Ontology of Gender - Revisited
Michael Kouyoumadjian
John-
>But the real trick, the one for which everyone is holding their breath
>(or at least I am) is to relate this trinitarian logic of gender through
>the Son and through him first to the Church and then to all men and women
>as we are actually called to live our lives and to actualize the Trinity
>in the world.
>
>Good Luck!<g>
<G> Too massive a job, John... and one I think I am quite unfit for:
we need to find a saint who will elaborate this on his or her knees...
theology at its core is prayer :-)
michael
Michael Kouyoumadjian
Walt-
>> I said before on this thread that in my view this fact is vitally
>> important and part and parcel of the revelation of Jesus Christ.
>
>That he was a man (_anthropos_) is vitally important; cf Hebrews 2:14:
>"Since, therefore, the children share flesh and blood, he himself
>lifekwise shared the same things." Whether it is equally vitally
>important that he be a _male_ is what you must demonstrate.
I thought that was the entire purpose of this thread: the ontology of
gender. If the distinction of genders is grounded in the Trinity and
images something in the Trinitarian processions, then the fact that
the Second Person comes down to earth as a man and not a woman is of
note, yes?
>> There is an internal (trinitarian) logic and necessity to this fact
>>over and beyond and before all arguments from sociology, e.g., the
>>society at Christ's time was patriarchal, etc.
>
>Logic and necessity? You mean God, if He had chosen to do so (even
>though He did not) _could not_ have become incarnate in a female?
_Trinitarian_ logic and necessity... as such its inner consistency and
coherence will elude us for ever. I am not too keen about speculating
what God can or cannot do. I _will_ insist, however, that things He does
are of immense importance. In this case, I am arguing that there is a
logic and a necessity to His becoming a man and not a woman. A glimpse
into this is provided by looking at the exchanges of the life of the
Trinity.
>When God chose to reveal Himself by becoming a man, He revealed Himself
>in one, particular, man. But what logic, what _necessity_, entails that
>had He chosen to do so, He could not also have revealed Himself as
>_another_ paricular man -- one that could have been, for example, a
>female and a seamstress rather than a male and a carpenter?
Those other characteristics are extraneous to the subject at hand. I
have not argued that being Jewish, or Palestinian, or a capenter or a
seamstress is ontological. I have been arguing for the ontology of
gender and how it is trinitarian in origin.
>Michael, again, I don't doubt that God became incarnate in a male -- even
>if, as you say, that that male was "supra-feminine" or "receptive" vis a
>vis God. But if God is unable to _choose_ the _particular man_ in which
>He becomes incarnate, then I really wonder whether or not He has the
>sovreignty requisite to deserve the Name "God."
But I am not the one who is restricting God's freedom. All I am saying
is that given His absolute freedom and power and knowledge, the Second
Person has incarnated as a man, and not a woman. Now I could just leave
things hanging on this brutal and scandalous fact and walk away; trying
to deal with this fact with reasons of sociology is useless. All such
reasons do not explain: they explain away. The attempt to look a little
deeper and see the roots for an ontology of gender makes it more
understandable... without however getting to the bottom of it: if gender
is ontological and therefore Trinitarian, then it will be 'overshadowed'
by this mystery. That is the trinitarian logic and necessity I am talking
about. This logic and necessity are not the property of the positivists;
they are part of the revelation of Jesus Christ.
Incidentally, I should note again the need for a precision in language.
It is inadequate when you phrase it like this: "I don't doubt that God
became incarnate in a male -- even if, as you say, that that male was
"supra-feminine" or "receptive" vis a vis God." It is more than mere
nit-picking, imo. The chief point of insisting on a trinitarian
understanding of gender is that the focus is on the three Persons and
their relational exchanges. Speaking of 'God', the unity of the nature
of the Persons, does not help in clarifying. So, in the 'fragmental'
relationship above between the Father and the Son, the Son is 'supra-
feminine' and receptive with respect to the Father as Absolute Origin.
But vis-a-vis the Spirit, the Son is 'supra-masculine'. In addition,
with respect to creation, all three Persons are 'supra-masculine'.
Creation is receptive and chiefly 'supra-feminine': the first act of
the creature is to _receive_ being.
>And I still don't see what all of this has to do with why women cannot
>become priests.
This should be the easiest leap of all once one grants that gender is
ontological. If the Second Person comes to earth as the Son to show us
the Father, who are we to suggest, much less demand, that a Daughter can
show the Father just as well? If the Son comes as a man (a male) 'in
persona patris' (whoever sees me, sees the Father), how can we say that
a woman, as an ordained priest, can stand in persona Christi?
michael
Walter Tappert
On Wed, 21 May 1997, Michael Kouyoumadjian wrote:
> >> There is an internal (trinitarian) logic and necessity to this fact
> >>over and beyond and before all arguments from sociology, e.g., the
> >>society at Christ's time was patriarchal, etc.
