Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team Short Duration Patrolling
Chinese Bandit 13
8th Cav in January 1966...RANGER
Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.
Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the 1st Bn
(ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Airborne
Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that
were still under construction in
January 1966. The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct
reconnaissance patrols and establish ambush
positions where the 1st and 2d Scout Squads were designated areas of
operations which where suspected
NVA approach routes to Hong Kong Mountain located near AnKhe; and the
3d Scout Squad (Chinese Bandit
13) was selected for various reconnaissance patrolling duties at
various scattered areas to the
northwest and southwest where enemy movement had been recently
detected. The majority of the scout
squad patrols were intended to be completed in three days and involved
day and night movement and the
selection of one ambush position that was to be determined by the
scout squad leader and based on
detected or suspected enemy use of the area.
The patrols conducted by the Chinese Bandit 13 scout squad required
one day of planning and
preparation and were executed in three or four days, followed by a one
or two day opportunity to visit
the `sights of AnKhe'. Although the patrols were under the direct
control of the scout squad leader,
various squad members were designated as the patrol leader and all
scouts were rotated into positions
that provided them training to sharpen their field leadership skills
in navigation, communications and
general patrolling skills. The designated patrol leader was required
to organize and conduct the
warning and operations orders, rehearsals, and ALL execution phases of
the patrol and prepare the
final debriefing. Frank Spickler, Carlos Hatcher, Frank Cunningham,
Louis Tyler and Raymond Carley
displayed the most interest in the opportunity to being assigned the
patrol leader duties and normally
lead the patrols, the actual 3d Scout Squad Leader, Sergeant Jerry
Conners, accompanied them. The
operations were conducted with the leadership roles performed in the
same manner as students attending
the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools. Participating in the navigation
team was of interest to all
members and Sergeant Conners spent the majority of his time working
with those chosen to determine the
route, construct the terrain table, and perform the point team
navigation role during the patrols. We
had used this training method before the war to prepare their scouts
for the 101st Recondo and Ranger
schools where they were expected to be the honor graduates of their
class and return with the Recondo
guidon and Ranger honor graduate plaque. The skill improvements were
essential and the confidence and
morale of the Chinese Bandit 3d Scout Squad improved significantly
during this period.
Our last in-country parachute training, proficiency pay jumps, were
conducted a month earlier in late
December; however other air assault training was performed during the
period before and after the
patrols. The Chinese Bandits provided the instructors for assault
rappelling refresher training for
the 1st Airborne Brigade. Carlos Hatcher had the most interest in
helicopter operations and was
responsible for maintaining the helicopter rappelling equipment,
including wire rope, clamps, anchor
rings, 2000lb tensile snap links and 3000+ lb tensile strength green
rope (and sections cut into Swiss
seats) and a roll of white `glacier' rope having a lesser stretch
factor. The equipment was stored in
one of our conex containers near our Jumping Mustangs LZ located
downhill from our tents at AnKhe.
Hatcher was an 11th Air Assault trained and designated rappelling
jumpmaster and rigged the two UH-1s
that we used to conduct refresher training; and performed the
jumpmaster duties on one of the
helicopters during the actual rappelling. The 227th Aviation Battalion
regularly provided helicopter
support and the crews were experienced in day and night helicopter
rappelling. Their helicopters would
begin to overheat after about thirty minutes and required `dropping
the ropes and going for a cooling
run'. Although not an aviator but having established an excellent
working relationship with the flight
crews while in the 11th Air Assault, Hatcher was occasionally allowed
to sit in the co-pilots seat
during these short low level flights and permitted to fly the
helicopter. The flights lasted only ten
minutes but were the highlight of Hatcher's involvement in the
training. He was scheduled to attend
the Army's flight school and took every opportunity to volunteer in
our pathfinder and other air
assault duties but was killed at Bon Song a month later. He normally
served as our rear security man
and fought at the right side of the scout squad leader when engaged
with the enemy and had done so
since December 27, 1965 when the Chinese Bandits were fired upon
during an air assault near Pleiku. As
the last man in movement, his appearance in the assault formation was
confirmation that all men were
on line and could provide an explanation when they were not. He could
perform any scout duty well but
was indispensable in many. He, Raymond Carley and Frank Spickler
(ex-11th Air Assault Recon) designed
and ordered the Chinese Bandit Sudden Death cobra pocket patches and
"calling cards". Neither Hatcher
or Carley lived to see them nor the scroll patch designed later by
Combat Jones; however, visiting
members of the Chinese Bandits place the patches on their graves.
