post-quantum > theft via a key-path spend of a BIP341 NUMS IPK to trigger the tripwire, > in addition to someone who has direct access to a CRQC. > > I think it could make sense

post-quantum transition cannot > rely primarily on self-reliance. If the migration requires most users to > understand Q-Day timing, keep EC spend paths secret, or react quickly

post-quantum signature schemes. I put together a small, two-program proof-of-concept to show how double-shake256 with SPHINCS+ using small paramaters can produce bitcoin sytled

made by quantum computer and can > prove it, but then it will be clear who leaked it, because the > signature has a unique nonce. This is where ZK can help. But how to do > ZK onchain

post-quantum-utxo-winternitz-signatures/2530 > > A live signet with full P2WOTS support is live for testing and a wallet demo can be interacted with from my website. I will

approach to quantum resistance >> for Bitcoin that I believe is simpler than BIP-360 P2QRH. >> >> **Q-Lock: Quantum-Resistant Spending Protocol** >>

, because quantum-resistant hybrid addresses > would be the specified standard for consumer wallets, and those wallets > would already have at least two script leaves. The

So you'd essentially be computing: e = H(R || hybrid_pk || m) P = e^{-1} * (s*G - R) ie the same as BIP340 Schnorr, but hashing a commitment to the

post-quantum-secure > hash-based signature scheme. However, to achieve the stateless feature > of being able to sign multiple messages, requires a significant size >

bridge for quantum-hardened cold storage/paper wallets while post-quantum consensus migration is still in the future. What does this even mean? There is no way to "quantum

concerned about Quantum. That is a fact regarding the number of quantum-related BIP 2. Now, the ecosystem has no incentive to actively participate in Quantum research. But the obvious

post-quantum, just discussing the technical possibilities. > > > > > > Best, > > > Abubakar Sadiq > > > On Friday, April 10, 2026 at 7:47:09 PM

On Wed, May 20, 2026, 9:02 AM Pieter Wuille wrote: > Hi Jason, > > See my comments below. > > On Tuesday, May 19th, 2026 at 11:27 PM,

. While quantum computers are still in theory, so if I would have to guess, then I would put more money on a scenario, where RIPEMD-160 collision is found faster than anyone will break

post-quantum-secure commutative group action scheme allows non-interactive key exchange. CSIDH is just one such example, and I'm sure there are and will be others. > >

do with quantum-vulnerable > coins?"[a][b] For reasons I have > explained elsewhere, I reject the meta-premise of the question ie that > there is any discussion >

are post quantum secure, as they don't require much more than polynomials and hash functions, and they don't have trust assumptions like SNARKs, which is why they are called

until some quantum-safe address has been created. Second of all, this change will not be possible without a hard fork. Hard forks are generally avoided by the community because they

"Post Quantum Signatures and Scaling Bitcoin" > post [0], which proposed using STARKs to aggregate PQ signatures per > block and raised the concern that proof generation

"all quantum-vulnerable addresses") spendable via a previously non-existant quantum safe path is a hard fork. Sorry if I didn't phrase that clearly enough. It is

adress to quantum resistant scheme so user do not > need to rush to move bitcoin before qday, in a space efficient form. > > > - *Universal P2PKH freeze* — At a defined block

if a quantum computer finds the private key to an exposed EC pubkey, to forge a new EC signature for a different SIGHASH is still quantum hard. > > > > Benefits: > > -

in a quantum-resistant environment. This email demos techniques we can use as drop-in post-quantum replacements for classical HD wallet standards, and shows how to mitigate problems

Post-Quantum-Cryptopgraphy (PQC) method of Bluetooth communication that's in their new Passport Prime device , but they've also implemented URs, Animated QRs, SSKR,

is not quantum-resistant — I fully acknowledge this. Like P2WPKH, >> it relies on secp256k1 and will need to be migrated once post-quantum >> schemes are deployed in Bitcoin

Post-quantum signatures. FALCON-512, FALCON-1024, Dilithium3, and SPHINCS+ are native block types. A SCHEME field on any signature block routes verification to classical Schnorr

19 Ian Quantum : > YKYC but P2PK has been deprecated since a little in 2013 after I joined Bitcoin as one of the silent masses around 2010. What does 13 years of "deprecated"

as a quantum computer (unicorn); it renders the optional PQC script spend path and PQ signatures unnecessary bloat to Bitcoin (and the entire tech and military industry) and makes

for a quantum-secure vault. There may be some missing details, but in general, this shows that covenant-protected vaults, with appropriate depth-locks are quantum-resistant.

post-quantum-surprise/#floating-points-falcons-achilles > > > > > > While I wouldn't rule out Falcon permanently, I personally feel > > > more