Economics 101
<-- I'M WITH STUPID
Walter E. Williams (archive)
August 11, 2004
Economic ignorance allows us to fall easy prey to political
charlatans and demagogues, so how about a little Economics 101?
How many times have we heard "free tuition," "free health care," and
free you-name-it? If a particular good or service is truly free, we
can have as much of it as we want without the sacrifice of other goods
or services. Take a "free" library; is it really free? The answer is
no. Had the library not been built, that $50 million could have
purchased something else. That something else sacrificed is the cost
of the library. While users of the library might pay a zero price,
zero price and free are not one and the same. So when politicians talk
about providing something free, ask them to identify the beneficent
Santa Claus or tooth fairy.
It's popular to condemn greed, but it's greed that gets wonderful
things done. When I say greed, I don't mean stealing, fraud,
misrepresentation or other forms of dishonesty. I mean people trying
to get as much as they can for themselves. We don't give second
thought to the many wonderful things others do for us. Detroit
assembly-line workers get up at the crack of dawn to produce the car
that you enjoy. Farm workers toil in the blazing sun gathering grapes
for our wine. Snowplow drivers brave blizzards just so we can have
access to our roads. Do you think these people make these personal
sacrifices because they care about us? My bet is that they don't give
a hoot. Instead, they along with their bosses do these wonderful
things for us because they want more for themselves.
People in the education and political establishments pretend they're
not motivated by such "callous" motives as greed and profits. These
people "care" about us, but from which areas of our lives do we derive
the greatest pleasures and have the fewest complaints, and from which
areas do we have the greatest headaches and complaints? We tend to
have a high satisfaction level with goods and services like computers,
cell phones, movies, clothing and supermarkets. These are areas where
the motivations are greed and profits. Our greatest dissatisfaction is
in areas of caring and no profit motive such as public education,
postal services and politics. Give me greed and profits, and you can
keep the caring.
How about the idea that if it saves just one life it's worth it?
That's some of the stated justification for government mandates for
childproof medicine bottles, gun locks, bike helmets and all sorts of
warning labels. No doubt there's a benefit to these government
mandates, but if we only look at benefits, we'll do darn near anything
because there's always a benefit to any action.
For example, why not have a congressionally mandated 5 miles per hour
highway speed limit? According to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, there were 43,220 highway fatalities in 2003, with an
estimated cost of $230 billion. A 5 mph speed limit would have spared
our nation this loss of life and billions of dollars. You say,
"Williams, that's preposterous!" You're right. Most people would agree
that a 5 mph speed limit is stupid, impractical and insane. That's one
way of putting it, but what they really mean is: The benefit of saving
43,220 highway deaths and the $230 billion that would result from
mandating a 5 mph speed limit isn't worth all the inconvenience,
delays and misery.
Admittedly, the 5 mph speed limit is an extreme example, a reductio
ad absurdum. Nonetheless, it illustrates the principle that our
actions shouldn't be guided by benefits only; we should also ask about
costs. Again, when politicians come to us pretending they're Santa
Clauses or tooth fairies delivering benefits only, we should ask
what's the cost, who's going to pay and why
Peter
Get to know its strengths, weaknesses and mechanics.
Only then will you see the great strength of the 'market system' and the
great waste caused by state supported monopoly.
I suggest as a starting point the excellent essay produced below.
Don't skim and give up on it, but read and ponder. For best effect have
another read it and you two can compare notes.
You're welcome.
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The Economic Organization of a P.O.W. Camp
by
R.A. Radford
From Economica, November, 1945
INTRODUCTION
After allowance has been made for abnormal circumstances, the
social institutions, ideas and habits of groups in the outside world are
to be found reflected in a Prisoner of War Camp. It is an unusual but a
vital society. Camp Organization and politics are matters of real
concern to the inmates, as affecting their present and perhaps their
future existences. Nor does this indicate any loss of proportion. No one
pretends that camp matters are of any but local importance or of more
than transient interest, but their importance there is great. They bulk
large in a world of narrow horizons and it is suggested that any
distortion of values lies rather in the minimization than in the
exaggeration of their importance. Human affairs are essentially
practical matters and the measure of immediate effect on the lives of
those directly concerned in them is to a large extent the criterion of
their importance at that time and place. A prisoner can hold strong
views on such subjects as whether or not all tinned meats shall be
issued to individuals cold or be centrally cooked, without losing sight
of the significance of the Atlantic Charter.
One aspect of social organization is to be found in economic
activity and this, along with other manifestations of a group existence,
is to be found in any P.O.W. camp. True, a prisoner is not dependent on
his exertions for the provision of the necessaries, or even the luxuries
of life, but through his economic activity, the exchange of goods and
services, his standard of material comfort is considerably enhanced. And
this is a serious matter to the prisoner: he is not "playing at shops"
even though the small scale of the transactions and the simple
expression of comfort and wants in terms of cigarettes and jam, razor
blades and writing paper, make the urgency of those needs difficult to
appreciate, even by an ex-prisoner of some three months' standing.
Nevertheless, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that economic
activities do not bulk so large in prison society as they do in the
larger world. There can be little production; as has been said the
prisoner is independent of his exertions for the provision of the
necessities and luxuries of life; the emphasis lies in exchange and the
media of exchange. A prison camp is not to be compared with the seething
crowd of higglers in a street market, any more than it is to be compared
with the economic inertia of a family dinner table.
Naturally then, entertainment, academic and literary interests,
games and discussions of the "other world" bulk larger in everyday life
than they do in the life of more normal societies. But it would be wrong
to underestimate the importance of economic activity. Everyone receives
a roughly equal share of essentials; it is by trade that individual
preferences are given expression and comfort increased. All at some
time, and most people regularly, make exchanges of one sort or another.
Although a P.O.W. camp provides a living example of a simple
economy which might be used as an alternative to the Robinson Crusoe
economy beloved by the text-books, and its simplicity renders the
demonstration of certain economic hypotheses both amusing and
instructive, it is suggested that the principal significance is
sociological. True, there is interest in observing the growth of
economic institutions and customs in a brand new society, small and
simple enough to prevent detail from obscuring the basic pattern and
disequilibrium from obscuring the working of the system. But the
essential interest lies in the universality and the spontaneity of this
economic life; it came into existence not by conscious imitation but as
a response to the immediate needs and circumstances. Any similarity
between prison organization and outside organization arises from similar
stimuli evoking similar responses.