Louis Tyler was the lead point team scout during this period. He had
an eye for anything unusual along
the route and did not hesitate to evaluate anything that alarmed him.
He had a developed interest in
topographic maps and aerial photographs, as did all Chinese Bandit 13
scouts, and took responsibility
for locating the enemy and moving quickly along our route. When I hear
the words to the later released
rock and roll song "Run through the Jungle", I think of him. Then SSG
Robert Grimes, our platoon
leader and platoon sergeant at the time, selected him as a member of
the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team that
conducted the 75 km operation along the northern border of Cambodia in
the spring of 1966. He was the
lead scout on much of that operation but medivaced when he became
unconscious and his fever was
dangerously elevated. We spent many hours together prior to the three
and four-day patrols performing
the topographic map spider drills and creating practice trail sketches
to sharpen our tracking skills.
Tyler had an unusual interest in everything. We have been unable to
locate him or his family, but
continue to try.
Frank Spickler, the 3d Scout Squad Team leader, and second in command
was courageous without a fault.
He attempted to master everything related to conducting day and night
long range patrolling and combat
engagements. His position required that he more frequently serve as
the patrol leader and did so. His
training was something that he chose but focused on navigation and
communications, including fire and
aerial support coordinations and the training of the other Chinese
Bandits. During this period I began
to have confidence in his abilities and believed that Chinese Bandit
13 would perform as well with or
without me. Frank never lost his ability to think and perform in the
most dangerous situations, he
simply gritted his teeth and put `getting the job done' first. The
fact that he survived the Vietnam
war was not something that I expected. During any engagement Spickler
would maneuver himself to get
into the best position to assist the men and our efforts to control
any situation had an imaginary
line that only he and I could see and we both operated on our side of
that line. This arrangement
worked and we both discussed our roles if one of us had been killed
and the adjustment in the chain of
command that would have been necessary. We practiced this combat
change of command during several
drills preparing for the patrols. No one had any doubt that Frank
would take command when it became
time to do so and his standards for performance would be as high and
probably higher than mine. At
times it was difficult to harness his energy but never an unpleasant
experience, only a strong
pressure felt on the reins during enemy contact. Frank would later
spend many months in a hospital and
almost die from a chest wound while serving as an airborne platoon
sergeant in the 101st Airborne
Division.
Terry Stevens was the Chinese Bandit 13 radio operator, somewhat
reluctantly at first since he wanted
to carry the M60 machine gun that was carried when the weapon was
necessary. He carried the PRC- 25
and the field expedient vertical half rhombic in addition to his short
and long antennas and the SOI
tethered about his neck and was developing the ability to know his
position to six digit coordinates
at all times. He was able to accomplish this feat during this period
where we were conducting the
patrols from our base at AnKhe. He would perform a map check at each
ridgeline and mid-valley crossing
and then visualize his position on the map between. He also memorized
the pre-arranged fire and other
critical check point names and locations and could call a fire mission
without consulting his map, or
at least initiate the call and adjust as necessary. The advantage of
his ability to do so was
appreciated by all Chinese Bandits and something that is a pleasure to
remember. Stevens' willingness
and preference to serve as the Chinese Bandit 13 RTO occurred only
when it was apparent that he was a
FO first and RTO second. I rarely actually used the radio, and relied
him to perform all routine radio
transmissions and only did when he thought I might have something to
offer or believed that something
was to be gained by my personally communicating. He prepared every
situation report and I only
confirmed the grid coordinate locations after Stevens and another
scout had completed a confirmation
check. I do not recall him ever making a mistake. Although our
internal SOPs required my checking all
coded messages, I rarely did so and relied totally on Stevens and
another scout to insure that no
errors were made. Stevens was also selected for the Chinese Bandit
LRRP Team and his role as an RTO
was expanded since he was often not in direct contact with either SSG
Grimes or myself. His command
and control responsibilities required an expertise and level of
initiative that was necessary since
separation between LRRP team members was normally deemed essential. He
performed these duties without
any problems occurring. The PRC-25 did not provide the long distance
capability needed during these
short duration patrols; however the Division had aviations assets and
relay equipment that were used
to support our hourly situation reporting requirements. The inherent
danger of not operating with
continuous uninterrupted communication capabilities and unable to
request supporting fires and other
support was apparent to all. We were provided emergency frequencies
for contact with other friendly
forces, however no direct coordinations were or rehearsed with such
units. Operating without
established and continuous communications capabilities was an error
that was not rectified for two
months. Stevens continued to sharpen his RTO and FO skills during this
early combat period and several
months later I recall our running towards each other while he was
initiating a call for fire and only
having to say "SHIFT RIGHT and FIRE FOR EFFECT". Stevens was largely
responsible for our being deadly
on the battlefield.
We have been unable to locate Stevens either. Duke Barrett of the
Chinese Bandit 2d Scout Squad said
several years ago, "your Chinese Bandit 13 scouts came home and
disappeared back into the mountains
where they came from." That may not be true for those scouts that had
been born and raised in cities,
but it may apply to Terry Stevens, ex-11th Air Assault Recon.
Frank Cunningham had been assigned to the Chinese Bandits while we
were conducting the first Cambodia
border operations in early January. He had volunteered for a levy from
his V Corps LRRP unit while
assigned to Germany. Cunningham required little training and only an
adjustment to our procedures and
the terrain. He quickly demonstrated his superior scouting skills and
assisted in training the other
Chinese Bandits in map reading and navigation and specifically route
selection. Cunningham trained and
demonstrated his excellent abilities as the designated patrol leader
and in January it was understood
that if Frank Spickler or I would go down then Cunningham would move
into our leadership position. He
preferred point but was later to assume the rear security role when
Hatcher was killed. Cunningham was
an obvious candidate for the first LRRP team operation along the
Cambodia border but was not selected
to insure the leadership of Chinese Bandit 13 in the event of my
death. Frank Spickler was likewise
prevented from participating in our first 12 day LRRP operation, but
both men would participate in the
second LRRP operation along the border of Laos where we participated
in an evaluation of the NVA's
radio communications capabilities. Cunningham's skill and
determination to perform long-range
reconnaissance operations greatly influenced Chinese Bandit 13 being
selected to perform such roles.
His demeanor was and remains that of a genuine explorer and scout and
the photograph of his Chinese
Bandits aboard the UH-1 prior to an air assault captures the spirit of
Larry Thorne and Robert Rogers
and the Chinese Bandits. He is a reincarnation of Kit Carson.
Glen Winnescheck, a proud Wisconsin Winnebago and at my side earlier
in the year when I had made an
error resulting in the Chinese Bandits being exposed to enemy fire and
were forced to attack and
maneuver from a poor position. I was only able to yell, "enemy to
front, ATTACK". Winnescheck came
flying out of somewhere behind me and into his assigned fighting
position on my left. The next few
seconds occurred without firing our weapons but low crawling and
diving to get into a more favorable
and dominating position and although the Chinese Bandits were online
and advancing at most times
Winnescheck remained ahead of me maneuvering himself which shielded me
to some degree. I was to ask
him later if he had done this to protect me from fire. He did not
answer and I had to say, "You will
answer and I want the truth." He stared defiantly back and answered
quietly "Yes." I did not have to
ask him why and the memory of him awakens strong emotions. Of all the
Chinese Bandits, I was the
closest to Winnescheck. He is dead now, buried on the Reservation and
we need to visit his grave when
the tribe has a ceremony honoring him. It is not uncommon for fighting
men to risk their lives for
another, but it is unusual to be a man who has had the honor of one
doing so for them. In January, I
assumed many of us would die and that Winnescheck would do so at my
side. Winnescheck fought on
quietly during his tour with intense effort and commitment to the
Chinese Bandits and our objective to
help the Vietnamese and was of course wounded but survived the war. I
regret going home and leaving
him in-country alone but with other the Chinese Bandits. At the time
we believed that we were freeing
the oppressed and Winnescheck was committed proudly to that goal. He
conducted himself honorably and
was a gracious and courageous defender of the poor and disadvantaged.
