time in human speech model

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Bijoy Misra

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Nov 3, 2026, 8:31:22 AM (7 days ago) Nov 3
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Dear friends,
During the past few months, I have written various notes presenting
the model assumptions and the foundation.  There is a cosmological
link on the "verb" क्रिया "action".  The universe has no "action", it only 
has "states".  The state differentiation is perceived as "time" by us,
so the "clock" is based on the observer and not in the universe.
The "evolution", "birth", "decay" are gauged locally from the human 
frame.
I will like to hear from you if you follow the above logic.  The current
models of physical cosmology operate on an external clock.  The 
brain model would suggest that the perception of the universe is 
through our ability of differentiation as proposed in साङ्ख्य, making
the clock local.
Let me know.  I thank you for your time.  
Best regards,
Bijoy Misra
   

Sivasenani Nori

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Nov 3, 2026, 12:59:51 PM (7 days ago) Nov 3
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Dear Prof. Misra

Namaste.

Your note took me back to Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya, to the Kriya-samuddesa and the Kala-samuddesa (Kanda 3, chapters 8 and 9). The questions you raise - whether there is action or only states, whether the clock lies in the universe or in the observer - are taken up there at some length. They are worked out within a single account of language and being. Some of what you propose is found there already; some of it is placed within a larger frame. 

Kriya is defined as a sequence that is imposed:

यावत्सिद्धमसिद्धं वा साध्यत्वेनाभिधीयते ।
आश्रितक्रमरूपत्वात्तत्क्रियेति प्रतीयते ॥ (VP 3.8.1)

गुणभूतैरवयवैः समूहः क्रमजन्मनाम् ।
बुद्ध्या प्रकल्पिताभेदः क्रियेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥ (VP 3.8.4)

The parts are born in sequence; their unity as one action is supplied by buddhi, and not found in them. Bhartrhari goes a step further:

स च पूर्वापरीभूत एकत्वादक्रमात्मकः ।
पूर्वापराणां धर्मेण तदर्थेनानुगम्यते ॥ (VP 3.8.18)

The action, in its unity, is itself without sequence; the sequence belonging to its constituent parts is attributed to it. Its appearance as a unified action, he says, is comparable to the circle formed by a moving firebrand:

इन्द्रियैरन्यथाप्राप्तौ भेदांशोपनिपातिभिः ।
अलातचक्रवद्रूपं क्रियाणां परिकल्प्यते ॥ (VP 3.8.8)

Your "states, not actions" is close to this. What Bhartrhari adds is the grammatical basis for the argument: it arises from an analysis of how verbs represent action, rather than from an assertion about the nature of the universe.

An objective conception of time, in which time exists independently of particular activities, appears at the opening of the Kāla-samuddeśa as one philosophical position:

व्यापारव्यतिरेकेण कालमेके प्रचक्षते ।
नित्यमेकं विभु द्रव्यं परिमाणं क्रियावताम् ॥ (VP 3.9.1)

The observer-dependent conception is recorded as well. Some hold that time is characterised by buddhyanusamhāra, a synthesis of cognition (VP 3.9.57). Bhartrhari also acknowledges the alternative explicitly: some conceive time as associated with cognition, others as an externally established reality. Without taking time into account, ordinary transactions cannot be conducted (VP 3.9.58).

Neither conception is simply adopted. Kala is treated instead as a power, the stage-manager of the world-machine, which orders things by holding them back and releasing them:

तमस्य लोकयन्त्रस्य सूत्रधारं प्रचक्षते ।
प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां तेन विश्वं विभज्यते ॥ (VP 3.9.4)

यदि न प्रतिबध्नीयात्प्रतिबन्धं च नोत्सृजेत् ।
अवस्था व्यतिकीर्येरन्पौर्वापर्यविनाकृताः ॥ (VP 3.9.5)

Birth and the other five modifications are made to depend on this kālaśakti (VP 1.3). The universe itself is said to be without sequence, and its appearing sequential is the working of time:

निर्भासोपगमो योऽयं क्रमवानिव दृश्यते ।
अक्रमस्यापि विश्वस्य तत्कालस्य विचेष्टितम् ॥ (VP 3.9.46)

Measured time is then defined as one action of known extent, used to mark off another:

क्रियान्तरपरिच्छेदप्रवृत्ता या क्रियां प्रति ।
निर्ज्ञातपरिमाणा सा काल इत्यभिधीयते ॥ (VP 3.9.77)

On measured time, your position and that of Bhartrihari coincide. On time itself, the observer's clock is one view amongst those he considers, but not the only one. He goes a step further: the differing conceptions of Kala, based on its powers, its essential nature and its presiding deity, are assigned to avidyā   (3.9.62), and are said not to obtain in vidyā  .

The question, it seems, was mapped and analysed some fifteen centuries ago with a thoroughness that is still not easily matched; and the chapter, read with Helaraja's commentary, repays the time spent on it.

Regards,
Senani


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Bijoy Misra

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Nov 3, 2026, 2:45:21 PM (7 days ago) Nov 3
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Dear Dr Nori,
Excellent.  Actually we stopped after Book II.  Two people I was studying with became disabled.  I switched to study the Vedas with another friend.
The doability of the brain model came from the Vedas, that is the sensory information being processed to language syllables as a part of
the neurological processes in the brain.   The syllable mapping is peculiarly Indian and is scientific in my view.
In stead of बुद्ध्या प्रकल्पिताभेदः (3.8.4) we can say that क्रिया is a physical perturbation that changes the sensory information of the object.
There is difference  भेदः between "ground" and the "rain-soaked ground".  The difference is "real" through the sensory information.
The quantitative difference between the two states is the action क्रिया which I do through a quantized table since we are limited by 2000  धातु
through Panini's analysis.   Even though action is analog, it registers as a quantized mode of the internal neuronal oscillations.
This is algorithmic, I am trying to solve the architecture of the neuronal oscillations.  There is work in MIT but not from this angle.  
For the model I don't need काल as a factor.  The universe is given, the brain receives information from a changing universe.
The brain doesn't know how and why.  But there is an internal clock in the brain which is species-specific.    क्रिया, the difference
between the observed states is calibrated by this internal clock by each being.  It could lead to  गुण as an extension of the model.

I am grateful for the pointer.  I will study..  This morning I announced a local Devi reading to help clear the mind.  Devi sent you right away!

Best regards,
Bijoy Misra

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Ramanath Pandey

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Nov 3, 2026, 11:13:57 PM (7 days ago) Nov 3
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Dear Senani and fellow scholars,

Thank you for drawing attention to Bhartṛhari’s Kriyā-samuddeśa and Kāla-samuddeśa. His account of the unity supplied by buddhi is certainly relevant. My approach, however, proceeds primarily through Diṅnāga’s anyāpoha, which I find more analytically precise for the question under discussion.

Diṅnāga observes:

dharmiṇo ’nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ |
svasaṃvedyaṃ hy anirdeśyaṃ rūpam indriyagocaraḥ ||
— Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.5

The first half states that an object possessing many aspects is not apprehended through sense perception in every respect. This concerns perceptual apprehension rather than contextual meaning directly. Nevertheless, it provides a useful starting point for distinguishing an object from the conceptual descriptions through which we understand it.

I develop the linguistic dimension of this distinction in my published paper, “Theory of Apoha on the basis of the Pramāṇasamuccaya” (The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies, vol. 11, 2010), particularly under “Primary Unit of Speech” and “Meaning of Sentence,” pp. 254–256. As I state on p. 255, “Diṅnāga considers the ‘contextual meaning’ as the main.” My interpretation emphasises that a term’s possible meanings do not independently determine its intended significance; this becomes determinate through its relation to the sentence and the context of use.

