Why Doesn't Mac Wear a White Hat Like Other Texas Rangers

[Tom Barry]

Dear List Members,

 

I apologize again for the long lapse in posts. I have been traveling extensively along the Chihuahuan and Sonoran borders over the past couple months as part of a couple of investigative and policy projects – meeting many inspiring folks, energized by the still vibrant crossborder consciousness in northern Mexico, and brimming with many stories to tell and share.

 

But this posting reverts back to a continuing focus – the scandalous outsourcing of Texas border security programs to militarist consultants from the Washington Beltway.  Both the Texas Department of Public Safety, which runs Operation Border Star, and Attorney General Greg Abbott have been attempting over the past few years to keep the so-called Texas border security model away from public scrutiny – having, among other things, refused public records requests for documents that DPS instructed its security contractor ALIS to produce.

 

But the Texas model may finally have to face demands for transparency (there has been none at all) and accountability (ditto), in part because of a recent audit of DPS subgrants and contracts underwritten by hundreds of millions of dollars in federal revenues. Another factor working against continued secrecy is that the Texas government shared documents (which it had told me were classified) with the general-consultants who produced that alarmist report about the military implications of illegal border crossings in September.

 

You remember that one – which praised the Texas Rangers and the governor for adopting military strategies (at least rhetorically) to protect Texas against crossborder “intrusions.” So now DPS seems to be revising its previous argument (supported by border hawk AG Greg Abbott) that all Operation Border Star documents are “law enforcement sensitive.”

 

Below find an excerpt from three longer pieces on the outsourcing of border security in Texas.  A couple of other pieces will follow over the next couple of weeks. The complete versions of these and forthcoming pieces will be available at the Border Lines Blog: http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/

 

Tom Barry

Why Mac Sikes Doesn’t Wear a White Hat

Like the Other Texas Rangers

 

Tom Barry

 

Roy “Mac” Sikes wasn’t wearing a white ten-gallon like the other top Texas Rangers attending the 2010 Texas Border Sheriffs Coalition meeting in El Paso.

 

Mac, as the Texas Rangers and Sheriffs call him, was going hatless. But that may have been because it’s not entirely clear exactly which hat Mac should have been wearing – ranger, cop, or consultant? 

 

Since 2006 many of the key figures in state-led border security operations and information campaigns have identified themselves as DPS employees or part of the Texas Rangers to the public, policy community, and the media, disguising their true identities.

 

The business card he handed me during the sheriffs meeting identified Sikes as the director of the Border Security Operations Center (BSOC) – which is a type of fusion center for border-security operations in Texas. It’s a project of the Texas Rangers Division, which in turn is a branch of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS).

 

However, Mac Sikes is neither a Texas Ranger nor a DPS employee. Like most of the other key figures behind the Lone Star State’s border security campaign, Sikes is a contract employee.

 

A “senior operational analyst” at Abrams Learning & Information Systems (ALIS), Sikes became director of BSOC as part of the firm’s $3-5 million annual contracts with DPS since 2006. The recent DPS decision -- in response to a public records request -- to release the ALIS contract revealed the true identity of Sikes.  

 

The Border Security Operations Center is the nexus of the Texas’ own border security initiatives, collectively known as Operation Border Star. ALIS, a homeland-security consulting firm with offices in Arlington, Virginia, was founded in 2004 by Ret. Army Gen. John Abrams to cash in on the billions of dollars in new government contracting funds that started to flow after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003.

 

Since 2006 ALIS functioned as the hidden force behind virtually all non-federal border-security operations in Texas. Whether it’s strategy formulation, border crime-mapping, operations management, or public relations, ALIS and its team of consultants have been closely involved in creating what Governor Rick Perry calls the “Texas model of border security.”