He served as a senior scout but
it was understood that when our roles became more combat then
reconnaissance he would be instrumental
in overcoming the NVA opposition. He was a scout second and a warrior
FIRST.
Big and Little Hall, one in red beret and the other always in the
designated patrol uniform, both men
rotated on point and mastered map reading and navigating. They
performed point duties always as a team
and were wounded early but were instrumental in developing the Chinese
Bandits patrolling techniques
and protocols during the January three and four-day patrolling period.
Malaria brought down all of us
from time to time and some more than others. Punji sticks took a toll
on the point teams more than
those performing other patrol duties and the Halls suffered from both
experiences and Chinese Bandit
13 did not perform as well when they were absent. On one occasion
while we were patrolling in the
mountains near the border, Big Halls' confidence had peaked and with
morale soaring donned his red
beret and proceeded down a tall grassy trail following old tracks into
the valley. We were spread long
distances apart but when I came out of the trees and looked down the
grassy slope ahead, I saw a
prominent red item moving near the base of the hill. I ran down the
trail to catch up with my point
team and passed Little Hall to confront Big Hall. We linked up in an
area that was coved in triple
canopy jungle and along the trail heading towards the border of
Cambodia. He had his rifle in the
`ranger carry' position and was moving at a brisk walk. The tracks
were still aged and there was no
indication of the enemy, and he was determined to close the distance
between the NVA and us. He heard
me approaching when I was 20 meters behind him and turned grinning. I
was wearing my snake eyes
expression and he stopped smiling and waited for me. "Do you honestly
think that red hat can't be
seen?" I asked. "Do you want me to take it off and not wear it?" He
responded. " No I want you to
answer my question." It took him a few seconds to answer, "There are
no NVA here and it will take us
at least another half day to locate them." "Are you referring to their
location on the aerial photos
we were given," I replied. "Yes, but there are also no fresh tracks or
other signs," he stated with
conviction. I responded "You ain't that good to make that call yet.
Don't wear the hat when it can be
seen from a distance." And then, "Am I correct?" I asked. He replied,
"Yes," immediately. Hall removed
the hat and put it in his butt pack. Later it was demonstrated on many
occasions that I was wrong. His
knowledge was excellent and judgment regarding where the enemy were
and were not was outstanding and
he was permitted to wear the red beret whenever he believed it was
appropriate to do so. The last time
I saw him wearing it was not on patrol, although he did so, but in Sin
City at the bar. Little Hall
had some type of brown beret. The berets had been bought or traded
from some South Vietnamese troops.
Neither of the Halls, both men wounded during the same operation, has
been located since their
evacuation.
Other Chinese Bandits arrived later as replacements and the original
eight man scout squad reached an
assigned strength of twenty-three men but could rarely field nine men
with individuals hospitalized
for wounds and disease and authorized R & R. These new men were
absorbed, trained and performed
heroically and excellently.
Several of the patrols that we conducted in January 1966, have special
significance but share a
threshold of common experiences. The planning and preparation, air
assault, day and night movements
searching for the NVA, ambush selection and occupation, searching for
the NVA while moving towards the
pickup zones, extraction and debriefing phases were similar but the
variation in the terrain and enemy
situation provided the variables that kept the patrolling interesting
and challenging.
All air assaults involved at least thirty minutes of flight time from
our base at AnKhe and often
provided by the same flight crews assigned to the 227th Aviation
Battalion. The routes were never
conducted directly to the insertion landing zones but varied for
obvious reasons. The patrol areas in
January were located at distances where artillery support was
unavailable and encompassed the valleys
and hills immediately east of the northern Cambodia and southern Laos
borders.
