Communist China and First Indochina War

[Carlyle A. Thayer]

On 3rd February Kim Nguyen posted an item which he titled, 'Communist China
and the First Indochina War 1950-1954.' This posting included reference to
an article by a Chinese academic shedding new information on Chinese
assistsance to Vietnam during the first Indochinese war and more
particularly at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. After presenting this and some
other material Kim Nguyen concludes 'Alas! Dependence or independence?' He
clearly believes that Vietnam became dependent.
The article cited by Kim Nguyen in fact originally appeared in the China
Quarterly [published in the UK] and is one of about four such articles to
appear in the past two years (see nos. 121, 129 and 133). Readers may wish
to consult the English language original which Kim Nguyen has not read. He
relied on a Vietnamese language newspaper (Thoi Bao, 30 Dec 1993) and a
manuscript written by Nguyen Van Canh and Tran Minh Xuan published by
Mekong-Ty Nan (1992).
This is not the first time Kim Nguyen has raised this issue. Previously,
when he first posted a similar 'article' on the first Indochinese war, I
suggested he read Greg Lockhart's book A Nation In Arms. Greg argued that
Vietnam 'creatively' used its relationship with China to gain support for
its struggle and to retain its independence. Without even consulting or
reading this book, Kim Nguyen dismissed its argument out of hand.
The questions raised by Kim Nguyen are important ones, both for propaganda
and for scholarship. It is the latter which I wish to address here. Quite
simply the historical record does not substantiate propaganda claims that
Vietnam sold its independence to China at this time.
I offer below selected extracts from Lockhart's study. I have not
reproduced all the footnotes. I urge those seriously interested in this
question to consult the original book. Lockhart mined the French military
archives and used Vietnamese language sources extensively. He recently
translated into English the fictional stories of Nguyen Huy Thiep,
published as The General Retires (Oxford in Asia, 1993).
Greg Lockhart, Nation in Arms: The Origins of the People's Army of Vietnam.
Boston, London and Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989. This book is based on Dr.
Lockhart's PhD thesis written at The University of Sydney. Lockhart is a
graduate of The Royal Military College - Duntroon (Australia's 'West
Point', he served in the Australian Army for ten years and saw combat in
Vietnam. This book has been favourably reviewed by Professor Alexander B.
Woodside of University of British Columbia.
The following is an extract from chapter 7, 'Independence in the Modern
World, 1950-1954':
[page 222] The year 1950 began a new phase in the history of the Peoples'
Army. From December 1949 links with Communist China led to the diplomatic
recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the socialist world in
January. Significant quantities of Chinese military aid that would break
the stalemate in Indochina by the end of the year began arriving in April.
By 1953 this aid contributed a great deal to the formation of six modern
main force infantry divisions and a heavy weapons division by the Viet
Minh. But when Chinese aid began arriving the Viet Minh at first had great
difficulty domesticating it.
Western accounts overlook this difficulty. [Bernard B.] Fall and others
have simply emphasised that with the receipt of Chinese aid Vietnam became
a model satellite of China. However, conditions in Vietnam were so
different from those in China that a slavish application of Chinese models
was quite incompatible with the idea of victory. For example we will see
that Chinese battle field advice during the delta offensive in 1951 could
encourage disaster and had to be rejected at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. But at
a deeper institutional level there was also no possibility of victory if
large regular divisions were simply built up and hurled into battle. Such
an application could only lead to gross institutional distortion as it did
in 1951 because of the society's incapacity to support such development.
Political-military mobilisation at the social base always remained
fundamental to the army's growth and strategic ability, and a low level of
mobilisation could never be compensated for by infusions of Chinese aid.
The Party's problem after 1950 was thus one of how it could best balance
the need for foreign aid with internal political-military development.
Because Chinese aid was so important, Chinese models [pg. 223] could not be
overlooked. Besides, there were cultural similarities which made the
Chinese model positively useful in some cases. But none of this changed the
fundamental need for foreign aid to be integrated with Vietnamese
capacities to use it.
Once initial errors in the application of Chinese aid had therefore been
recognised, major changes in political-military administration occurred...
[pg. 225] By April [1950] the Viet Minh's internal political-military
development was further reinforced when material support began to arrive
from China. Around this time a military mission under General Lo Kuei-po
was sent to work with Giap [note to General Yves Gras, Histoire de la
guerre d'Indochine, Paris, Plon, 1979]. In May official Vietnamese sources
tell of the Central Committee stressing the need for 'urgent repair of
large roads in the Viet Bac Inter-Zone that enter (the region) from the
border'. 'At the present time communications and liaison between our
country and foreign countries, especially China, is most essential' [Ban
Nghien Cuu Lich Su Quan Doi Thuoc Cuc Chinh Tri, Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan
Viet Nam, Hanoi, 1974, p. 393 and Hoang Van Hoan, Giot Nuoc trong Bien Ca:
Hoi Ky Cach Mang, Beijing, 1966, pp. 343-344]....
Up to 40,000 rifles, 125 machine guns, 75 mortars, 3,000 cases of
ammunition, and 870 tons of general stores were supplied to the Viet Minh
by the Chinese during this period....
[pg. 229] Nevertheless, in their attempt to highlight the gravity of the
situation the early French writers overlooked much in connection with
