along Bagby Avenue between the retail plaza and the school.
The density of homes along the stretch is significant, but engineers have been working with residents on how construction near their property will be handled, Reed said previously. It is possible some fences residents have built on city property will be taken down as needed, but the city will pay to rebuild them, he said.
The Court has reviewed the motions, the memoranda of law submitted in support thereof, the responses thereto, the record, and the law, and has heard oral argument of counsel for the parties. Having been fully advised in the premises, it is thereupon
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, for reasons as are more fully set forth in this Court's Memorandum Opinion which follows, that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, in its own right and as converted into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., is GRANTED[1]. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
This is an action by a Michigan contractor for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and under Florida law. The undisputed facts are that Plaintiff was the second lowest bidder on one contract for the construction of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Water Supply and Transmission Line. The Invitation for Bids (IFB) provided, in pertinent part:
Plaintiff filed its notice of protest with Defendant Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority (FKAA), and, on October 19, 1981, an administrative hearing was held on Higgins' complaint that the above-quoted language in the I-F bid constituted a "condition" and did not amount to an "informality or minor defect" waivable by FKAA. Higgins claimed that it could have submitted a lower bid had it submitted a bid conditional on the award of two or more contracts to include Contract 3 because of the economies of scale arising out of the award of two or more contracts. The FKAA denied Higgins' protest.
In addition to filing the instant action, Higgins had appealed the FKAA's decision to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal. The District Court of Appeal reached its decision on February 1, 1983, by per curiam affirming the decision of the FKAA in denying Higgins' protest.
*128 Before the state appellate court had reached its decision, however, Plaintiff filed the action now pending before this Court. The first count of the Plaintiff's complaint alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, Higgins claims that it had a property interest in the expectation of the lowest bidder whose bid was in full compliance with the IFB to be awarded Contract 3 once the FKAA exercised its discretion to make an award and that this property interest was taken from it by the Defendant state administrative agency.
The second count of the complaint raises numerous violations of Florida law in that the FKAA's acceptance of I-F's bid violated the competitive bidding requirements of state law. In view of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, however, Plaintiff conceded in its response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that the state claims "could no longer be ethically advanced" leaving only the section 1983 claim for resolution.
Higgins contends that the law of Florida created in Higgins a property interest the expectation of the lowest responsible bidder whose bid was in full compliance with the terms of the IFB to be awarded Contract 3 once the FKAA exercised its discretion to make an award protected by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Higgins argues that although the FKAA had complete discretion as to whether to make an award, the same statute circumscribed the exercise of that discretion to make an award in that it required the award to be made to the lowest responsible bidder. Chap. 76-441, 36, Laws of Florida.
Plaintiff relies mostly on the Three Rivers case. That case involved an action by a disappointed bidder for the cable television contract in Pittsburgh. That city, pursuant to its decision to solicit bids for a cable television contract, enacted an ordinance to regulate the prospective cable system and to provide the basic contract terms and specifications the bidders must meet. The ordinance further provided that all bids must meet the construction and service specifications set forth in the ordinance as a prerequisite to consideration for award of the contract. In stating its claim under section 1983, plaintiff alleged that its competitor, which was eventually awarded the contract, (1) failed in a significant and material respect to comply with the bid requirements of the city ordinance and (2) thereafter, met privately with certain officials for the purpose of amending the bid deficiencies.
The court initially concluded that there can be no property interest in the procedures themselves; that is, the plaintiff did not possess a property interest "in the adherence by council to the procedures outlined" by the ordinances. Instead, the protected *129 property interest "is to be found in the benefit whose enjoyment is sought to be regulated by the procedure; namely, the award of the contract."
Turning to the facts, the Three Rivers court concluded that while plaintiff substantially complied with the bidding procedures, plaintiff's competitor violated the procedures in several respects. Thus, in the terminology of Roth, while the plaintiff conformed with the "existing rules or understandings" of the bidding procedure, from which the expected benefit emanated, plaintiff's competitor did not conform with the "existing rules or understandings" but actually received the benefit defined by those rules or understandings. As the court concluded:
Two other district courts have interpreted and followed the Three Rivers case. In Kendrick, supra, a disappointed bidder for a city tow-in contract filed a section 1983 claim against the city which awarded the contract to a competitor. The court there agreed with the conclusions reached in Three Rivers but denied plaintiff relief on grounds that there was no showing that the competitor's bid did not comply with the bidding specifications. In Teleprompter of Erie, supra, the court agreed with its sister court's Three Rivers decision in holding that the plaintiff stated a sufficient claim to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff relies heavily on the Three Rivers rationale in support of its position. However, it is clear that the instant case bears a closer resemblance to the Kendrick case, at least after the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal. The Kendrick court, while agreeing with the analysis of Three Rivers, found that, in contrast with Three Rivers, the plaintiff had failed to show material non-compliance with the bidding procedures by the successful bidder. This was one of the "unique factual allegations" that was dispositive in Three Rivers. If the Third District Court of Appeal had already found, implicit in its affirmance of the FKAA's denial of violation of competitive bidding requirements of state law, that I-F's bid did not significantly fail to comply with the bidding requirements of state law, then that finding might collaterally estop a different finding by this Court.
The findings of fact of the FKAA administrative tribunal were entered under a preponderance of the evidence standard, Florida Department of H.R.S. v. Career Service Com., 289 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Fitzpatrick v. Miami Beach, 328 So. 2d 578 *130 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). This standard is, of course, distinct and different from the substantial evidence standard for review employed by the Third District Court of Appeal in its affirmance of the FKAA's decision. Re: Baldridge's Estate, 74 So. 2d 658 (Fla.1954). Nevertheless, the Third District Court of Appeal has found, implicit in its affirmance of the FKAA's decision, that the FKAA's use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in reaching its findings of fact was not in error, and that court (the appellate court) had before it the same record that this Court has before it today.
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