The first of these three and four-day patrols was to be performed west
of AnKhe in a long valley,
which was not believed to be occupied or used by the NVA and only
small Viet Cong units, were believed
to be operating in the area. I selected Frank Spickler as the
`informal' patrol leader and assisted
him with the warning and operations order while Louis Tyler and Frank
Cunningham worked with Raymond
Carley on point team skills including map reading with emphasis placed
on performing his `spider
drill' exercise and creation of the terrain table. Carley had been
designated the assigned M60 gunner
in part due to his persistent request to carry the machinegun and
another scout was temporarily
designated to carry the M60 on the patrol. The area of operation
provided the opportunity to make use
of the machine gun and Spickler had chosen to use the weapon despite
my `vote' not to do so.
Two UH-1s arrived at 0600 on the Mustang LZ located near our tents at
AnKhe and the crews shut down
their engines and secured their aircraft. I accompanied Spickler when
he briefed the flight crews and
discussed details related to our flight route, altitude, checkpoints,
and actions approaching and on
the landing zone where we would be inserted. The flight would take
approximately 30 minutes.
With our patrol caps tucked into our shirts, we loaded aboard the
helicopters thirty minutes later and
began the flight to the insertion point. Spickler knelt behind and
between the pilot and copilot seats
and wore a flight helmet connected to the aircraft's communication
system. I set in the seat nearest
the pilot and observed Spickler call off each checkpoint while enroute
and confirmed the release point
ahead before removing the flight helmet as we approached the landing
zone. Spickler gave the signal
and we moved to sit on the edge of the floor with our feet on the
landing struts of the helicopter.
With the other helicopter to our rear, the pilot flared the helicopter
and we exited onto the dry
short grass field and ran towards the near tree line that marked the
edge of the western hill.
The helicopters would return to AnKhe by another route and made no
fake insertions. The procedure was
deemed too dangerous for the flight crews and provided marginal
benefits to minimizing our insertion
being detected. We believed that any insertion would be investigated
and that is was important that we
quickly move long distances away from any landing zone and thereby
increase the degree of difficulty
in being followed and detected.
The Chinese Bandits from both helicopters assembled on the run and
transitioned into a file formation
with Carley at the lead. Tyler and Cunningham followed a short
distance behind him. Carley lead the
patrol northward along a trail towards the first checkpoint where we
would conduct our first `laydog'.
He, Tyler and Cunningham occasionally stopped to exam the trail that
was dry and did not contain
tracks of any kind. No member of the patrol conducted pace counts and
was expected to `remain on the
map' at all times with minimal map checks of the topographic maps that
had been issued to each man. We
moved at a 4 kilometer per hour pace and arrived at the laydog site in
hour. The route along the
valley consisted of gently rolling terrain with dense small, less than
25-foot tall trees and tall
shrubs and became more dense and damp as we advanced northward. We
occupied the site forming a
100-meter diameter circular perimeter after circling back along the
trail. The scouts moved into the
previously designated positions that had been identified from aerial
photographs and all persons began
the process to adjust to the sights, sounds and smells of the area. We
did not anticipate enemy
activity but understood the importance of optimizing our perception
skills quickly and after only
fifteen minutes of the last man occupying the site, the Chinese
Bandits patrol began its file movement
towards the next checkpoint.
Spickler and Terry Stevens would link up and discuss pre-arranged fire
targets and emergency
rendezvous points. Spickler and I assisted Stevens in his efforts to
stay on the map within six digit
coordinates using only infrequent map checks. Tyler and Cunningham
were making similar efforts with
Carley. We slowed our movement to about 2 km per hour without
encountering any enemy or indigenous
persons and stopped at predetermined locations where we `lay dogged'
and observed and persons were
permitted to eat portions of the C- rations that were carried. Each
man carried only one C-ration meal
per day and was permitted to carefully bury and conceal any cans,
wrappers or other trash. We were
easily able to advance northward for a distance of twenty-five
kilometers before sundown.
