[budaya_tionghua] KRT Secodiningrat alias Tan Jin Sing

[PK Lim]

Dear All,

Saya ingin membagi cerita:

Tan Jin Sing lahir ditahun 1760. Pada usia muda (?) diangkat menjadi Kapiten China di Kedu. Berjasa membantu Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono III, sehingga diangkat menjadi Bupati Yogyakarta dan dianugerah gelar Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat. Kabarnya di Yogya ada jalan yang dinamakan Secodiningrat. Meninggal pada tahun 1831. Keturunannya membentuk Paguyuban Keturunan Secodiningrat dan beranggota lebih dari 200.

Mungkin ada yang dapat menambahkan serita ini?

Salam,
P.K. Lim

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[RM Danardono HADINOTO]

Saya pernah menulis disini sudah agak lama, mengenai KRT
Secodiningrat.

Ini saya tambahkan:

A Short Page from the History of Java

The circumstances that stand out in the background of this story's
protagonist is his spirit of national unity: His extensive
socialization with people of various ethnicities, his equal love for
diverse cultures - Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat (1760-
1831) is a figure who probably can be a worthy example for the
Indonesian nation regarding her efforts to strengthen the
composition of unity among her citizens within the scheme of
realizing concretely the sublime ideals of our country's reformation.

Certainly when still in his childhood years, he was known under
the name Tan Jin Sing, later becoming a successful entrepreneur who
at the age of 30 years attained the rank of Chinesche Kapitein
(Chinese Captain) at Kedu, Central Java. Several years later, he
held office with a similar resposibility in Yogyakarta. Having
committed himself to the political arena, thus placing his life as
well as assets at stake, he aided Prince Suroyo and the Sri Sultan
Raja to liberate the throne of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat, hence
being enthroned with the title Khalifah Ngabdurrachman Sri Sultan
Hamengkubuwono III. Thereupon, Captain Tan Jin Sing was designated
as a major royal aide with the aristocratic title Raden Tumenggung
(Lord Regent) Secodiningrat, despite still retaining his charge as
the Chinese Captain of Yogyakarta.

Consequently, K.R.T. Secodiningrat was considered through'out his
life by Javanese, by Chinese as well as Europeans as someone of
Chinese descent, a certain false presumption that is until today
still adhered to by a segement of Java's populace.

Nevertheless, a uniqueness in his life, is that K.R.T.
Secodiningrat was born in the Kalibeber rural district, Wonosobo,
into a noble Javanese princely family and, as his father passed away
while he was still in his infancy, he was then adopted by Tek Yong
who was very close to his family. His mother R.A. (Raden Ayu)
Patrawijaya, one of the daughters of R.M. (Raden Mas) Kunting, third
descendant of his Royal Highness the Sunan (Sovereign) of Mataram
Mangkurat Agung (Tegal Arum), from the former he learned the
étiquette and kromo inggil/bagongan (high language) of the Javanese
Kraton (palace) without knowing at all the true identity of the
woman that loves him so much. From his adoptive Chinese family, he
learned the ways as well as the language of the Middle Kingdom
civilization. The Malay and common Javanese languages were absorbed
through everyday conversations with his friends and servants.

K.R.T. Secodiningrat could easily accomodate himself into three
different worlds, namely: Chinese, Javanese and Occidental,
Westerners knowing him as a friend or an enemy acknowledged his
extreme level of wisdom and intelligence. Chinese are of the
opinion that he is talented in synthesizing Chinese meticulousness
with Javanese courteousy. As concerning those who disliked him,
they oftentimes derided him in the following manner: "Cino wurung,
Jowo tanggung, Londo pun durung" or in other words, that he isn't
Chinese anymore, Javanese yet half-heartedly, however not yet
Dutch. As the Bupati (Regent) of Yogyakarta, K.R.T. Secodiningrat
worked hard so that this Sultanate would advance and prosper, but
when he began to show signs of success, political upheavals occured
which hassled much his diligent efforts.

Since 1798, England was already involved in a terrible war against
France under Napoleon Bonaparte, battles seemed all the ready to
spread to Asia. The Kingdom of the Netherlands had surrendered to
France, therefore, the Dutch East Indies which were then governed by
Governor-General Willem H. Daendels, had to prealably yield to
France's right of territorial sovereignity. The Lieutenant-General
of the Straits Settlements colony based in Malacca, Sir Thomas
Stamford Raffles, was immediately given the prerogative to iniate
and execute a rapid takaeover of Java, the Dutch main center of
military-economic operations, as the English feared that French
armies could have landed there in the first place. Hereforth
speaking, like it or not, Yogyanese were thus being obliged to
resist the forthcoming English armed incursion that was being
anticipated, at the same time K.R.T. Secodiningrat was taking as
much initiative as possible to achieve a peaceful consensus between
the Sultanate and the English authorities.

This tentative instead proved futile, it unseemingly happened due
to an interception of R.T. Secodiningrat's courrier to Sir Stamford
Raffles, it resulted from palace intrigue, supported by certain
Dutch colonial administrators who wished to maintain their
power...this incident was preceded and subsided by several tragic
occurences, for example the assassination of Patih (Vizier) Danurejo
II who was regarded as having betrayed the Sultan Raja, even if this
despicable act certainly embittered much his Majesty's heart who
himself was going to have a similar sort, in which he was deposed
from the throne, due to Palace political infighting. Henceforth,
for safety's sake he made the decision to abdicate returning the
crown to Sultan Sepuh who no doubt, mirthfully accepted it. Prince
Suroyo was stripped of all his royal prerogatives and the newly
ascended Sultan appointed Prince Mangkudiningrat, 11th son from his
wife, Ratu (Queen) Hemas, as his representative.

K.R.T. Secodiningrat very much regretted this catastrophy as he
considered Sultan Sepuh's behavior to be inhuman, as can be clearly
seen from his cruel treatments towards the nobility as well as
towards the commonfolk, he promised Prince Suroyo that he was going
to resolve this dilematic and troubling problem. Affirmative, his
unfaltering resolution paid off with the reinstallation of Sultan
Raja after the English mandate over Java expired.

In later days, at a more elderly age, a wayang kulit (shadow
puppet) performance was being carried out at the residence of K.R.T.
Secodiningrat which took the thematic title of the protagonist-
heroic figure Bima, renowned for his honesty and valiant knightly
demeanour, upon receiving from the Priest Durna - his mentor's
order, in order to seek the tirta amarta (holy water) of life.
During his voyage which was full of hazards and obstacles, Bima was
compelled to engage in battle against a roguish creature whose life
he forcibly had to put an end to. Finally, Bima crossed an ocean
and after having pitted himself in a gruesome fray against a
ferocious dragon, he met with a certain dwarf called Dewa Ruci who
then commanded the large-bodied Bima to enter it's small body
through it's earhole. Within Dewa Ruci's corpse, Bima encountered
various phenomena, colors, patterns and shapes; One by one of which
the dwarfish Dewa Ruci elucidated.

From this dialogue, Bima in the end comprehends what life's
quintessential meaning is and the importance of self-introspection.
Bima humbly conveyed his thankfulness to Dewa Ruci. This little
creature was held in awe because it knew everything about the
secrets of life, wisdom, calmitude and the puzzles of eternal bliss,
at once, Dewa Ruci disappears from the wayang play-screen.

Now, K.R.T. Secodiningrat just realizes that the parable of
searching for the tirta amarta is meant as a symbol of man's
struggle in yearning for pacification and eternal happiness, what is
as a matter of fact something to be found in one's inner self. For
to reach such a level of intrisinic guna (virtue), it is absolutely
necessary that one bridles and controls his sense of smell, hearing,
feeling, touch and taste. When all these senses are mastered, one
isn't easily disturbed by the temporal world which is full of
darkness. Thereby the material can unite with the spiritual and one
will have a secure calm existence, subsequently enabling one to
communicate directly with the Supreme Being - God.

May 10 1831, the clock indicates 6 o'clock in the morning, the
deceased K.R.T. Secodiningrat is entombed at Rogocolo, Mrisi, his
funerals are assisted by thousands of visitors.

As regards to the descendants of K.R.T. Secodiningrat or Tan Jin
Sing, within a time period of one and a half centuries he has
yielded two groups, namely Javanese and Chinese; Raden Dadang
succeeded his father both as Chinese Captain and Bupati, he later
carried the title R.T.Secodiningrat II; As permitted by Islamic
tradition, he had three wives: (1) a local Peranakan Chinese woman
addressed to as Nyonya Kapitein (Madam, or simply Captain's wife),
(2) a Javanese woman with the title Mas Ajeng Secodiningrat (3)
another Javanese woman greeted to as Raden Nganten Secodiningrat.
One of Raden Dadang's daughters - B.R.A. Kumaraningrum (Putri Bhe
Siu Kai) married Prince Mangkusuno of the Yogyakarta Sultanate.
Besides, with respect to the compelling done of the Dutch resident
representing the Dutch East Indies administration, towards Sri
Sultan Hamengkubuwono VI, all of K.R.T. Secodiningrat's legal heirs
were suggested by him to hand over their inherited land to the
Sultanate, moreover there was going to be a financial compensation
sum worth f 7.800 per annum, or f 650 per month. If this sum is
combined with financial indemnities of lands outside the Yogyakarta
residence that has been received by K.R.T. Secodiningrat since 1824,
therefore a sum of f 1.500 per month would have been divided among
all his heirs. This agreement is imprinted in the Notary Act No. 57
dated April 24 1861.

In this brief treatise K.R.T. Secodiningrat (Tan Jin Sing) life is
narrated, one sees that he had succeeded in his time to do what
seems today something aspired for and regarded as very crucial in
the future Indonesia's nation-building process, it is social
mingling which is a two way junction in that both the concepts of
integration and assimilation are perceived as equally acceptable,
neither one carries precedence over the other, nor has any
government the right to interfere in an individual's inalienable
right to live as he wishes in accordance with good morality as
embodied in the Law. Before the introduction and implementation of
a semi-apartheid legal system by the Dutch colonial Government after
the devastating Java War, Java was indeed on the whole a very
cosmopolitan society where there was much cohesiveness amongst
people of varying backgrounds, religions and ethnic origins.

----------------

OK?

Salam

danardono

[RM Danardono HADINOTO]

Saya pernah muat tulisan mengenai sejarah Tionghoa di Indonesia,
oleh David S. Widihandojo, yang juga menyinggung peran KRT
Secodingingrat, pada 26 februari 2005.

Silakan membaca:

------------------------------------
The Vulnerable Citizen
Indonesian Chinese and Their Identity
David S. Widihandojo

Introduction

Indonesian Chinese have always been a small minority. Estimated to
number six million in 1998, they have probably never accounted for
more than three per cent of the total population. In the country
where ethnic diversity is so pronounced, the Indonesian Chinese have
nevertheless stood out as a distinctive ethnic group, and its
presence is strongly felt because of its business activities. There
is no doubt that the Indonesian Chinese exercises an influence
beyond its numerical strength, however, it is still far from
controlling the economy of the country. The economic status of the
Chinese minority is the most significant element in "the Chinese
problem". The indigenous Indonesian frequently considers the Chinese
have been dominating the Indonesian economy. While, the Chinese do
not deny that they are strong in business, they do not think that
they dominate the Indonesian economy. They feel that they are
only "the milk-cow" of the state-bureaucrats and "scapegoat" for any
social problems.

