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The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most
Dangerous Terrorist Network
Does Southeast Asia have a burgeoning problem in Islamic extremism? The
moniker "second front," seems to suggest one, with the first
front originally meaning Afghanistan.
Ken Conboy, a seasoned Indonesian analyst, goes straight to the heart of
how political Islam has tried to entrench itself in Indonesia almost from
the start of the Indonesian republic. He begins by chronicling the fortunes
of Sarekat Islam (Islamic League), founded in 1911, which marked the first
attempt to create a "Darul Islam,"or Islamic state.
Relying mostly on secondary historical sources and declassified intelligence
documents, Mr. Conboy's forays into the origins of political Islam are
sound. For instance, he was able to uncover the workings of Komando Jihad,
which later splintered into a ragtag criminal groups.
Mr. Conboy is also correct to have observed that no groups or individua!
ls have had any success in creating an attractive Islamic ideology since
the 1950s. Indeed, efforts to introduce Islam - by political mobilization
and in rare cases by force - have never been taken lightly by the state.
Sarekat Islam's first proponent, Kartusowirjo, a Javanese, not only failed
in this endeavor, but was also executed despite being an old acquaintance
of President Sukarno. Sukarno, and later on President Suharto, kept political
Islam frozen in amber during their time in power, using it only when it
suited them. Political Islam, in other words, did not hold any truck with
the state.
Things have of course changed. In 1999, President B.J. Habibie allowed
Islam to be used as a legitimate symbol of political rally. Since then
it has become respectable to merge politics with Islam.
But it is here that readers are confronted with the teaser embedded in
Mr.Conboy's book: Can Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was formed in 1993 by
Abu Bakar Baasyir ! and the late Abdullah Sungkar, two Indonesian clerics
based in Malaysi a, be regarded as a part of the Islamic fabric in Indonesia?
Mr. Conboy makes the case that JI drew its inspiration from Serekat Islam,
especially the goal to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. That said,
Mr.Conboy's book is different from other tracts on Islam in Indonesia.
Whereas other Indonesia specialists have always paid homage to the role
and importance of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, two entities that
were able to recruit millions of Muslim members, Mr. Conboy does not address
them at all. A check of the index shows that neither party gets a mention.
Nor did Mr. Conboy explain why radical clerics like Messrs. Baasyir and
Sungkar avoid NU and Muhammadiyah completely. This is strange, because
unlike other Islamic activists in North Africa and the Middle East, where
the option of joining an Islamic party was often denied to them, the same
cannot be said of activists in Indonesia.
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis! , Abdurrahman Wahid, for
instance, was able to use his influence in NU to catapult himself into
becoming the president of Indonesia at one stage. The distance between
political Islam and power-the latter being what JI has always sought-is
therefore not large, or a warrant for JI to adopt violence.
Nevertheless, Mr. Conboy finds little difficulty tying JI to the history
of Islamic activism in Indonesia. By dint of this move, Mr. Conboy finds
himself in safe company with Sidney Jones, the director of the International
Crisis Group, who is widely regarded as an expert of JI. Indeed the actual
ambitions of JI lie beyond Indonesia too.
By 1995, Mr. Conboy writes that Mr. Sungkar had "began contemplating
a regional Islamic super state-daulah Islamiah raya-that would encompass
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and parts of the Philippines and Thailand."
In contrast, Islamic parties and organizations in Indonesia, even those
in Aceh, have never embraced such wi! ld and expansive goals. What Mr.
Conboy did not mention, however, is t hat there now exists different factions
within JI that repudiate the idea of an Islamic super state, preferring
to "Islamize" Indonesia first in order to tilt the balance of
the entire region. According to Ms. Jones, this has led to the creation
of "bombing" and "nonbombing" wings of the movement.
Mr. Conboy's work also contains another shortcoming: Despite the schools
and camps created by JI in the region, there is no sense of the actual
number of students or recruits that passed through their ranks. Yet, words
like "exponential growth" are used.
Still, if one ignores the methodological oversight, the case can be made
that Mr. Conboy has made a significant contribution to the understanding
of JI, especially its activities up to the most recent Bali bombings in
October 2005. The Second Front , for instance, provides details
on the networks and exchanges fostered by JI with other militant groups,
and the military training it received in Afghanistan and ! Mindanao. In
this sense, Mr. Conboy's work could be read in tandem with the ICG's investigative
reports, some of which were used to corroborate his own accounts.
However, The Second Front also retains a stealthy characteristic
throughout its 17 chapters. Although Mr. Conboy used nearly 274 footnotes
to produce the numerous accounts on JI, the very richness of the narrative
suggests the need for more. Many stories could not have been known without
Mr. Conboy either being present at the scene, or receiving detailed notes
on the interrogations conducted by the Indonesian intelligence.
But if Mr. Conboy relied primarily on the latter, he was not candid with
how he obtained such information, except to affirm in his preface that
he used some intelligence sources who must remain anonymous. Hence, readers
unfamiliar with Mr. Conboy, who has also authored a book on the Indonesian
intelligence apparatus, are left wondering about the authenticity of the
accounts! ; or rather how he sourced the information from his contacts.
Still, b ased on the careful narrative, one could give Mr. Conboy the benefit
of the doubt.
In all, there are many fascinating accounts that one can take away from
the book, given the shadowy nature of JI. And although Azahari Husin, the
leading Malaysian bombing expert in JI, was recently killed in a police
operation in Jakarta, Noordin Mohammed Top, the other key Malaysian operative,
is still at large. JI, while greatly weakened by a series of operations
against it, remains a potent threat in Indonesia and elsewhere by virtue
of the willingness of some of its members to resort to suicide bombing.
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