For List Members who have access to the Journal of Transatlantic Studies
through their librairies, three recent articles of interest (with abstracts)
:
1)
Author: |
Jespersen, T.
Christopher |
Title: |
China in Anglo-American
relations: the Cairo Conference, November 22–26 and December 2–7,
1943 |
Journal: |
Journal of Transatlantic Studies,
18 - 1 Date: 2020 Pages: 1-18
https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00038-6 |
China’s participation in the Cairo Conference in late
November and early December 1943 served as a highwater mark for China’s
diplomatic standing during World War Two. Spurred by President Roosevelt’s wish
to elevate China and Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek’s international standing to
one of the “Big Four” allies along with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, Chiang sought to make the most of his first,
and only, appearance on the international war-time stage by pressing for China’s
interests to be addressed. Assisted by American General Joseph Stilwell, Chiang
pushed for the Americans and British to commit to a major military operation in
Burma in addition to a long list of requests. However much Roosevelt wished to
honor the Chinese requests, he came up against British resistance, and although,
by this time, the Americans were contributing far more to the fighting of the
war, the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill, between the Americans and
the British, took precedence over any and all Chinese needs. Cairo may have
marked the peak of China’s international influence during the war, but it failed
to overcome the far greater bond that connected the USA and Great Britain.
2)
‘Churchill’ has been used as a powerful lure in US
collective memory on questions of military intervention and defiance. While the
history of Winston Churchill is extensive and complicated the image of him in US
collective memory has been reduced to a narrower image and understanding of him
set around resolution, defiance, individual heroism as an antidote to the
discourses and memories of appeasement. US presidents have a proclivity to reach
for a memorable phrase or quotation from Churchill when considering questions of
defiance and intervention. While the common aphorism suggests that lessons from
the past that are unlearned will be repeated, it does not engage the issue of
memory. Collective memory, as opposed to history, provides a consciousness that
can be used by speechwriters and presidents to galvanise, define and motivate
public opinion under particular circumstances.
3)
Author: |
Cross,
Graham |
Title: |
‘Command of the air’: Alfred T.
Mahan, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill and an Anglo-American
personal diplomacy of air power |
Journal: |
Journal of Transatlantic Studies,
19 - 1 Date: 2021 Pages: 27-53
https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-020-00063-w |
Explanations of the importance of Allied air power
during World War II often look to the supporting military theorists such as Gen.
William L. Mitchell and Marshal Hugh Trenchard to explain the rhetoric, if not
the reality, of the air campaign. These theorists and their military acolytes
undoubtedly had a significant impact on the deployment of air power, but they
had much less to say on its use as a diplomatic tool. Study of both Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill demonstrates that they had a sophisticated
appreciation of how to use air power to achieve their foreign policy goals
within the realm of personal diplomacy. For both Roosevelt and Churchill, the
origin of this appreciation lay in their early experiences of political office
and particularly in their exposure to the work of naval strategist Capt. Alfred
T. Mahan. As wartime national leaders, both came to share a discourse of
personal air power diplomacy acting to simultaneously refine, challenge and
reinforce each other’s conceptions. Viewed in this light, clear Anglo-American
fields of cooperation in deterrence, coercion, persuasion and moral diplomacy
emerge. Closer examination of this Anglo-American discourse and exchange adds to
our understanding of the role of personal air power diplomacy at the national
level in this era. It also brings into relief both the consensus and tensions
surrounding air power within the Anglo-American wartime alliance. Ultimately, it
suggests that there was a good deal of continuity in the personal air power
diplomacy of both leaders as they strove to integrate atomic weapons into their
calculations and confronted the developing Cold War.
................
With all best wishes,
Antoine CAPET, FRHistS
Professor emeritus of British Studies
University of Rouen
76821 Mont-Saint-Aignan
France
'Britain since 1914' Section Editor
Royal Historical Society Bibliography
Reviews Editor of CERCLES
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