Pla Rocket Force Organization Pdf Download |BEST|
Christia Satchwell
As the largest ground-based missile force in the world, the PLARF fields a wide variety of missile systems. Approximately half of these are short-range weapons intended for use against Taiwan. Ground-based missiles fall into several categories based on type and range. PLARF missiles are organized into six classifications:
DF-4/CSS-3. A liquid-fueled ICBM carrying a 3.3-megaton nuclear warhead, the DF-4 is an older design that may be phased out in favor of the DF-31 or the DF-41. As is typical with older Chinese ICBMs, it is very inaccurate.27 It is one of only two Chinese weapons systems with a megaton payload. The DF-4 is silo-based or cave-based, limiting its utility compared to the road-mobile ICBMs China has been recently fielding like the DF-31. As of 2020, there were only six DF-4s in the Chinese arsenal, further evidence the weapon is retiring.28 As liquid-fueled missiles cannot store their fuel and thus must be fueled prior to use (a process that can take hours), liquid-fueled missiles are being retired in favor of solid-fueled missiles that can deploy instantly, increasing force readiness.
Overall PLA forces are divided into five theater commands, and each command has a distinct mission (see figure 3).50 There is some confusion as to whether PLARF units in these theater commands report directly to the theater commander or are directly controlled by Chairman Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission. Even if PLARF units are under direct control of the Chinese Communist Party, they undoubtedly have liaison and advisory relationships with the theater commands in which they share space, even if they are nominally independent of the theater command structure. For instance, PLARF units at Base 61 in the eastern Anhui Province almost certainly are fully integrated into Eastern Theater Command plans for Taiwan. There are five PLA theater commands:
By fully integrating enablers, Army and joint commanders can mitigate the risk posed by PLARF units in the event of a conflict. The PLARF is a formidable but not invincible element of the Chinese military. As China continues to flex its muscles regionally, the United States must, at the strategic level, counter malign influences and strengthen legitimate ties. Should strategic deterrence fail and the United States enter into open conflict with China, combatant commanders must be prepared to counter the force-multiplying nature of the PLARF to ensure success in the operating environment.
While the Space Force is the newest service, the Department of Defense has been working in the space domain since the beginning of space exploration. The Space Force consolidates satellite acquisition, budget and workforce from across more than 60 different organizations into a unified, efficient, effective service for space operations.
The Space Force organizes, trains and equips personnel in order to protect U.S. and allied interests in space and to provide space capabilities to the joint forces. To that end, the Space Force manages space launch operations at the East and West Cost Space Launch Deltas. These bases provide services, facilities and range safety control to conduct DOD, NASA and commercial space launches.Through the command and control of all DOD satellites, satellite operators provide force-multiplying effects - continuous global coverage, low vulnerability and autonomous operations. Satellites provide in-theater secure communications; weather and navigation for ground, air and fleet operations; and threat warning.Ground-based and space-based systems monitor ballistic missile launches around the world to guard against surprise missile attacks. A global network of space surveillance sensors provides vital information on the location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space superiority is an emerging capability required to protect U.S. space assets from hostile attacks.
In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by the General Staff.
In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development of MRBM, IRBM and ICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.
By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In May 1980, China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the western Soviet Union and the United States.
In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.
In 1986, China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers.
China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (no first use), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets.
The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.
The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.
The PLARF operates another base, Base 67,[34] which is responsible for nuclear warhead storage, warhead transport, warhead inspection and nuclear weapon's training. It is believed to form part of the nuclear C3 (command, control and communications) network, though it is unknown if this network is PLARF-only, shared between the PLARF and military commands, or if it used by the Central Military Commission, which is believed to have its own communication system for the nuclear forces.[35]
Chinese nuclear C3 capabilities are centered around fiber-optic and satellite-based communication networks, replacing older radio command networks that made up the-then Second Artillery's C3 infrastructure before the 1990s. While historically Chinese nuclear missile forces had to launch from pre-prepared sites, the newest generation of nuclear-capable missiles (the DF-26 and DF-31AG) have been seen deploying to, and launching from, unprepared sites in exercises.
This would corroborate reports that PLARF communications regiments are being trained in the ability to set up telephone and command networks "on-the-fly". The reason for these changes likely has to do with concerns about PLARF survivability; China's commitment to a no-first-use policy means that its nuclear forces have to be capable of both surviving a first-strike, and receiving the orders required to fire back.
Raymond said his organization will integrate closely with all of the combatant commands to ensure they have the support they need in the space domain. To do that, teams are being formed that will be a part of that integration effort.
One of the notable values the Space Force will bring to the American people is unity of effort and cost savings, he said, noting that there are many organizations, allies and partners doing work involved in the space domain.
The Space Force is looking to avoid duplication of effort. As an example, the Defense Department needed to have two satellites in polar orbit. Raymond said his organization found that Norway was already involved in doing just that, so the U.S. partnered with its NATO ally to put payloads on their rockets.
Raymond said he wants the new workforce to be up to date, both technically and proficiently. In an effort to do that, he said he expects Space Force personnel will be allowed to work for certain periods of time within agencies like NASA and the National Reconnaissance Office as well as industry.
Like other organizations, the Space Force has been impacted by COVID-19, he said. As a result, the Space Force has embraced virtual events, such as hosting a combined space operations principles meeting with close partners in space: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France and Germany.
Since 1985, Chinese missile forces, which are under the command of the Second Artillery Force (SAF) or Second Artillery Corps (SAC), have changed strikingly in character. The forces have shifted from a nuclear deterrent force based primarily on intermediate and medium-range missiles to a force of intercontinental- and medium-range nuclear forces combined with a powerful conventional missile arm capable of conducting precision attacks at a medium range.
dafc88bca6