 

ALIS, which has received $22.7 million from DPS and the Governor’s Office for border-security operations in FY 2007-FY 2011, describes its mission in Texas as follows:

 

ALIS was commissioned to improve border security strategy and operations along the U.S. – Mexico border through the development of an epicenter for security operations. The objective of the operational center is to plan, coordinate, implement, and evaluate interagency border security operations to counter the threat of organized crime, terrorism, and the flow of contraband and human trafficking to foster a secure border region. 

 

The “made-in-Texas” boasts about the state’s model of border security and the “can-do” braggadocio about “Texans protecting Texans” don’t stand up to close scrutiny.

 

Border Star operations and programs are funded by a combination of DHS grants, Justice Department criminal-justice assistance and economic-stimulus funding, and Texas general revenues.

 

The first funding for Operation Border Star came from the Obama administration’s border-security programs to aid local and state law enforcement. Although the state legislature, starting in 2007, started appropriating about $100 million annually for BSOC and other Border Star operations, federal funding has been the main stay of the Texas model. It’s also an operation that has been almost wholly outsourced to Washington Beltway consultants.

 

The DPS contract with ALIS, which was signed August 31, 2010, delegated not only the inner-workings of Operation Border Star to the Beltway contractor but also gave the contractor the responsibility for formulating border-security and homeland-security strategy statements, running public-relations operations, and directing law-enforcement operations.

 

Questions about the value of Operation Border Star and about its political character have been repeatedly raised over the past few years by several Texas media outlets and by the Texas American Civil Liberties Union. 

 

Texas border communities that have been adversely affected by the redirection of state and local law-enforcement agencies into border-security campaigns and away from public-safety missions have also criticized the cost and focus of the Perry administration’s border-security programs.

 

DPS Grossly Mismanages Homeland and Border Security Funds

 

The Texas State Auditor recently raised new questions and concerns about the unprofessional DPS management of federal funds and about the agency’s dubious contracting practices under the stewardship of Steven McCraw.

 

The independent report, which was commissioned by the state auditor and released in February 2012, found, among other violations, cases of stunning material weaknesses in DPS accounting, a pattern of noncompliance in following federal procedures, and an array of alarming deficiencies in reporting and monitoring federal funds.

 

The report highlights a pervasive and systemic mismanagement of federal funds by DPS, including ight duplicate payments to contractors, sloppy accounting, failure to open contracts to competitive bidding (while in at least one other case bypassing low bidder for a preferred one), routine reliance on emergency contracts to avoid contract renewal and bidding processes, and a persistent failure to communicate accounting and reporting guidelines to subrecipients of more than federal funds managed by DPS.

In fiscal year 2011 Texas received $57.5 billion in federal funding. That same year DPS relied on federal funding for approximately half its annual budget -- down from the 60% funding in 2010 when federal stimulus funds were still flowing.

The audit, which occurred during 2010, underscored problems with the type of DPS emergency contracting that benefited ALIS. The audit and its alarming findings have contributed to mounting cynicism and criticism about the Texas border security model and its outsourcing.

The audit raises fresh questions about McCraw’s ability to manage the large state agency. The shocking findings of DPS management of DHS and DOJ funding to support Texas homeland and border security programs also underscores rising skepticism about the “go-it-alone” and “can-do” boasting of the Texas border hawks critical of the Obama administration.

Outsourcing Strategy and Propaganda

It would be hard to exaggerate the degree to which Governor Perry and DPS Chief McCraw have outsourced state border-security, homeland-security, and public-safety programs to Washington Beltway contractors.

Echoing the expansive scope of the language used in earlier contracts, DPS once again hired ALIS to:

Develop and refine border-wide security strategies and plans for seamless integration of interagency law enforcement border security operations in the State of Texas.

With a staff of at least 17 analysts -- many with military backgrounds --ALIS was contracted to give provide the vision for and the structural foundation for Operation Border Star.

By late 2010, however, DPS was paying ALIS to, among other things:

• “Define and write a Border Security Strategic Vision.”
  
• “Manage and operate the Border Security Operations Center (BSOC).”
  