The following is as brief an account of the essential data as may
render the narrative intelligible. The camps of which the writer had
experience were Oflags and consequently the economy was not complicated
by payments for work by the detaining power. They consisted normally of
between 1,200 and 2,500 people, housed in a number of separate but
intercommunicating bungalows, one company of 200 or so to a building.
Each company formed a group within the main organization and inside the
company the room and the messing syndicate, a voluntary and spontaneous
group who fed together, formed the constituent units.
Between individuals there was active trading in all consumer goods
and in some services. Most trading was for food against cigarettes or
other foodstuffs, but cigarettes rose from the status of a normal
commodity to that of currency. RMk.s existed but had no circulation save
for gambling debts, as few articles could be purchased with them from
the canteen.
Our supplies consisted of rations provided by the detaining power
and (principally) the contents of Red Cross food parcels - tinned milk,
jam, butter, biscuits, bully, chocolate, sugar, etc., and cigarettes. So
far the supplies to each person were equal and regular. Private parcels
of clothing, toilet requisites and cigarettes were also received, and
here equality ceased owing to the different numbers dispatched and the
vagaries of the post. All these articles were the subject of trade and
exchange.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET
Very soon after capture people realized that it was both
undesirable and unnecessary, in view of the limited size and the
equality of supplies, to give away or to accept gifts of cigarettes or
food. "Goodwill" developed into trading as a more equitable means of
maximizing individual satisfaction.
We reached a transit camp in Italy about a fortnight after capture
and received ¼ of a Red Cross food parcel each a week later. At once
exchanges, already established, multiplied in volume. Starting with
simple direct barter, such as a non-smoker giving a smoker friend his
cigarette issue in exchange for a chocolate ration, more complex
exchanges soon became an accepted custom. Stories circulated of a padre
who started off round the camp with a tin of cheese and five cigarettes
and returned to his bed with a complete parcel in addition to his
original cheese and cigarettes; the market was not yet perfect. Within a
week or two, as the volume of trade grew, rough scales of exchange
values came into existence. Sikhs, who had at first exchanged tinned
beef for practically any other foodstuff, began to insist on jam and
margarine. It was realized that a tin of jam was worth l/2 lb. of
margarine plus something else; that a cigarette issue was worth several
chocolate issues, and a tin of diced carrots was worth practically nothing.
In this camp we did not visit other bungalows very much and prices
varied from place to place; hence the germ of truth in the story of the
itinerant priest. By the end of a month, when we reached our permanent
camp, there was a lively trade in all commodities and their relative
values were well known, and expressed not in terms of one another - one
didn't quote bully in terms of sugar - but in terms of cigarettes. The
cigarette became the standard of value. In the permanent camp people
started by wandering through the bungalows calling their offers -
"cheese for seven" (cigarettes) and the hours after parcel issue were
Bedlam. The inconveniences of this system soon led to its replacement by
an Exchange and Mart notice board in every bungalow, where under the
headings "name," "room number," "wanted" and "offered" sales and wants
were advertised. When a deal went through, it was crossed off the board.
The public and semi permanent records of transactions led to cigarette
prices being well known and thus tending to equality throughout the
camp, although there were always opportunities for an astute trader to
make a profit from arbitrage. With this development everyone, including
non-smokers, was willing to sell for cigarettes, using them to buy at
another time and place. Cigarettes became the normal currency, though,
of course, barter was never extinguished.
The unity of the market and the prevalence of a single price
varied directly with the general level of organization and comfort in
the camp. A transit camp was always chaotic and uncomfortable: people
were overcrowded, no one knew where anyone else was living, and few took
the trouble to find out. Organization was too slender to include an
Exchange and Mart board, and private advertisements were the most that
appeared. Consequently a transit camp was not one market but many. The
price of a tin of salmon is known to have varied by two cigarettes in 20
between one end of a hut and the other. Despite a high level of
organization in Italy, the market was maculated in this manner at the
first transit camp we reached after our removal to Germany in the autumn
of 1943. In this camp - Stalag VIIA at Moosburg in Bavaria - there were
up to 50,000 prisoners of all nationalities. French, Russians, Italians
and Jugo-Slavs were free to move about within the camp: British and
Americans were confined to their compounds, although a few cigarettes
given to a sentry would always procure permission for one or two men to
visit other compounds. The people who first visited the highly organized
French trading center, with its stalls and known prices, found coffee
extract - relatively cheap among the tea-drinking English - commanding a
fancy price in biscuits or cigarettes, and some enterprising people made
small fortunes that way. (Incidentally we found out later that much of
the coffee went "over the wire" and sold for phenomenal prices at black
market cafes in Munich: some of the French prisoners were said to have
made substantial sums in RMk.s. This was one of the few occasions on
which our normally closed economy came into contact with other economic
worlds.
Eventually public opinion grew hostile to these monopoly profits -
not everyone could make contact with the French - and trading with them
was put on a regulated basis. Each group of beds was given a quota of
articles to offer and the transaction was carried out by accredited
representatives from the British compound, with monopoly rights. The
same method was used for trading with sentries elsewhere, as in this
trade secrecy and reasonable prices had a peculiar importance, but as is
ever the case with regulated companies, the interloper proved too strong.
The permanent camps in Germany saw the highest level of commercial
organization. In addition to the Exchange and Mart notice boards, a shop
was organized as a public utility, controlled by representatives of the
Senior British Officer, on a no profit basis. People left their surplus
clothing, toilet requisites and food there until they were sold at a
fixed price in cigarettes. Only sales in cigarettes were accepted -
there was no barter - and there was no higgling. For food at least there
were standard prices: clothing is less homogeneous and the price was
decided around a norm by the seller and the shop manager in agreement;
shirts would average say 80, ranging from 60 to 120 according to quality
and age. Of food, the shop carried small stocks for convenience; the
capital was provided by a loan from the bulk store of Red Cross
cigarettes and repaid by a small commission taken on the first
transactions. Thus the cigarette attained its fullest currency status,
and the market was almost completely unified.
It is thus to be seen that a market came into existence without
labor or production. The B.R.C.S. may be considered as "Nature" of the
text-book, and the articles of trade - food, clothing and cigarettes -
as free gifts - land or manna. Despite this, and despite a roughly equal
distribution of resources, a market came into spontaneous operation, and
prices were fixed by the operation of supply and demand. It is difficult
to reconcile this fact with the labor theory of value.