Indonesian Chinese are not a transient immigrant minority indeed
they are a settled population. The majority must have been at least
third-generation inhabitants. It is also widely believed that two-
thirds of them are mixed Chinese and indigenous ancestry[1]. In a
legal sense, they are Indonesian citizen (WNI-Warga Negara
Indonesia). However, many Indonesians, even state officials, today
still regard Indonesian Chinese politically, culturally and socially
as foreign as any other real foreigners. Most of Indonesian national
leaders think of the Indonesian nation as comprising of various
indigenous Indonesian ethnic groups, and ethnic Chinese are
perceived as a foreign group. Until today, only a few Indonesian
political parties are prepared to accept the Chinese as full
members.

This xenophobic framework is also reflected in the 1945
Constitution, the term `native Indonesian' (orang Indonesia asli) is
provided upon citizenship. Consequently, citizenship is conferred
automatically upon indigenous Indonesian and is unavailable to other
groups, unless they are satisfied certain further conditions.
Furthermore, the term WNI is an artificial and legalistic flavour.
In everyday speech, someone is referred to as a WNI, it is commonly
understood that he/she is of foreign Chinese origin and not
indigenous. This expression itself underlined the alien-ness of the
Indonesian citizen Chinese in Indonesian eyes. Similarly, in the
Dutch colonial era, the Chinese, even they were Dutch subject and
hold Dutch citizenship card in their pocket, were officially
described as `Foreign Asiatic'.

If the term `Indonesian Citizen/WNI' is narrowed in this way, the
term `National' is often narrowed in other direction. In the
official speech, those who speak of national economy (ekonomi
nasional) are usually means an economy particular for indigenous
Indonesian rather than economy for society as a whole. Consequently,
many economic policies are understood exclusively for indigenous
Indonesian. The writing of Indonesian history is also narrowed in
the same way, however, there is abundant evidence that Partai
Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese Party) fully identified with
the struggle for Indonesian independence and lined itself up with
the other co-operating nationalist parties of 1930s.[2] Many
Indonesians assert that the Chinese gave no support to the
Indonesian struggle. Of course, there were Indonesian Chinese, same
as indigenous Indonesian, who loyal to the Dutch administration.
However, in fact, Indonesian Chinese actively supported the
Republic, a few of them even becoming cabinet ministers.

Then, who are the Indonesian Chinese? It is clear that legal
criteria do not correspond with social realities. Even, a simple
racial criterion, such as China-born descendants of earlier
immigrants through the male line is not sufficed. Skinner pointed
out that because of considerable intermarriage and assimilation;
this would `exclude many persons in Java who are uniformly
considered Chinese and include those are considered themselves and
by local people to be indigenous Indonesian'.[3] In other word,
Skinner excluded a definition based on cultural criteria because of
the extent to which many Indonesian Chinese have abandoned
traditional Chinese cultural. In this work, I use Coppel's framework
that the Indonesian Chinese as persons of Chinese ancestry who
either function as members of, and identify with, Chinese society,
or are regarded as Chinese by indigenous Indonesian and given
special treatment as a consequence. It should be stressed that this
definition includes a number of Indonesians, whom has close links
with Chinese society or has Chinese physical appearance, which has
been treated as socially and politically significant or relevant.[4]

The myth of uniformity and changelessness of Indonesian Chinese dies
hard, however, there are abundant evidence of their cultural
diversity and capacity for acculturation to local ways of life and
beliefs. The Indonesian Chinese are not homogeneous, even on their
arrival, although the majority came from Fukien and Kwangtung
provinces. The diversity of the immigrants was compounded by the
variable degree to which their descendants were influenced by
Indonesian cultures. Skinner suggested that there was `the locally
rooted Chinese population in which adults as well as children are
Indonesian-born, the orientation toward China is attenuated, and the
influence on Indonesian culture is apparent'.[5] Thus, although
outsiders frequently see the Chinese in Indonesia is a homogenous
group, the community is in fact highly diverse. Therefore,
the "Chinese problem" in Indonesia is extremely complicated. It is
part of human problem in Asia, which needs to be approached with
more reason.

Regarding with what so called `the Chinese problem' in Indonesia, I
have used the history of Indonesia to illustrate the dynamics of
policy in the respective periods under consideration. I view that it
is the process within the society and the intervention of the state,
which gives shape to the specific form of Chinese-indigenes
relationship in Indonesia. This perspective demands that the present
relationship should be studied in its historical and social context.
The particular form in which the relationship takes is conditioned
by a complex variety of factors, including the nature of the pre-
colonial social structure, the impact of colonialism upon economy
and society, the formation and disintegration of classes under
colonial rule, and the nature of political conflict in the post-
colonial period.

The Legacy of the Past

By the sixteenth century, internationalism and free trade were
distinguishing features of Southeast Asian trade with Malacca as the
main entrepot.[6] Traders representing all religions and
nationalities, such as Chinese, Indians, Arabs and Javanese were
welcome to do business as long as they paid the tolls and obeyed the
local laws. This pattern of international trade was based on
specialisation according to each island's comparative advantages,
for instance, pepper was traded from Sumatra; rice, salt, cotton and
textiles from Java; nutmeg, maize, and cloves from Maluku.

Javanese merchants, particularly from the north coast of Java had
taken a substantial role in Southeast Asian trade in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.[7] By the seventeenth century, a Javanese
entrepreneurial class had emerged in a number of areas including
Pekalongan, Solo, Jogjakarta, and Kudus. Their businesses covered
silver manufacturing, batik printing, cigarette manufacturing.
Probably, the largest entrepreneurial community was in the north
coast. The north coast was a coastal society, lying open to the sea
and so had commercial power, because of access to international
trade in the region. The north coast Javanese princes were involved
in trade by controlling strategic commodities, such as rice and
spices, and by imposing tolls.

At this time, the Chinese traders occupied a dominant position.
Inter-marriage between the Chinese and the Javanese was not unusual
because emigration of Chinese women was extremely rare. Chinese men
assimilated into the indigenous society naturally. After his visit
to Java in the early seventeenth century, Ong Tae Hee, a Chinese
officer, reported to the Chinese emperor.

The Chinese do not recognize our philosophy anymore. They do not
speak Chinese. They do not eat our food and do not use our apparel.
They have become Javanese. They read Javanese and learn their
philosophy, and called themselves Muslim.[8]

The Chinese also had access to power. Dutch historians, De Graaf and
Pigeaud, pointed out that the founder of the dynasty of Demak, an
Islamic kingdom in the north coast of Java in the fifteenth century,
was a Chinese, Cek Kok Po who adopted the Javanese name Raden Patah.
Under his rule, the Demak kingdom controlled the rice trade along
the north coast. His successor, Cu-Cu, known by the Javanese name,
Trenggana, expanded the kingdom to East and West Java, and in 1527
subjugated the Majapahit kingdom of East Java.[9] It is reported
that the Regent (Bupati) of Bangil was Chinese.[10] The principal
Chinese of Central Java, Captain Tan Jin Sing (1760-1831), who
adopted the Javanese name, Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat,
was appointed by Sultan Hamengkubuwono II as the Regent (Bupati) of
Jogjakarta, a key position in the Javanese feudal bureaucracy.[11]
It is probable that in this period in the north coast, a domestic
business class, derived from state bureaucrats and foreign traders,
mainly Chinese, started to form.

The division between indigenous Indonesian and Chinese had been
exaggerated by the Dutch colonial administration which created and
supported the ideology that stressed the idea that service on behalf
of the state was a noble profession for Javanese who were otherwise
identified as being, by nature, unfit as businessperson. Van
Deventer, a Dutch official, stated,

Real thrift is foreign to the modern-day Javanese, money rolls
through their fingers, or burns in their hands; the Chinese is
thrifty, frugal cautious at the same time. In the matter of free
will, of the spirit of enterprise, the Native of Java has not come
far either; his nature is rather docile. Carefree also is the nature
of the ordinary Javanese; they live from hand to mouth, and would
rather think as little as possible about tomorrow; this source of a
cheerful outlook on life, however, stands in sharp contrast with the
inborn notion of the Chinese that people, as much as possible
through material appearances, must uphold the sacred honour of their
ancestors. Already in this one cardinal notion the Chinese possesses
a mighty incentive to drive him to work, while the spirit of the
Javanese knows nothing of this sort.[12]

If a coalition between the Chinese and indigenous Indonesian was
formed, the colonial administration took action to eradicate the
threat, even if this meant massacring thousands of lives, as
occurred in the massacre of the Chinese in Batavia in October 1740.
By 1740, there were about 15,000 Chinese within Batavia's walls,
representing at least, seventeen per cent of the population. In the
city's environs (outside the walls) about 26 per cent of the
population was Chinese.[13] They constituted an important part of
Batavia's economy, particularly as wholesalers, sugar millers,
shopkeepers, artisans etc. Those Chinese grew rich and assimilated
into the indigenous noble community, through marriage and business,
resulting in a significant domestic bourgeoisie. In this climate
integration between indigenous political power and Chinese economic
power, began to form. The colonial administration perceived this
coalition as a threat to their position because the rich traders
collaborated with indigenous rulers who held political power. To
restrain the increasing influence of the Chinese, the colonial
administration took steps to restrict the number of Chinese
migrants, but this did little to rectify the problem, because the
Chinese easily circumvented the regulation with the help of `corrupt
and greedy officials',[14] and newcomers continued to arrive. After
recognising that the regulation was useless, the colonial
administration took action. The head of the Chinese community,
Captain Nie Hoe Kong, and all of his family, were imprisoned without
reason.

In early September 1740, widespread rumours percolated through the
European community at Batavia, that the Chinese were threatening to
rebel. Rumour had it that the Chinese were armed and collaborated
with indigenous gangs from outside Batavia. At the end of September
1740, Governor-General Adriaan Van Valckenier (1737-41) ordered all
Chinese houses in town to be searched for arms. On 9 October 1740,
fire broke out and all control was lost. Dutch soldiers and citizens
rushed out into the streets, entered the houses of the Chinese,
robbing and killing men, women, children, babies, prisoners, even
Chinese patients in the hospital, about 10,000 Chinese were
butchered.[15] Heuken graphically described the scene,

`Blood was everywhere and the canals full of corpses. Large sections
of the city lay in ashes and over 10,000 were dead. The old city of
Batavia never recovered from this blow. The golden days had passed
for good.'[16]

Only making additional payments to the Dutch troops to return to
duty eventually stopped the looting. There was clear evidence of the
involvement of the colonial administration. Later, Governor-General
Van Valckenier admitted that `a massacre of the Chinese would not be
unwelcome'.[17] The survivors moved to the north coast and allied
with the Javanese princes. The war, between a coalition of Chinese
and Javanese trader princess against the alliance between the
Javanese king of Mataram and the Dutch, lasted almost seventeen
years without interruption. In 1757, the war was over. The remaining
allied forces continued to rule in some enclaves in Java. The Dutch
were exhausted by this war. They turned their attentions to open
tea, coffee and rubber plantations.

