[Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards: preventing miner deviation as the block rewards approaches zero

[Junhyuk Jun Lee]

Hi, list.

I'd like to share a paper on Bitcoin security in the fee-only regime, after block rewards reach zero. 

This paper analyzes at what point deviating from honest mining becomes the rational strategy and how to prevent massive deviation for profit-maximizing miners using Base Fee, Fee Floor, and adaptive block size rules .

Results:

1. We define a threshold (G_t) that signals when deviation becomes rational in a fee-only regime.
2. In simulation, deviation becomes rational at fee differentials as low as 0.17% of transaction fees when the block reward reaches zero by continuous halving.
3. We evaluate three mitigations and their effect on the deviation threshold: base fees, fee floors, and adaptive block sizing.

Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503

Related discussion on Delving Bitcoin, including recent fee-equilibrium modeling that approaches the same regime from the revenue side:
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/research-bitcoin-after-block-rewards-preventing-miners-deviation-when-the-bitcoin-rewards-is-zero/2626
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/addressing-the-diminishing-block-subsidy/2640

Feedback on the model and its assumptions is welcome and whether the mitigations are realistic as soft forks.

Best,
Junhyuk Lee

[Melvin Carvalho]

ne 12. 7. 2026 v 0:09 odesílatel Junhyuk Jun Lee <xod...@gmail.com> napsal:

Hi, list.

I'd like to share a paper on Bitcoin security in the fee-only regime, after block rewards reach zero. 

This paper analyzes at what point deviating from honest mining becomes the rational strategy and how to prevent massive deviation for profit-maximizing miners using Base Fee, Fee Floor, and adaptive block size rules .

Results:

1. We define a threshold (G_t) that signals when deviation becomes rational in a fee-only regime.
2. In simulation, deviation becomes rational at fee differentials as low as 0.17% of transaction fees when the block reward reaches zero by continuous halving.
3. We evaluate three mitigations and their effect on the deviation threshold: base fees, fee floors, and adaptive block sizing.

Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503

At what halving epoch does your model predict deviation becomes materially significant in practice?

For example, could this begin around 2040, when the subsidy falls to roughly 0.195 BTC per block, or only much later?

 

Related discussion on Delving Bitcoin, including recent fee-equilibrium modeling that approaches the same regime from the revenue side:
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/research-bitcoin-after-block-rewards-preventing-miners-deviation-when-the-bitcoin-rewards-is-zero/2626
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/addressing-the-diminishing-block-subsidy/2640

Feedback on the model and its assumptions is welcome and whether the mitigations are realistic as soft forks.

Best,
Junhyuk Lee

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