Between Idealism of the positivsitic Theory of Cognition and Hegels Dialectic of the Selfmovment of Ideas

[Wolfgang Cernoch]

Hi, Colleagues!

I think about Robert B. Brandom as an great philosopher, who works out
his ideas in the style of the great philosophers in history, but in a
modern way. I try to say, he is the first great philosopher of the so
called "Postmoderne" in the USA, who is able to translate some big
points of classical philosophy, which is in our days nearly only to
find in continental philosophy in Europe.

But I think also, that Brandom is jailed between

-- a kind of idealism of positivism,
-- the problems of Wittgenstein, to "lay a sentence" on the part of the
phaenomens (Tractatus, phaenomenical language). on the part of the
public and common "part of objects" our world (physical language), and
at last Wittgenstein try to "lay the language" on our "living
world" (Edmund Husserl: Lebenswelt).
-- the pure self-movement of the idea (conceptual) in the consciousness
of Hegel (Selbstbewegung des Begriffes), which always start to be
dialectic without a affimation of the beiing.

It seems, that Brandom only can speak about communication in regular
terms, but he could not communicate about ohter topics in regular
terms, because he cannot make a clear and distinct difference between

(a) making conclusions in thinking and try to communicate it and
(b) taking influence to others with communication about something

If You read also in German, take a look to <
http://groups.google.at/group/intuition-und-konstruktion >
and search to articles about Brandom!

Greatings

Wolfgang Cernoch, Vienna, Europa

[matthew...@gmail.com]

Thanks for the post Wolfgang. I was wondering If you could explain a
bit more of what you mean when you say Brandom is jailed between
positivism, the problems of Wittgenstein, and the pure self-movement
of the idea in the consciousness of Hegel. Speciffically, in what
sense is he "jailed"?

-Matt Riddett

On Apr 12, 8:14 am, Wolfgang Cernoch <wolfgangcern...@gmail.com>
wrote:

[Wolfgang Cernoch]

Dear Matthew!

Sorry, my English is a bit cruel.

Jailed: Because it seems to me, Brandom dont think on denotations, or on denotation from one »language« in a ohter »language«, if »language« means language with same special relation to a field of practice like technicians, scientists, philosophers, literates. I think, that is also a kind of denotation, and I think also, that this kind of denotation have the function of a representation. Why? Short: Because the difference of more and less abstract concepts between different classes of languages, which are classified coarse (gross) in speaking more or less in abstract concepts.

I have assumed historically, that this goes back to late Wittgenstein, who »lay« not longer sentences (propositions) on a part of the publik physical world, like Leibniz think in his beginning (logic build up with 'terms'), and how Wittgenstein did after the Tractatus logicus. In the Tractatus the early Wittgenstein think a little bit phaenomenological like in the sense of Franz Brentano or Husserl (but for W. its come with Ernst Mach): simple impressions like extended colours (spatium) or sounds or tones, extended in time are the first elements, which is the base, on which »lay« a first concept, which is possible, to express it in language. At least he »lay« the whole language on the whole practice in common. Common practice an common language are refered on each other, but that do not discriminate between »doxa« and »episteme«, or between all day practice and practice in common with theories. This lack is also the lack of Brandom. This refers to Aristoteles, he think, that science do not find new informations, science find only informations in the »doxa«. Such ideas are not modern science since Newton or Descartes.

This old-fashioned lack goes in my opinion in the same direction like Hegels self-moving of the concepts (ideas), which could'nt have any expierience with it. I think, its seems similar to the consequences of Wittgenstein or Brandom, both are cannot explain the progress of science. Hegel think about his philosophy as an end of high reflexions in the german idealism, and believe to be able to find the structur of thinking and the pure rules of their development. This means the »philosophy of system«. The problem is now, that Hegel think, that also science have to go historically in the ways, which he planned abstract as a pure Movment of pure idea of »concept« in general. On the other hand is there the idea of being near on the end of history, the basic of science are founded now. We need no new kinds of information, we need only more of the same kind of information, from which we know its works with this kinds of theory, we know.

We can now change the point of view, and think about ideas and concepts not in the way, how we get it, but how we let the concepts circulate. — This is really necessary, we need this view to get concepts of communication, but we get new problems, to understand the progress of science; problems, which we make alone with this kind of idealism.

Simple saying, it is the same idealism in Wittgensteins (Mach), Hegels and Brandoms thinking than in the believing, that patterns, which we get, if we make Theories with higher abstractions, are always mighter than patterns of theories with lower abstractions. Its not simple to say it simple in german, perhaps I can say it later also in english in a more clear way.

I closed now for today, and I hope, I can make my opinion a little bit understandable.

regards

Wolfgang Cernoch


PS: Please send me »Pred« in html. I work with an old system on Mac, and I can only see the first page. Perhaps works Word or Adobe Reader 7.05

Thank You!



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