> >
> >Logic and necessity? You mean God, if He had chosen to do so (even
> >though He did not) _could not_ have become incarnate in a female?
>
> _Trinitarian_ logic and necessity... as such its inner consistency and
> coherence will elude us for ever.
Michael, first you say that there is "an (internal) trinitarian logic and
necessity," and now you say "_trinitarian logic and necessity .. will
elude us forever."
Now which is it -- do you understand that "gender is ontological" because
of trinitarian logic and necessity, or don't you?
> I am not too keen about speculating
> what God can or cannot do. I _will_ insist, however, that things He does
> are of immense importance.
No one has denied that. The question is -- of what importance?
Specifically, how does the _fact_ that God became incarnate in a male
_entail_ that women cannot become priests?
> In this case, I am arguing that there is a
> logic and a necessity to His becoming a man and not a woman. A glimpse
> into this is provided by looking at the exchanges of the life of the
> Trinity.
But you said, "_Trinitarian_ logic and necessity ... as such its inner
consistency and coherence will elude us forever." Since the "logic and
necesssity" of the Trinity eludes you (and I certainly don't fault you for
that -- it eludes me too), it can scarcely be used as an argument that
there is a "logic and necessity to His becoming a man and not a woman."
> Those other characteristics are extraneous to the subject at hand. I
> have not argued that being Jewish, or Palestinian, or a capenter or a
> seamstress is ontological. I have been arguing for the ontology of
> gender and how it is trinitarian in origin.
No, you've _asserted_ that gender is ontological, and trinitarian in
origin. An _elusive_ "logic and necessity" can scarcely be the premise
of an argument.
> But I am not the one who is restricting God's freedom. All I am saying
> is that given His absolute freedom and power and knowledge, the Second
> Person has incarnated as a man, and not a woman.
That he did.
> Now I could just leave
> things hanging on this brutal and scandalous fact and walk away; trying
> to deal with this fact with reasons of sociology is useless. All such
> reasons do not explain: they explain away.
But why do you have to explain anything? God chose -- for whatever reason
-- to become incarnate in a particular man (_anthropos_, _homo_) who
happened to be a male (_aner_, _vir_). Why does this need explanation?
> The attempt to look a little
> deeper and see the roots for an ontology of gender makes it more
> understandable... without however getting to the bottom of it: if gender
> is ontological and therefore Trinitarian, then it will be 'overshadowed'
> by this mystery. That is the trinitarian logic and necessity I am talking
> about. This logic and necessity are not the property of the positivists;
> they are part of the revelation of Jesus Christ.
A "trinitarian logic and necessity," however, which eludes you.
> So, in the 'fragmental'
> relationship above between the Father and the Son, the Son is 'supra-
> feminine' and receptive with respect to the Father as Absolute Origin.
> But vis-a-vis the Spirit, the Son is 'supra-masculine'. In addition,
> with respect to creation, all three Persons are 'supra-masculine'.
> Creation is receptive and chiefly 'supra-feminine': the first act of
> the creature is to _receive_ being.
Prescinding from the _filioque_ controversy, and given all these
relationships, your desription of the varying relationship within the
Trinity seem all the more reason why whether a priest is a
male (imaging the "supra-masculine" relationships within the Trinity) or
female (imaging the "supra-feminine" relationship within the Trinity)
is a matter of indifference -- at least with respect to Trinitarian
ontological logic and necessity.
> >And I still don't see what all of this has to do with why women cannot
> >become priests.
>
> This should be the easiest leap of all once one grants that gender is
> ontological. If the Second Person comes to earth as the Son to show us
> the Father, who are we to suggest, much less demand, that a Daughter can
> show the Father just as well?
No, all that we know is that God became incarnate in a male. We do not
know that He could not reveal Himself, or become incarnate, in a female.
What is is not necessarily what must be.
> If the Son comes as a man (a male) 'in
> persona patris' (whoever sees me, sees the Father), how can we say that
> a woman, as an ordained priest, can stand in persona Christi?
Michael, you are begging the question.
A woman, as an ordained priest, can stand _in persona Christi_ because she
is a _homo_ -- a human. It is in a _human being_ that we see the Father.
You have yet to demonstrate that the maleness of Jesus was necessary for
the Incarnation, instead of simply being one more characteristic of the
particular _homo_ through which God revealed Himself.
