it post quantum or other security fixes, and imo it's better as a community we don't sleep on them. Cheers, Antoine OTS hash: dbc7c36dbce85e4885b4d140bb90a1d775176b7ec60753d02a655e42418062bb

post-quantum peer-to-peer) > - CRQC (cryptographically relevant quantum computer) > - HNDL (harvest now, decrypt later): Recording classically encrypted > traffic

, and quantum computers were a distant thought, but he acknowledged that in certain circumstances we might need to rewrite the chain. However, you are right: this is vanishingly unlikely

post-quantum transition solution that avoids burning coins. I have tried to incorporate the feedback I received on my earlier posts. The proposed solution is laid out in five draft

>> quantum)*. SHRINCS' security depends only on properties of > >>> the (truncated) SHA256 hash function which are believed to > >>> be post

coins of quantum procrastinators - those who take no >> action to move their coins to PQC-enabled wallets by Q-Day. >> >> https://conduition.io/bitcoin/dropkick

post-quantum leaves exist, and NOT_EXPOSED has no member today. Draft, reference implementation and 25 vectors: https://github.com/duncan0k/pubkey-exposure-classification

Hi everyone, TL;DR (using Terms and Defs below): In order to support encryption upgrades and the addition of authentication to P2P, I propose we

post-quantum use. Under current rules a CRQC that solves Q can key-path spend any P2TR output regardless of how Q was built; on-chain, a tweaked NUMS key and a bare untweaked key are indistinguishable

before a quantum attacker did, ie a commit/reveal protocol. Details here: https://conduition.io/bitcoin/dropkick/ and here: https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/

mass-quantum-theft event. I think you can do that with a soft-fork, if you go as deep of designing merge-mining mechanisms to minimize miners equivocation, at the time of the "

to build quantum computers, we have no reason to expect anyone will build a QC that can break 192-bit curves but not 256-bit curves. There is actually incentive not to do so, especially

a-quantum-emergency/18901 Quantum attackers would want plausible deniability, but also finality (no backsies). Otherwise the attack is pointless. regards, conduition On Monday

for a quantum safe scheme), and a timestamp to prove that this attestation was produced before some pre-defined deadline chosen to expire before a viable quantum computer exists.

not actually quantum-safe by default, need to solve the Q-day timing problem). 2. Hide the EC pubkeys behind a hash in the SPK (eg P2MR or P2TRH), and attach the EC pubkey in the witness

post-quantum note since I don't think readers could understand this to be quantum secure and it opens a pretty big can of worms to start mentioning things that a BIP is not. I think

post-quantum secure. > > (Is it worth mentioning the co-EUF-CMA definition here? Perhaps in a > footnote? While it's both in the weeds, and also has no direct implication

post-quantum transition cannot > rely primarily on self-reliance. If the migration requires most users to > understand Q-Day timing, keep EC spend paths secret, or react quickly

post-quantum signature schemes. I put together a small, two-program proof-of-concept to show how double-shake256 with SPHINCS+ using small paramaters can produce bitcoin sytled

made by quantum computer and can > prove it, but then it will be clear who leaked it, because the > signature has a unique nonce. This is where ZK can help. But how to do > ZK onchain

post-quantum-utxo-winternitz-signatures/2530 > > A live signet with full P2WOTS support is live for testing and a wallet demo can be interacted with from my website. I will

approach to quantum resistance >> for Bitcoin that I believe is simpler than BIP-360 P2QRH. >> >> **Q-Lock: Quantum-Resistant Spending Protocol** >>

, because quantum-resistant hybrid addresses > would be the specified standard for consumer wallets, and those wallets > would already have at least two script leaves. The

So you'd essentially be computing: e = H(R || hybrid_pk || m) P = e^{-1} * (s*G - R) ie the same as BIP340 Schnorr, but hashing a commitment to the

post-quantum-secure > hash-based signature scheme. However, to achieve the stateless feature > of being able to sign multiple messages, requires a significant size >

bridge for quantum-hardened cold storage/paper wallets while post-quantum consensus migration is still in the future. What does this even mean? There is no way to "quantum

concerned about Quantum. That is a fact regarding the number of quantum-related BIP 2. Now, the ecosystem has no incentive to actively participate in Quantum research. But the obvious

post-quantum, just discussing the technical possibilities. > > > > > > Best, > > > Abubakar Sadiq > > > On Friday, April 10, 2026 at 7:47:09 PM

On Wed, May 20, 2026, 9:02 AM Pieter Wuille wrote: > Hi Jason, > > See my comments below. > > On Tuesday, May 19th, 2026 at 11:27 PM,

. While quantum computers are still in theory, so if I would have to guess, then I would put more money on a scenario, where RIPEMD-160 collision is found faster than anyone will break