Actually there was an embryo labor market. Even when cigarettes
were not scarce, there was usually some unlucky person willing to
perform services for them. Laundrymen advertised at two cigarettes a
garment. Battle-dress was scrubbed and pressed and a pair of trousers
lent for the interim period for twelve. A good pastel portrait cost
thirty or a tin of "Kam." Odd tailoring and other jobs similarly had
their prices.
There were also entrepreneurial services. There was a coffee stall
owner who sold tea, coffee or cocoa at two cigarettes a cup, buying his
raw materials at market prices and hiring labor to gather fuel and to
stoke; he actually enjoyed the services of a chartered accountant at one
stage. After a period of great prosperity he overreached himself and
failed disastrously for several hundred cigarettes. Such large-scale
private enterprise was rare but several middlemen or professional
traders existed. The padre in Italy, or the men at Moosburg who opened
trading relations with the French, are examples: the more subdivided the
market, the less perfect the advertisement of prices, and the less
stable the prices, the greater was the scope for these operators. One
man capitalized his knowledge of Urdu by buying meat from the Sikhs and
selling butter and jam in return: as his operations became better known
more and more people entered this trade, prices in the Indian Wing
approximated more nearly to those elsewhere, though to the end a
"contact" among the Indians was valuable, as linguistic difficulties
pre-vented the trade from being quite free. Some were specialists in the
Indian trade, the food, clothing or even the watch trade. Middlemen
traded on their own account or on commission. Price rings and agreements
were suspected and the traders certainly co-operated. Nor did they
welcome newcomers. Unfortunately the writer knows little of the workings
of these people: public opinion was hostile and the professionals were
usually of a retiring disposition.
One trader in food and cigarettes, operating in a period of
dearth, enjoyed a high reputation. His capital, carefully saved, was
originally about 50 cigarettes, with which he bought rations on issue
days and held them until the price rose just before the next issue. He
also picked up a little by arbitrage; several times a day he visited
every Exchange or Mart notice board and took advantage of every
discrepancy between prices of goods offered and wanted. His knowledge of
prices, markets and names of those who had received cigarette parcels
was phenomenal. By these means he kept himself smoking steadily - his
profits - while his capital remained intact.
Sugar was issued on Saturday. About Tuesday two of us used to
visit Sam and make a deal; as old customers he would advance as much of
the price as he could spare then, and entered the transaction in a book.
On Saturday morning he left cocoa tins on our beds for the ration, and
picked them up on Saturday afternoon. We were hoping for a calendar at
Christmas, but Sam failed too. He was left holding a big black treacle
issue when the price fell, and in this weakened state was unable to
withstand an unexpected arrival of parcels and the consequent price
fluctuations. He paid in full, but from his capital. The next Tuesday,
when I paid my usual visit he was out of business.
Credit entered into many, perhaps into most, transactions, in one
form or another. Sam paid in advance as a rule for his purchases of
future deliveries of sugar, but many buyers asked for credit, whether
the commodity was sold spot or future. Naturally prices varied according
to the terms of sale. A treacle ration might be advertised for four
cigarettes now or five next week. And in the future market "bread now"
was a vastly different thing from "bread Thursday.” Bread was issued on
Thursday and Monday, four and three days' rations respectively, and by
Wednesday and Sunday night it had risen at least one cigarette per
ration, from seven to eight, by supper time. One man always saved a
ration to sell then at the peak price: his offer of "bread now" stood
out on the board among a number of "bread Monday's" fetching one or two
less, or not selling at all - and he always smoked on Sunday night.
THE CIGARETTE CURRENCY
Although cigarettes as currency exhibited certain peculiarities,
they performed all the functions of a metallic currency as a unit of
account, as a measure of value and as a store of value, and shared most
of its characteristics. They were homogeneous, reasonably durable, and
of convenient size for the smallest or, in packets, for the largest
transactions. Incidentally they could be clipped or sweated by rolling
them between the fingers so that tobacco fell out.
Cigarettes were also subject to the working of Gresham’s Law.
Certain brands were more popular than others as smokes, but for currency
purposes a cigarette was a cigarette. Consequently buyers used the
poorer qualities and the Shop rarely saw the more popular brands:
cigarettes such as Churchman's No. I were rarely used for trading. At
one time cigarettes hand-rolled from pipe tobacco began to circulate.
Pipe tobacco was issued in lieu of cigarettes by the Red Cross at a rate
of 25 cigarettes to the ounce and this rate was standard in exchanges,
but an ounce would produce 30 home-made cigarettes. Naturally people
with machine-made cigarettes broke them down and re-rolled the tobacco,
and the real cigarette virtually disappeared from the market.
Hand-rolled cigarettes were not homogeneous and prices could no longer
be quoted in them with safety: each cigarette was examined before it was
accepted and thin ones were rejected, or extra demanded as a
make-weight. For a time we suffered all the inconveniences of a debased
currency.
Machine-made cigarettes were always universally acceptable, both
for what they would buy and for themselves. It was this intrinsic value
which gave rise to their principal disadvantage as currency, a
disadvantage which exists, but to a far smaller extent, in the case of
metallic currency; that is, a strong demand for non-monetary purposes.
Consequently our economy was repeatedly subject to deflation and to
periods of monetary stringency. While the Red Cross issue of 50 or 25
cigarettes per man per week came in regularly and while there were fair
stocks held, the cigarette currency suited its purpose admirably. But
when the issue was interrupted, stocks soon ran out, prices fell,
trading declined in volume and became increasingly a matter of barter.
This deflationary tendency was periodically offset by the sudden
injection of new currency. Private cigarette parcels arrived in a
trickle throughout the year, but the big numbers came in quarterly when
the Red Cross received its allocation of transport. Several hundred
thousand cigarettes might arrive in the space of a fortnight. Prices
soared, and then began to fall, slowly at first but with increasing
rapidity as stocks ran out, until the next big delivery. Most of our
economic troubles could be attributed to this fundamental instability.
PRICE MOVEMENTS
Many factors affected prices, the strongest and most noticeable
being the periodical currency inflation and deflation described in the
last paragraphs. The periodicity of this price cycle depended on
cigarette and, to a far lesser extent, on food deliveries. At one time
in the early days, before any private parcels had arrived and when there
were no individual stocks, the weekly issue of cigarettes and food
parcels occurred on a Monday. The non-monetary demand for cigarettes was
great, and less elastic than the demand for food: consequently prices
fluctuated weekly, falling towards Sunday night and rising sharply on
Monday morning. Later, when many people held reserves, the weekly issue
had no such effect, being too small a proportion of the total available.