Peace,
Walt
John Medaille
Amen, But I believe that it is a task for our time. It is all very well to
debate the role of women in the clergy, but the fact is that modernism has
destroyed women in the workaday world. Nothing is more feminized than
poverty, nothing more reduced in regard and prestige than motherhood and
"women's work". The meaning of gender has been reduced by the secular world
(and those fashionable religions which are barely distinguishable from it)
to meaninglessness. Yet the task of the moral order is always and
everywhere the recovery of meaning.=20
John C. M=E9daille
"A dead thing can go with the stream...=20
but only a living thing can go against it."
-G. K. Chesterton
http://www.medaille.com
jo...@medaille.com
Michael Kouyoumadjian
Walt-
>> _Trinitarian_ logic and necessity... as such its inner consistency and
>> coherence will elude us for ever.
>
>Michael, first you say that there is "an (internal) trinitarian logic and
>necessity," and now you say "_trinitarian logic and necessity .. will
>elude us forever."
>
>Now which is it -- do you understand that "gender is ontological" because
>of trinitarian logic and necessity, or don't you?
What is the problem? The logic of the incarnation is trinitarian. It is
also internal: this logic is carried in the person of Christ Himself
(rooted in the Trinity) and not external: it cannot be accounted for by
purely sub-lunar 'reasons'... e.g. 'Christ became a man and not a woman
because his society was patriarchal'. This logic is not positivistic;
it comes to us from above. And as with everything from above, it is
mystery. That's all I meant by saying that its inner coherence will
forever elude us. Not that the thing is totally meaningless or
incomprehensible, but that we will never get to the bottom of it:
it is inexhaustible. More on this below...
>> In this case, I am arguing that there is a
>> logic and a necessity to His becoming a man and not a woman. A glimpse
>> into this is provided by looking at the exchanges of the life of the
>> Trinity.
>
>But you said, "_Trinitarian_ logic and necessity ... as such its inner
>consistency and coherence will elude us forever." Since the "logic and
>necesssity" of the Trinity eludes you (and I certainly don't fault you
>for that -- it eludes me too), it can scarcely be used as an argument
>that there is a "logic and necessity to His becoming a man and not a
>woman."
Oh yes, it can be used as an argument. In fact, Trinitarian logic _has_
been used as an argument... more: that sort of 'logic' and 'argument' is
the best thing the world has ever seen. The chief example is the
Christological debates of the first millenium. How do you think it was
that the concept of the _person_ can to be sharpened and understood?
There goes elusive Trinitarian logic at work for you (elusive because no
one will claim to grasp the totality of Christ's Person). Etienne Gilson
speaks of "Revelation as generator of Reason". Revelation eludes our
reason but not totally... or else we should miss everything of the
Incarnation and make no sense of it.
>> Those other characteristics are extraneous to the subject at hand. I
>> have not argued that being Jewish, or Palestinian, or a capenter or a
>> seamstress is ontological. I have been arguing for the ontology of
>> gender and how it is trinitarian in origin.
>
>No, you've _asserted_ that gender is ontological, and trinitarian in
>origin. An _elusive_ "logic and necessity" can scarcely be the premise
>of an argument.
Nope, on both counts. See above for an answer to the second objection: I
am totally justified in using such an elusive logic... it is the purest
sort of 'logic' available. My 'premise' is nothing other than the
Trinity. As to the first objection: I think I have done more than merely
_assert_. I explained to you how there were two distinct movements in the
Trinity that could be labeled as the 'supra-genders'. If I remember
correctly, you thought at first that this was "an interesting line of
argument". What does this mean? Do you mean it's feasible and defensible?
When did this "line of argument" transmogrify into an _assertion_?
>> Now I could just leave
>> things hanging on this brutal and scandalous fact and walk away; trying
>> to deal with this fact with reasons of sociology is useless. All such
>> reasons do not explain: they explain away.
>
>But why do you have to explain anything? God chose -- for whatever
>reason-- to become incarnate in a particular man (_anthropos_, _homo_)
>who happened to be a male (_aner_, _vir_). Why does this need
>explanation?
Because it is part of Revelation. It is also relevant to other things (in
this case, the issue of the ordination of women). But it seems you cast
the situation in words that are favorable to you from the beginning: God
chose to become a man who _happened_ to be a male. I am saying: God
_chose_ to become a man and not a woman. And that He chose with a reason.
I don't know about you, but I want to understand more deeply.
>> But vis-a-vis the Spirit, the Son is 'supra-masculine'. In addition,
>> with respect to creation, all three Persons are 'supra-masculine'.