Chinese aid that shaped the history of the People's Army, and later [pg.
230] writers have followed their example. Chinese aid had undoubtedly
created a marked shift in the power balance towards the Viet Minh by late
1950, and the pre-1950 stalemate would soon be broken. However, the
literature obscures the fact that this great change also caused great
difficulties for the Viet Minh. As early as January 1949 when the prospect
of Chinese aid was being discussed in Party circles, Truong Chinh had
already signalled a fundamental problem in his criticism of cadres who 'had
a tendency to rely [o]n China and cannot bear to make efforts themselves'.
There were tensions in the Party over what the implications of Chinese aid
might be, and these clearly reflected the problem in a relatively small
national liberation movement and in domesticating aid from a more powerful
benefactor. Aid was essential to gain independence, but reliance on aid
could jeopardize independence. Without some understanding of this
fundamental tension the basis on which the state built its power and the
army built its main battle force will always remain a mystery.
Problem of Chinese Aid
In institutional terms the problem of Chinese aid was that the rapid
formation of main force units to attract Chinese aid and meet the high
expectations generated by that in Vietnam could easily leave the regional
guerrilla forces relatively undeveloped. The main force would then be cut
off from its social base, and no matter what quantities of Chinese aid were
forthcoming they would soon become ineffective. The strategist, Hong Nam,
drawing on operational experience in Inter-Zone 4 and around the Lo River
made this point in 'Truth' in early 1950, although he did not refer
directly to Chinese aid [indented quotation omitted]...
[pg. 231] No matter how much Chinese aid was forthcoming political-military
mobilisation at the social base was the first and most fundamental
requirement for building the army. Truong Chinh thus drew the inevitable
conclusion from this realisation in an article he wrote for the 'Communist
Review' six months later, 'We have a number of countries helping us. But if
we want victory before all else we must make our own efforts. Our own
efforts are the first condition, foreign help is secondary. We must not
depend on outside help...[sic] The work of building the forces pays
attention to building the main force units at the same time as the
regimental regional units, the militia and so on...[sic] To build the
forces too slowly will not be good for the war effort, but to build the
forces too quickly without a basis of support, equipment and essential
cadres will be decidedly harmful'.
Yet it was one thing to recognise that victory could only come from within,
as Hong Nam and Truong Chinh clearly did, and quite another to implement
the kind of balanced institutional development this recognition suggested.
Balanced institutional development essentially meant a continuation of
guerrilla strategies. But in 1950 there were strong reasons why the arrival
of even relatively small quantities of Chinese aid began to build up
pressure for a general counter offensive which meant regular war....
[pg. 235] ...we still have the central dilemma which the Party had to deal
with once it became a recipient of Chinese aid. Despite the intricate
formula, 'the general counter offensive is a general counter offensive...',
Truong Chinh was still describing a protracted guerrilla war strategy. Put
another way, even though he was plainly trying to minimise it, Truong Chinh
was caught in the contradiction that adherence to Mao's model of a three
stage guerrilla war culminating in the general counter offensive was
necessary to gain Chinese aid, yet the regional nature of the People's Army
worked against the use of Mao's model.
This contradiction could not then be contained as the momentum of events
projected the problem of Chinese aid onto the battle field in an
interrelated sequence of success and failure in late 1950 and early 1951...
[Carl Thayer: now to turn to the subject of Chinese military advice:]
[pg. 238] [King C.] Chen argued in 1969 that 'Giap dismissed Chinese advice
to be cautious' in his attacks on the delta in 1951. But there is mounting
evidence that this was not the case. When Giap began his general counter
offensive with a vengeance in mid-January 1951 he used the kind of massed
human wave tactics the Chinese were concurrently using in Korea. Since it
is well known that Chinese advisers accompanied Chinese aid to the Viet
Minh it is not surprising that their advice reflected the practice of the
Chinese Army in Korea. This line of reasoning is supported by the recent
researches of Georges Boudarel who has demonstrated that Chinese advice to
the Viet Minh from at least December 1952 revolved around the use of human
wave tactics [Boudarel, 'Comment Giap falli perdre la bataille de Dien Bien
Phu,' Le Nouvel Observateur, 8 Avril 1983, pp. 90-98]. Furthermore, one
document unearthed in the French military archives shows that by late 1950
Chinese advice revolved around human wave tactics, and 'battles of
destruction' rather than 'battles of dispersal' ['Buoi Noi Chuyen cua Dong
Chi XX (Chinese adviser) tai Hoi Nghi Can Bo Trung Doan-Tieu Doan trong
Bien Gioi, circa November-December 1950].
[Thayer: Chinese advice proved to be a failure, see discussion pp. 238-241]
[pg. 242] While Chinese aid was indispensable, it had to be used in such a
way that it reinforced the army's development in Vietnamese society, rather
than jeopardize it with insupportable levels of military organisation and
inappropriate tactics. As Truong Chinh had argued, the need was for
balanced institutional development so that the power of the People's Army
would come from the people's willingness and capacity to support it. The
integration, or, to use a word that sits more comfortably in Vietnamese
literature, the unity (thong nhat) of the army with the community's
capacity to support it was the only possible foundation for victory and
independence. The most conspicuous change in the Viet Minh's attitude to
Chinese support from early 1951 therefore reflected the reassertion of one
of Vietnam's oldest political traditions.