After the war, the colonial administration imposed a regulation that
forcing the Chinese to live in a specific area, called pecinan
(China-town), and prohibiting them from travelling without a
government permit. By this regulation, the Chinese were effectively
ghettoised and completely segregated from indigenous Indonesia.
Furthermore, the colonial administration divided the society into
three separate groups, the European, the foreign Asiatic and the
indigenous Indonesian. The division was not only based on ethnicity,
but also on division of labour and wealth. The European controlled
the lucrative large-scale export-import trade; the foreign Asiatic,
mostly Chinese, kept the intermediate trade and the small-scale
trade remained in the hands of indigenous Indonesian. Consequently,
the average income per capita in 1928 was: European, 4.439 guilders,
foreign Asiatic, 298 guilders and indigenous Indonesian, 61.4
guilders.[18] These groups had different legal rights and
privileges. The differences in income, ethnicity and culture created
barriers against the coalition of groups in the society,
assimilation would therefore a drop in social status and the loss of
some privileges in law. Even if, the desire to assimilate were
there, the colonial administration took action. In one case, the
Chinese who had so completely assimilated into indigenous population
of a village in Cirebon residency, that `the only thing which
recalled their Chinese origin was their queue', were forcibly
removed into China-town (pecinan) and made to identify themselves as
Chinese.[19]

The colonial administration also restricted any involvement of
indigenous people in big or middle business activities. In the early
eighteenth century, it was common for the wealthy Javanese, usually
from the noble class, involved in business as supplier of coffee,
indigo, rice, spices etc. Many of them had become rich, such as in
1707; a Javanese merchant of Cianjur paid 10,000 guilders for a new
cart with Persian horses. The Colonial administration saw the
involvement of Javanese in business as serious threat. De Haan
states, `if the Javanese have money and power, soon they will
threaten us [the Dutch]'.[20] Under this perceived threat, then, the
colonial administration applied a regulation in which all business
with indigenous businessperson must be done in barter-style using
Dutch products, such as textiles and consumer goods, as collateral.
Meanwhile, the Dutch still paid their Chinese agents with money. In
other cases, the colonial administration had also exercised tougher
measures, such as in East Java; the majority of indigenous middlemen
were forced to cease operating their businesses, which the Chinese
appropriated, and quickly becoming the new compradors.[21] The VOC
officials at Batavia ordered the shipping of Chinese slaves to
Maluku in order to replace the indigenous middlemen in the
plantation, and to act as middlemen between the Dutch and the
indigenous smallholders or traders. The reason was that the Chinese
were `hard workers, smart and powerless'.[22] Given these
circumstances the Dutch did not need to worry that the Chinese might
challenge them.

By these measures, the colonial administration attempted to restrict
the development of indigenous business class and replaced them with
the Chinese. This also illustrated that the Dutch colonial
administration actively discouraged the crossing of ethnic
boundaries, and that the colonial administration played central role
in ensuring that a stable local-born Chinese society was formed and
were not absorbed by the indigenous population.

Along with the awakening of Indonesian nationalism in the first
decade of the twentieth century, in Kudus, a town in the north-coast
of Java, many well-known indigenous businesspersons were born. Of
these, Sirin, Muslich, Atmowijoyo, Nawawi, Ashadi, Rusjdi, Ma'aroef
and Nitisemito, are notable. All of them are cigarette
manufacturers. It is quite difficult to estimate the precise wealth
of these men, however, it is clear from their life styles that they
were very wealthy, indeed, even in comparison with Europeans or
foreign Asians. In the 1920s, they had several cars, lived in
mansions with large gardens, had luxurious villas in the country or
at the seaside, and they were able to finance their children's
tertiary education abroad. They employed around 65,000 workers, in
industries that consumed 12,000 tons of cloves to produce 20,000
million cigarettes annually. The amount of cloves required totalled
more than half of the world's production for the same period.[23]
The Encyclopedie van Nederlandsch Indie remarked,

The native trade in textiles and agricultural produce in tobacco and
livestock is unusually developed. Where elsewhere in Java the second
level and often the third level trade is in the hands of Chinese and
Arabs, both of these groups are here driven out by the natives.[24]

In an economy mainly controlled by the Dutch and the Chinese, Kudus
appeared to be one of the enclaves of successful indigenous
entrepreneurship. Undoubtedly, along with the awakening of
Indonesian nationalism, the Kudus experience contributed to the core
idea of the indigenisation of the economy.

The first organisation, which involved indigenous entrepreneur, was
Sarekat Dagang Islam (The Islamic Trading Society) founded by Raden
Mas Tirtoadisuryo in order to cope with the economic pressure of the
Chinese and the Dutch. The Muslim identity was used to distinguish
between Indonesians and the Dutch or the Chinese. By using Islam as
the determination of Indonesian identity, Tirtoadisuryo easily
grabbed the support of most of indigenous people, particularly the
Javanese, the West Sumatrans, Sundanese and Madurese. More
importantly, he also activated the largest traditional religious
organisations in Java, pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and their
traditional leaders kyai. As a result, Sarekat Dagang Islam
experienced spectacular growth, becoming the first Indonesian mass
party and, by 1919, claiming about two million members.[25] Because
of its spectacular growth, the organisation had to move its focus
away from commercial activities and eventually changed its name to
Sarekat Islam (The Islamic Society).

Most of the members were villagers who perceived Sarekat Islam as an
independent political movement to counter monolithic colonial power
structures. Sarekat Islam expressed group solidarity, motivated by
hatred towards the Chinese and the Dutch. The following statement
that appeared in Neraca [The Scales] clearly demonstrates their
political concerns, 'In consideration of the fact that the majority
of native people exist in miserable living conditions, the Central
Sarekat Islam will continuously oppose any domination by sinful
capitalism'.[26] The term `sinful capitalism' is an interesting
expression, with the distinction between sinful and non-sinful
capitalism having never been clearly drawn. However, coterminous
with an awakening Indonesian nationalism, it could be argued that
all non-indigenous capital was sinful because it drained wealth from
the archipelago. Given this scenario, therefore, indigenous capital
was not sinful.

By 1911, grievances against Chinese had become the central feature
of the policy of the Sarekat Islam Congress, with calls to exclude
all Chinese from the movement. Meanwhile, the tension between the
indigenous Indonesian and the Chinese grew steadily. In Surakarta
and Jogjakarta, it was widely felt that the Chinese were gaining a
firmer control over the batik industry, especially since Chinese
agents controlled the supply of cambric, dyes, waxes and the
marketing of the finished products. The economic competition with
the Chinese was interpreted by militant members of the Sarekat Islam
of Surakarta as a racial threat that had to be met by force. They
began to attack Chinese in the street, burning their shops and
warehouses. Consequently, on 10 August 1912, the Resident of
Surakarta issued a decree banning the organisation. In Kudus, on
October 1918, thousands of people attacked Chinese factories, shops,
pawnshops and houses. More than fifty houses were destroyed, about
eighty Chinese were killed, twenty-two rioters died and about one
hundred were wounded.[27]

The source of the hatred was principally economic, centred on the
entrance of the Chinese into the cigarette industry, which had
previously been vested predominantly in the hands of indigenous
entrepreneurs. This is apparent from the fact that of sixty-one
revolters sentenced for their part in the riot, about twenty were
manufacturers and a further eight were traditional religious leaders
(kyai). Budiman and Ong remark that `many of the indigenous
cigarette manufacturers were sentenced with being involved in the
riot'.[28] There is clear evidence of the involvement of Sarekat
Islam in the riot. The local vice-president and a high proportion of
members were arrested with many leaders fleeing the town to escape
arrest.

Thereafter, responding to the Kudus riot, Semaun, a young and
brilliant Javanese railway worker, the leader of Sarekat Islam
Semarang branch, revealed the ethnic tensions in colonial Indonesia
as follows,

Nowadays, the life of the indigenes is worsening; they feel that
they are getting poorer and poorer but they can see for themselves
that other races [bangsa], for example the Chinese, are getting
richer. The Chinese show off their wealth and contrast it with the
poverty of the indigenes. The contrast between the poverty of the
indigenes and the richness of other peoples caused the hatred of
these indigenes toward the rich, of whom a large number are Chinese.
The hatred of the poor indigenes toward their rich fellow indigenes
disappeared because they belong to same race and same religion. What
is left is only their hatred toward the rich Dutch and the rich
Chinese. The hatred toward the rich Dutch was drowned because the
Dutch are the rulers and they are very strong, but the hatred toward
Chinese has no counterbalance.[29]

The Indonesian revolution was a critical period for the formation of
Indonesian nationalists attitude toward the Chinese. Many
Indonesians still assert that the Chinese gave no support to the
Republic. However, Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese
Party) firmly identified with the struggle for Indonesian
independence and fully lined itself up with the other nationalist
parties. Indeed, many Indonesian Chinese did actively support the
Republic, some of them even becoming cabinet ministers.
Nevertheless, the anti-Chinese incident in Tangerang in May 1946 and
in some areas controlled by the Republican forces brought about an
exodus of Chinese from rural areas to more secure Dutch controlled
areas. These incidents pushed many Chinese, who have been
sympathetic to the Republican, to reject Indonesian citizenship by
1951, under the provisions of the Round Table Agreement, and chose
to be Dutch subject.

The Rise of the Indigenist Policies

In 1945, in a legal sense, the independent Republic of Indonesia
faced the prospect of shaping its own future. At this time the
Republic was led by a tiny layer of urban society, they were well-
educated politicians who spoke fluent Dutch and\or English and had
backgrounds in government service. On the other hand, the majority
of Indonesian people were still trapped in poverty; mostly
illiterate and shackled by authoritarian feudal rule. The business
class was weak and divided between the Chinese, who controlled
substantial commercial networks, and the indigenes that had less
extensive commercial networks.

The economy remained in the hands of non-Indonesian interests.
Caltex, Shell and Stanvac dominated the oil industry and inter-
island shipping was in the hands of the Dutch KPM [Koninklijke
Paketvaart Maatschappij]. The Dutch and the British controlled
plantations and banking industry. After the war, most plantations,
industrial installations and infrastructure, such as roads, bridge,
ports that is essential to boost exports, had deteriorated. The
recovery of Indonesia's economy was slow and therefore it is not
surprising that inflation and the cost of living rose by about 100
per cent in the period between 1950 and 1957.