>> Creation is receptive and chiefly 'supra-feminine': the first act of
>> the creature is to _receive_ being.
>
>Prescinding from the _filioque_ controversy, and given all these
>relationships, your desription of the varying relationship within the
>Trinity seem all the more reason why whether a priest is a
>male (imaging the "supra-masculine" relationships within the Trinity) or
>female (imaging the "supra-feminine" relationship within the Trinity)
>is a matter of indifference -- at least with respect to Trinitarian
>ontological logic and necessity.
As I understand it, the priest stands in persona Christi and Christ
reveals the Father. He is not merely imaging "the 'supra-masculine'
relationships within the Trinity". If these 'supra-genders' are
meaningful at all, it is not a matter of indifference that the Second
Person comes as Son and not as a Daughter. Neither is it a matter of
indifference when it comes to who can stand in persona Christi.
>> This should be the easiest leap of all once one grants that gender is
>> ontological. If the Second Person comes to earth as the Son to show us
>> the Father, who are we to suggest, much less demand, that a Daughter
>>can show the Father just as well?
>
>No, all that we know is that God became incarnate in a male. We do not
>know that He could not reveal Himself, or become incarnate, in a female.
>What is is not necessarily what must be.
I think I find your pretensions of being ignorant charming. Not least
because the issue is not ignorance but indifference and trivialization.
You seem to trivialize it in the sense that you are acting as if the thing
is of no consequence. You have decided already and a priori: even though
"We do not know", it is irrelevant. If I wanted to be nasty, I could
reformulate the line from that joke: "What do you mean _WE_, little-c
catholic?!". You said above that God chose to become a man and not a
woman "for whatever reason". So then there is a reason? But how can you
pretend as if this (unknown) reason has no impact on anything? I'd
suggest that if "We do not know", then the safest thing to do is to stick
to Tradition... the way we (and I really mean _WE_) have always done it.
One final note: when speaking of the Trinity, what _IS_ is what must be...
by the force of its own internal necessity. We are talking of the ground
of all truth and life and love. What the Trinity _IS_ defines what
everything else ought to be...
>You have yet to demonstrate that the maleness of Jesus was necessary for
>the Incarnation, instead of simply being one more characteristic of the
>particular _homo_ through which God revealed Himself.
I only need to 'demonstrate' that gender is ontological and I am pretty
sure the rest falls into place. So your task before we proceed further:
how "interesting" is it when I say that there are two distinct movements
in the Trinity that can be taken to be its 'supra-genders'? I maintain
this is the ontological basis for the distinction of genders as we see
it most clearly in biology (the sexes). I don't think I want to repeat
the discussion with Liz on this list 5 months ago, but I believe she was
more alert to the fact that allowing gender to be ontological is already
granting too much. That's what you have to decide also.
michael
Alexander R Pruss
Walter Tappert (wtap...@CENSUS.GOV) wrote:
: But why do you have to explain anything? God chose -- for whatever reason
: -- to become incarnate in a particular man (_anthropos_, _homo_) who
: happened to be a male (_aner_, _vir_). Why does this need explanation?
Does God do anything without good reason? If not, then God must have a reason
here. It need not be a reason that we can grasp. If God does nothing
without good reason, then there must be an explanation of why God chose to
take on the particular flesh in all its individuality, including sex,
that He did.
I do not see anything anything metaphysically or logically barring the Logos
from becoming a woman. But the question is: Would it be as fitting?
My question actually is poorly defined. I think that given everything else
that had gone on in the salvation plan before Jesus' miraculous conception,
yes it was only fitting that the Logos become a male man. For instance, the
business of _all_ sacrifices in the OT being wrought by males comes to mind
(though there is some suggestion, I think in Baruch, that pagan women were
involved in sacrifice, but the sacred author takes this as further evidence
of the evils of paganism). Also, the fact that Isaac and Moses (both of
whom foreshadowed Christ) were male. And also the fact that the Passover
lamb, whatever its species (goat or sheep), had to be male. All this would
have to change. And of course the prophecy to David that a _son_ would be
the Messiah.
So, my question should be refined, because _given_ the OT preparation, it
was necessary that the Logos become a male man. The point I am making right
now is that we cannot consider one part of God's plan in isolation---the whole
plan is wondrously interconnected---tout est lie' (everything is linked, to
use Leibniz's phrase). If we change one thing in the plan, e.g., the sex of
the man that the Logos becomes, then we may have to change much else.
