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Vaniria Setser

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Jun 28, 2024, 7:35:40 PM6/28/24
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Note: In 2017, security researchers identified a ransomware variant that appended an identical file extension (.akira) to encrypted files; however, this variant is not related to the Akira ransomware group.

We assess that Akira is likely an opportunistic ransomware group due to their victimology and negotiation tactics. In nearly every incident response case Arctic Wolf investigated, the threat actors claimed that they needed time to review the exfiltrated data to determine a ransom demand.

Identifying code overlap between different ransomware variants typically allows analysts to attribute activity back to a specific group due to ransomware source code being tightly guarded by threat actors. However, with the Conti source code leak, multiple threat actors leveraged the code to develop or modify their own code base making attribution back to Conti threat actors much more difficult.

Although both ransomware variants differ, Akira ransomware does bear some semblance to Conti ransomware. Akira ignores the same file types and directories as Conti ransomware and has functions that are similar. Akira also used the ChaCha algorithm to encrypt files, which was implemented similarly to the one used by Conti ransomware.

On June 29, 2023, however, Avast released a decryptor for Akira ransomware that victim organizations can use to decrypt files. Based on current intelligence, the threat actors have modified the encryption routine since the decryptor was published, indicating that it may not work if files were encrypted after June 29th.

Although cryptocurrency can be acquired without attribution back to the buyer, it is not completely anonymous. Transactions between cryptocurrency wallets are published to the blockchain ledger which is publicly viewable via a blockchain explorer.

By leveraging known threat actor cryptocurrency wallet addresses, we are able to conduct pattern analysis of the transactions and discover additional wallet addresses. In some instances, we have observed cryptocurrency address reuse between threat groups, indicating the individual controlling the address or wallet has either splintered off from the original group or is working with another group at the same time.

By following transactions discovered during blockchain analysis, we can tie individual groups together with higher fidelity based on transactions to and from known threat actor-controlled cryptocurrency addresses. Tracking ransom payments to Akira allowed Arctic Wolf Labs to identify transactions to Conti-affiliated addresses. The same analysis method allowed our team to identify connections between the Karakurt extortion group, Diavol, and the Conti ransomware group in 2022.

Steven Campbell is a Senior Threat Intelligence Researcher at Arctic Wolf Labs and has more than eight years of experience in intelligence analysis and security research. He has a strong background in infrastructure analysis and adversary tradecraft.

Akshay Suthar is a Senior Threat Intelligence Researcher at Arctic Wolf Labs focused on researching adversary tradecraft and malware analysis. He has more than seven years of experience in a multitude of domains including threat intelligence research, detection engineering, and intrusion analysis.

Connor Belfiore is a Threat Intelligence Analyst at Arctic Wolf Incident Response. He has more than five years of experience in threat intelligence, financial crimes investigation, and blockchain analysis.

Akira attackers do not discriminate when it comes to victimology outside of targeting large enterprises. As of this writing, educational institutions as well as those in the financial, manufacturing, real estate, and medical industries are all known targets of Akira attackers.

Initial delivery is achieved by exploiting public facing service or applications. Weaknesses in multi-factor authentication (MFA) are often targeted as well as known vulnerabilities in VPN software. Attackers attempt to dump credentials though LSASS dumps, for further lateral movement and privilege escalation where necessary. The group has also been associated with other LOLBins/COTS tools like PCHunter64 or the use of minidumps.

Upon launch, the ransomware payloads will launch PowerShell commands to remove volume shadow copies (VSS). The ransomware appends the .akira extension to all files that are affected by the encryption. In the event that a file is locked by the Windows operating system, the ransomware will attempt to utilize the Windows Restart Manager (WRM) API to address said issues. VSS removal is handled via PowerShell command. The ransomware payloads are also known to contain hard-coded extensions to process for encryption, along with an exclusion list to prevent anything from inhibiting the encryption process. Affected files have a .akira extension added to them.

In case you do not have SentinelOne deployed, detecting Akira ransomware requires a combination of technical and operational measures designed to identify and flag suspicious activity on the network. This allows the organization to take appropriate action, and to prevent or mitigate the impact of the ransomware attack.

Employees should be educated on the risks of ransomware, and on how to identify and avoid phishing emails, malicious attachments, and other threats. They should be encouraged to report suspicious emails or attachments, and to avoid opening them, or clicking on links or buttons in them.

Organizations should implement strong, unique passwords for all user accounts, and should regularly update and rotate these passwords. Passwords should be at least 8 characters long, and should include a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters.

Organizations should enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all user accounts, to provide an additional layer of security. This can be done through the use of mobile apps, such as Google Authenticator or Microsoft Authenticator, or through the use of physical tokens or smart cards.

Organizations should regularly update and patch their systems, to fix any known vulnerabilities, and to prevent attackers from exploiting them. This includes updating the operating system, applications, and firmware on all devices, as well as disabling any unnecessary or unused services or protocols.

Organizations should implement regular backup and disaster recovery (BDR) processes, to ensure that they can recover from ransomware attacks, or other disasters. This includes creating regular backups of all data and systems, and storing these backups in a secure, offsite location.

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