History Of Subcontinent From 712 To 1857 Pdf Download
Stephanie Dejoode
In the mid-19th century, India was very different from the nation state we know today. It didn't exist as a country, but instead consisted of different territories controlled by a variety of rulers. The greatest of these was the British East India Company which governed two thirds of the subcontinent.
The British Raj (/rɑːdʒ/ RAHJ; from Hindi rāj, 'kingdom', 'realm', 'state', or 'empire')[10][a] was the rule of the British Crown on the Indian subcontinent;[12] it is also called Crown rule in India,[13]or Direct rule in India,[14] and lasted from 1858 to 1947.[15] The region under British control was commonly called India in contemporaneous usage and included areas directly administered by the United Kingdom, which were collectively called British India, and areas ruled by indigenous rulers, but under British paramountcy, called the princely states. The region was sometimes called the Indian Empire, though not officially.[16]
This system of governance was instituted on 28 June 1858, when, after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the rule of the East India Company was transferred to the Crown in the person of Queen Victoria[18] (who, in 1876, was proclaimed Empress of India). It lasted until 1947, when the British Raj was partitioned into two sovereign dominion states: the Union of India (later the Republic of India) and Pakistan (later the Islamic Republic of Pakistan). Later, the People's Republic of Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan. At the inception of the Raj in 1858, Lower Burma was already a part of British India; Upper Burma was added in 1886, and the resulting union, Burma, was administered as an autonomous province until 1937, when it became a separate British colony, gaining its own independence in 1948. It was renamed Myanmar in 1989. The Chief Commissioner's Province of Aden was also part of British India at the inception of the British Raj, and became a separate colony known as Aden Colony in 1937 as well.
A Princely State, also called a Native State or an Indian State, was a British vassal state in India with an indigenous nominal Indian ruler, subject to a subsidiary alliance.[146] There were 565 princely states when India and Pakistan became independent from Britain in August 1947. The princely states did not form a part of British India (i.e. the presidencies and provinces), as they were not directly under British rule. The larger ones had treaties with Britain that specified which rights the princes had; in the smaller ones the princes had few rights. Within the princely states external affairs, defence and most communications were under British control.[citation needed] The British also exercised a general influence over the states' internal politics, in part through the granting or withholding of recognition of individual rulers. Although there were nearly 600 princely states, the great majority were very small and contracted out the business of government to the British. Some two hundred of the states had an area of less than 25 square kilometres (10 square miles).[146] The last vestige of the Mughal Empire in Delhi which was under Company authority prior to the advent of British Raj was finally abolished and seized by the Crown in the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 for its support to the rebellion.[147][148]
Taxes in India decreased during the colonial period for most of India's population; with the land tax revenue claiming 15% of India's national income during Mughal times compared with 1% at the end of the colonial period. The percentage of national income for the village economy increased from 44% during Mughal times to 54% by the end of colonial period. India's per capita GDP decreased from 1990 Int'l$550 in 1700 to $520 by 1857, although it later increased to $618, by 1947.[198]
Universities in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were established in 1857, just before the Rebellion. By 1890 some 60,000 Indians had matriculated, chiefly in the liberal arts or law. About a third entered public administration, and another third became lawyers. The result was a very well educated professional state bureaucracy. By 1887 of 21,000 mid-level civil services appointments, 45% were held by Hindus, 7% by Muslims, 19% by Eurasians (European father and Indian mother), and 29% by Europeans. Of the 1000 top-level civil services positions, almost all were held by Britons, typically with an Oxbridge degree.[240] The government, often working with local philanthropists, opened 186 universities and colleges of higher education by 1911; they enrolled 36,000 students (over 90% men). By 1939 the number of institutions had doubled and enrolment reached 145,000. The curriculum followed classical British standards of the sort set by Oxford and Cambridge and stressed English literature and European history. Nevertheless, by the 1920s the student bodies had become hotbeds of Indian nationalism.[241]