The question should instead be: Could God have instead arranged the
preparation in a fitting way which would ensure that the Logos becoming
a woman would be fitting? Under such a preparation, the Logos becoming a
male man would be unfitting. Remembering that _tout est lie'_, let us
first note that the Logos becoming a woman would require many changes to
the divine plan. We'd have to have Sarah sacrificing her daughter.
Melchizedek would be female. So would Moses and Aaron and the levitical
priesthood. So would Abel. So would David. So would the passover lamb.
We may ask: Would all this be fitting? Would it be fitting to have Sarah
sacrifice her daughter instead of Abraham sacrificing his son? Or would it
be contrary to the nature of motherhood in some way so deep that it would make
the act very different from the terrible act of Abraham? I will leave this
as a question, not at all rhetorical, for I do not have an answer. In such
a case, Catholic priests would presumably all be female.
Thus far we have
listed some consequences for the sex of various persons. But is this really
the only kind of consequence there is? If truly _tout est lie'_ (and we would
expect this in a world wrought by a God Whose wisdom surpasses all things),
then one would think it plausible that there would have to be other changes
in the divine plan then, changes other than just reversals of sex of various
characters. It seems plausible that if the Logos were to become a woman,
then other things in the divine plan would have to be modified. How deep
would the changes reach? Would they make the plan worse or better? Surely
not better, since surely we can't improve on God's handiwork. This doesn't
imply that they'd make the plan worse. But quite possibly it would make the
plan different. Would the Cross remain? Or might it not be the case that
a different kind of death would then have taken place? E.g., by stoning?
But perhaps we cannot even see how deep the consequences for the divine plan
would be! Perhaps instead of a sacrificial death of the Logos there would
then be a different kind of sacrifice? I do not know. But I think it would
be naive to suppose that if the Logos were to become a woman instead of a
male man, then except for changes of sex, the divine plan would stay the same.
I do not know if it would or would not. But if we take seriously the
interconnectedness of all things, then we might suppose that every detail
in the divine plan matters, and that a change of one thing might lead to
deep changes elsewhere. Maybe not. Maybe there is a robustness in the plan.
Yet, maybe _tout est lie'_.
- - -
As to the sex of a person being ontological, it is worth noting that sex is
one of very few natural characteristics of a person which has the
property that certain sacramental acts become invalid if a person is of a
different sex than he is. Changes of a person's race do not invalidate any
of the sacraments. Changes of a person's eye-colour or intelligence don't
either (unless the change of intelligence is such that the person loses the
freedom necessary to the act). But substituting a person of a different
sex can render a sacramental act invalid. I am not speaking only of
Holy Orders. Evidently, the same thing happens with marriage. If A is male
and B is female, then there is a sacramental act X involving A and B
(the sacrament of matrimony) which has the ontological result of a
marriage bond being created. But now substitute for the male A a female C.
Then the very same ceremony has no ontological result (beyond sin). Thus,
the sacrament of matrimony is one which depends on the sexes of the candidates.
It does not depend on their race or their intelligence or their eye-colour.
But it does depend on their sexes. Of the four combinations of sexes
(male&male, male&female, female&male, female&female), only two can marry.
So there is a sacramentally relevant ontological component to matrimony.
So it does seem that sex is more important in sacramental contexts than
race, eye-colour, etc., since the latter do not enter into the validity
conditions for any of the sacraments, while the former enters into the validity
conditions for matrimony (with this Walter will agree) and Orders (with this
Walter has disagreed, though I hope he will come to agree).
Alex
Walter Tappert
On Thu, 22 May 1997, Michael Kouyoumadjian wrote:
> I think I find your pretensions of being ignorant charming. Not least
> because the issue is not ignorance but indifference and trivialization.
> You seem to trivialize it in the sense that you are acting as if the thing
> is of no consequence.
Sorry, Michael, at no time have I ever said that differences in gender are
indifferent, trivial, or of no consequence. I _have_ said that I see no
reason why the Church should refuse to ordain women to the priesthood
simply because they are women.
> You have decided already and a priori: even though
> "We do not know", it is irrelevant.
I am taught by revelation (_a priori_, to use your language):
That God made humankind in His own image, and that both males and females
share the image of God.
And I have concluded, based on my understanding of Genesis 1:28 and 2:24,
that the reason for the differences between males and females is the
different roles they play in generation. (Please see Aquinas' _Summa
Theologica_ for a similar conclusion).
I am _still_ waiting to see what the differences between males and females
have to do with ordaining women; rather than being an _a priori_ decision
on the fitness of women for the priesthood, it was a decision which was
arrived at only after careful and prayerful study by me, and by the
ecclesial communities of which I have been a part.
