SPRING 1966 LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (LRRP)
Chinese Bandit 13
Conners (Chinese Bandit 13)
A Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol was formed from members of the 1st
Bn (ABN) 8th Cav Recon platoon and attached to division headquarters
in the spring of 1966 as directed by the Department of Defense where
seven LRRP teams from the US Army Special Forces, US Marine Corps,
Navy and other Army units were established to conduct simultaneous
patrols within the Republic of Vietnam.
The Chinese Bandit six man team members were SSG Robert Grimes (Acting
Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon), SGT Jerry Conners, Keijo
Hyvonen, Frank Bishop, Louis Tyler, and Terry Stevens. The first long
range patrol was conducted along a 75 mile route adjacent to the
Cambodian and Laotian borders for a period of twelve days and was
performed while the other DOD directed teams performed LRRP patrols in
other portions of Vietnam. The major objective of the patrol was to
locate North Vietnamese positions that had been reported along the
border and to obtain specific essential elements of information that
included descriptions of the enemy's uniforms, weapons, communication
and other equipment and the presence of any Caucasian personnel.
We wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle
fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues and 'tiger
fatigues'. All members wore patrol caps, LBE with two canteens, two
ammo pouches containing four magazines each, one butt pack and carried
M-16 rifles (taped with slings removed) with bayonets. Two members of
the patrol also wore NVA captured rucksacks. Only one 35mm camera and
two sets of binoculars and one small IR device were carried. The first
LRRP rations were issued and each member carried six after removing
the outer package and discarding everything except the main dehydrated
meal. We intended to only eat one meal every other day and our diet
was supplemented by a variety of foods including 'jungle chocolate
candy bars'. Only one PRC-25 radio was carried; however, a vertical
half-rhombic antenna was assembled in addition to the two other
standard antennas. Only one SOI was carried and used to prepare the
coded daily reports what were transmitted. No fragmentation grenades
were carried and only two smoke grenades, one by both Grimes and
myself. I carried the only signal mirror and a single VS17 air panel
to assist in any emergency extraction. Several of us wore the 101st
Recondo School taped soap dish containing sutures, morphine and other
emergency medical items secured to our LBE harness. All members of the
patrol had a wound piece of '550 chord' secured to our harness with a
2000 pound tensile strength snap link.
SSG Grimes and I drove a jeep to Division G-2 where captured NVA
equipment was stacked in front of the entrance. We were given a
briefing that included descriptions of the area we were to patrol and
the locations of suspected NVA regimental CPs. We were instructed to
recommend and plot our routes and request for pre-arranged fire
support after Grimes completed his low aerial reconnaissance of the
area in an OH-13. Grimes and I returned to the Battalion area and
tentatively selected the routes and observation points from the
supplied topographic maps and aerial photographs. We gave the LRRP
patrol members a warning order prior to Grimes performing the
reconnaissance flight. Upon his return we discussed what he had
observed and updated our information on the area but did not alter our
intended routes. The entire patrol participated in the preparation of
the operations order that was later given by SSG Grimes. There were no
rehearsals performed and the time prior to departure was spent
studying maps and checking equipment.
We were inserted about two hours before nightfall using one UH-1 that
made only one descent and hover for unloading located near an active
and believed to be safe farming area located about 2.5 km east of the
area where we would be operating. The actual LZ was located north of
the area at coordinates 48PYA554597 and this area had been evaluated
for enemy activity during Grimes' observation flight and by the low
level photo reconnnaissance performed by the Air Force. No enemy
contact was anticipated and none were encountered. We moved rapidly
into the tree covered mountains at the southern limit of the patrol
area and proceeded northward along the border and through the night to
our first observation and study area (hilltop 847) and arrived prior
to BMAT. We had previously conducted numerous three day patrols,
including those along the Cambodia border, where we had located and
cleared a NVA Regimental CP and hospital; however the terrain had not
been as steep but our navigation skills and physical conditioning
enabled us to move quickly.
Movement, consisting of rapidly walking (routinely 3 km/hour)point to
point routes for approximately 18 hours, was intended to be limited to
late evening and night navigation with daily situation reports made in
the early morning to airborne Air Force aircraft from positions
selected on mountain tops that afforded the opportunity to observe
long distances. Rising smoke from what was believed to be cooking
fires was plotted on the topographic maps that we carried; however,
the planned patrol route was not altered and these sightings were not
evaluated from close range. We remained on well worn and narrow trails
during most of the movements between observation points. We did not
expect the enemy to establish ambush sites or set out mines and booby
traps in these areas that were believed to be only occupied by NVA
troops. On several occasions we discovered enemy boot prints at stream
and trail junctions but not along the trail routes that we were
following. We wore issued jungle boots and altered our routes to avoid
trails having damp and soft surfaces where our boots would have made
an impression in the soil. This was difficult to achieve during night
movement but when I checked our trail when doubling back during
temporary halts, we managed to do well at leaving no signs of our
passing.
After about a week of patrolling, an emergency extraction was
necessary when Tyler became unconscious with a malaria fever. At the
risk of compromising our location, we requested a single UH-1 to a
small tree lined hilltop where we used a rope hoist secured to Tyler's
snap link to lift him from a large rock outcropping to the skids of
the hovering helicopter where the crew were able to grab and lift him
onboard. After the aircraft departed, we moved quickly along a narrow
trail down to a valley and up to another mountain ridge where we 'lay-
dogged' until nightfall and then resumed our patrol as planned.
We were able to zig-sag along our planned routes and complete the
daily observation reports from the pre-selected observation points.
Close enemy observation was only made on the last day of the patrol
where we were to be extracted by two UH-1s from an area located in the
northern limits of the patrol area. Eight NVA were found gathering
firewood with their rifles leaning against one tree. That encounter
will be described in a separate writing.
We were extracted by two UH-1s from a LZ which we had occupied for the
entire morning. The areas and trails leading into the LZ were reconned
by different team members and we were certain that no enemy troops
were within several miles of the LZ. The UH-1s arrived mid-day and on
time and we dove aboard the helicopters and returned to base camp
where we requested and were given ice cream, milk and different meals
while we prepared our combined de-briefing report that was given by
Grimes to G-2 and other division staff late that afternoon. No other
LRRP members accompanied him. When he returned, he informed us that
everyone was surprised that we had not become lost since the other six
teams had more difficulty navigating. When he and I were alone, he
asked, "Would you like to dye your skin brown, put on black pajamas
and parachute into North Vietnam?" "We have a chance to be the first
'Sting-Ray' team.