JohnEB
unread,Dec 10, 2010, 11:23:44 AM12/10/10Sign in to reply to author
Sign in to forward
You do not have permission to delete messages in this group
Either email addresses are anonymous for this group or you need the view member email addresses permission to view the original message
to Classical Physics
Stephen Greener, on the Hydrino listserver, presented a very
insightful description of the old HSG. It reminded me of another
insightful description. Joseph Agassi, in the Foreword to Mendel
Sachs book "Einstein Versus Bohr" explains the difference between
"shop window" science as presented by Dr. Mills' detractors and
"workshop" science as presented by Dr. Mills:
"Foreword
In any introduction to modern philosophy in general or to the theory
of knowledge in particular, two candidates for the foundations of
science are presented: the a priori and the a posteriori (meaning the
before and the after, meaning before experience and after experience,
the deductive and the inductive, the axiomatic and the empirical).
They lead respectively to the deductive and the inductive styles of
presentation. And philosophers traditionally debate the pros and cons
of each of the two proposed views. Now how does one debate pros and
cons, deductively or inductively? Indeed, in most presentations,
whether deductive or inductive, including even Euclid's Elements, one
comes to a point where our authors leave the style of their choice and
break into debate. Debate, then, has its own style. It is called
hypothetic-deductive or, more generally, the dialectical or the
argumentative, or still more generally, the problem-oriented.
Most books follow the inductive or the deductive style, and more often
than not, a mixture of these. Few authors employ the dialectic style,
so very useful at all junctions of scientific revolutions, beginning
with Galileo's Dialogues and ending with the problem-oriented works of
Einstein and Schrodinger.
Sachs has made a valid observation: most popular science presentations
avoid problems, or present problems only after they have been solved
to the satisfaction of all concerned. Personally, I think there is
room for a broader complaint. Often individuals who have graduated
with flying colors prove to be utter failures as graduate students, or
have severe emotional and intellectual breakdowns out of which they
may emerge entirely transformed in order to be able to continue as
graduate students. This suggests that what is required of a successful
undergraduate does not suffice to qualify one as a research student.
This is what Sachs views as an insult to the intelligence of that
student. And how right he is.
It is traditional within science to have a tidy shop window and a
messy workshop. The individual who graduates well as a science student
but is not qualified, or not yet qualified, to work in the scientific
research workshop is one who has been thoroughly convinced that
science is orderly---inductive, deductive or both— but not the mess of
the problem-oriented workshop. The tradition of equating science with
the shop window is understandable; it began in the days when science
faced hostility and needed strong arguments to recruit novices
dedicated to its cause. It is no doubt paradoxical to invite people to
the workshop by pretending that science is all shop window. But the
paradox is soluble in practice. The non-scientific world outside is
impressed by success. The impressed outsider is slowly drawn in and
invited to see that success is the outcome of challenge, is challenged
to visit the workshop and at times is challenged by some item noticed
only in the workshop, and then the visitor settles down in the
workshop.
In truth, however, the division between shop window and workshop is an
artifact; in reality each item is double-faced, one face successful,
one problematic. These days every really challengeable individual must
recognize that, and the obstacle to this recognition is the fear that
when the shop window is destroyed, the ammunition science has against
its enemies is lost. Perhaps. But then, science has no real enemies
these days, and anyway, the internal concerns of science are more
important than those of its public relations.
For the two sets of concerns do clash. when a newcomer to scientific
education is troubled by some weak aspect or rough edge of science as
presented to the public—say in the classroom of the undergraduate
science class--then the old-timers have two choices: they may insist
on discussing the shop window until the newcomers graduate and then
allow them a view of the workshop; or they may admit openly that
science is all workshop and that every shop window item is also a
workshop item. Here, Mendel Sachs's observation signifies that the
concealment of the workshop is an insult.
It is a simple empirical fact that a problem-oriented presentation is
much easier to comprehend than either a deductive or an inductive one.
Presenters who are frank about the shortcomings of the material they
present make better sense to their public and are able to direct the
public's attention to where they think the action is, while
postponing, if need be, discussion of some other problematic aspects
of the materials they present. Doing this acknowledges that we cannot
solve all problems at once; we always have to postpone attending to
some problems while we attend to other problems.