Your suggestion that my decision on the ordination of women was made _a
priori_ is not only inaccurate; it is insulting.
And I take it that since _your_ decision on the ordination of women was
_not_ made _a priori_, you have consider the issue of women's ordination
to be a proper topic of discussion in your ecclesial community.
> If I wanted to be nasty, I could
> reformulate the line from that joke: "What do you mean _WE_, little-c
> catholic?!". You said above that God chose to become a man and not a
> woman "for whatever reason". So then there is a reason? But how can you
> pretend as if this (unknown) reason has no impact on anything?
God became a _human_. Now, if you are going to argue that half of
humankind _cannot_ become priests because of something in their nature
which disqualifies the, the burden of proof is on you.
Please note that I am not arguing here that the Roman Catholic Church
_must_ ordain women, or that it is unjust of them not to do so.
I am saying that if your argument is that the Church _cannot_ do so, then
you are going to have to do something more than offer your _personal_
(and, to the best of anyone's knowledge, uncodified by Scripture or any
ecumenical council) speculations concerning the internal metaphysics of
the Holy Trinity -- which you yourself admit cannot be fully understood.
> I'd
> suggest that if "We do not know", then the safest thing to do is to stick
> to Tradition... the way we (and I really mean _WE_) have always done it.
Fine -- bed like the one talent guy who wraps up his treasure for fear of
losing it. But that makes the refusal of the Roman Catholic Church to
ordain women prudential and disciplinary, not a necessity.
And will leave you with a great deal of egg on your face (well, not you,
but your great-great grandchildren) when some future Ecumenical Council
declares that the Church has just been granted authority to ordain women.
> One final note: when speaking of the Trinity, what _IS_ is what must be...
> by the force of its own internal necessity. We are talking of the ground
> of all truth and life and love. What the Trinity _IS_ defines what
> everything else ought to be...
So? And the Word became the flesh of a _homo_, and there is no reason to
believe the the Word become flesh cannot be imaged by _any_ _homo_.
> >You have yet to demonstrate that the maleness of Jesus was necessary for
> >the Incarnation, instead of simply being one more characteristic of the
> >particular _homo_ through which God revealed Himself.
>
> I only need to 'demonstrate' that gender is ontological and I am pretty
> sure the rest falls into place.
And you have not demonstrated that gender is anything more than the
different roles God has assigned humankind in generation.
> So your task before we proceed further:
> how "interesting" is it when I say that there are two distinct movements
> in the Trinity that can be taken to be its 'supra-genders'?
Interesting enough that it shoots down your theory that, to be a proper
icon of the Second Person of the Trinity, that a priest must be a male.
If there are both 'supra masculine' and 'supra feminine' movements in the
Trinity, the Trinity is most perfectly imaged in a priesthood which
contains -- in its whole -- both male _and_ female priests.
> I maintain
> this is the ontological basis for the distinction of genders as we see
> it most clearly in biology (the sexes).
Which is why my three granddaughters can never become fathers, and my two
grandsons can never become mothers.
But all five bear the image of God.
And all five can -- if they discern a vocation to the priesthood, and that
discernment is validated by the Church -- can become priests.
Peace,
Walt
Walter Tappert
On Thu, 22 May 1997, Alexander R Pruss wrote:
> Walter Tappert (wtap...@CENSUS.GOV) wrote:
> : But why do you have to explain anything? God chose -- for whatever reason
> : -- to become incarnate in a particular man (_anthropos_, _homo_) who
> : happened to be a male (_aner_, _vir_). Why does this need explanation?
>
> Does God do anything without good reason? If not, then God must have a reason
> here. It need not be a reason that we can grasp. If God does nothing
> without good reason, then there must be an explanation of why God chose to
> take on the particular flesh in all its individuality, including sex,
> that He did.
OK, but if we do not know the reason, of what practical use is it? How
can we apply it?
> So, my question should be refined, because _given_ the OT preparation, it
> was necessary that the Logos become a male man.
To be sure, the OT Testament imagery (Messiah, King, sacrifice) was being
continued. But, as you noted above, why that might suggest practicality,
it does not entail logical or metaphysical necessity. A community which
knew not of Golda Meir would scarcely understand the sovreign God as a
woman.
> Remembering that _tout est lie'_, let us
> first note that the Logos becoming a woman would require many changes to
> the divine plan. We'd have to have Sarah sacrificing her daughter.
> Melchizedek would be female. So would Moses and Aaron and the levitical
> priesthood. So would Abel. So would David. So would the passover lamb.