British sports (particularly hockey early on, but then largely replaced by cricket in recent decades, with football also popular in certain regions of the subcontinent)[262][263] were cemented as part of South Asian culture during the British Raj, with the traditional games of India largely having been diminished in the process.[264] During the Raj, soldiers would play British sports as a way of maintaining fitness, since the mortality rate for foreigners in India was high at the time, as well as to maintain a sense of Britishness; in the words of an anonymous writer, playing British sports was a way for soldiers to "defend themselves from the magic of the land".[265] Though the British had generally excluded Indians from their play during the time of Company rule, over time they began to see the inculcation of British sports among the native populace as a way of spreading British values.[265][266] At the same time, some of the Indian elite began to move towards British sports as a way of adapting to British culture and thus helping themselves to rise up the ranks;[267][268] later on, more Indians began to play British sports in an effort to beat the British at their own sports,[269] as a way of proving that the Indians were equal to their colonisers.[270]
The 1857 war was a watershed moment in the history of the Indian subcontinent. The battle has sparked academic debate among historians and sociologists all around the world. Despite the fact that it has been more than 150 years, this battle continues to pique the interest of historians. The war's causes and events that occurred throughout the conflict, persons who backed the British and anti-British fighters, and the results and ramifications, are all aspects of this conflict. In terms of outcomes, many academics believe that the war was a failure for those who started it. It is often assumed that the Indians who battled the British in this conflict were unable to achieve their goals. Many gains accrued to Indians as a result of the conflict, but these achievements are overshadowed by the dispute over the war's failure. This research effort focuses on the war's achievements for India, and the significance of those achievements.
Some time in February 1857, a curious occurrence took place. A Chowkeydar ran up to another village with two chupatties. He ordered his fellow-official to make ten more, and give two to each of the five nearest village Chowkeydars with the same instructions. In a few hours the whole country was in a stir, from Chowkeydars flying around with these cakes. The signal spread in all directions with wonderful celerity. The magistrates tried to stop it, but, in spite of all they could do, it passed along to the borders of the Punjab. There is reason to believe that this was originated by some intriguers of the old Court of Lucknow.
The series of acts passed by Parliament banned private trading on the part of Company employees and separated judicial and administrative functions of the Company from commercial ones. The attempt was to regulate taxation, justice, rule, and bribery (the last being viewed by Company servants as an indispensable feature of doing business in India). The Company had acquired considerable political power (although consisting of only a fraction of one percent of the population of the subcontinent), over more people than there were in England. Parliament was concerned, and was to remain so. Empire may not have been, at this early stage, a governmental declaration, but the wheels were in motion and Parliament became a core part of it all. The India Act of 1784 created a council of six commissioners, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a newly-created Secretary of State for India. This group was constituted above the Company directors in London.
Racism is a core characteristic of the British Empire in India, or, as it came to be known, the Raj (from a Sanskrit word, which found its way into vernacular languages, meaning to rule over, or the sovereign who does so). Historically, the term was applied to Hindu kings (as raja, or maharaja, great king). While implying political superiority, it did not have racial implications. Cultural and political factors were to add racial distinction to the concept under the British: Christian proselytizing and the great uprising, or rebellion, or mutiny, of 1857. This historic rebellion was not an insurrection, for it was not organized, and therein may have been its failure.5
This book makes a number of significant contributions to the history of the study of religions, the history of modern South Asia, and studies of Islam in modern India. It reveals the important role of debates about the revolt of 1857 to the development of Muslim religious and political identity in modern South Asia. In addition, the author makes a valuable contribution to studies of competing understandings of Islamic law in the global nineteenth century and to a growing body of work re-evaluating the impact of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Muslim reform movements in British India. Although not an explicit theme, this book also can be read as part of a growing vein of scholarship on commemoration in modern South Asia. More broadly, Morgenstein Fuerst makes a compelling case that we must further examine the interplay between the British empire and Muslim communities in South Asia to better understand popular (and problematic) assumptions about Islam in the present.
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