• “Develop border-wide strategies and plans to support interagency effectiveness.”
  
• “Refine and update Operation Border Star 2012-2013.”
  
• “Develop plans for border-related Mass Migration contingencies.”
  
• Develop plans for “Texas Ranger operations,” and develop standard operating procedures for “Ranger Renaissance Teams” (including the new gunboat operations).
  
• “Facilitate creation of the Border Operations Planning Group.”
  
• “Develop a Border Security media/public information outreach strategy.”
  
• “Provide sufficient manpower to provide leadership, subject-matter expertise, and quality assurance/control in areas of border security planning and operations.”
  
• “Support and sustain the six Joint Operations Intelligence Centers (JOICs),” which are situated along the Texas border and Gulf Coast.
  
• “Conceptualize a Sensor Master Plan for the border region,” as part of the “web-based” electronic surveillance systems created by the governor’s officer and DPS.
  
• “Develop and refine DPS Agency Strategic Plans,” including the DPS Strategic Plan 2011-2015.
  
• “Facilitate development of a DPS policy document outlining roles, responsibilities, and authorities of Regional Commanders, Ranger Captains, DPS Divisions, and JOICs with regard to countering crime and terrorism in the border region.”
  

The August 31, 2010 emergency contract with ALIS built on earlier contracts, which steadily reinforced the centrality of the homeland security contractor not only to execute assigned tasks but also to formulate strategy and direct operations.

An earlier contract had empowered ALIS to formulate the drafts of the Texas Border Security Campaign Plan, the governor’s 2010-2015 Homeland Security Strategy Plan, and the DPS Agency Strategy Plan 2010. 

One of the most striking and disturbing components of the August 2010 contract was the new public relations and outreach role given ALIS contractors. According to the contract, ALIS would assume a new role that would combine public relations, communications, and policy-advocacy functions.

 

 

Specific tasks outsourced to ALIS included producing “reports, briefings, studies, and recommendations” for “Texas leadership.” ALIS was also tasked to “orient senior government leaders on border security issues,” with possible options including “public affairs strategy and plans, fact sheets, talking points, speeches, presentations, and testimony.”

 

The stipulated goal of the “Border Security media/public information outreach strategy” was, according to the DPS contract, to “build support for border security” among the public, media, and policy community in Texas.  As noted in the contract, ALIS would at times also be expected to leverage its BSOC fusion center staff “to surge for 24/7 information operations.”

 

Rather than gathering intelligence and analyzing information, DPS tasked ALIS to provide DPS and the Texas Rangers with “the necessary information to assist the ongoing operations.” Its BSOC staff were expected to “discipline the information operations process by serving the state information operations ‘net control” station for border security.”

 

The BSOC and the JOICs would be tasked, according to the contract, to “provide needed information products as required by Texas Rangers” and to produce “effective information products.”

 

In review, in the interests of border security and homeland security, ALIS was contracted by DPS – with the approval of the Public Safety Commission and the governor – to manufacture “information products.” What is more, DPS wanted ALIS to ensure that the information was “effective” as well as “necessary” for ongoing operations.

 

There has been absolutely no review by policy makers or by the public of DPS outsourcing of border security strategy and operations. It’s likely that if there were ever such transparency and accountability that at least a few policymakers and concerned citizens would caution that structuring information as an instrument may replicate the information and psychological ops of the military and intelligence agencies but may not be an appropriate way to consider information gathering and dissemination on the home front. The term propaganda might arise in any public review this type of outsourcing.

 

Similarly, the concept that a private contractor should participate in information surges that would parallel operational surges by law enforcement officers and state troops might also have sparked discussion about the proper use of state and federal funds.

 

As is, it seems that the directors Operation Border Star – Governor Perry and DPS Director McCraw – view information and intelligence as fungible commodities that can be created, manipulated, and shaped to serve the greater good of the nation and Texas border security.