Foresight Civil Design And Survey Crackl
Latrina Cobbett
A total of 167 experts shared their insights on what geopolitics, climate change, technological disruption, the global economy, social and political movements, and other domains could look like a decade from now. Although respondents are largely citizens of the United States (roughly 60 percent of those polled), their nationalities are spread across thirty countries, with European citizens constituting the majority of non-Americans. (In the following analysis, all geographic distinctions among those surveyed are based on what individuals identified as their sole or primary nationality, not on the countries where they currently reside.)
Respondents are also employed in a range of fields, including the private sector (26 percent), academic or educational institutions (21 percent), non-profits (19 percent), government (16 percent), and independent consultants or freelancers (13 percent). They are quite evenly distributed across age categories over thirty-five, with less than 10 percent between the ages of twenty-two and thirty-five, but they skew heavily male (a result that we will aim to rectify in future surveys).
Nearly half (46 percent) of respondents expect Russia to either become a failed state or break up by 2033. More than a fifth (21 percent) consider Russia the most likely country to become a failed state within the next ten years, which is more than twice the percentage for the next most common choice, Afghanistan.
Even more striking, 40 percent of respondents expect Russia to break up internally by 2033 because of revolution, civil war, political disintegration, or some other reason. Europeans are particularly pessimistic about Russia breaking up: Forty-nine percent of them foresee such an event, compared with 36 percent of Americans.
This puts another finding into a darker context: Fourteen percent of respondents believe that Russia is likely to use a nuclear weapon within the next ten years. Among those expecting the country to experience both state failure and a breakup in the coming decade, a sobering 22 percent believe that use of nuclear weapons will be part of that history ten years hence.
Some, though, see hope: Of those who believe Russia is likely to experience state failure or a breakup over the coming decade, 10 percent think that it is the most likely of any currently autocratic country to become democratic by the end of this period.
One reason for this anticipation of multiple new nuclear-armed countries could be that experts expect regional rivalries to drive nuclear proliferation over the next decade. For example, of those who believe that Iran will obtain nuclear weapons during this timeframe, 41 percent say Saudi Arabia will as well. In contrast, of those who do not believe that Iran will acquire these weapons, just 15 percent envision Saudi Arabia doing so anyway. Similarly, 57 percent of those who say that Japan will acquire nuclear weapons believe the same of South Korea. The former is almost certainly a function of Saudi-Iranian antagonism (wherein if one gets the bomb, the other will feel pressure to follow suit); the latter is likely less a function of Japanese-South Korean tension than of both countries feeling increasingly threatened by China and/or North Korea. Indeed, among those who foresee China initiating military action to retake Taiwan in the next decade (discussed in more detail below), 22 percent think that South Korea will obtain nuclear weapons over the same period while 16 percent believe Japan will. Among those who foresee no such Chinese use of force, the equivalent figures are 13 percent and 6 percent.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is consistent with respondent answers that predict a lack of international attention to this issue. Less than 2 percent of respondents named nuclear nonproliferation as the area likely to see the greatest increase in international cooperation over the coming decade. When given the chance to name the biggest global risks receiving insufficient attention, 10 percent mentioned either proliferation or war involving nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.
Overall, 58 percent of respondents forecast less economic interdependence between the two countries by 2033 and just 23 percent expect more. US respondents are slightly more convinced about this direction of travel, with 64 percent anticipating a drop in interdependence (24 percent still anticipate an increase).
Climate change is the issue most likely to shoot up the international policy agenda in the coming decade, according to respondents. A plurality (42 percent) believe that it will garner the biggest increase in international collaboration, comfortably ahead of second-place public health (cited by 25 percent of those polled).
Of those who assert that climate issues will attract the biggest boost in global cooperation by 2033, nearly a third (29 percent) believe that, among various social movements presented to respondents, environmental movements will have the most political influence worldwide over the next ten years. Among those who do not think climate change will rise up the international agenda, only 12 percent expect environmental movements to wield such influence.
One remarkable survey result is how many respondents expect the world to face additional economic and public-health perils in the coming decade. Seventy-six percent predict another global economic crisis on the scale of the 2008-2009 financial crisis by 2033. A further 19 percent say that there will be two or more such crises. Forty-nine percent foresee another global pandemic with the scale and impact of COVID-19 breaking out by 2033, with an additional 16 percent anticipating two or more such pandemics.
Admittedly, nationalists and populists are not invariably more supportive of autocratic political systems than democratic ones. Nor are, say, youth movements invariably opposed to autocracy. But our survey responses pointed to a connection between gathering nationalist and populist strength and greater popular pressure toward autocracy. Among those who foresee fewer democracies in the next decade, 68 percent predict increasing political influence for populist or nationalist movements and just 2 percent growing clout for pro-democracy ones. Of those forecasting more democracies, the equivalent figures are 38 percent and 10 percent.
To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight gurus on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the prospect of nuclear proliferation to the probability of great-power war to the potential for more global volatility.
Advances in the internet, artificial intelligence (AI) and online applications have allowed humans to vastly expand their capabilities and increase their capacity to tackle complex problems. These advances have given people the ability to instantly access and share knowledge and amplified their personal and collective power to understand and shape their surroundings. Today there is general agreement that smart machines, bots and systems powered mostly by machine learning and artificial intelligence will quickly increase in speed and sophistication between now and 2035.
As individuals more deeply embrace these technologies to augment, improve and streamline their lives, they are continuously invited to outsource more decision-making and personal autonomy to digital tools.
Some analysts have concerns about how business, government and social systems are becoming more automated. They fear humans are losing the ability to exercise judgment and make decisions independent of these systems.
It should be noted that in explaining their answers, many of these experts said the future of these technologies will have both positive and negative consequences for human agency. They also noted that through the ages, people have either allowed other entities to make decisions for them or have been forced to do so by tribal and national authorities, religious leaders, government bureaucrats, experts and even technology tools themselves.
At the same time, experts on both sides of the issue also agree that the current moment is a turning point that will determine a great deal about the authority, autonomy and agency of humans as the use 0f digital technology spreads into more aspects of daily life. Collectively, people will face questions such as: What are the things humans really want agency over? When will they be comfortable turning to AI to help them make decisions? And under what circumstances will they be willing to outsource decisions altogether to digital systems? Some outlined the stakes:
The experts replying to this canvassing sounded several broad themes in their answers. Among those who said that evolving digital systems will not be designed to allow humans to easily be in control of most tech-aided decision-making, the main themes are in the accompanying graphic.
Several main themes also emerged among those who said that evolving digital systems will be designed to allow humans to easily be in control of most tech-aided decision-making. They are cited in the accompanying graphic:
This is a nonscientific canvassing, based on a nonrandom sample. The results represent only the opinions of the individuals who responded to the queries and are not projectable to any other population.
The remarks made by the respondents to this canvassing reflect their personal positions and are not the positions of their employers. The descriptions of their leadership roles help identify their background and the locus of their expertise. Some responses are lightly edited for style and readability.
The following incisive and informative responses to our questions about the evolution of human agency by 2035 represent some of the big ideas shared by a small selection of the hundreds of thought leaders who participated in this canvassing.
While there will be gradually widespread adoption of AI augmentation (not necessarily replacement) of human decisions by applied AI and machine learning deeply embedded in hardware and digital services, in most cases [the use] of fully autonomous systems will only gradually be successfully applied. It will still be constrained by evolved versions of the same systemic vulnerabilities [of current systems], including pervasive digital security vulnerabilities and continued tensions of targeted personalization and privacy surveillance.
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