> _iterated dominance_ is a procedure by which a player may eliminate from consideration any of the _other_ players’ strategies that are
strictly dominated (i.e., would not be advantageous to adopt in any
strategy profile). Truncating the other players’ strategy sets in this
manner changes the structure of the game such that the game truncated
by iterated dominance may have a Nash or dominant strategy equilibrium
even though the complete game did not.
My reasoning runs as follows:
a) in a Nash equilibrium no one can unilaterally switch to a better strategy
b) iterated dominance removes strictly dominated options
c) by definition, strictly dominated options are always dominated by a
better strategy
d) thus they would never be considered or used in a Nash equilibrium
e) thus removing them couldn't possibly affect a Nash equilibrium
Where did I go wrong?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoMfCQlVC0A#t=44m11s
I'm glad you brought this up. I hadn't realized this had gone over my
head, and I wouldn't have taken the time to track it down otherwise.
On Aug 23, 2009, at 7:19 AM, Aaron Swartz wrote: