India’s Foreign Policy Since Independence By V.p. Dutt

[Kerby Kolpack]

Indiaand Iran have interacted with each other since time immemorial. During the post-independence period, their relations passed through strains. During the 1950s, Indo-Iranian relations remained cool because of Iran's alignment with the West and India's policy of non alignment. Their relations however started improving during the 1960s and 1970s, except during Ayatollah Khomeini's period.

After the end of the Cold War, common security threat perceptions brought India and Iran closer. Iran was deeply concerned with the US ties with the Arab states, and unstable states to its north. As a result Iran wanted to promote regional ties. India's main security dilemmas arose from international pressures and regional rivalries. All this led to the convergence of their interests, the main areas being—energy, Afghanistan, Central Asia and business. As their interests coincide the two started making concious efforts to improve ties by keeping up high level contacts, which was followed by very important visits, particularly, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to Iran in 1993 and President Hashemi Rafsanjani's visit to India in 1995.

The Indo-Iranian equation is a significant evolving factor affecting regional politics in South and West Asia. Both the countries have realised that their relations were not determined only by the issue of Islam but extend much farther. The mutual desire for friendship and cooperation has lessened the misunderstandings and both the countries can now look forward to a more stable relationship.

The rulers and the people of Iran and India have interacted with each other since time immemorial. The continuity of these age old interactions was broken for a time after the British conquest of India in the early 19th century,1 but they were revived after the departure of the British from the subcontinent in August 1947.

Even before independence, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru supported the Iranian demand for the withdrawal of the Russian forces but he desisted from any direct criticism of the Soviet Union. There was a vague perception in Iran, that a leading Indian leader, (Nehru) though supportive of Iran, seemed to have a soft corner for the USSR, yet Iran remained well-disposed towards India. Iran also participated in the first non governmental organisation convened 'Asian Relations Conference" held in New Delhi in March 1947. At this forum, the Iranian delegate extended his country's friendship and good wishes for India's independence.2

During the post-independence period, due to the changed international relations system, there was a qualitative difference in the Indo-Iranian relationship. By 1947, both Iran and India experienced a complex fall-out of World War II. Iran found itself deeply involved in the throes of the Cold War. The Iranian people interpreted communism as a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the state, their social system and to the regimes security.3 The Shah feared that the Soviet Union had a design to destabilise his regime through its ideological protg the Tudeh party which had close links with the USSR. A definite policy predicated on close, even intimate, relations with the United States, rabid anti- communism and the systematic expansion of Iranian military power was pursued deliberately by the Shah from that time on often causing domestic opposition to the policy.4

While Iran aligned itself with the West, for India, the post-World War II period brought about the culmination of its independence movement. The Indian government after independence, sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. Nehru said, "we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else...neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be made to vote this way or that way."5 India's policy of non- alignment and Iran's policy of alignment with the West determined the Indo-Iran relations in the post-war period to a great extent.

Nasser Factor: Nehru's endorsement of Gamal Abdel Nasser as the leader of the Arab world and of his policies did not go down well with the Shah. Similarly, Nasser's crusade against monarchies and his attempts at the unification of the Arab states, like the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) by the merger of Egypt and Syria only tended to increase the Shah's sense of insecurity.6

Islam and Pakistan as Factors: The Shah's response to the perceived threats from these challenges (Arab radical Republicanism/ Nasser) appeared in two counter-moves. Firstly, he sought to use Islam as a counter ideology in order to neutralise Nasserism. That was why he supported the Islamic bloc.7 It was because of this that the Shah attempted to organise the Islamic conferences particularly in the 1960s. Secondly, the Shah intensified his efforts to shore up Iran's isolation by cultivating non- Arab countries in the region as well as Pakistan. It may be stressed that the Shah's motives in taking interest in Islamic solidarity and befriending Pakistan was basically political and not Islamic. Thus the Shah cultivated both Islam and Pakistan as a counterpoise to Nasserism and a possible Arab domination of the region. However, Iran's reason to befriend Pakistan due to its security concerns failed to convince the Indian policy makers. The Indian policy makers did not seem to realise that the West Asian considerations were more important to Iran than its considerations towards India. Iran's tilt towards Pakistan was not directed against India.That was the main reason why commercial relations between India and Iran remained by and large steady.