I made frequent trips to the rear and brainstormed rear security
duties and methods with Carlos
Hatcher. I would take one of the Halls with me each time so that they
would also benefit from the
training involved when occasionally lagging back behind a greater
distance in an effort to determine
if we were being followed. During my movements along the patrol file I
would normally carry my map out
and had each individual point out our location using a small twig.
Most of the Chinese Bandits were
still struggling with terrain association at this time and their
navigation skills were a major factor
in their selection for participation on more difficult and dangerous
missions. Earlier patrols
conducted in late November and December had identified those
individuals who were not committed to the
mastery of navigation and other the skills required and they had been
transferred to other units.
`Remaining on the map' was approaching a `do or die' standard in
Chinese Bandit 13 and each of the
remaining men demonstrated continued improvement.
As darkness fell, the scouts moved closer together attempting to
maintain visual contact with the man
ahead. This was accomplished only sporadically, since the trail that
we were following meandered
through the tall trees and prevented continuous visual contact unless
persons were to maintain a
distance of less than twenty feet. On this early patrol we had planned
to maintain a minimum distance
between scouts of 50 meters that required adjusting as a scout was
detected at lesser distances.
As planned, I joined the point team at EECT and assisted the point
team in their navigation and
tracking duties. We discussed many things during the next few hours,
including the origin of any
sighting, sound or smell and stopped frequently to examine the trail
surface for any evidence of
usage. Carley had not master map reading and land navigation at this
stage and we stopped many times
in the night to have `class'. The Chinese Bandits' rifle slings had
been removed and members typically
went down on one knee when stopping or leaned against a tree and
selected halt positions that provided
some advantage that could be either a creature comfort or afforded
some tactical advantage.
We maintained our 50% awaken and alert policy at each laydog position
and each scout was afforded the
opportunity to sleep three hours during the first twenty-four hours of
the patrol. Sleep cycles
required the use of two men groupings during halts both during the day
and night. Although I regularly
`walked the line' to insure everyone was `accounted for' the standard
for maintaining contact, knowing
when to sleep and remained with each individual. We did not establish
the teamwork needed to operate
in this manner until late February. A counter-snoring program was
enacted early and before December
1965; however, it took some time to solve the problem that was often
specific to each individuals
needs. In addition to 50% remaining alert, the two men grouping when
sleeping was permitted also
required an individual to prevent his `ranger buddy' from snoring. As
we lost weight from our physical
activity, minimal diet, and disease, persons that had snored
previously did not or at least rarely;
however, we remained vigilant to prevent the sounds of snoring or
other noises being made by our
sleeping comrades. Few persons talked in their sleep or experienced
nightmares. We did not carry or
wear gloves and learned to aggressively place a hand over the mouth
and nose of others when necessary.
I do not recall anyone sleep-walking but we remained alert for that
behavior also.
One of the earliest errors that occurred when we stopped during laydog
or other halts was a person
urinating/defecating near their position. The smells dominated the
odors in the area and prevented
persons from developing the smell perceptions needed and would have
been easily detected by anyone
moving nearby. The Chinese Bandits had learned that urinating and
defecating required planning and
that persons having diarrhea should not patrol on missions where
stealth was especially important.
An essential element at halts was the planning to do so after scouting
trail intersections in all
directions and then moving the entire patrol beyond that intersection
where the rear security team
would then monitor in the manner that was appropriate. Many previously
unidentified trail
intersections were discovered which required variation and flexibility
to optimize our efforts to
locate the enemy and minimize the risk of our discovery.
We encountered many suitable ambush sites but having found no evidence
of human occupation or usage of
the area, we continued northward to the planned trail intersection
that turned westward and up the
hillside covered in taller and sparsely spaced trees. As the sky began
to lighten we approached the
ridgeline having stopped many times to hold one-on-one navigation and
tracking classes with specific
patrol individuals. Noise discipline was not maintained and the
discussions were not done quietly. I
was confident of our assessment that the area was not occupied by
enemy forces and took the
opportunity to TRAIN. When operating in more dangerous situations, the
Chinese Bandits remained in a
training `mode', including individuals performing pushups and sit-ups
on a frequent, often hourly
basis; however, such physical training was discretionary but something
that many of us believed
important and necessary. Hatcher and I often `pushed away the
mountains of Vietnam' with our feet
elevated upslope. I do not recall for certain if he could do more than
I but believe that he did so.
