on top 5 economics journals

[Qingmin Liu]

The issue of "overweighting" the importance of the top 5 journals within the profession has sparked numerous formal and informal discussions. The punchline is mostly: read papers. However, we must consider whether individuals have sufficient incentives to do so. 

Readers face a moral hazard problem. Individuals outside of the field of an author, such as those in the tenure and promotion committee, face even greater costs of assessing the merits of their papers. Given the general understanding that papers at top 5 journals tend to have higher quality on average, it is not hard to imagine that many individuals (experts or not) opt to free-ride on this knowledge. This becomes more problematic for many young scholars and aspiring students who, during their formative years, have a high opportunity cost of time. Unless they possess strong willpower and exceptional tastes, they will optimally limit their reading to top 5 publications to learn "good economics," rendering them vulnerable. This moral hazard problem amplifies the quality differentials between top 5 publications and the rest. 

Here's an idea. 

Make referee reports and editors' decision letters publicly accessible for accepted papers (while keeping the referees' names anonymous, if desired).

It does not force people to read. The aim is to increase the informativeness and reduce the marginal cost of reading. In cases where judgments are subjective to a considerable extent, observing the process that leads to the publication outcome can be more informative than solely knowing the outcome itself. Transparency would benefit not only readers but also letter writers and administrators. It would greatly aid young scholars as they embark on their careers, ultimately benefiting the future of the profession. It will improve the editorial process. The editors’ flexibility of overturning negative reports will now come at a cost and they will have a stronger incentive to make decisions carefully and consistently. It will also discipline the referees indirectly -- editors will have stronger incentives to pressure the referees to behave if the editors' names are associated with publicly accessible referee reports. There is no magic simple solution for this complicated problem. But I fail to see substantial downside of this idea. 

One might argue that it makes anonymous referees more identifiable. It is unclear to me this is the case. Even if it is, does it make referees less objective and less constructive? Also, the error of identification goes both ways. How many times do some people think you are an critical referee of their papers when you are not?  

A relevant question: who has the property right of an anonymous referee report? referee, author, or the journal?