Mohammad Hatta, the Vice President, an influential figure during the
Liberal period, generally proposed Indonesian economic policies 1950-
57. His attitude towards foreign-descent minorities was reflected in
his Manifesto Politik [Political Manifesto], where he declared,

`In our internal policy we will implement sovereignty of our people
by formulating the nationality regulations in making all peranakans,
both Asian and European extraction, true Indonesians, that is,
Indonesian patriots and Indonesian democrats.' [30]

Hatta's statement, however, clearly indicates that the government
would accept Chinese, Arabs and Europeans as citizens of Indonesia.
Later, this statement was interpreted to suggest that Hatta was
proposing that Indonesian Chinese should be assimilated into the
indigenous Indonesian population. In September 1956, Hatta
guaranteed that the Chinese would have access to the same positions
and have the same rights as indigenous Indonesians. Hatta's
intentions were clear when he wrote that the Indonesian Chinese, `no
longer like to be called Chinese but only Indonesians.' Furthermore,
Hatta added that,

`the course of history in Indonesia has gradually made them [the
Chinese] real Indonesians. Only their names remind one of the
country from which their ancestors came, their language and way of
life are Indonesian.'[31]

Hatta was well known for his sympathy towards the indigenous
entrepreneurial class. Arguing that small entrepreneurs could be
helped through the establishment of cooperatives under state
protection, he launched a cooperative movement to help small
indigenous entrepreneurs and peasants become economically
independent. In addition, he pointed out that it was the duty of the
Indonesian Chinese to contribute their economic expertise to promote
Indonesia's exports, and urged them to take indigenous Indonesians
as business partners. Hatta strongly opposed racial discrimination
against the Chinese. As he commented the Assaat movement,

If the Assaat Movement aimed at protecting weak national business
against foreign business, especially the Chinese, I would agree with
that and would be ready to help. But I disagree with racial
discrimination because this is against our constitution, which does
not allow us to discriminate one citizen against another. If this is
continued, we will not be able to create a homogeneous nation,
because the nation would be fragmented.[32]

The 1950s marked the commencement of `the Indonesianisation policy'
in the economy, covering sectors such as trade, finance,
agricultural estates, public utilities, manufacturing, mineral
production and transportation. The prime targets were Europeans,
particularly the Dutch, but soon, the Indonesian Chinese encountered
a similar fate. The first discriminatory measures against non-
indigenes, in general, and Indonesian Chinese, in particular,
occurred in early 1950 after the establishment of Republik Indonesia
Serikat [the Republic of the United States of Indonesia]. In April
1950, Djuanda, the Minister of Prosperity, announced that the
Indonesian government would protect national importers so they could
compete with foreign businessperson. Thereafter, the national
importers were defined as indigenous Indonesian, or import firms
whose capital was 70 per cent owned by indigenes. The government
granted indigenous importers credit and exclusive licenses for the
importation of certain goods, this policy was called the Benteng
[fortress] policy. Throughout the history of Java, the Benteng
strategy had been used to recapture territory occupied by enemies.
According to the strategy, a circle of fortresses would be built
around an occupied territory, with the circle gradually decreasing
in size until the territory was recaptured. Thus, the term Benteng
was no coincidence. Indigenous Indonesians wanted to recapture the
lost territory, in this case the economy that was in the hands of
Chinese or foreigners. Using the Benteng regulations, the indigenes
Indonesian hoped to gradually regain complete control of the
Indonesian economy. The purpose of the Benteng policy was to
encourage the growth of an indigenous entrepreneurial class, which
would begin, with `the relatively simple problems of the import
trade, and then branch out into other undertakings'.[33]

Another indigenist policy, promulgated by the Ali Satroamidjojo
government, involved the regulation to control the rice-mills. In
the 1950s, the Chinese controlled most rice-mills, borne out by
figures from the East Java province where, in 1952, the Chinese
owned 138 out of 154 mills.[34] According to the regulations, no new
licenses for running rice-mills would be issued for `foreigners'
(read: Indonesian Chinese) and the existing rice-mills should be
transferred to Indonesian control. Not surprisingly, the Chinese
community opposed this measure and in September 1954, Iskaq
Tjokrohadisuryo, the Minister of Economic Affairs, announced that
the regulation was intended to apply only to foreigners (read:
Totok/Singkeh Chinese). This meant that the regulation only affected
Totok Chinese who still held foreign citizenship.

The more radical campaign is the Assaat Movement. Assaat was a
businessperson, turned politician, from West Sumatra. In early 1956,
he organised a campaign, which demanded preferential economic
treatment for indigenous Indonesians. He argued,

`Native Indonesian citizens must receive special protection in all
their endeavours in the economic field, from competition of
foreigners in general and the Chinese in particular.' [35]

In March 1956, at the Indonesian National Economic Congress in
Surabaya, Assaat made an influential speech that demanded
discrimination against all Chinese in Indonesia. He said,

'The Chinese as an exclusive group resist the entry of others,
whether in the cultural, social, or, especially the economic sphere.
In the economic sphere they are so exclusive that in practice they
are monopolistic…. The power of the exclusivist and monopolistic
Chinese in the economic field is far more dangerous for the progress
of the Indonesian people…. We must face this danger together. The
entire people and the government must face it consciously and
systematically… Therefore, I urge the Congress to consider and
eventually to accept three propositions as a basis for this
struggle. They are:

The power of the exclusive Chinese group in the economic field,
especially in the trading sector, hinders the progress of Indonesian
business in all sectors of economic life.

In economic life it is not possible to differentiate between foreign
Chinese and Chinese who are citizens of Indonesia according to the
present citizenship regulations.

Native Indonesian citizens must receive special protection in all
their endeavours in the economic field, from the competition of
foreigners in general and the Chinese especially.[36]

Obviously, Assaat intended to create a powerful indigenous business
class at the expense of Chinese and foreign businessperson. This
movement gained immense support from economically active Islamic
nationalists. The majority of Indonesian leaders, however, were
reluctant to give public support to Assaat's proposal because of its
possible disastrous impact on the Indonesian economy.

Nevertheless, in practice, the discriminatory measures against the
Chinese continued, as demonstrated by the following example. In
October 1956, in answering a written question from Sjech H.
Djalaludin, a Member of Parliament from Nahdatul Ulama, the Ali
government stated that priorities for granting licenses to new firms
were as follows,[37]

Enterprises 100 per cent managed and owned by indigenous Indonesian.

Enterprises jointly managed and owned by Indonesian citizens of
foreign descent and indigenous Indonesian on 50:50 bases.

Joint enterprises of indigenous Indonesians, Indonesian citizens of
foreign descent and foreigners.

Enterprises 100 per cent managed and owned by Indonesian citizens of
foreign descent.

Foreign-owned enterprises that are in the category of domestic
capital.

This regulation also prohibited the transfer of indigenous
Indonesian enterprises to non-indigenous groups.

In May 1959, Rachmat Muljosemino, the Trade Minister who was also a
member of NU and an ardent supporter of the Assaat Movement, issued
a regulation to ban the involvement of `foreigners' (read: Chinese)
in rural business, requiring that their businesses must be
nationalised (read: transferred to indigenous Indonesian) by 30
September of the same year.[38] The prime target of this regulation
was the Totok Chinese who still held foreign citizenship. Before
that date, in fact, the military commander had already declared
rural areas closed to all Chinese, either foreigner or Indonesian.
[39] Presidential Decree, no. 10, was issued on 16 November 1959, to
reiterate the ban introduced by the former cabinet. `Foreigners'
were not allowed to engage in rural trade, or live in rural areas,
and were ordered by law to transfer their businesses to Indonesians
no later than 1 January 1960. It is reported that approximately four
to five hundred thousand Chinese were affected by the regulation.
[40] Presidential Decree no. 10 represented a significant departure
from previous strategies to cut down the economic strength of the
Chinese, since the ban was limited to foreign Chinese traders only,
probably, based on the `consideration that the desired objective
might not have been achieved if it applied to all Chinese'.[41]

The records of the Department of Immigration of Indonesia show that
in 1960, 102,196 Chinese left Indonesia for China.[42] Relations
between the People's Republic of China and Indonesia deteriorated
because of the Decree. The People's Republic of China accused
Indonesia of violating the Dual National Treaty that stated that the
Indonesian government would protect the interest of Chinese
nationals. In reply, the Indonesian government, through Foreign
Minister Dr. Subandrio, argued that the action `was a necessary step
toward the building of a socialist economy, and the protection of
the national economy from the monopolistic economic activities of
the overseas Chinese.'[43]

In order to defend the interests of the Chinese minority, the
Indonesian Chinese, on 12 March 1950, established its own party,
PDTI [Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia - Indonesian Chinese
Democrat Party]. Subsequently, as discrimination against the Chinese
increased, key figures in the party such as Yap Tjwan Bing, Tjoa Sie
Hwie, Tjoen Tin Jan, Tan Po Goan and Tan Boen An, introduced an anti-
isolationist argument.[44] They argued that if the Indonesian
Chinese defended their interests through a minority party based on
ethnic origin, they would be weak and isolated because the
indigenous Indonesian would feel threatened, and in turn, increase
discriminatory policies. These men argued that the Indonesian
Chinese would gain more advantages if they struggled within the
ethnic Indonesian structure. This argument was supported by most of
the members, with the result that in 1953, Yap Tjwan Bing and Tjoa
Sie Hwie joined PNI (Indonesian National Party), Tjoen Tin Jan moved
to Partai Katholik (Catholic Party), and Tan Po Goan and Tan Boen An
became members of PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party).[45]

As a substitute for PDTI, in March 1954, the Indonesian Chinese
established Baperki [Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan
Indonesia - Indonesian Citizens Consultative Body]. Indonesian
Chinese businessperson and politicians, however, dominated Baperki.
Unlike PDTI, Baperki was a socio-political organisation, which did
not limit its membership to Indonesian Chinese. For instance, the
executive secretary of Baperki was Bujung Saleh, a well-known
indigenous intellectual. Furthermore, the term Tionghoa
or `Indonesian Chinese' [peranakan Cina] was deleted from its
statutes, and was replaced by the term Indonesian citizen [Warga
Negara Indonesia - WNI].

One of the most influential Chinese politicians at the time was
Siauw Giok Tjhan, president of Baperki. Siauw favoured pluralism and
shared a non-racial concept of the Indonesian nation, which regarded
racial exclusiveness as a legacy of colonialism.[46] In this way
Siauw managed to move the focus away from the discussion on racial
exclusiveness, or racial prejudice, to the urgently felt need to
establish an Indonesian socialist society in which there would be no
exploitation. Siauw believed that if there were no exploited groups,
group and racial conflicts would disappear. With this in mind, Siauw
introduced `integrationist policy' which encouraged Indonesian
Chinese to integrate themselves into the struggle of the Indonesian
people to achieve a non-exploitative socialist society.

Since early1960s, the army had collaborated with right wing forces
to gradually establish its political dominance, which eventually
resulted in civilian rule in Indonesia being replaced with an
authoritarian-military dominion. Economic deterioration was a
significant factor in the fall of the Soekarno government in 1966.
Soekarno lost the support of the urban middle and upper class as
well as the Armed Forces.