We performed the planned lay dog on the ridge line and I met with each
Chinese Bandit to insure that
they had our position plotted on their maps and remember the planned
route that we would be taking
during daylight and the tentative ambush site that would be occupied
that night. Every Chinese Bandit
correctly identified the route, ambush site and other critical points.
We had only moved about six
kilometers during the night and proceeded down hill along the trail
reaching the next checkpoint
located in the valley floor before 6 AM. We had moved more than 35
kilometers since being inserted.
At the valley floor we intercept the trail running parallel to the
hill ridgeline. The valley terrain
and vegetation was identical to that we had encountered the previous
day and we advanced slowly
southward towards at a pace that was intended to allow our passing the
planned ambush site in the
early evening. Again, no signs of human occupation or usage of the
trail was found; however, we did
not `go admin' and remained vigilant and shifted into our maximized
efforts to maintain noise
discipline while focusing on training the newly designated point team
which consisted of the Halls.
Tyler and Cunningham remained with them while Carley resumed his
duties carrying the M60 machine gun.
I continued moving along the file working with each man, but walked
with Carley for long periods
discussing our plans to get his navigation and tracking skills to the
level that he sought.
Despite my direction and requests, many of the men had not abandoned
their smoking habit and those
individuals knew not to request that they be allowed to smoke but
often carried the issued cigarettes
with them hoping that conditions might permit them doing so. "Don't
even think about it," I would say
to some of them as we met along the trail. Chewing was not permitted
either and spitting would have
compounded the problem in our minimizing signs of our use of the
trail.
I doubled back often to examine the signs that we were making along
the trail and discussed the
problem with Hatcher often. Each man avoided the trail when it was
easily marked but this was more
difficult to determine during darkness and we did not have the skills
that would later evolve.
Circling back at each planned halt and lay dog was always expected to
reveal a talented enemy or local
hunter following us, but that never happened until the Crazy Horse
operation five months later and the
circumstances were different.
The Halls had advanced navigation and tracking skills and after
rotating Carley, Tyler was designated
the patrol leader and Spickler moved rearward to assume his normal
role in Chinese Bandits 13. I spent
the much of the day with Tyler assisting him when needed and
discussing our SOPs. He was very
motivated and wanted to learn more. The need for a Ranger-Recondo
school was evident and we talked
about him going to Ranger school when he rotated home. I believed that
he could have easily passed the
course without attending either the 101st Recondo or 82nd Raider
courses, but recommended he do so if
assigned to either unit which was the expected next assignment for
returning Chinese Bandits. I lost
track of Tyler after the Chinese Bandit tour and do not know what he
did later. Frank Spickler did
attend the 101st Recondo School when he rotated but was shot in the
chest on his second tour and his
physical profile prevented him from attending Ranger school or remain
on jump status and he left the
military.
I did not intervene or coach anyone as the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol
approached and passed the site
selected earlier as a tentative ambush site. The site was located at a
T-intersection of trails. The
intersection did not reveal and signs of usage but Tyler made the
decision that we would occupy the
site as planned and lead the patrol southward for several kilometers
before reversing direction and
doubling back along side but not on the trail towards the T-
intersection where the Chinese Bandits
would occupy and form an L- shaped ambush. Hatcher remained back with
another scout in an early
warning role alongside the trail. He was not equipped with any radio
equipment that would allow
communication with Tyler at the actual ambush site and the SOP at the
time required that he allow any
personnel that numbered less than 10 persons pass without any action.