Credit allowed people with no reserves to meet their non--monetary
demand over the weekend.
The general price level was affected by other factors. An influx
of new prisoners, proverbially hungry, raised it. Heavy air raids in the
vicinity of the camp probably increased the non-monetary demand for
cigarettes and accentuated deflation. Good and bad war news certainly
had its effect, and the general waves of optimism and pessimism which
swept the camp were reflected in prices. Before breakfast one morning in
March of this year, a rumor of the arrival of parcels and cigarettes was
circulated. Within ten minutes I sold a treacle ration, for four
cigarettes (hitherto offered in vain for three), and many similar deals
went through. By 10 o'clock the rumor was denied, and treacle that day
found no more buyers even at two cigarettes.
More interesting than changes in the general price level were
changes in the price structure. Changes in the supply of a commodity, in
the German ration scale or in the make-up of Red Cross parcels, would
raise the price of one commodity relative to others. Tins of oatmeal,
once a rare and much sought after luxury in the parcels, became a
commonplace in 1943, and the price fell. In hot weather the demand for
cocoa fell, and that for soap rose. A new recipe would be reflected in
the price level: the discovery that raisins and sugar could be turned
into an alcoholic liquor of remarkable potency reacted permanently on
the dried fruit market. The invention of electric immersion heaters run
off the power points made tea, a drug on the market in Italy, a certain
seller in Germany.
In August, 1944, the supplies of parcels and cigarettes were both
halved. Since both sides of the equation were changed in the same
degree, changes in prices were not anticipated. But this was not the
case: the non-monetary demand for cigarettes was less elastic than the
demand for food, and food prices fell a little. More important however
were the changes in the price structure. German margarine and jam,
hitherto valueless owing to adequate supplies of Canadian butter and
marmalade, acquired a new value. Chocolate, popular and a certain
seller, and sugar, fell. Bread rose; several standing contracts of bread
for cigarettes were broken, especially when the bread ration was reduced
a few weeks later.
In February, 1945, the German soldier who drove the ration wagon
was found to be willing to exchange loaves of bread at the rate of one
loaf for a bar of chocolate. Those in the know began selling bread and
buying chocolate, by then almost unsaleable in a period of serious
deflation. Bread, at about 40, fell slightly; chocolate rose from 15;
the supply of bread was not enough for the two commodities to reach
parity, but the tendency was unmistakable.
The substitution of German margarine for Canadian butter when
parcels were halved naturally affected their relative values, margarine
appreciating at the expense of butter. Similarly, two brands of dried
milk, hitherto differing in quality and therefore in price by five
cigarettes a tin, came together in price as the wider substitution of
the cheaper raised its relative value.
Enough has been cited to show that any change in conditions affected
both the general price level and the price structure. It was this latter
phenomenon which wrecked our planned economy.
PAPER CURRENCY - BULLY MARKS
Around D-Day, food and cigarettes were plentiful, business was
brisk and the camp in an optimistic mood. Consequently the
Entertainments Committee felt the moment opportune to launch a
restaurant, where food and hot drinks were sold while a band and variety
turns performed. Earlier experiments, both public and private, had
pointed the way and the scheme was a great success. Food was bought at
market prices to provide the meals and the small profits were devoted to
a reserve fund and used to bribe Germans to provide grease-paints and
other necessities for the camp theatre. Originally meals were sold for
cigarettes but this meant that the whole scheme was vulnerable to the
periodic deflationary waves, and furthermore heavy smokers were unlikely
to attend much. The whole success of the scheme depended on an adequate
amount of food being offered for sale in the normal manner.
To increase and facilitate trade, and to stimulate supplies and
customers therefore, and secondarily to avoid the worst effects of
deflation when it should come, a paper currency was organized by the
Restaurant and the Shop. The Shop bought food on behalf of the
Restaurant with paper notes and the paper was accepted equally with the
cigarettes in the Restaurant or Shop, and passed back to the Shop to
purchase more food. The Shop acted as a bank of issue. The paper money
was baked 100 percent by food; hence its name, the Bully Mark. The BMk.
was backed 100 per cent by food: there could be no over issues, as is
permissible with a normal bank of issue, since the eventual dispersal of
the camp and consequent redemption of all BMk.s was anticipated in the
near future.
Originally one BMk. was worth one cigarette and for a short time
both circulated freely inside and outside the Restaurant. Prices were
quoted in BNlk.s and cigarettes with equal freedom - and for a short
time the BMk. showed signs of replacing the cigarette as currency. The
BMk. was tied to food; but not to cigarettes: as it was issued against
food, say 45 for a tin of milk and so on, any reduction in the BMk.
prices of food would have meant that there were unbacked BMk.s in
circulation. But the price of both food and BMk.s could and did
fluctuate with the supply of cigarettes.
While the Restaurant flourished, the scheme was a success: the
Restaurant bought heavily, all foods were saleable and prices were stable.
In August parcels and cigarettes were halved and the Camp was
bombed. The Restaurant closed for a short while and sales of food became
difficult. Even when the Restaurant reopened, the food and cigarette
shortage became increasingly acute and people were unwilling to convert
such valuable goods into paper and to hold them for luxuries like snacks
and tea. Less of the right kinds of food for the Restaurant were sold,
and the Shop became glutted with dried fruit, chocolate, sugar, etc.,
which the Restaurant could not buy. The price level and the price
structure changed. The BMk. fell to four-fifths of a cigarette and
eventually farther still, and it became unacceptable save in the
Restaurant. There was a flight from the BMk., no longer convertible into
cigarettes or popular foods. The cigarette re-established itself.
But the BMk. was sound! The Restaurant closed in the New Year with
a progressive food shortage and the long evenings without lights due to
intensified Allied air raids, and BMk.s could only be spent in the
Coffee Bar - relict of the Restaurant - or on the few unpopular foods in
the Shop, the owners of which were prepared to accept them. In the end
all holders of BMk.s were paid in full, in cups of coffee or in prunes.
People who had bought BMk.s for cigarettes or valuable jam or biscuits
in their heyday were aggrieved that they should have stood the loss
involved by their restricted choice, but they suffered no actual loss of
market value.