From that time on, the resistance leadership placed increasing emphasis on
the Chinese model. This, in history, had always had a dual function when
Vietnamese kings were strong and independent. The model symbolised the
power of the ruling dynasty in Vietnam through the support it
simultaneously attracted from the Chinese court. Under modern conditions,
the ICP [Indochinese Communist Party] consequently began to make a big
demonstration of its adherence to Chinese models in 1951 in order to
consolidate its power in Vietnamese society, and thereby pursue policies
designed to ensure balanced military development. On this basis, Chinese
aid could be used to reinforce the political-military unity of the
resistance, rather than to destroy it. And the first sign of change after
the battle of Vinh Yen was the reemergence of an open communist party to
both legitimize and enforce the unity of the resistance....
[page 243] This does not mean, as Fall suggests, that Ho Chi Minh's
Republic had now become a 'model satellite'. Nor does it mean, as Chen
sought to show, that the resistance slavishly followed Chinese models of
civil and military administration. There were many fields in which the
Party did make use of Chinese models as it promised the Chinese it would in
its international propaganda. But in the very subtle manoeuvres of the
Sino-Vietnamese relationship it is of the greatest importance to understand
that Ho Chi Minh's government was not a passive partner. The positive
aspect of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship for the Lao Dong party after
February 1951 was the way it was able to use its imitations of the Chinese
model to [pg. 244] strengthen its internal position, develop independent
state power, and integrate the army into society [the next several pages
provide examples of this point - Thayer]....
[Thayer: now to turn to the question of Chinese advisers and the battle of
Dien Bien Phu which Lockhart discusses on pages 252-263 under the heading
'Dien Bien Phu: A Stake in the Land']
[pg. 260] The main capacity of these [Viet Minh logistics] units was
provided by the 800 two and a half ton Molotova trucks that often moved in
convoys of thirty to forty vehicles. But the use of hundreds of cars,
thousands of rafts and sampans, thousands of mountain ponies, and tens of
thousands of bicycles packed with rice sacks and ammunition was also
indispensable... we have some idea of one of the most stupendous logistics
efforts in modern history. Moreover, we have some idea of how the roughly
37,000 combatants on the firing lines of Dien Bien Phu and the 10,000
replacements that were fed into the battle before it was over, where the
head of the 'human serpent' that came up from the plains and wrapped its
coils around the 12,00 strong French garrison by 13 March when the main
battle began.
Yet if this great national effort to win the logistics battle was [pg. 261]
fundamental to the final victory, so too was the artillery battle that was
won with an indispensable measure of international support from China...
But while Vietnamese sources neither highlight this crucial international
support from China, nor the Chinese battle field advice that came with it,
aspects of the battle epitomised Vietnam's struggle for national
independence.
Georges Boudarel has demonstrated clearly that [Vo Nguyen] Giap would have
lost the battle if he had not taken the independent decision to countermand
the Chinese battle plan. The Chinese plan for 'a rapid attack to achieve a
rapid solution' was virtually impossible to execute. In order to strike
rapidly at the heart of the French position and destroy it from the inside
out in two or three days of intense combat, the assaulting divisions would
have to attack from the western side of the valley of Dien Bien Phu when
their main supply lines came from the east. Also the artillery could not be
positioned to support such an attack because of the nature of the terrain.
Therefore, after strenuous efforts to position the artillery for an attack
on the Chinese model had failed, Giap had a stormy debate with his Chinese
advisers on January 25 and suspended the battle which the French
legionnaires expected expected to begin that night. From this point the
battle was completely reorientated so that it would develop into a
protracted siege designed to ensure victory....
[Thayer, now for Lockhart's concluding words to his historical study:]
[pg. 264} Because of its origins the People's Army epitomised the nation in
arms. In a situation where the Vietnamese people had no alternative but to
fight for their independence, the army played a central role in
constituting the power of the nation-state. The formation of the first
guerrilla base was a political as well as a military manifestation of the
revolution already underway in the society. Once the DRV [Democratic
Republic of Vietnam] had therefore come into existence with overwhelming
popular support and declared its independence in 1945, the regional and
regular forces were pumped up out of the villages with armed propaganda to
oppose the invasion of the French Expeditionary Corps. As the [pg. 265 is a
map, continued pg. 266] People's Army consolidated the unity of the nation
within an international socialist context over the next seven years, it
then consolidated and reflected the legitimate power of an independent
government. Therefore, while the People's Army divided the French and
defeated them at Dien Bien Phu, subsequent American attempts to divide the
Vietnamese nation overlooked the legitimacy of the power of the DRV at the
same time as they overlooked the subject of this book.
[Thayer, the contents of this 314-page book are:]
Abbreviations
Maps
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction
Ch1 French Conquest, 1859-1939
Ch2 Force of the New Nation: A Conceptual Construct, 1900-1939
Ch 3 Formation of the First Guerrilla Bases, 1940-1945
Ch 4 Armed Propaganda, the Army, and the 'August Revolution', March-August 1945
Ch 5 State Apparatus and the Army
Ch 6 Shaping the People's Army in the People's War, 1947-1949
Ch 7 Independence in the Modern World, 1950-1954
Epilogue
Appendix: The First Vietnamese Maoist Writings
Select Bibliography
Index