Here, anyāpoha becomes especially illuminating. Meaning operates through the exclusion of alternatives without requiring a real universal corresponding to an expression. Applied to our discussion, identifying “one action” requires us to consider which occurrences belong to it, which are excluded, and what purpose governs that delimitation. The same activity may be described as “walking,” “going home,” or “taking exercise.” Each description selects a different significance without exhausting what occurs.

The comparison with Bhartṛhari also raises the question of epistemic authority. Bhartṛhari challenges the sufficiency of reasoning, particularly in matters of dharma and knowledge transmitted through āgama. His observation that even a carefully established inference may be differently explained by a more accomplished reasoner brings the fallibility of reasoning into focus (Vākyapadīya 1.34).

In my reading, Diṅnāga’s approach requires us to examine the warrant of verbal claims as well. Recognising perception and inference as the two means of valid knowledge does not render testimony or comparison useless; it requires their epistemic force to be explained without treating them as independent pramāṇas. A statement’s ability to communicate an intelligible meaning must therefore be distinguished from its ability to establish the truth of what it communicates.

For our present discussion, I would distinguish the occurrence of change, its conceptual organisation, and its measurement. That cognition supplies unity does not, by itself, establish that change is unreal or that time exists only in an observer. Equally, successful measurement does not establish time as an independently existing substance. I offer this as an application of the apohic approach, rather than as a temporal theory explicitly formulated by Diṅnāga.

Bhartṛhari thus provides an important interlocutor. My central question, however, remains: what warrants the move from the unity of an intelligible description to the unity of reality itself? It is in examining this transition that I find Diṅnāga’s approach particularly compelling.

With regards,
Ramanath Pandey

Bijoy Misra

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Nov 4, 2026, 9:41:16 AM (6 days ago) Nov 4
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Dear Dr Pandey,
This is an interesting observation about how cognition becomes knowledge.  This is where memory and prior experiences would come in.
We create the brain as an objective cognizer.  There is no bias.  It has an understanding of the universe through its  बुद्धि.  The universe
changes through its own processes, but all that is नित्य .  The natural objects do make a neural map in the brain through natural reinforcement.
The baby knows the surroundings.  We develop our own linguistic map as muscles develop.  This inner neurological map is given to us
by our   बुद्धि.   Perturbation to this map is the क्रिया.   So the क्रिया is subject perception.  What I try is to create a neurological algorithm
by which the perturbation can be measured.  Perturbation is the difference between subsequent states of the universe as perceived locally.  
This difference involves a clock which is local to the receiver.  Intensity, emotion, timescale come through the perturbation.  They are subjective
and local.  Measuring the difference involves neurology and internal brain operations, which have to be sorted out.  I am trying.  It's gets involved.  .
I will appreciate copies of your papers on the subject.  You can post here or send me privately.
Best regards,
Bijoy Misra     



Nagaraj Paturi

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Nov 4, 2026, 10:28:01 AM (6 days ago) Nov 4
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Nagaraj Paturi
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Ramanath Pandey

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Nov 4, 2026, 10:41:09 AM (6 days ago) Nov 4
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Connectivity, Cognition and Consciousness

Dear Dr Misra,
Connectivity is indeed important. Cognitive science itself brings together several disciplines—traditionally psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, and artificial intelligence—to study mind and cognition through their interrelationships. I have examined these questions specifically in another research project, Cognitive Science and Indian Philosophy: Concepts of Mind and Brain.
From the Sāṃkhya standpoint, however, we must distinguish connections within the cognitive apparatus from its association with consciousness. The brain, as a physical organ, belongs to prakṛti, while manas and buddhi are its subtle evolutes. They are not independently conscious. Their interconnected operations concern sensory processing, memory, and responses; Puruṣa is the conscious witness rather than the agent performing these operations.
Your neurological model offers an opportunity to explore this distinction: how does connectivity account for conscious experience, and under what conditions does the resulting cognition constitute valid knowledge?