After the failure of the 30 September 1965 Coup, the army publicly
blamed the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) for the coup
attempt. This triggered an outbreak of violence against people
associated with the PKI. The army supported the proclamation and
collaborated with the zealots to identify PKI targets. Not only were
PKI supporters eliminated, but other leftists were also killed. The
Chinese, the most vigorous element in the Indonesian business class,
were accused of supporting the Communist revolution and were
victimised by both soldiers and civilians. In February 1967,
regional military authorities took independent action against the
Chinese. In East Java and West Sumatra, the military authorities
prohibited the Chinese from any economic activities, and many
Chinese were killed or jailed without reason.[47] Shops, factories,
houses and warehouses were smashed, burned and robbed. On the West
Kalimantan pogrom of 1967, a British journalist reported,'…dozens of
war painted Dayaks marched in triumph to the Kalimantan military
commander with the heads of their Chinese victims ceremoniously
impaled on their spears, and then asked to be paid for helping him
fight the communist'.[48] The 1965-1967 pogroms left a national
death toll, which is never likely to be known with certainty,
although it is widely accepted that at least one million people
died.

The New Order Accommodation

At the heart of the bloodstained and turbulent events that led to
the establishment of the authoritarian-military regime, which called
itself the New Order, stood the previously unrecognised General
Soeharto. Soeharto, like Soekarno, was of Javanese ethnic origin,
but unlike Soekarno, Soeharto was indeed a `true Javanese', in the
sense of his apparent cool-headedness and phlegmatic attitude. When
Soeharto challenged, it seemed that Soekarno underestimated his
adversary, indeed, Soeharto proved to be a formidable opponent, and
an able politician who was too elusive for President Soekarno who
ultimately succumbed.

In order to control the society, President Soeharto established an
authoritarian-corporatist style of political representation under
state management with a bureaucratic machine reaching into the
smallest hamlets in the country, the legacy of which remains today.
Deeply involved in attempting to control political life, the State
weakened political participation by channelling political energy
into state-sponsored organisations. State intervention also went
beyond the political spectrum and intervened directly into the
market. For instance, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce became a
formalistic organisation, headed by government appointees, including
retired military officers, retired state bureaucrats or
businessperson with close connections to top state bureaucrats. As a
consequence of this political framework, clientelistic patterns or
personal relationships between state bureaucrats and businessperson
were, and have continued to be, the dominant pattern.

The regime was strongly committed to economic development. Supported
by lucrative oil income, the regime financed massive projects,
building infrastructure and industry throughout the country.
Indonesian industrialisation began in earnest soon after the New
Order came to power. Indeed, the New Order was successful in
reducing the annual inflation rate from 650 per cent in 1966 to 15
per cent in the 1970s. Further, the New Order adopted reform
measures, which were consistently favoured by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. A group of Indonesian economists and
technocrats known as the `Berkeley Mafia' was crucial to these new
policies. In early 1967, the Foreign Capital Investment Legislation
was promulgated. Oil production, which provided the most significant
revenue in financing the development, grew at about 20 per cent per
annum between 1968 and 1970. From 1966 to1968, the average annual
growth rate of the manufacturing sector was 6.02 per cent,
accelerating to 12.44 per cent during the following three years.[49]

Rapid economic growth in the 1970s appeared to be associated with
the expansion of the role of the New Order state. It was not the
private sector, nor multi-national capital that led the process, but
the deliberate efforts of the interventionist state. Although
foreign investment was formally invited, it could not play a
significant role because of highly protectionist walls. Between 1967
and 1980, foreign investment occupied only 3.10 per cent of total
investment. The state dominated over 55 per cent of total investment
and the remainder was domestic private investment. It is clear that
the state controlled most of the economy and guided it firmly.

The New Order state also introduced an import substitution strategy.
Between 1966 and 1968, a wide range of locally made consumer goods
and durable products gradually replaced imported goods. The firms
that produced these products were supported by highly protective
import substitution policies. These policies aimed at creating an
independent national economy, which was closely related to the
attempt to create a national capitalist class. The ideology behind
the policy derived from a nationalist position which argued that the
growth of the economy should be sustained by the growth of the
domestic market, that the companies should be owned by local people
and that profits should be invested in the home country rather than
being sent to other countries.

The New Order, however, had very close links with indigenous
business interests and was sensitive to the resentment of indigenous
businessperson. Yet, they abandoned any radical indigenist policies
and consistently maintained economic stability. New Order State
policy in relation to the development of small indigenous
businessperson was ambiguous. The problems lay not only in the poor
implementation of the indigenist policy which was exacerbated by
corruption, incompetence and confusion over the policies and lack of
coordination between institutions, but more importantly, in the
essence of the state policies itself. Since the state had adopted
economic growth oriented policy and established coalition with the
Chinese to utilise domestic capital. The economy was under the
dominion of state bureaucrats and Chinese businessperson, clearly
disadvantaging the indigenous entrepreneurial society. However, this
does not mean that the state was not supportive of indigenous
business interests, for the New Order state was sensitive to this
particular problem. Indeed, a significant indigenous bourgeoisie
from bureaucrats' families was nurtured at the expense of other
indigenous entrepreneurs.

Under the New Order, the indigenist policies had taken the form of
management education and credit assistance, exclusively for
indigenous businesspersons. The failure of indigenous business was
perceived as being due to personal weaknesses on the part of
indigenous businessperson, such as lack of management skills, lack
of entrepreneurial spirit and lack of working capital. With this
perception firmly entrenched, the government investigated various
policies for helping indigenous entrepreneurs. The term `weak
economic group' [golongan ekonomi lemah] was coined for firms in
which the indigenes owned at least fifty per cent of the shares and
occupied the majority of the management positions. Also in this
category were companies in which investment capital was less than
twenty-five million Rupiah for trading and service companies and one
hundred million Rupiah for construction and industrial companies.
Credit was provided through such institutions as PT Askrindo, PT
Upprindo, PT Bahana and state banks. In fact, the credit granted to
small indigenous businessperson accounted for only a small amount of
the total available credit. In the 1979/80 fiscal years, the total
bank credit was Rp. 2.5 trillion, but the credit given to indigenous
businessperson was only Rp. 591.5 billion, with the remainder, going
to big business. Shin Yoon Hwan found that in the first four years
of implementation, credit was awarded to 377,529 projects for a
total of Rp. 203,285 million. Thus, on an average, each project
counted for only about Rp. 500,000 (about US$1,000).[50] It is
doubtful that the programme would have created a significant
difference in the context of Indonesian capitalism, with only
US$1,000 per case for fixed investment and working capital. By the
end of 1978, the total cumulative value of indigenist credit
represented only 6.4 per cent of the total cumulative value of
approved domestic investment. Other programs were nothing more than
showcases. After six years of implementation, only ninety projects
of small indigenous business management were assisted by PT Bahana
and by PT Upprindo.

Regarding the Chinese issue, the New Order regime had also played an
ambiguous policy. On one side, in a legal sense, they issued a
series of tough measures against Chinese interest, put a ban on
using any Chinese characters, ban on Chinese cultural performance
and closing Chinese schools. There was also restriction on the
number of Chinese students in the public schools and the Chinese is
forbidden to have land in the rural areas. However, on the other
side, since the regime had adopted an economic growth oriented
policy, they establish a coalition with the Chinese to utilise
domestic capital.

On 16 June 1968, in Jakarta, the Soeharto government established a
mechanism for mobilising domestic Chinese capital, in the form of
the Indonesian Business Centre.[51] Its members were Chinese
businesspersons and high-ranking government officers. Major-General
Suhardiman headed the Presidium and the other members were two
Indonesian Chinese businesspersons; Hamid (Ong Ah Lok) and Sulindro
(Ma Shih Ling). In the 1970s, the Indonesian Business Centre
coordinated most domestic Chinese investment and represented the
government in negotiation with Chinese businessperson from other
Asian countries. Detailed data on the activities of the Indonesian
Business Centre is unavailable since it has kept a low profile and
acts behind the scene. Nevertheless, Suhardiman and his group have
continued to play a crucial role in shaping state decisions. For
instance, in the early 1980s, Suhardiman led a group of key
officials from Kadin [Kamar Dagang Indonesia - Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce] on a visit to the People's Republic of China. This was a
starting point for the normalisation of relations between Indonesia
and the People's Republic of China.

In July 1968, the Domestic Capital Investment Legislation [UU PMDN -
Undang-Undang Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri] was issued, with the
main target being Chinese capital, Sarbini, the head of the
legislation committee, explained,

I was the head of the team, which drafted the PMDN law of 1968. I
worked on it mainly with Soedjatmoko. Our thinking was simple. In
order to develop we needed to mobilize capital. In the spirit of a
kind of deregulation, we put forth the 1968 law. We were aware that
there was a lot of Chinese capital outside the country. With the
1968 law, we made formal for domestic investors the same incentives
and protection enjoyed by foreigners under Wijoyo's 1967 PMA law.[52]

Since the mid 1970s, the chief beneficiaries of economic expansion
have been mostly Chinese urban upper and middle classes, and wealthy
landowners, with the largely Islamic indigenous entrepreneurial
society failing to gain any benefits. The bulk of government
projects and credits have fallen into the hands of the Chinese
businessperson, acting as the business partners of the bureaucrats.
This practice is known as percukongan. According to Hawkins, in the
early 1970s, 90 per cent of project aid ended up in the hands of the
cukong, `who had privileged access to government contracts,
investment credits and other funds'.[53]

In Indonesia, industrial policy was and continues to be the domain
of high-level state bureaucrats. There is no evidence that the
cukong were able to determine national policy-making processes, such
as national industrial policy, including industrial priorities and
budgetary allocations. Even, if the cukong had close connections
with the powerful generals. He was only able to influence particular
discrete decisions, for instance the allocation of licenses, credits
or contracts.

The opportunities, which were available to those Chinese
businesspersons attracted criticism, particularly from their
indigenous competitors and from the press and this criticism was
directly levelled at the cukong. Indigenous Indonesian, cynically,
described the cukong as Chinese businessperson who had a special
relationship with Indonesian officials and who manipulated their
Indonesian partners. They, however, believed that the cukong were
more powerful and had stronger capabilities to manipulate their
partners. The Chinese tended to say that they were only `the milch-
cow' of the officials. As one Chinese entrepreneur complained,

Doing business in Indonesia does not really need good business
skills. We are not shrewd merchants compared with the Singaporean or
the Taiwanese. Our success is due to 20% for business skills and 80%
bribery. We are only their (the government officers') milch-cows!
[54]

Criticism of the cukong focused on the unfair advantage they gained
because of their close relationships with influential public
figures. Chinese businessperson was given preferential treatment for
contracts, licences and credit, in return for ransom paid to the
officers involved. In answering the criticism, the government
consistently defended itself by saying that domestic capital had to
be utilised or it would fly to other countries. Consequently, the
indigenous outcry had fallen on deaf ears.