PRICE FIXING
Along with this scheme came a determined attempt at a planned
economy, at price fixing. The Medical Officer had long been anxious to
control food sales, for fear of some people selling too much, to the
detriment of their health. The deflationary waves and their effects on
prices were inconvenient to all and would be dangerous to the Restaurant
which had to carry stocks. Furthermore, unless the BMk. was convertible
into cigarettes at about par it had little chance of gaining confidence
and of succeeding as a currency. As has been explained, the BMk. was
tied to food but could not be tied to cigarettes, which fluctuated in
value. Hence, while BMk. prices of food were fixed for all time,
cigarette prices of food and BMk.s varied.
The Shop, backed by the Senior British Officer, was now in a
position to enforce price control both inside and outside its walls.
Hitherto a standard price had been fixed for food left for sale in the
shop, and prices outside were roughly in conformity with this scale,
which was recommended as a "guide" to sellers, but fluctuated a good
deal around it. Sales in the Shop at recommended prices were apt to be
slow though a good price might be obtained: sales outside could be made
more quickly at lower prices. (If sales outside were to be at higher
prices, goods were withdrawn from the Shop until the recommended price
rose: but the recommended price was sluggish and could not follow the
market closely by reason of its very purpose, which was stability.) The
Exchange and Mart notice boards came under the control of the Shop:
advertisements which exceeded a 5 percent departure from the recommended
scale were liable to be crossed out by authority: unauthorized sales
were discouraged by authority and also by public opinion, strongly in
favor of a just and stable price. (Recommended prices were fixed partly
from market data, partly on the advice of the M.O.)
At first the recommended scale was a success: the Restaurant, a
big buyer, kept prices stable around this level: opinion and the 5
percent tolerance helped. But when the price level fell with the August
cuts and the price structure changed, the recommended scale was too
rigid. Unchanged at first, as no deflation was expected, the sale was
tardily lowered, but the prices of goods on the new scale remained in
the same relation to one another, owing to the BMk., while on the market
the price structure had changed. And the modifying influence of the
Restaurant had gone. The scale was moved up and down several times,
slowly following the inflationary and deflationary waves, but it was
rarely adjusted to changes in the price structure. More and more
advertisements were crossed off the board, and black market sales at
unauthorized prices increased: eventually public opinion turned against
the recommended scale and authority gave up the struggle. In the last
few weeks, with unparalleled deflation, prices fell with alarming
rapidity, no scales existed, and supply and demand, alone and
unmellowed, determined prices.
PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion on the subject of trading was vocal if confused and
changeable, and generalizations as to its direction are difficult and
dangerous. A tiny minority held that all trading was undesirable as it
engendered an unsavory atmosphere; occasional frauds and sharp practices
were cited as proof. Certain forms of trading were more generally
condemned; trade with the Germans was criticized by many. Red Cross
toilet articles, which were in short supply and only issued in cases of
actual need, were excluded from trade by law and opinion working in
unshakable harmony. At one time, when there had been several cases of
malnutrition reported among the more devoted smokers, no trade in German
rations was permitted, as the victims became an additional burden on the
depleted food reserves of the Hospital. But while certain activities
were condemned as anti-social, trade itself was practiced, and its
utility appreciated, by almost everyone in the camp.
More interesting was opinion on middlemen and prices. Taken as a
whole, opinion was hostile to the middleman. His function, and his hard
work in bringing buyer and seller together, were ignored; profits were
not regarded as a reward for labor, but as the result of sharp
practices. Despite the fact that his very existence was proof to the
contrary, the middleman was held to be redundant in view of the
existence of an official Shop and the Exchange and Mart. Appreciation
only came his way when he was willing to advance the price of a sugar
ration, or to buy goods spot and carry them against a future sale. In
these cases the element of risk was obvious to all, and the convenience
of the service was felt to merit some reward. Particularly unpopular was
the middleman with an element of monopoly, the man who contacted the
ration wagon driver, or the man who utilized his knowledge of Urdu. And
middlemen as a group were blamed for reducing prices. Opinion
notwithstanding, most people dealt with a middleman, whether consciously
or unconsciously, at some time or another.
There was a strong feeling that everything had its "just price" in
cigarettes. While the assessment of the just price, which incidentally
varied between camps, was impossible of explanation, this price was
nevertheless pretty closely known. It can best be defined as the price
usually fetched by an article in good times when cigarettes were
plentiful. The "just price" changed slowly; it was unaffected by
short-term variations in supply, and while opinion might be resigned to
departures from the "just price," a strong feeling of resentment
persisted. A more satisfactory definition of the "just price" is
impossible. Everyone knew what it was, though no one could explain why
it should be so.
As soon as prices began to fall with a cigarette shortage, a
clamor arose, particularly against those who held reserves and who
bought at reduced prices. Sellers at cut prices were criticized and
their activities referred to as the black market. In every period of
dearth the explosive question of "should non-smokers receive a cigarette
ration?" was discussed to profitless length. Unfortunately, it was the
non-smoker, or the light smoker with his reserves, along with the hated
middleman, who weathered the storm most easily.
The popularity of the price-fixing scheme, and such success as it
enjoyed, were undoubtedly the result of this body of opinion. On several
occasions the fall of prices was delayed by the general support given to
the recommended scale. The onset of deflation was marked by a period of
sluggish trade; prices stayed up but no one bought. Then prices fell on
the black market, and the volume of trade revived in that quarter. Even
when the recommended scale was revised, the volume of trade in the Shop
would remain low. Opinion was always overruled by the hard facts of the
market.
Curious arguments were advanced to justify price fixing. The
recommended prices were in some way related to the calorific values of
the foods offered: hence some were overvalued and never sold at these
prices. One argument ran as follows: not everyone has private cigarette
parcels: thus, when prices were high and trade good in the summer of
1944, only the lucky rich could buy. This was unfair to the man with few
cigarettes. When prices fell in the following winter, prices should be
pegged high so that the rich, who had enjoyed life in the summer, should
put many cigarettes into circulation. The fact that those who sold to
the rich in the summer had also enjoyed life then, and the fact that in
the winter there was always someone willing to sell at low prices were
ignored. Such arguments were hotly debated each night after the approach
of Allied Aircraft extinguished all lights at 8 p.m. But prices moved
with the supply of cigarettes, and refused to stay fixed in accordance
with a theory of ethics.