These are related but distinct questions: the organisation of cognitive processes, their conscious manifestation, and their epistemic validity. Explaining their relationship would strengthen the proposed model.
With regards,
Ramanath Pandey

Ramanath Pandey

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Nov 4, 2026, 10:43:30 AM (6 days ago) Nov 4
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Connectivity, Cognition and Consciousness
Dear Dr Misra,
Connectivity is indeed important. Cognitive science itself brings together several disciplines—traditionally psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, and artificial intelligence—to study mind and cognition through their interrelationships. I have examined these questions specifically in another research project, Cognitive Science and Indian Philosophy: Concepts of Mind and Brain.
From the Sāṃkhya standpoint, however, we must distinguish connections within the cognitive apparatus from its association with consciousness. The brain, as a physical organ, belongs to prakṛti, while manas and buddhi are its subtle evolutes. They are not independently conscious. Their interconnected operations concern sensory processing, memory, and responses; Puruṣa is the conscious witness rather than the agent performing these operations.
Your neurological model offers an opportunity to explore this distinction: how does connectivity account for conscious experience, and under what conditions does the resulting cognition constitute valid knowledge?
These are related but distinct questions: the organisation of cognitive processes, their conscious manifestation, and their epistemic validity. Explaining their relationship would strengthen the proposed model.
With regards,
Ramanath Pandey

Nagaraj Paturi

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Nov 4, 2026, 10:52:08 AM (6 days ago) Nov 4
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https://archive.org/details/Kalasamuddesa/mode/2up

The Kālasamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (together with Helārāja's commentary translated from the Sanskrit for the first time)

by
Peri Sarveswara Sharma

Bijoy Misra

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Nov 4, 2026, 4:44:20 PM (6 days ago) Nov 4
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The question is more physical than philosophical.  Your awareness of the universe is limited to what you can physically sense.
Sensing is a peculiar human capacity and is limited by human physiology.  The individual has its own perception
of the physical world based on the local clock (body chemistry and vascular system).   
The important concept is "local clock" based on the object.  The perception is different to the individual
because of the local clock.  The perception can point to the same quantized  धातु because of the wide bandwidth.
Let me stop here.  We can discuss on Zoom if you wish to get to the model..

Bijoy Misra

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Nov 5, 2026, 10:33:43 AM (5 days ago) Nov 5
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Dear Nagarajji and friends.
I spent considerable time yesterday and some today studying this book.
It was disappointing.  She writes a literal book borrowing from translations.
I wish she studied the originals to understand the thrust.  It could be a good
Introductory text for undergraduates in the western universities. It is not
analytic.  Might be it had value in 1983 when it appeared.
At the current period, we cannot stay with theological interpretations since
there is considerable advance in the sciences.  The only scientific speculation
is what is enunciated in the vedas as  ऋत, a cosmic order.  We don't know why
it is there, and we cannot know since we are governed by it.  What   ऋत 
speculates is that our local activities are a part of the large play of the universe.  
Then we add the further speculation of Vedanta that each living entity is a self-
contained universe.  A contradiction comes with decay and death.  The remedy
is to create the material object, the container of life.  The material object degrades
because of  ऋत .  The material needs  गुण to sustain itself and  गुण is transient.
This  गुण manifests through local clocks in the living entity given to it by  ऋत,
So the local clock is the signature of the life-form, life is the same, the forms are
different.  
One can then say that there is an instant that life appeared (theology). But
what we see from science is that life can be dormant for any length of time.  
Through extrapolation we stipulate that life is a field and physical perceptible
objects appear as opportunities to us.  From the mathematical point of view.
ऋत is नित्य.  It is given, it operates on its own (gravitation, electricity, magnetism
are parts of it.). One can call it  शक्ति.  These are  नित्य, they have no time
element, no गुण.   A local manifested form has   गुण  and has  आयुः, a vedic word.
This आयुः has the local clock, it is possibly measured in object heart beats,
which can be a variable quantity but unable to influence ऋत .
This is broadly Vedic cosmology superposed on modern cosmology in my view.
Best regards,
Bijoy Misara

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