When I was a student of physics I was troubled by the difficulties
presented and aired by Sachs in this book. Both the physicists and the
philosophers of science to whom I confessed my troubles—as clearly as
I could--showed me hostility rather than sympathy. I had earlier
experienced the same from my religious teachers, so that I was not
crushed by the hostility, but I was discouraged from pursuing my
scientific interests. This book has returned me to those days and
reminded me of the tremendous joys I experienced then, reading
Einstein and Schrodinger and meeting Karl Popper and Alfred Lande. All
four expressed, one way or another, the same sentiment as Sachs:
feeling difficulties about current ideas should be encouraged, not
discouraged.
Perhaps I am biased as a result. For I share the view of Lande and
Popper about a major problem in contemporary physics. Most physicists
today are indeterminists and subjectivists. I will not explain these
terms here, since Sachs does that extremely well in this book. The
minority, including Einstein, Schrodinger, Bohm, and Sachs, are
determinists and, of course, objectivists. Can one consistently be an
objectivist and an indeterminist? Lande and Popper say yes. And I hope
that they are right. But the most important thing is not so much the
correctness of a view but its rationality. For all the above views are
well-known, and each of them has many adherents, some learned and some
ignorant. Learned adherents of an erroneous view are preferable to
ignorant adherents of a view which may be right, yet which they adhere
to not because it is right but simply because they are ignorant and
because of some arbitrary choice or some chance in their lives. The
learned who are in error may learn more and improve, but the ignorant
hold their views for no good reason and then may change them for
reasons which are no better.
The problem-oriented approach is thus the best. And when we come to
contemporary physics it is essential. For, it is essential to present
competing solutions side by side and compare them. Using books each of
which presents its author's own ideas will not do, since the slightest
variations in meanings of key terms may cause the greatest
difficulties. At times, as Sachs shows, authors write at cross-
purposes because terms such as the term `hidden variable' have diverse
meanings in diverse contexts.
I do not mean to say that Sachs adjudicates correctly even concerning
accepted terminology. Even his discussion of hidden variables may be
criticized on account of his strict use of the term; I cannot say. Yet
at least he is clear. Concerning hidden variables there is the
celebrated proof—von Neumann's proof—of their exclusion from quantum
theory. Every time I raised a difficulty with quantum theory I was
told to read von Neumann's book. His proof and his book are repeatedly
mentioned in the vast literature on the trouble with quantum theory.
There is never reference to a page number, or even to a chapter
number, where the proof is given. I confess to having studied the book
very carefully both by myself and together with two famous students of
the matter, Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend. I still remember the long
evenings the three of us spent together in an effort to find the proof
in that book. At least for myself I can say that I failed. I
challenged a few scholars to tell me where that proof is or to restate
it to me. One of them, Abner Shimony, whose contribution to the study
of hidden variables is by now so very justly famous, once conceded to
me in a conversation that he had attempted to meet my challenge and
failed, and then took it back in another conversation, in which he
claimed that his concession was due to my having confused him. Well,
all is well that ends well.
Sachs offers a proof which is clear, easy to follow and possibly
correct. This will force the profession, if anything will, to consider
this book seriously as offering an important clarification of a major
item in a classical dispute. And those who find fault with Sachs's
presentation I now challenge to publish a criticism and preferably
also a correction. This is the road to progress.
I have mentioned only two items on which this book is usefully
informative: determinism versus subjectivism and von Neumann's
theorem. But the book is full of clarifications, presented by the use
of the problem-oriented or dialectical style. It is a fascinating
study by any reasonable standard, but especially the standard of the
problem-oriented dialectician; it deserves careful scrutiny and, of
course, correction. It will help keep the debate moving and help to
destroy the barrier between shop window and workshop—which happens to
be the same barrier as that between by-stander and active researcher.
In this book, as in those of Einstein, Schrodinger, Lande, and Popper,
the reader can stand close to the anvil and see the sparks flying
while the workers forge their tools.
JOSEPH AGASSI
Tel-Aviv University and York University, Toronto"