If more than 10 persons were to
pass, then he was expected to fire his M16 on full automatic at those
following the `first ten' and
immediately break contact and move rapidly to the designated rallying
point that was located about
1000 meters uphill from the trail. In the event Hatcher made the
decision to open fire, then all
Chinese Bandits were required to immediately move towards the rally
point and abandon any trip flares
or Claymore mines that were setup in the kill zone. The point men, on
this night, the Halls, were
likewise occupying the other early warning position that was located
uphill along the trail and had
the same SOP.
As the men occupied their ambush position under EENT light conditions,
I moved towards the Halls
position and located them when they waved their patrol caps with
`ranger eyes' in my direction. We
talked quietly for an hour. None of the Chinese Bandits anticipated
contact but remained vigilant with
the `50% awake' routine. We did not have starlight scopes and the
heavier infrared scopes and power
source was only carried when we operating in open terrain where a long
shot could be made. However,
Chinese Bandit 13 did carry two smaller infrared observation devices
capable of viewing objects to a
range of about fifty meters. Each early warning team used one IR
device.
I returned to the center of ambush site occupied by Tyler and Stevens
and remained with them for
several hours and informed them that I would move to Hatcher's
position before moving southward
further down the valley as I had planned earlier. Since we did not
anticipate contact, I would move by
myself southward along the trail for several thousand meters and meet
the patrol in the morning at the
designated checkpoint. In the event of an enemy engagement where
weapons fire was exchanged, then I
would meet the patrol at the designated ambush rally point. I did not
take this action for practical
reasons but scouting `out ahead' was something that did have some
merits and I enjoyed doing so and
attempting to find the NVA alone. Some of the Chinese Bandits were
permitted to also do this later but
not in January.
We linked up in the morning as planned and I rotated Carley back on
point and Spickler as the patrol
leader. The route we used crossed the valley where it narrowed and
then northward along the opposite
side of the valley. We occupied another ambush that night without
detecting any sign of the enemy or
indigenous personnel. Again, I left the patrol during the ambush and
followed a trail that led towards
a small treed depression in the valley. At daybreak, I reached the
edge of the tree line where I found
a small paper pamphlet that read "Don't be cannon fodder for Johnson,
go home". I followed the trail
into and down the slope into the bottom of the sink hole where I
observed a pith helmet lying on the
ground about 20 meters ahead. I turned and moved quickly back along
the trail and in daylight back
towards the checkpoint where I would link up with the patrol. I did
discover human barefoot tracks
that I had not noticed while moving in the darkness.
We were to be extracted from a clearing near the depression where I
had located the pamphlet. When we
were assembled, I notified Tyler and the others of the discovery of
tracks, pamphlets and pith helmet
and we discussed using the alternate LZ located further to south and
near the route that we had taken
the previous day. Stevens who had been transmitting hourly status
reports during the daytime was
instructed to send our extraction request using the alternate LZ in
his next report. We were to be
extracted at 7 AM and moved several kilometers backward along the
trail to the LZ and arrived about
twenty minutes before the aircraft were scheduled to arrive. We
secured the LZ and did not locate any
evidence of enemy activity but remained vigilant of the possible
presence of enemy approaching from
the direction where we had came and where the sightings were
discovered.
Two UH-1s arrived as planned and we quickly boarded and made the
return flight with each man
considering what would have occurred if we had extended the patrol and
followed the tracks found at
the treed depression. Spickler again knelt between the pilots and
called out the checkpoints along the
route. Hatcher was doing the same thing in the trailing aircraft.
After landing at the Mustang LZ in AnKhe, the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol
assembled at the picnic table
near the field mess and compared notes and assisted in preparing the
debriefing report while SSG
Robert Grimes I discussed the pamphlet and other findings that were
made only a few hours ago. We all
ate breakfast together and the men returned to the Chinese Bandit
tents while Grimes and I went to
present the NATO format debriefing. The discoveries became the hot
topic in the briefing and steered
the group away from the equally important problem of solving our radio
equipment limitations that
would be only partially solved to any of our satisfaction two months
later when the first DOD/MACV
directed LRRP operation was performed by the Chinese Bandit LRRP team
along the northern Cambodia
border.