CONCLUSION
The economic organization described was both elaborate and
smooth-working in the summer of 1944. Then came the August cuts and
deflation. Prices fell, rallied with deliveries of cigarette parcels in
September and December, and fell again. In January 1945, supplies of Red
Cross cigarettes ran out: and prices slumped still further: in February
the supplies of food parcels were exhausted and the depression became a
blizzard. Food, itself scarce, was almost given away in order to meet
the non-monetary demand for cigarettes. Laundries ceased to operate, or
worked for pounds or RMk.s: food and cigarettes sold for fancy prices in
pounds, hitherto unheard of. The Restaurant was a memory and the BMk. a
joke. The Shop was empty and the Exchange and Mart notices were full of
unaccepted offers for cigarettes. Barter increased in volume, becoming a
larger proportion of a smaller volume of trade. This, the first serious
and prolonged food shortage in the writer's experience, caused the price
structure to change again, partly because German rations were not easily
divisible. A margarine ration gradually sank in value until it exchanged
directly for a treacle ration. Sugar slumped sadly. Only bread retained
its value. Several thousand cigarettes, the capital of the Shop, were
distributed without any noticeable effect. A few fractional parcel and
cigarette issues, such as one-sixth of a parcel and twelve cigarettes
each, led to momentary price recoveries and feverish trade, especially
when they coincided with good news from the Western front, but the
general position remained unaltered.
By April, 1945, chaos had replaced order in the economic sphere:
sales were difficult, prices lacked stability. Economics has been
defined as the science of distributing limited means among unlimited and
competing ends. On 12th April, with the arrival of elements of the 30th
US. Infantry Division, the ushering in of an age of plenty demonstrated
the hypothesis that with infinite means economic organization and
activity would be redundant, as every want could be satisfied without effort
Mike Wilcox
<-- I'M WITH STUPID wrote:
If you looked at most of these "Free Services" or mandates you would
find that studies were done beforehand to determine if there was a net
benefit to society. Having services that promote education, health care
and communications are a net benefit, unless you consider ignorance,
disease and getting your mail via pony express is preferable. What you
appear to be offering is as my granny used to say is, " Penny wise and
pound foolish". Making cuts to such services is counter productive,
costing more in the long run than the savings.
catchmerevisited
at so...@shaw.caNADA wrote on 8/11/04 9:38 AM:
what exactly is your point?
If you are against the perception of free government services, then
don't forget that the snowplow operator is clearing "free" roads, as well.
There are certain services that SHOULD be covered by Government as opposed
to private enterprise.
notritenoteri
whether you see yourself as the fucker or the fuckee"
Wellcome to reality!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
<-- I'M WITH STUPID " <so...@shaw.caNADA> wrote in message
news:4oikh017n1fjhu4vm...@4ax.com...
Duncan Patton a Campbell is Dhu
" <-- I'M WITH STUPID " <so...@shaw.caNADA> writes:
> Economics 101
> Walter E. Williams (archive)
>
>
> August 11, 2004
>
>
> Economic ignorance allows us to fall easy prey to political
> charlatans and demagogues, so how about a little Economics 101?
>
You confuse greed and its rewards with profit. A common failing in capitalist Idolotors.
Dhu
>
>
>
>
> http://www.townhall.com/
--
***********************************************
All persons named herein are purely fictional victims
of the Canidian Bagle Breader's Association.
Save the Bagle!
Sun Šhu
***********************************************
Rhino
"Mike Wilcox" <spamsp...@montypython.org> wrote in message
news:DqsSc.21651$Mq1.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
studies of the kind you suggest are actually done, there should be no reason
for the governments that do them to keep them secret from us. In fact, you'd
think that these studies would actually be debated in parliament or at least
in parliamentary committees and certainly published for the edification of
us all.
Personally, I'd like to think that studies like this actually get done.
However, I'm cynical enough to suspect that if you actually looked them over
carefully, you'd see that most of them ignored all sorts of costs or grossly
overstated the benefits in order to make the benefits exceed the costs. But
then I haven't actually seen such a study so I could be wrong.
Rhino
Mike Wilcox
These studies, such as Royal Commissions are not kept secret, (See
http://juno.concordia.ca/services/govsource.html )usually they are all
over the news (at least in Canada) before any major decision is made.
One such study that comes readily to mind is the Romanow report,
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/care/romanow/index1.html which spent over
a year studying all phases of health care and determined that private
healthier cost more and the survival rate was lower than in the public
system.
The reasons public systems were developed in the first place was that
the private systems for services such as health and education worked
only for those that could afford them.
Cam Newton
And now we can't afford the public system. How could that have
happened?
Mike Wilcox
I guess you didn't read the report, the private system cost far more to
administer and the survival rate is not as good. The USA has private
health care and spends far more per capita than Canada, even then 44
million are not covered.
tsarkon
>
> You confuse greed and its rewards with profit. A common failing in capitalist Idolotors.
>
> Dhu
Well all mighty DHU please explain the difference. Please use plain
english as us evil capitalist idolotors can't understand big words.
tsarkon
> I guess you didn't read the report, the private system cost far more to
> administer and the survival rate is not as good. The USA has private
> health care and spends far more per capita than Canada, even then 44
> million are not covered.
Post the report. I doubt they took into account the quality of care
which we all know is vastly superior in the US.
Mike Wilcox
I did post the link, and I would consider survival rates being the best
indicator of quality of care. Having highly invasive surgical techniques
and the very latest technology means piss all if you still die in the
hospital ;~)
catchmerevisited
ccn...@hotmail.com wrote on 8/11/04 3:55 PM:
>>>
>>>
>>
>> These studies, such as Royal Commissions are not kept secret, (See
>> http://juno.concordia.ca/services/govsource.html )usually they are all
>> over the news (at least in Canada) before any major decision is made.
>> One such study that comes readily to mind is the Romanow report,
>> http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/care/romanow/index1.html which spent over
>> a year studying all phases of health care and determined that private
>> healthier cost more and the survival rate was lower than in the public
>> system.
>>
>> The reasons public systems were developed in the first place was that
>> the private systems for services such as health and education worked
>> only for those that could afford them.
>>
>
> And now we can't afford the public system. How could that have
> happened?