> We may ask: Would all this be fitting? Would it be fitting to have Sarah
> sacrifice her daughter instead of Abraham sacrificing his son? Or would it
> be contrary to the nature of motherhood in some way so deep that it would make
> the act very different from the terrible act of Abraham? I will leave this
> as a question, not at all rhetorical, for I do not have an answer.
God _could_ have done it that way -- and She would have been the same God!
> In such
> a case, Catholic priests would presumably all be female.
Not at all. Both males and females would still bear the image of God.
In such an Amazonian society, I, as a woman, would be arguing that men
should be able to be ordained <g>.
My wife, God bless her, has at times suggested that the reason why men are
given privilege is that they're really big babies who can't handle
disappointment; rather than listen to men whine like spoiled children, God
has given them what they want to shut them up. <g>
> As to the sex of a person being ontological, it is worth noting that sex is
> one of very few natural characteristics of a person which has the
> property that certain sacramental acts become invalid if a person is of a
> different sex than he is.
Let's be careful here that we're not begging the question.
In my Church, the only sacrament or sacramental rite which at all depends
on the gender of the recipient is Holy Matrimony -- and Holy Matrimony
requires one man and one woman.
> I am not speaking only of
> Holy Orders. Evidently, the same thing happens with marriage. If A is male
> and B is female, then there is a sacramental act X involving A and B
> (the sacrament of matrimony) which has the ontological result of a
> marriage bond being created. But now substitute for the male A a female C.
> Then the very same ceremony has no ontological result (beyond sin). Thus,
> the sacrament of matrimony is one which depends on the sexes of the candidate
> s. It does not depend on their race or their intelligence or their
> eye-colour. But it does depend on their sexes. Of the four combinations of
sexes
> (male&male, male&female, female&male, female&female), only two can marry.
> So there is a sacramentally relevant ontological component to matrimony.
Alex, I have never questioned the fact that the difference between males
and females is their different roles in generation. The reason matrimony
requires one male, and one female, is that one of the purposes of
matrimony is the procreation of children. Whether you call it ontological
or not, the difference between male and female is relevant to marriage in
a way it is not to the other sacraments or sacramental rites.
> So it does seem that sex is more important in sacramental contexts than
> race, eye-colour, etc., since the latter do not enter into the validity
> conditions for any of the sacraments, while the former enters into the
> validity conditions for matrimony (with this Walter will agree) and
> Orders (with this Walter has disagreed, though I hope he will come to
> agree).
Sorry, Alex, I am not yet persuaded <g>
Peace,
Walt
Alexander R Pruss
Walter Tappert (wtap...@CENSUS.GOV) wrote:
: Alex, I have never questioned the fact that the difference between males
: and females is their different roles in generation. The reason matrimony
: requires one male, and one female, is that one of the purposes of
: matrimony is the procreation of children.
Were it as simple as that, then incurably infertile persons wouldn't be
allowed to marry.
--
Alexander R. Pruss || e-mail: pru...@pitt.edu
Department of Philosophy || home page: http://www.pitt.edu/~pruss
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
U.S.A.
John Medaille
At 07:20 PM 5/25/97 -0500, Michael Kouyoumadjian wrote:
Michael,
It is disappointing, to a certain extent, to watch the progress of this
conversation, since the sides are not at all evenly matched, dispite claims
of "prayerful" examination of the issue. The issue of gender and Trinity is
indeed a powerful and leaves (or should leave) everyone with some exclusive
choices. Either gender is or is not rooted in being, that is, in the
Trinity. And if it is, you are certainly correct to apply the tools of
intelligence that God has given us to see how our being (including our
gender and sexuality) image God.=20
But if gender is not rooted in being, one ends up with a reductionism
and
a particularly grim one, a reductionism that reduces a powerful aspect of
personality, of personhood, to an accidental, indeed to genitalia. Morover,
it is necessary to assert that this hugely important aspect of being a
person has no roots in the model of personhood -- a strange philosophy
indeed! And if there are no such roots, one must come to grips with the
fact that every civilization and culture without exception have assigned
complimentary roles to men and women; in other words, they found gender to
me essential. Now this cannot be merely a case of a lot of people getting
it wrong, a common enough phenomenon; this is a case of *everybody* getting
it wrong and doing so in exactly the same way. That requires some cogent
explanation, and a mere claim of prayful examination, without sharing the
results of same, is insufficient. Liz as I remember attirbuted this
remarkable unanimity to the devil. I find that explanation unconvincing,
but it is at least corageous compared to merely ignoring all of history.
