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On the morning of June 3, 2023, the American destroyer Chung-Hoon and Canadian frigate Montral entered the Taiwan Strait to conduct freedom of navigation operations. They did so in defiance of the Chinese government, which had declared these to be its sovereign waters. A Chinese warship, seeking to harass the vessels, came within 150 yards of the bow of the Chung-Hoon, forcing the latter to take evasive action. Had the two ships collided, the world might have witnessed the first violent clash between the two superpowers of the twenty-first century.
At about the same time, the EU signed into law its new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Slated to take effect in October 2023, the CBAM will impose taxes on carbon-intensive imports from trading partners with less stringent emissions requirements than European nations. Although the EU contends that the measure is compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, that opinion is not universal. The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have described the CBAM as discriminatory, and they and other governments may well lodge a formal complaint with the WTO.
These four vignettes appear disconnected, but they share something in common. Each reveals disagreement over the principles and rules that should govern the behavior and define the obligations of sovereign states in world politics. Such episodes are increasingly common. Indeed, such normative contestation has become a defining feature of contemporary international relations, undermining the institutional foundations of world order and presenting major impediments to multilateral cooperation at a time of global turbulence and great power confrontation.
To be sure, the quality, depth, and scope of world order has varied dramatically over time and space. In Europe alone, one can contrast the classical balance of power, which saw a bare-bones set of rules and the frequent resort to war as an instrument of policy, with the more managed nineteenth-century Concert system, which had more elaborate tenets to facilitate mutual adjustment and a balance of satisfactions among five great powers (at the time, Austria-Hungary, France, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom). A truly global order as we know it today, based on the principle of sovereign equality, began to emerge only after World War II (although it was long divided into separate capitalist-democratic and communist suborders, each vying for influence among a diverse set of postcolonial and developing nations). The postwar decades saw a profusion of international organizations, frameworks, and treaties across virtually every global domain, a process that accelerated when the Cold War ended. This horizontal latticework of intergovernmental cooperation, complemented by transnational networks of nongovernmental actors, has permitted an unprecedented, if incomplete, degree of governance in world politics.
It was this vision that animated the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II to draft blueprints, beginning with the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter of 1941, for a managed, rule-bound international system. The original U.S. scheme had three main components. The first was a new universal organization for peace and security, the United Nations (UN). Grounded in international law and guaranteed by the great powers, it would replace traditional secret alliances, balances of power, and spheres of influence. The second was a new multilateral system of trade and payments, governed by the Bretton Woods institutions and an envisioned trade organization, to replace economic nationalism, autarkic blocs, imperial preference, and beggar-thy-neighbor monetary policies. The third was the political self-determination of European colonial empires and their replacement by independent, self-governing, and ideally democratic nations.
Needless to say, the international system that actually emerged from World War II diverged in important ways from this blueprint. The rapid onset of the Cold War forced the United States and its allies to adjust liberal internationalism to the advent of bipolarity and the perceived imperatives of containment. Similarly, the abrupt process of decolonization transformed the composition of the UN, providing developing countries with a platform to resist and seek to reshape international norms and rules, including those governing the world economy. Despite these important adjustments, the broad contours of a multilateral international order persisted, becoming potentially global with the demise of the Soviet Union.
The question today is: What are the major rules of world order in 2023, and how healthy are they? The following pages examine the current status of multilateral principles, norms, and rules of state conduct across fourteen important global issue areas. This short survey reveals major normative disagreements among UN member states over the appropriate responsibilities of sovereign governments and the desirable contours of global governance.
To be sure, sovereignty has never been universal, immutable, or absolute. It was not until decolonization was well underway, for instance, that most of the entire terrestrial surface of the Earth (save Antarctica) was apportioned into independent territorial states. The obligations and prerogatives of sovereignty have also evolved and fluctuated in response to changing domestic and international expectations. As a practical matter, moreover, all states struggle to exercise aspects of their sovereign authority in an interdependent world. Despite these caveats, sovereignty remains the most jealously guarded principle of world order.
Meanwhile, pressure is growing to update the governance structures and agendas of the main multilateral economic institutions to reflect major ongoing shifts in the distribution of global economic power. Many emerging and developing economies perceive organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as stacked against them, insufficiently representative, and incapable of meeting their needs and advancing their priorities. At the same time, influential voices advocate overhauling the mandates of those same bodies to better address new transnational challenges like pandemic disease and climate change. Preserving a relatively open, nondiscriminatory, and rule-bound world economy in the face of these multiple pressures will require forging diplomatic agreement on a reform agenda that simultaneously enhances the voice of developing nations in multilateral bodies, facilitates the delivery of global public goods, and sufficiently accommodates the diversity of national preferences and circumstances so that nations can chart their own economic courses.
In an epidemiologically interconnected age, international health security is a global public good. It will continue to be elusive, however, so long as WHO member states elevate the pursuit of absolute sovereignty over their binding international legal obligations. Improving global health governance will require UN member states to temper their nationalist and unilateralist instincts by granting the underpowered WHO greater authority and resources to safeguard global health security, by increasing the transparency of their national pandemic preparedness and response efforts, and by harmonizing their respective approaches during global public health emergencies.
To improve the global governance of both migration and refugees, national governments will need to try to close loopholes in existing regimes, negotiate common standards for categories of individuals not currently covered, and improve their own compliance with existing norms. At the same time, they should be wary of trying to revise the Refugee Convention, which could well dilute what refugee protections currently exist, or to negotiate an entirely new legal regime for climate migrants, given the political hurdles involved. A more prudent and pragmatic approach would seek to fine-tune existing international laws, institutions, and instruments.
By far the toughest negotiations will be on steps to prevent growing space militarization in a context of deepening geopolitical mistrust and pervasive dual-use technologies. As great power adversaries seek to protect their space-based assets, the situation is ripe for miscalculation and catastrophic escalation. Unfortunately, the UN Disarmament Commission has failed over four decades to produce a legally binding instrument to prevent an outer space arms race. A proposed treaty to prohibit the placement of weapons there, sponsored by China and Russia, went nowhere, because it ignored the more immediate threat of anti-satellite weapons, which generate massive debris, and did not address significant verification challenges.
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