"Don't believe the Hype is a Sequel"-Public Enemy '92 "Boooooy!"
tsarkon
Waiting six monnths to two years for sugery sure sucks.
catchmerevisited
spamsp...@montypython.org wrote on 8/11/04 6:43 PM:
but this applies only to those who have the financial ability to pay for
HMO's, etc. to receive surgical care in the US.
Mike Wilcox
Beats the hell out of dying because you can't afford it or lost your
home to pay your hospital bill. Medical costs are the second highest
cause of bankruptcy in the USA.
notritenoteri
yah gotta look it from tsarkon's view. Maybe he sees dead as a better
option and bankruptcy as just another opportunity to enjoy the AMerican
entrepeneurial spirit. There's also the issue of freedom of choice he can
choose to be dead and/or bankrupt. Although, if he choses dead first he
won't be able to get to bankruptcy unless he knows something the rest of us
don't.news:k_JSc.24889$Mq1.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
Rhino
that "studies were done beforehand to determine if there was a net benefit
Medicare in this country, it was done long after the system was established.
I was hoping you could point us to cost-benefit analyses that showed it made
good economic sense to pay a billion dollars to the gun registry. Or to
subsidize every VIA train fare so that for every dollar you paid in fare,
the government kicked in $4 more.
As far as I'm concerned, every government program should have had a
cost-benefit analysis done before the program was ever created and staffed.
I suspect that relatively few ever had thorough analyses in the first place
and would never have been created if the analyses had been done.
In addition, each such program should have objectives set for it when it is
created that state what it should accomplish each year and should be
modified or even scrapped if it doesn't accomplish those objectives.
For example, if you create a child daycare program on the grounds that it
will be "better" and will "save money", I think you need to define what
"better" means and describe that benefit in ways that can be measured. For
instance, saying that children would be "happier" is hard to measure so it
would be hard to assess later whether the children really were happier. On
the other hand, if you put the benefit in measurable terms like "30% better
results on standardized tests for children using the program", you'd have
something that could be assessed. Then, if the program didn't yield the
benefits expected by the program, you could modify the program to make it
more likely to achieve the result or admit that it doesn't work and scrap
it.
By the same token, if you create the program on the grounds that it will
save money, you need to specify how much money it will save. If the program
instead costs money or saves far less than was predicted, the whole premise
of the program needs to be rethought or even scrapped.
Rhino
notritenoteri
problems, soft costs and soft benefits. Benefits are only of value to
those to whom they accrue. I am unlikely to benefit from the gun registry
but I might benefit from better regulation of drinking water. Some costs are
pretty soft too.
How do you know something won't work till you try it and by then its too
late. The Egyptians built about 50% of a pyramid before they figured out it
was going to fall down the way they were doing it, so they changed the slope
and continued on. It is not too esthetically pleasing but it is a pyramid
of sorts. That was about 4000 years ago looks like we still haven't learned
how to estimate.
While in theory your idea of measure the outputs and shut it down if it
doesn't measure up may be a good one, it neglects to account for such things
as changing circumstances. Have you ever heard of a project once started
that has been turned off because it wasn't turning out as planned? The best
that you can hope for is slow starvation but never a quick execution. In a
lot of cases the original project gets repackaged and sold a second time.
Besides we do things because we can, not because they are the right thing to
do.
"Rhino" <rhi...@NOSPAM.sympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:EgKSc.25214$Mq1.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
Mike Wilcox
From what I understand they are even making it harder to go Bankrupt in
the USA ;~))
Rhino
"notritenoteri" <colda...@hades.com> wrote in message
news:oOLSc.508$H23....@newscontent-01.sprint.ca...
> You know you have a point about cost benefit studies. Just a couple of
> problems, soft costs and soft benefits. Benefits are only of value to
> those to whom they accrue. I am unlikely to benefit from the gun registry
> but I might benefit from better regulation of drinking water. Some costs
are
> pretty soft too.
That's absolutely right.
And the soft costs and benefits are not always handled honestly. For
example, if you consider the gun registry, I feel sure that a bureaucrat who
choses to defend it will say something like "But if it saves just one life,
isn't it worth it?".
On an emotional level, we are going to tend to buy that argument. No
reasonable person wants to see others murdered. And few people are going to
be comfortable putting a cash value on human life. In effect, we are going
to say that every human life is of infinite value. Therefore, the
cost/benefit analysis of the gun registry is going to look like this:
COST
$1 billion
BENEFIT
Based on a prediction that the program will save at least 1 life and valuing
each life as of infinite value, clearly the benefit of the program is:
1 life times infinity = infinity.
CONCLUSION
BENEFIT exceeds COST (infinity is greater than $1 billion). Therefore, the
gun registry is worthwhile.
But this isn't a very honest analysis. The fact is we DO put a cash value on
human life. Suppose you injure a pedestrian with your car and the
authorities ruled that it was your fault. Leaving aside the entire issue of
criminal charges, your insurance company is going to have to pay
compensation to the victim. Leaving aside the issue of punitive damages, the
victim's insurance company is going to make a claim for a monetary value
that roughly equals the amount of money the victim would have made, assuming
a normal life span, had he not been hit by your car. That amount is NOT
going to be infinite, although it may be high. Picture a top professional
athlete who has just started his career. Of course, if you hit the town
drunk who is already very old, you could expect the payout to be
considerably less.
Distasteful as we may find it morally, we DO put a cash value on human life.
In fact, we pretty much have to, like it or not.
Let's take an example. I've heard that thousands of people die of starvation
of starvation every day. Why don't we have a government program that brings
each and every one of those who are at risk to Canada where we can feed them
and ensure that they don't die? If we value every life as being of infinite
value, we clearly have a winner of a program here, by the same argument as I
suggested that defenders would use for the gun registry. So why don't we do
it?
Simple: the costs would be enormous, far exceeding the costs of the gun
registry. Heck, it would probably exceed the GNP of the whole country. Just
imagine the cost of finding all the qualified people, flying them to Canada,
building housing for them, etc. etc. But if you believe that each human life
has infinite value, you'd still conclude that the benefits exceed the costs.
Will you support such a measure if someone proposes it? Are you willing to
pay your share of those costs? Or would you say "Hey, wait a minute!
Wouldn't we accomplish the same thing for much less cost by simply helping
them grow their own food?" (Or by sending them surplus grain or building
dams or whatever.)