Pakistan, right from its formation, carried on propaganda in a sustained manner against India in the West Asian and North African States in order to establish an Islamic bloc and to internationalise the Kashmir issue.8 This had an impact on Indo-Iran relations because Iran was well disposed towards Pakistan. This was evident from the fact that Iran was the first country that extended recognition to the state of Pakistan and established diplomatic relations with it in May 1948. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan of Pakistan visited Iran in May 1949 and the Shah visited Pakistan in March 1950 and the Treaty of Friendship was signed between Iran and Pakistan the same month.9 The overall relationship, by and large remained cool and low key.

Formal diplomatic relations between India and Iran commenced in March 15, 1950. One year after the formalisation of bilateral relations Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq of Iran nationalised the Anglo-Iranian oil company. India's reaction to it was found to be equivocal. "The Iranian government has taken up a very strong and unbending attitude and perhaps it may be criticised to some extent... But I have ventured to suggest to the Iranian government, as well as to the British government, that it is in the interests of all concerned as well as of world peace to have a peaceful settlement."10

The regional alliances like the Baghdad Pact and SEATO were not seen by India with favour. In his speech Jawaharlal Nehru stated: "It is clear that the approach of military pacts, like the Baghdad Pact and SEATO is a wrong approach, a dangerous approach and a harmful approach... The Pakistan newspapers and the statements of responsible people in Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined this pact because of India ... They have joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO essentially because of their hostility to India... people enter into these pacts with different motives. I am quite sure that the other members of the pact have no hostility to India..."11 The Baghdad Pact was also instrumental in bringing Iran and Pakistan closer.

It is important to note the motives of both Pakistan and Iran for joining the alliance. Pakistan of course joined the alliance so that it could count on the support of Iran and other pact members on the Kashmir issue both at the UN and outside. Iran however joined the Baghdad Pact for its own security reasons.

Iran aligned to the West and non-aligned India were not politically on the same wavelength. Trade between the two was not significant enough to fill the void created by the diametrically opposite positions of the two in the Cold War. Just four months after Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the Shah paid his first visit to India (February 16 to March 9, 1956). The Shah tried to assure the Indian Prime Minister that Iran's closeness to Pakistan was not directed against India and that it was not at the cost of friendship with India. No joint communique was issued at the end of the visit and the bilateral state relations could at best be described as cool and correct. Nehru paid a return visit to Iran in September 1959 but that only highlighted the political gulf.12

There was very little in common between India's non alignment and Iran's alignment with the West. That was the reason why Indo-Iran relations during 1950s, were confined to non political spheres like trade and commerce.13

The 1960s witnessed certain changes in the international environment, the repercussions of which affected Indo-Iranian relations. The diversification and expansion of trade during this period tended to bring India and Iran closer and improve their relationship. By the 1960s, India was in a position to share its experience and expertise with other developing countries due to the importance that India attached to technical and commercial collaboration with them.

Due to the changes in the strategic environment, Iran was compelled to redefine and enlarge its role as a regional power. The dtente between the superpowers had started and by 1964-65, the US strategic interest in the area had shifted from the land mass of the northern tier to the Indian Ocean. The changing American perceptions had serious implications for Iran. For example, the US policy towards Iran tended to be a little more relaxed and America was reluctant to aid Iran in case of threat from sources other than the USSR. The Shah realised the limitations and conditional nature of external assistance in safeguarding Iran's security and integrity and its basic unreliability. 14 As a result, the Shah started looking beyond the Persian Gulf and Pakistan for understanding and support in favour of Iran's new regional policy. In other words, Iran began to follow a more independent foreign policy to emphasise both the end of a client relationship to the United States and to restore, as much as conditions permitted, normalcy in its relations with the Soviet Union. As a consequence, on September 15, 1962, it assured the Soviet government that it would not grant any foreign nation the right of possessing any kind of rocket bases on Iranian soil. Since then Soviet-Iranian relations and mutual cooperation substantially improved and expanded.15 Hence, the dtente allowed more relaxed and uninhibited relationships between countries like India and Iran.

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