Historically, collaboration between indigenous power holders and the
Chinese businessperson was not unusual. The fact that the state-
bureaucratic class had nurtured the indigenous bourgeoisie was also
significant. While the indigenous officials held power and
facilities, they needed business partners who were not associated
with particular political groups. However, the indigenous
bourgeoisie was often associated with a particular political group,
which could present a threat to officials. In contrast, the Chinese
were in a vulnerable position, and therefore it was much safer to
have Chinese rather than indigenous partners. The Chinese gained
state support, which was essential for capital accumulation.

The cukong pattern was vital to the emergence of Indonesian
capitalism and the practice of collusion could be seen as a
primitive form of capital accumulation, which occurred in the early
stage of capitalism. The cukong pattern, nevertheless, retained the
substance of primitive capital accumulation as mentioned by Marx.
[55] The difference between the cukong pattern and Marx's primitive
capital accumulation lay in the level of sophistication and the far
shorter period required to transform primitive accumulation to
industrial accumulation. Through the cukong pattern, the political
power of the state and the economic power of the most vigorous
element in the domestic bourgeoisie were integrated to back up
capital accumulation. The New Order fostered the pattern by
promoting a nationalist ideology and by using nationalism to
legitimate the collusion. Consequently, the pattern became an
effective and sophisticated device for expropriating wealth.
Excessive profits from every corner of the country were transferred
to a small powerful elite in Jakarta. The by-product of the system
was to create a national industry.

During the economic boom of the 1970s, indigenous entrepreneurs
began to make demands, which resulted in the revival of the
indigenist policy, though on a far smaller scale than the sweeping
Benteng program of the 1950s. The catalyst was the January 1974, so-
called, Malari Affair, which made an issue of foreign capital
domination and the corrupt association between state bureaucrats and
Chinese businessmen. Responding to the critics, the National
Economic Stabilization Board [Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional]
issued guidelines to restrict foreign investment and speed up the
transfer of shares from foreign investors to their indigenous
partners. These changes proved quite effective in silencing the
critics who had argued that state bureaucrats were not responsive to
indigenous businessperson. However, a closer look at the changes
indicates that they advanced indigenous interests in only a
superficial way. Robison stated that it was not the indigenous petty
capitalist who benefited, but rather the larger domestic capitalist
and state owned capital.[56] Winters found that the government
itself backed down on its enforcement of the fifty-one per cent
transfer of foreign equity to Indonesians within ten years, because,

`The shortage of indigenous capital, and skills and the absence of a
stock exchange or other institutions capable of mobilizing capital
meant that the guidelines remained guidelines and could not be
implemented as the government would wish.[57]

Ethnic tensions culminated in an outburst of violence against the
Chinese in 1980. On November 1980, thousands of workers and students
attacked the Chinatown districts in Solo, Semarang and Kudus. This
riot subsided by the end of November, but troops were placed on full
alert until the end of January 1981. The government never announced
the total number of casualties. The cause of the riot was economic.
The demonstrators' slogan attacked the role of the cukong and the
unfairness in the distribution of government projects. The
demonstrators also distributed pamphlets entitled `Social
Revolution', the main theme of which was that only by revolution
would the indigenous become masters in their own country. The six
student leaders who organised the demonstrations were all imprisoned
without fair trials. Four of them were the sons of small indigenous
businessperson.[58]

In the first week of December 1980, Hipmi [Himpunan Pengusaha Muda
Indonesia - Indonesian Young Businessperson's Association], an
indigenous association, issued a statement that declared that the
cause of the riots was unfairness in issuing government projects,
licences and credits, and called on the government to change the
system.[59] In January 1981, Subiyanto, the Head of BKPMD [Badan
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah - Regional Investment Coordination
Board] of Central Java, announced that BKPMD Central Java would
assist in the transfer of 50 per cent of the stock of Chinese
investments to small, indigenous businessperson.[60] This policy
satisfied the indigenous militants, however, it was never carried
out effectively. After two years of implementation, only four small
Chinese firms had transferred the requisite stock to their
indigenous counterparts.[61]

The most shocking anti-Chinese riot broke out on May 13, 1998 in
Jakarta and Solo. The rioters robbed and burned Chinese houses,
shops, factories, and warehouses. Moreover, they also attacked the
Chinese in the street and rapped the Chinese women. The May 1998
Affair represented a significant departure from previous riot, since
the riot shocked the Chinese community in the world, and resulted in
a wave of serious protest from the Chinese communities in the US,
Europe and some Asian countries to the Indonesian government.

The deteriorating social and economic conditions in the 1998 pushed
the Chinese capital abroad. It is reported that only in a month at
least 80 billion US Dollar was transferred abroad. However, the
massive movement of Chinese capital in the period is not calculable,
it is certain that the Chinese capital was indeed diverted.
Therefore, the economic crisis in Indonesia is much worsening.
Frantically, the government formed a commission to persuade the
Chinese to invest their capital in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is
worthless effort, as until the present day capital flight continues.

Post-New Order: A Full Acceptance?

Since Soeharto was overthrown in May 1998 until today is a turbulent
era in Indonesian history. After enjoying high growth for two
decades, Indonesia has been directly battered by Asia's economic
turmoil, and until the present day, it is still the farthest from
recovery. Indonesian currency has suffered the most vertiginous fall
into the abyss of devaluation. It has been depreciated more than 600
per cent against US Dollar, and it seems to be no end in sight. This
is resulted in the soaring up of inflation by more than 80 per cent.

Indonesia's economy has taken a hard fall and no stratum in the
society has escaped the pain. Indonesians which more than two
hundred millions have seen their income per capita drop from US$
1.200 to US$300. Prices are shooting up more than 60 per cent.
Parents complain that they cannot afford milk powder for their
babies and even medicines are hard to find. The prices of items
regarded as necessities for the poor, such as kerosene, the poor's
cooking fuel, have gone up significantly. As a result, the
impoverished households have no way of paying the steeply rising
prices for necessities such as rice, sugar, cooking oil, flour,
corn, soya-beans, soaps etc. For other players in the economy,
corporations have no way of repaying the US$70 billions foreign
loans and a great deal of businesses have simply ceased. This is
resulted in the bankruptcy of companies and banks in the country and
the increasing numbers of the unemployed. The risk is clear:
millions of people are newly unemployed and at least over the next
few months untold millions more stand to lose their jobs.

The prolonged economic crises have struck Indonesia since the last
four years have a very deep impact on the lives of the people. Not
surprisingly, resentment has burgeoned. Many recent incidents seem
to have had an ethnic or religious flavour. Not only riots growing
bigger, they are also growing more frequent. Ethnic riots scar the
streets. The riots seem to be a product of fear, economic
frustrations and a breakdown of law and order.

Nevertheless, after more than thirty years of state dominion, the
endeavour of the Reformist to deregulate the economy has been widely
supported by Indonesian tired of state domination in every aspect of
life. A more outward-looking economy has been created, with more
participants in the policy system, increasing the need for
bargaining and compromise. This is an unavoidable accompaniment of
reformation. More importantly, such developments offer the prospects
of greater political pluralisation in Indonesia, as the economy
becomes more industrialized, more complex and increasingly more
integrated into the international market, and as the foreign
investor, the important element in the business community, demands a
more stable investment climate rather than powerful political
patronage.

Regarding the Chinese issue, the attitude of Wahid government is
much more liberal, and has tendency to accept the Indonesian Chinese
with full acceptance. This is shown with his decision to abolish
regulations discriminated against the Chinese. Therefore, public
anti-Sinicism is far more moderate. The stories of Chinese tycoons
and political leaders have become common in newspapers and
magazines. Today, the Chinese cultural performance is common in
public. The Chinese language course has been mushrooming in the
cities. The Chinese New Year is the most vigorous and joyful
celebration in the cities, with parties and dragon dances in the
streets.

Another significant change occurred with a lessening of ethnic
division in the business community, as large number of Indonesian
join the business and gained lucrative positions. As a result, this
sector is no longer the domain of the Chinese Indonesian. This move
in public opinion can be illustrated by the sparked public anger
towards the bureaucrats and their patrons, including the cukong.
Most of the critics, instead, were demanding a clean government
rather than racial prejudice against Chinese. These critics wanted
the elimination of collusion between state bureaucrats and
businesspersons.

Conclusion

The dynamic relationship between the Indonesian Chinese and the
indigenous Indonesian is not simply a racial conflict. While race
remains a crucial factor, other issues, including conflict of
interest between different element in the business class and
contending policy advocates, have also important. Throughout the
course of Indonesian history, the relationship was formed within a
range of complex allowances and amalgams in which the state and its
officials played a central role.

It is the economic competition as being at the root of tension
between Chinese Indonesian and indigenous Indonesian. This is shown
with the riot in Kudus and Solo and the founding of Sarekat Dagang
Islam. Nevertheless, this is perennial social conflict since the
colonial administration introduced the segregation racial policy.

The New Order regime was deeply concerned with forming a more
integrated and solid national business class in order to ensure the
country's economic stability and growth. Furthermore, the New Order
pushed for the cultural integration of Indonesian Chinese and the
indigenous Indonesian, legitimated business, promoted capitalist
ideology and prevented class conflict by strengthening patrimonial
ties between the businesspersons and the bureaucrats. While to some
extent this move satisfied the hard-liners amongst the indigenous
Indonesian, it was at the same time an attempt to create a more
stable environment for capital accumulation. Since the regime had
adopted an economic growth policy, the economy was under dominion of
state bureaucrats and Chinese businessperson, clearly disadvantaging
the indigenous entrepreneur.

The Wahid administration is much more liberal, and has strong
tendency to accept the Indonesian Chinese with full acceptance. The
Chinese, as a small minority, has a tendency to come to terms with
the power. Since anti-Chinese prejudice and conflicting interests
persist. There is perennial dilemma that too great identification
with the power, which at a given time may spell disaster for the
minority when the power is overthrown. Consequently, after along
years of discrimination and repression, the position of Indonesian
Chinese as citizen of Indonesia is still vulnerable.

Therefore, as a small ethnic minority, the Indonesian Chinese have a
little choice but to try to come to terms with the social and
political situation of the day. In order to avoid discrimination, it
is not enough for the Indonesian Chinese simply to be good citizens,
given the negative attitude towards the Chinese as a whole. The
situation demands that the Indonesian Chinese should demonstrate
their loyalty to and identification with Indonesia. It also requires
the Indonesian Chinese actively involve in the struggle of the
Indonesian to oppose discrimination and to fight for the equal
rights of all citizen. Since Indonesian social and political life is
an arena, in which there are competing forces that the Chinese have
to take into account and to which they have to adjust.

Notes:

Williams, Lea, A. Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of Pan
Chinese Movement in Indonesia 1900-1916. Glencoe: Free Press, 1960,
pp. 9-10.

Suryadinata, L. Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-
1977. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979: chapter 3

Skinner, G. W. `The Chinese Minority', in McVey, Ruth, T. Indonesia.
(New Haven, Conn., 1963) p. 97.

Coppel, C. A. Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1983, p.5.