> How do you know something won't work till you try it and by then its
too
> late. The Egyptians built about 50% of a pyramid before they figured out
it
> was going to fall down the way they were doing it, so they changed the
slope
> and continued on. It is not too esthetically pleasing but it is a
pyramid
> of sorts. That was about 4000 years ago looks like we still haven't
learned
> how to estimate.
You're right of course. We often can't estimate exactly what the cost of
something will be. The Montreal Olympics were supposed to be "cheap" at only
$100 million. In fact, they cost over $1 billion and the taxpayers of
Montreal will be paying the tab for some time to come. The US Space Program
went over budget. Etc. etc. etc.
However, we do have mechanisms to deal with that problem. In this city, the
companies that get the contracts to repair our municipal roads get bonuses
for finishing early and penalties for finishing late.
Also, some people just plain do a better job of estimating than others. We
can make efforts to find and train the best estimators possible to estimate
costs for new programs.
> While in theory your idea of measure the outputs and shut it down if
it
> doesn't measure up may be a good one, it neglects to account for such
things
> as changing circumstances. Have you ever heard of a project once started
> that has been turned off because it wasn't turning out as planned? The
best
> that you can hope for is slow starvation but never a quick execution. In a
> lot of cases the original project gets repackaged and sold a second time.
You are right that circumstances can change things. 9/11 is certainly an
example of changing circumstances and has led to many changes in US policy
and expenditures.
But what were the changing circumstances that caused the bill for the gun
registry to balloon from $2 million to $1 billion? What were the changing
circumstances that caused Via fares to be subsidized by $4 tax dollars for
every dollar of fare that we pay? What were the changing circumstances that
caused the Montreal Olympics to balloon from $100 million to $1 billion?
I suspect that if you look into these programs, you'd find that the reasons
were some mix of:
a) bad estimating
b) no penalties for late completion
c) no competitive bidding for the services used by the program
d) corruption
Those all seem like things that could be prevented by a properly run
government.
You are right that programs, once started, are rarely cancelled. They simply
take on a new form. As human beings, I think we innately live by the feeling
that once something that seemed worthwhile has started, we don't want to
abandon it. Sometimes, that is justifiable but sometimes it is just plain
irrational. The federal government (and the government of Nova Scotia)
pumped billions upon billions of dollars into Sydney Steel to keep the steel
industry alive in that area yet for all of that money, all they have to show
for it are the Sydney Tar Ponds, which will cost many millions more to
clean. That was one hell of an expensive make-work project. It would have
been far cheaper to simply give each of the employees $40,000 a year to do
nothing. It took far too long for that project to get cancelled and we're
all on the hook for that wasted money.
> Besides we do things because we can, not because they are the right thing
to
> do.
>
And here I disagree with you completely. If they are not the right thing to
do, why on earth are we doing them?
Rhino
Mike Wilcox
notritenoteri wrote:
I don't know if Rhino is aware of it but there are " Sun Set" clauses in
many programes that call for examination of a program or its closure at
the end of a certain period.
Duncan Patton a Campbell is Dhu
Profit is a religious principle espoused by puritans and other Calvinist
that directs us to engage only in activities that have material or moral
benefits that can be shared by all participants. It allows moral governance
over the temporal affairs of men.
Greed is, by definition, something not shared.
Dhu
--
***********************************************
All persons named herein are purely fictional victims
of the Canidian Bagle Breader's Association.
Save the Bagle!
Sun Ðhu
***********************************************
notritenoteri
the falling dollar.
"Mike Wilcox" <spamsp...@montypython.org> wrote in message
news:%UMSc.25947$Mq1.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
notritenoteri
concerned is subjective and never really known, one theory is as good as
the next. It is my conjecture that the gun registry is a cover for
something far more sinister, a national identity and citizen profile card.
It is the stuff that the Stazi could only have wet dreams about. I think
the GR is just prototyping on a massive scale. Only time will tell.
In my not so illustrious career I have had some small part in projects in an
industry that is characterized by massive cost overruns, extremely
optimistic estimates, numerous failures to complete and doubtful benefits.
I'll let you figure which it is.
Bad estimates are the norm. No one will buy a pessimistic estimate. You've
heard of shoot the messenger? A lot of estimates are based on the "how much
do you think it should cost?" method. Experts are employed but only to
bolster the virtues of the undertaking, never to show why it is
unaffordable, impractical,or lacking in benefits, soft or otherwise.
Penalties are for hockey players. Why would anyone undertake an activity
where the uncertainties are high and be prepared to pay for the privilege?
Besides most buyers have no idea of what they want except they don't want to
pay any more than they have to. You say that your city pays extra for
timely completion and extracts penalties for delays. I'll bet that there are
so many weasel clauses about what constitutes a delay that most of the time
the whole deal is just set aside. If a buyer / supplier relationship is
always at the contract "in the face" point its time for both sides to cut
and run, like divorce.
Get yourself a copy of some government procurement policies and see how
complex they are.
Believe it or not, corruption in my experience is minimal.
We do put a value on life but it depends on who is doing the valuing.
Sudanese in Darfur seem to be worth nothing on the other hand 911 victims
are worth about 7.5 mil each. What's the moral of these facts? I don't know.
Your suggestion that we should hire and train the best is a bit naive. All
estimates are exactly that, estimates based on a set of assumptions that are
subject to change before, during or after the inception of the project.
Should the designers of the WTC be held liable for not designing for a
situation that they or anyone else never conceived of?
Just one final question how does anyone know what is right? I don't believe
in capital punishment in any circumstances but I'm not adverse to wars and
the associated killing. I just don't want my sons involved. AM I a
hypocrite you bet.
"Rhino" <rhi...@NOSPAM.sympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:FlNSc.25969$Mq1.1...@news20.bellglobal.com...
Rhino
> I don't know if Rhino is aware of it but there are " Sun Set" clauses in
> many programes that call for examination of a program or its closure at
> the end of a certain period.
>
Yes, I'm familiar with the concept. Sunset clauses are a great idea.
However, they don't seem to be a feature of *all* programs, which I think
they should be.
If we had real sunset clauses in every program from the beginning, I suspect
that the huge Via subsidies would have vanished long ago and Sydney Steel
would have been closed down when the Sydney Tar Ponds were just the Sydney
Tar Puddle.
And what about all the Royal Commissions that produced reports that were
simply shelved? Or the Senate?
Rhino
notritenoteri
"Cam Newton" <ccn...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:411aa3d1...@news.gv.shawcable.net...