ISBN 0 04 301294 9
ISBN 0 04 324012 7 (paperback)

Assoc. Prof. Carlyle A. Thayer
Visiting Fellow on Secondment
Dept. of Political & Social Change
Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA
fax: +616 249 5523

[Stephen O'Harrow]

It is always refreshing to see careful scholarship disect a problem
elegantly, well supported and well argued, as we have come to expect from
Carl Thayer. When Thayer does not know a subject, he knows where to find
someone who does, fully footnoted. It is relatively hard to pull the wool
over his eyes and I have yet to see him lose an academic argument on this net
where he was engaged by an opponent who was less prepared than he (and
so far, his opponents do seem uniformly unprepared, in spite of their
frequently self-proclaimed wealth of personal experience).

Now there is value in a variety of viewpoints. People who have lived
under the current government of Viet Nam and who have left that country
to live here in America do have valuable experience and I do not wish
anything I write here to be interpreted as an attempt to silence them or
belittle their personal sagas. But that experience does not make them
ipso facto scholars of Vietnamese history and politics. The scholars who
generally tend to be most clear and useful in their analyses are those who
are disinterested in the outcome of events (i.e., who do not themselves
wish to participate in or personally benefit from domestic Vietnamese
political activity -- the people I have previously referred to as
having "no personal stake" in these matters). Carl Thayer is not about
to run for political office (anywhere, to my knowledge), particularly not
in Viet Nam; he will continue to ply his trade, analyzing whomever comes
to power in Viet Nam, come what may. If by some miracle of supernatural
intervention the NUF actually does come to power in Viet Nam, I am sure
Thayer will make it his business to write about those folks.

The key word here is "disinterested," not "uninterested" or "indifferent."
All of us with family in Viet Nam are interested and concerned about the
course of political events in Viet Nam. Now it seems quite reasonable to
assume that a publication like "Vietnam Insight," which is published by
the NUF, an organization which is, by its own description, headed by a
former high-ranking officer of the defunct Saigon government and whose
leadership contains many others of the same ilk, an outfit which says
that it intends to overthrow the SRV government, by force if necessary,
thus fitting very nicely the definition of a Vietnamese Contra
organization, is not in the least "disinterested." On the contrary,
"Vietnam Insight" is an organ whose publishers wish to put themselves in
power and one would be foolish to read what it says about events in Viet
Nam uncritically, or to regard it as a highly reliable source of straight
information.

The same criteria hold true for others who are committed partisans of one
party or the other in the Vietnamese political arena and who publish on
this net. The greater the degree of self-proclaimed "insight" into
events through irreproduceable personal revelation, the more ad hominem
the arguments, the stronger the tendency to label oneself as the true
representative of Vietnamese authenticity (and the "other side" as having
sold out to "alien" incfluences), the more the scholar tends to doubt the
argument and disdain the source.

Co' tha^.t Kgia^.t mi\nh. Caveat lector.