Skinner, `The Chinese,' p.103

H. W. Dick, `Interisland Trade, Economic Integration, and the
Emergence of the National Economy', in Booth, O'Malley and Weidemann
(eds), Indonesian Economic History in The Dutch Colonial Era, Yale
University Southeast Asian Studies, 1990: pp.297-321.

Major studies dealing with this period include J. C. Van Leur,
Indonesian Trade and Society, The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Publishers
Ltd, 1967, particularly chapters 3 and 4; A. Reid, `An "Age of
Commerce in Southeast Asian History", Modern Asian Studies, 24, 1,
1990: pp.1-30; H. Dick, `Interisland Trade', 1990; J.
Villiers, `Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth
Century', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 4, 1981: pp.723-50.

Onghokham, Rakyat dan Negara, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983, p. 30.

H. J. De Graaf and Th. G. Pigeaud, Kerajaan-Kerajaan Islam Di Jawa:
Peralihan Dari Majapahit Ke Mataram, Jakarta: Pustaka Utama
Graffiti, 1989: pp. 41-51.

G. R. Knight, `From Plantations to Padi-field: The Origins of the
Nineteenth Century Transformation of Java's Sugar Industry', Modern
Asian Studies, 14, 2, 1980: pp.177-204.

T. S. Werdoyo, Tan Jin Sing: Dari Kapten Cina Sampai Bupati
Yogyakarta, Jakarta: Intermasa, 1990.

Brenner, S.A. `Competing Hierarchis: Javanese Merchants and the
Priyayi Elite in Solo, Central Java', Indonesia, 52, (1991), pp.55-
84. This quote p. 66.

Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia Since 1300, 2nd ed.
London: the Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 90.

A. Heuken, Historical Sights of Jakarta, Singapore: Times Books
International, 1989, p.47.

Kemasang, Heuken, Ricklefs and Reid and Trocki estimated that the
number of victims was about 10,000. See also, Reid and C.
Trocki, `The Last Stand of Autonomous States in Southeast Asia and
Korea, 1750-1870', Asian Studies Review, 17, 2, November, 1993,
pp.103-20; and Ricklefs, History, 1993, p. 90. Kahin estimated that
7000 Chinese were killed. See, G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and
Revolution in Indonesia, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970.
Furthermore, he estimated that `about 20,000 unemployed and armed
Chinese of West Java attacked Batavia'. According to Kahin, the
population of Chinese throughout Java was about 100,000 in 1740.
According to Raffles, who wrote an extensive study on Java, the
number of Chinese in Batavia was 11,249 and throughout Java and
Madura, with the exception of Batavia, was 17,843. See, T. S.
Raffles; The History of Java, (Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1988): pp.241-86. It is probable that the number of Chinese was not
numerous due to two reasons. Firstly, the migration of Chinese from
mainland China had not reach a large number. They arrived in small
boats as traders, and were usually men. The mass migration was
organised by the Dutch, after the introduction of the Cultivation
System in 1830 when cheap labour was needed for plantations and
minings. Secondly, the living conditions of the Chinese were
extremely humble. Raffles states, `The Chinese suffer more than any
class of the people. The number of casualties among them, I am told,
is incredible; and if one judge from the extent of their burial
ground and the number of their tumuli, it cannot admit of a doubt'.
(Appendix A, viii.) Thus, the number `20,000 Chinese soldiers'
stated by Kahin, probably, refers to the allied forces mounted by
the Chinese and the Javanese princes of the north coast.
Heuken, Historical Sights, 1989, p. 49.

Ricklefs, The History, 1993, p. 90.

Maddison, A. `Dutch Income in and from Indonesia 1700-1938', Modern
Asian Studies, 23, 4, October, (1989): pp.645-70.

The Siauw Giap,'Group Conflict in a Plural Society', Revue du Sudest
Asiatique, 1966, p. 187.

F. De Haan, Priangan: De Preanger Regentschappen On Der Het
Nederlandsch Bestuur tot 1811, Vol. III, Batavia, 1912: p.502.

Kemasang, A.R.T. `Overseas Chinese in Java and their Liquidation in
1740', Southeast Asian Studies, XIX, 2, 19, (1990): pp.123-46.

P. Meijer, Verzameling van Instructien, Ordonnacien en Reglementen
voor do Regering van Nederlandsch Indie, vastgesteld in de Jaren
1609, 1617, 1632, 1650, 1807, 1815, 1818, 1827, 1830 en 1836, met de
Onderwepen der Staaats Commissie van 1805 en Historische
Aantekeningen, (Batavia, 1848): p.44.

Castles, L.`Cloves', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 2, 1,
(1965): pp. 49-59.

The English version is cited from L. Castles, Religion, Politics and
Economic Behavior in Java: The Kudus Cigarette Industry, (Southeast
Asian Studies, Yale University, 1967): p.85.

M. C. Ricklefs, History, 1993, p. 166.

The English version is cited from R. Van Niel, The Emergence of the
Modern Indonesian Elite, (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1970):p.135. The
editor of the Neraca newspaper was Haji Agus Salim, the leading
figure in Sarekat Islam. The newspaper presented social and
political issues to readers.

Castles, Religion, 1967, p. 62.

Budiman and Onghokham, Rokok, 1987, p. 108.

`Peroesoehan di Koedoes dan Hal-Hal jang Berhoeboengan Dengan Itoe,
II', Sin Po, November 12, 1918. The English version is quoted from
Suryadinata, L. Pribumi, Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and
China, (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1986): p.16.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 25.

M. Hatta, `One Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue', Asian
Survey, 5, 3, (March, 1965): pp.576-81. This quote p. 580.

Pedoman, (July 1956), republished in Kompas, (20 February 1967).

B. Higgins and J. Higgins, Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones,
(Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963): p. 91.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 132.

Assaat, `The Chinese Grip on Our Economy', in H. Feith and L.
Castles (eds), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1970): p.346.

Ibid., pp. 343-46.

Sin Po, 17 October 1956. The English version is cited from
Suryadinata Pribumi, p. 134.

For the full text of the document, see, Lembaran Negara Republik
Indonesia, 128, (1959).

M. F. Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca:
Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University, 1964): p. 197.

Ibid.,p.207.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 135.

G. W. Skinner, `The Chinese Minority', in R. McVey, (ed.),
Indonesia, (Yale University: Southeast Asian Studies, 1963): pp.97-
117.

Merdeka, (14 December 1959). The English version is cited from
Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 176.

On the anti-isolationist argument see, `Dua Aliran', Berita PDTI,
(15 October 1953):pp.3-4; Tan Boen An, `Minoriteit Adalah Masalah
Massa Yang Belum Selesai', Nusaputra, 2, 9, (10 March 1952). See
also, L. Suryadinata, Pribumi, pp. 64-5.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 65.

About Siauw Giok Tjhan's political ideas see, Siauw Giok Tjhan,
Pantjasila Anti Rasialisme, (Jakarta: Baperki, 1962); Gotong Rojong
Nasakom Untuk Melaksanakan Ampera, (Jakarta: Baperki, 1963).

Sinar Harapan, (17 February 1967): p.2.

Garth Alexander, Silent Invasion, London, 1973, p.3

Thee Kian Wie and Y. Kunio, `Foreign and Domestic Capital in
Indonesian Industrialization', in Southeast Asian Studies, 24, 4,
(March 1987): pp.327-49.

Shin Yoon Hwan, `Demystifying the Capitalist State: Political
Patronage, Bureaucratic Interest and Capitalist in-Formation in
Soeharto's Indonesia', (Yale University: Ph.D. Thesis, 1989):pp.311-
20. According to McLeod the amount was Rp. 900,000 per case. See R.
H. McLeod, `Concessional Credit for Small Scale Enterprise: A
Comment', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 19, 1, (April
1983): pp.83-9.

L. Suryadinata, `Kebijakan Pemerintah Orde Baru Indonesia Terhadap
Golongan Minoritas Indonesia', Economica, 4, 3, (1980): pp.25-31.

J. A. Winters, `Structural Power and Investor Mobility: Capital
Control and State Policy in Indonesia, 1965-1990', (Yale University,
Ph.D. Dissertation, 1991): p. 122.

F. Hawkins, `Indonesia's Own Military-Industrial Complex', Bangkok
Post, (28 January 1971). The Indonesian version was published in
Nusantara, 30 January 1971 with the title `Kompleks Industri Militer
Indonesia'. Later, the editor of Nusantara was prosecuted and
sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Interview, 19 December, 1992.

On primitive capital accumulation see K. Marx, Capital, 1, (New
York: International Publishers, 1990).

Robison, R. Indonesia:The Rise of Capital, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin,
1986) pp. 164-8.

Winters, J.A. `Structural, pp 170-1.

`Hary Mulyadi Mengaku Sebagai Pencetus Ide Peristiwa Solo', Sinar
Harapan, (4 December 1980); `Ada Blackout, Ada Desas-Desus', Tempo,
(13 December 1980); `Adam Malik Menyinggung Peristiwa Jateng:
Tonggak Sisa Kolonialisme Masih Terasa', Merdeka, (24 December
1980).

`Tidak Ada Lagi Jam Malam', Tempo, (13 December 1980): pp.12-14.

`Pribumisasi dan Indonesianisasi Modal di Jateng Mulai Tahun Ini',
Merdeka, (31 January 1981).

Interview,July 1986.

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------ `The Anti Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia', in Mackie, J.,
(ed.), The Chinese, 1976.

Marx, K., Capital, 1, London: Penguin Books, 1990.

McLeod, R. H., `Concessional Credit for Small Scale Enterprise: A
Comment', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 1, April (1983):
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McVey, R. T., The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca: Cornell
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------ (ed.), Southeast Asia Transitions: Approaches Through Social
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------ `The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia', in Anderson and Kahin,
(eds), Interpreting, 1982.

Meek, J. P., 'The Government and Economic Development in Indonesia,
1950-1954', The University of Virginia, Ph.D. thesis, 1956.

P. Meijer, Verzameling van Instructien, Ordonnacien en Reglementen
voor do Regering van Nederlandsch Indie, vastgesteld in de Jaren
1609, 1617, 1632, 1650, 1807, 1815, 1818, 1827, 1830 en 1836, met de
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Aantekeningen, Batavia, 1848.

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O'Malley and Weidemann, (eds), Indonesian, 1990, pp. 111-35.

------ and Fernando, M. R., `Peasant and Coffee Cultivation in
Cirebon Residency, 1800-1900', in Booth, O'Malley and Weidemann,
(eds), Indonesian, 1990, pp. 171- 86.

Onghokham, `The Case of Assimilation', in Feith, and Castles, (eds),
The Indonesian, 1970.

------ `The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation Into the
Sources of the Brotodiningrat Affairs', in McVey, (ed.), Southeast
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------ `The Decline of Indigenous Commodity Trade', Prisma, 30,
December (1983).

------ Rakyat dan Negara, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1983.

Palmier, L. H., Social Status and Power in Java, London, Athlone,
1960.

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Press, 1988.

Reid, A., `An Age of Commerce in Southeast Asian History', Modern
Asian Studies, 24, 1, (1990): pp. 1-30.

