Media Role in Vietnam War, Pt. 3 of 6
Carlyle A. Thayer
media and anti-war movement in 'losing' the Vietnam War. Footnotes have
been omitted.
VIETNAM: AN ANALYSIS (Pt. 3 of 6)
Paper Presented by
Carlyle A. Thayer, Associate Professor
Department of Politics, University College
Australian Defence Force Academy
Canberra, A.C.T.
lst International Conference on
Defence and the Media in Time of Limited Conflict
Queensland University of Technology
Parkroyal Hotel
Brisbane, Queensland
3rd-5th April l99l
VIETNAM: AN ASSESSMENT (continued)
Another study by Lau, Brown and Sears found that longstanding commitments
and habits of a lifetime had greater bearing on public opinion of the
Vietnam War than even kinship ties. In examining attitudes of Americans who
had relatives serving in Vietnam, they found that the families of soldiers
paid more attention to the war than those who had few kin ties to it. The
acceptance of official policy on the war, however, was more influenced by
attitudes and preconceptions formed early in life, as expressed in
political affiliations, degree of anti-communism, and a sense of confidence
and support for the system of U.S. government, than by their concern for
kinsmen (loved ones) in Vietnam.
Quite simply, television coverage of the Vietnam War may have reinforced
views already held. Walter Cronkite's famous about face on the war
following Tet l968 is an example. Licthy found in his l968 survey of public
opinion, that 75% of those who favoured the war at the time Cronkite made
his remark considered Cronkite (and other network anchormen) 'hawks'; while
a majority of those who opposed the war considered Cronkite (and other
network anchormen) a 'dove'. And in a similar vein, a l972 study by
Hofstetter and Moore found to their surprise that '[t]he bivariate
relationships between television news exposure and the two military
variables... reveal a positive correlation between TV news exposure and
support for the military: those who watch TV news frequently express a
higher regard for the military (69% vs. 59%) and greater support for
defense spending (69% vs. 58%) than those who watch TV news infrequently.'
The above discussion should serve as a warning that measuring the impact of
television on public opinion is a complex affair. As Hallin notes,
This is not to say that television should be assumed not to be a
significant force in shaping of public opinion. Very few media researchers
today accept the "minimal effects" view that dominated academic media
research in the l950s and early l960s. A growing number of studies confirm
the commonsense idea that television - and other media - can indeed, in
certain circumstances and in certain ways, shape political perceptions very
powerfully. But sweeping statements about the power of television, which
have been a staple of most discussion of television and Vietnam, clearly
need to be taken with a grain of salt. And the reader should remember, as
we look at television's presentation of the war, that is is impossible to
be certain how the news affected the audience.
With this as background, we can now turn to the issue of American
television coverage of the Vietnam War.
Television and the Vietnam War
Television coverage of war, which began with the Korean conflict, grew to
maturity with the Vietnam War. Vietnam thus became the first truly
televised conflict. Since Vietnam became one of America's most divisive and
least successful foreign wars, critics argue, it would seem surprising if
the two were not somehow related. According to Hallin:
Those who have argued that the media played a decisive role in the defeat
of American aims in Vietnam almost invariably focus on television as the
principal cause of what they see as a national failure of will. And the
view that, for better or worse, television turned the American public
against the war is accepted so widely across the American political
spectrum that it probably comes as close as anything to being conventional
wisdom about a war that still splits the American public.
Television news reporting in Vietnam carried on the tradition of 'patriotic
journalism' characteristic of the Second World War and the Korean conflict
and differed in significant ways from newspaper reporting. Hallin (p. l09)
boiled down these differences to two main categories: (l) television, as a
visual medium, can show the raw horror of war in a way print cannot but, as
a corollary, television is ill-equipped to deal effectively with politics
and strategy; and (2) television focuses on the negative - especially on
conflict - more than print.
Hallin presents his analysis of the role of television and the Vietnam War
by noting that the model of 'objective journalism' used as a framework in
which to analyse the reporting of newspaper journalists is not applicable
in the case of TV reporters. Hallin argues that 'the model of objective
journalism.. does not apply: the television journalist presented himself,
in this case, not as a disinterested observer, but as a patriot, a partisan
of what he frequently referred to as "our" peace offensive [or "our war"]'.
In l966, when the Johnson Administration launched a peace offensive, there
was a stark contract between the coverage in the 'prestige press' and on
television. According to Hallin, 'The prestige press, for the most part,
continued to practice the kind of objective journalism that lies just
outside the Sphere of Consensus, though there has perhaps been a little
movement outward within the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy... Most press
reports reported official statements at face value'. These were accompanied
by front page reports of Congressional criticism. A greater diversity of
sources were cited, invariably from within the Administration or from
Congress. But television was very different, as Hallin notes (p. ll8):
On television, on the other hand, the peace offensive appeared as a kind of
morality play: while the coverage of a paper like the Times had a dry and
detached tone, television coverage presented a dramatic contrast between
good, represented by the American peace offensive, and evil, represented by
Hanoi.
Figure one below sets out the realm of 'objective' reporting for the
television reporter it is the middle region labelled 'sphere of
legitimate controversy'. This is the region of electoral contests and
legislative debate on only those issues recognised as such by the major
established actors of the American political process. The limits are
defined by the two-party system and their relationship to the bureaucracy
and Executive. 'Within this region', notes Hallin, 'objectivity and balance
reign as the supreme journalistic virtue'.The 'sphere of legitimate
controversy' is bounded on one side by the 'sphere of consensus' and on the
other by the 'sphere of deviance'. Within the former the television
reporter deals with 'motherhood and apple pie' issues. As such, TV
journalists do not present opposing views nor do they remain disinterested
observers. As Hallin notes (p. ll7), 'on the contrary, the journalists'
role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values'. Within
the latter, the 'sphere of deviance', are to be found political actors and
views which the political mainstream of society rejects as being worthy of
consideration. For example, it was written into the Federal Communication
Commission's 'Fairness Doctrine' 'it is not the Commission's intention to
make time available to Communists or to the Communist viewpoints'. Hallin
notes that there are 'internal gradations' within each sphere and that the
boundaries between them are 'often fuzzy'.
Figure l . Spheres of Consensus, Controversy, and Deviance
[figure cannot be reproduced/formatting difficulties]
Source: Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War", p. ll7.
Space does not permit a more elaborate presentation of Hallin's
quantitative content analysis of television coverage of the war. What
follows below is a bald summary of his major findings.
continued
Revised paper published as:
"Vietnam: A Critical Analysis," Small Wars and Insurgencies, (December
l99l), Vol. 2, No. 3, 89-ll5.
"Vietnam: A Critical Analysis," in Peter R. Young, ed., Defence and the
Media in Time of Limited War (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., l992), 89-ll5.
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Assoc. Prof. Carlyle A Thayer _--_|\ c...@coombs.anu.edu.au
Political & Social Change / \ Telephone : +61 6 249 4453
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