------ `The Seventeenth Century Crisis in Southeast Asia', Modern
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------ and Trocki, C., 'The Last Stand of Autonomous States in
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------ A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300, 2nd ed., London:
The Macmillan Press, 1993.

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------ Gotong Rojong Nasakom Untuk Melaksanakan Ampera, Jakarta:
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------ Lima Jaman: Perwujudan Integrasi Wajar, Jakarta:
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Yale University: Southeast Asian Studies, 1963, pp. 97-117

Somers, M. F., Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca:
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Golongan Minoritas Indonesia', Economica, 4, 3, (1980): pp. 25-31.

------ Pribumi, Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China,
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------ Indonesia After Sukarno, Vancouver: University of British
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------ `The Effect of Export Cultivations in Nineteenth Century
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------ `The Legacy of the Cultivation System for Subsequent Economic
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the Transformation of Domestic Bourgeoisie in Indonesia' (Murdoch
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Chinese Movement in Indonesia 1900-1916, Glencoe: Free Press, 1960.

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Control and State Policy in Indonesia, 1965-1990', Yale University,
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Weidemann, (eds), Indonesian, 1990, pp. 90-110.

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[FBY]

Ada juga di buku oei hong Kian dokter gigi Bung Karno.
drg. oei yang sekarang di Belanda masih keturunan Secodiningrat kalau
ngak salah.
(Sorry bukunya ketlingsut kemana nggak tahu!)

On 6/26/06, PK Lim <p9...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> Saya ingin membagi cerita:
>
> Tan Jin Sing lahir ditahun 1760. Pada usia muda (?) diangkat menjadi Kapiten China di Kedu. Berjasa membantu Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono III, sehingga diangkat menjadi Bupati Yogyakarta dan dianugerah gelar Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat. Kabarnya di Yogya ada jalan yang dinamakan Secodiningrat. Meninggal pada tahun 1831. Keturunannya membentuk Paguyuban Keturunan Secodiningrat dan beranggota lebih dari 200.
>
> Mungkin ada yang dapat menambahkan serita ini?
>
> Salam,
> P.K. Lim
>
> __________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
> http://mail.yahoo.com
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>
>
>
>

> .: Forum Diskusi Budaya Tionghua dan Sejarah Tiongkok :.
>
> .: Kunjungi website global : http://www.budaya-tionghoa.org :.
>
> .: Untuk bergabung : http://groups.yahoo.com/group/budaya_tionghua :.
>
> .: Jaringan pertemanan Friendster : budaya_...@yahoo.com :.
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[Eddy Tlessh]

kebetulan dulu tinggal di jogja, dan memang ada jalan Secodiningrat

dari browsing santai dapat ini, semoga dapat menambah cerita:

http://www.tasteofjogja.com/IDA/detailbud.asp?idbud=342

Di dalam buku yang diterbitkan oleh trah Tan Jing Sin,
disebutkan bahwa Tan Jing Sin (1803-1831) dilahirkan dari keluarga priyayi
Jawa yang kemudian diangkat anak oleh keluarga Tionghoa. Ibunya bernama
R.A.Patrawijaya, salah satu putri R.M.Kunting, keturunan ketiga Sunan
Mataram Amangkurat Agung (Tegal Arum). Tan Jing Sin menguasai adat istiadat
Cina dan Jawa sehingga tidak heran jika ia dikenal sebagai seorang Kapiten
Cina yang "njawani".

Pada tahun 1803-1813, Tan Jing Sin diangkat menjadi Kapiten
Cina untuk wilayah Yogyakarta. Pada tanggal 18 September 1813 Hamengku
Buwana III mengangkat Tan Jing Sin sebagai bupati, dengan gelar Raden
Tumenggung Secodiningrat. Dngan demikian, Tan Jing Sin mempunyai dua
jabatan, yaitu sebagai Bupati Yogyakarta sekaligus Kapiten Cina. Pada
tanggal 13 Desember 1813, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwana III memberikan piagam
kepemilikan tanah meliputi 14 desa di daerah Bagelen dan Yogyakarta kepada
Tan Jing Sin. Akan tetapi, pada bulan Desember 1824, Hamengku Buwana V
meminta R.T.Secodiningrat mengembalikan tanah tersebut, dan sebagai gantinya
ia dijanjikan untuk diberi uang sejumlah HFL 850 setiap bulannya.

Pada tanggal 10 Mei 1831, R.T.Secodiningrat wafat dan
dimakamkan di makam keluarga di Rogocolo, Mrisi, Bantul, Yogyakarta. Di
makam yang berada di puncak bukit kecil itu dimakamkan R.T.Secodiningrat,
kedua istrinya yang keturunan Tionghoa dan Jawa, serta makam keturunannya.

Pemakaman Cina
Selain makam Rogocolo, di Yogyakarta pada masa-masa lalu terdapat pemakaman
warga Cina yang lain yaitu di daerah Sagan, di daerah Cokrodiningratan, di
sekitar Gunung Boko Prambanan, dan di daerah Gunung Sempu, Kasihan, Bantul.
Akan tetapi, pemakaman Cina, yang disebut juga Bong Cina, yang berada di
daerah Sagan saat ini telah hilang dan lahannya digunakan menjadi Masjid
Kampus Universitas Gadjah Mada. Adapun pemakaman Cina di daerah
Cokrodiningratan hanya tersisa sebagian dengan kondisi tidak terawat. Hingga
saat ini yang masih difungsikan adalah makam di daerah Boko, Prambanan,
Sleman, dan Gunung Sempu, Kasihan, Bantul.

On 6/27/06, FBY <biaw...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Ada juga di buku oei hong Kian dokter gigi Bung Karno.
> drg. oei yang sekarang di Belanda masih keturunan Secodiningrat kalau
> ngak salah.
> (Sorry bukunya ketlingsut kemana nggak tahu!)
>
>

> On 6/26/06, PK Lim <p9...@yahoo.com <p918k%40yahoo.com>> wrote:
> > Dear All,
> >
> > Saya ingin membagi cerita:
> >
> > Tan Jin Sing lahir ditahun 1760. Pada usia muda (?) diangkat menjadi
> Kapiten China di Kedu. Berjasa membantu Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono III,
> sehingga diangkat menjadi Bupati Yogyakarta dan dianugerah gelar Kanjeng
> Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat. Kabarnya di Yogya ada jalan yang dinamakan
> Secodiningrat. Meninggal pada tahun 1831. Keturunannya membentuk Paguyuban
> Keturunan Secodiningrat dan beranggota lebih dari 200.
> >
> > Mungkin ada yang dapat menambahkan serita ini?
> >
> > Salam,
> > P.K. Lim
> >
> > __________________________________________________
> > Do You Yahoo!?
> > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
> > http://mail.yahoo.com
> >
> > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > .: Forum Diskusi Budaya Tionghua dan Sejarah Tiongkok :.
> >
> > .: Kunjungi website global : http://www.budaya-tionghoa.org :.
> >
> > .: Untuk bergabung : http://groups.yahoo.com/group/budaya_tionghua :.
> >

> > .: Jaringan pertemanan Friendster : budaya_...@yahoo.com<budaya_tionghua%40yahoo.com>:.
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>

--
Best Regards,

Eddy

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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[PK Lim]

Wow, thank you atas penjelasannya. Ini sudah seperti makalah. Satu lagi bukti pengabdian kaum Tionghoa pada tanah air.

RM Danardono HADINOTO <rm_dan...@yahoo.de> wrote: Saya pernah muat tulisan mengenai sejarah Tionghoa di Indonesia,

Silakan membaca:

Introduction

The New Order Accommodation

Conclusion

Notes:

Skinner, `The Chinese,' p.103

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 25.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 132.

Ibid., pp. 343-46.

Ibid.,p.207.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 135.

Suryadinata, Pribumi, p. 65.

Interview, 19 December, 1992.

Interview,July 1986.

Bibliography

---------------------------------
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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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[RM Danardono HADINOTO]

jelek jelek, saya yang kala itu anak SD juga pasiennya Oom Oey Hong
Kian. Pasien awalnya sih ibu saya. Tambalan pertama di geraham saya
adalah ciptaannya ha ha ha.

Oom Oey ini memang dokter gigi anggauta kabinet bung Karno ditahun
50an sebelum beliau pindah ke LN.

Rumah kami tak berjauhan dekat Taman Sundakalapa, Menteng..

Salam nostalgia

Danardono

--- In budaya_...@yahoogroups.com, FBY <biawak99@...> wrote:
>
> Ada juga di buku oei hong Kian dokter gigi Bung Karno.
> drg. oei yang sekarang di Belanda masih keturunan Secodiningrat
kalau
> ngak salah.
> (Sorry bukunya ketlingsut kemana nggak tahu!)
>

> On 6/26/06, PK Lim <p918k@...> wrote:
> > Dear All,
> >
> > Saya ingin membagi cerita:
> >
> > Tan Jin Sing lahir ditahun 1760. Pada usia muda (?) diangkat
menjadi Kapiten China di Kedu. Berjasa membantu Sri Sultan Hamengku
Buwono III, sehingga diangkat menjadi Bupati Yogyakarta dan
dianugerah gelar Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat. Kabarnya
di Yogya ada jalan yang dinamakan Secodiningrat. Meninggal pada
tahun 1831. Keturunannya membentuk Paguyuban Keturunan
Secodiningrat dan beranggota lebih dari 200.
> >
> > Mungkin ada yang dapat menambahkan serita ini?
> >
> > Salam,
> > P.K. Lim
> >
> > __________________________________________________
> > Do You Yahoo!?
> > Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
> > http://mail.yahoo.com
> >
> > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > .: Forum Diskusi Budaya Tionghua dan Sejarah Tiongkok :.
> >
> > .: Kunjungi website global : http://www.budaya-tionghoa.org :.
> >
> > .: Untuk bergabung :
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/budaya_tionghua :.
> >

> > .: Jaringan pertemanan Friendster : budaya_tionghua@... :.
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>

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[PK Lim]

di buku dr. Oey Hong Kian hanya disebut nama Indonesia dr. Oey yang menandakan keturunan Secodiningrat. Selain itu tidak ada referensi lain berkaitan dengan Secodiningrat.

RM Danardono HADINOTO <rm_dan...@yahoo.de> wrote: jelek jelek, saya yang kala itu anak SD juga pasiennya Oom Oey Hong

Salam nostalgia

Danardono

---------------------------------
Sneak preview the all-new Yahoo.com. It's not radically different. Just radically better.

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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[PK Lim]

di buku dr. Oey Hong Kian hanya disebut nama Indonesia dr. Oey yang menandakan keturunan Secodiningrat. Selain itu tidak ada referensi lain berkaitan dengan Secodiningrat.

RM Danardono HADINOTO <rm_dan...@yahoo.de> wrote: jelek jelek, saya yang kala itu anak SD juga pasiennya Oom Oey Hong

Salam nostalgia

Danardono

---------------------------------
Sneak preview the all-new Yahoo.com. It's not radically different. Just radically better.

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

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