Finally, one could say that we simply can't know. Well and good, but if
so
then we also cannot say they the church. No matter how "prayerful" one's
inquiry is, if it results in ignorance, it leaves one in silence.
Thus one must either affirm, deny, or feign ignorance. The second choice
leaves one with a heap of explaining to do (which has not been attempted)
and the third should leave one silent (which certainly has not happened
here.).
>decision after 'careful and prayerful study'. Permit me to doubtI also
said explicitly
>that the discussion must be carried out at the level of the _person_.
>You repeatedly veer into the unity of the nature: "God became a _human_".
>That forces me to conclude one of two things: either you don't see the
>relevance of my insistence on the _person_, or you are deliberately
>muddying the waters.
I think the problem here is that when discussing the nature of men and
women Walt wants to here something analogous to a mechanical biological
problem, ie men don't have the reporductive organs to bear children, women
don't have the "x" to become priests. The level of compliementarity and
images is not the same thing, n'cest pas?
The whole idea of images seems to get reduced to an inferior set of
examples, rather than an intuitive way of knowing. This view represents the
triumph of science (so-called) over art. Yet, I have always held that
instead of *mere* images, we should refer to *mirror* images: images that
reflect to us that which we cannot see directly.
Walter Tappert
On Sun, 25 May 1997, John Medaille wrote:
> Either gender is or is not rooted in being, that is, in the Trinity. And
if it is, you are certainly correct to apply the tools of
> intelligence that God has given us to see how our being (including our
> gender and sexuality) image God.
John, slow down, take a deep breath.
Our being (including our gender and sexuality) _does_ image God.
Who said it didn't? Read, once again, Genesis 1:27.
> But if gender is not rooted in being, one ends up with a reductionism and
> a particularly grim one, a reductionism that reduces a powerful aspect of
> personality, of personhood, to an accidental, indeed to genitalia.
You do have this fixation with genitalia, don't you John? Strange -- the
Angelic Doctor was able to discuss the question in the _Summa Theologica_
without mentioning genitalia.
> Morover,
> it is necessary to assert that this hugely important aspect of being a
> person has no roots in the model of personhood -- a strange philosophy
> indeed!
"Male and female created He them" -- but both male and females are
persons! What _are_ you talking about, John?
> And if there are no such roots, one must come to grips with the
> fact that every civilization and culture without exception have assigned
> complimentary roles to men and women; in other words, they found gender to
> me essential.
And who has ever disagreed with this? Only males can be fathers; only
females can be mothers; perfect complementarity (but it does require the
Holy One, blessed be He, before a male and a female can become parents.)
> Now this cannot be merely a case of a lot of people getting
> it wrong, a common enough phenomenon; this is a case of *everybody* getting
> it wrong and doing so in exactly the same way.
No, John, *everybody* agrees that only males can be fathers, and only
males can be mothers.
Now, who can be princes, and priests, and thralls, is something different
societies do disagree on -- and prince, and priest, and thrall are roles
that both males and females can fill.
> That requires some cogent
> explanation, and a mere claim of prayful examination, without sharing the
> results of same, is insufficient.
Still waiting, John, for _any_ role -- other than father or mother --
which is universally restricted to one gender, universally denied to one.
> Liz as I remember attirbuted this
> remarkable unanimity to the devil. I find that explanation unconvincing,
> but it is at least corageous compared to merely ignoring all of history.
I can understand calling sexism demonic.
But do share with us, John; one single role, other than father or mother,
which is _universally_ bound to gender. Shouldn't be hard to point out
one.
> Finally, one could say that we simply can't know. Well and good, but if
> so then we also cannot say they the church. No matter how "prayerful"
> one's inquiry is, if it results in ignorance, it leaves one in silence.
The gender bound role, John -- other than father and mother.
> Thus one must either affirm, deny, or feign ignorance. The second choice
> leaves one with a heap of explaining to do (which has not been attempted)
> and the third should leave one silent (which certainly has not happened
> here.).
John, I _deny_ that there has ever been a role -- other than father or
mother -- which has ever been universally restricted to one sex, or
universally denied to one sex, in every society, at every time, and in
every place.
It is not a question of feigning ignorance, John. Please draw from your
treasurehouse of knowledge, and show us one role, one single role -- other
than being father and mother -- which every society, at every time, in
every place, has ever restricted to one gender, or denied to the other.
And remember -- the roles of males and females in generation _are_
universal, distinct, and complementary -- thus meeting the requirements of
your Trinitarian ontology.
Peace,
Walt
Walter Tappert
On Sun, 25 May 1997, Michael Kouyoumadjian wrote:
> >And I have concluded, based on my understanding of Genesis 1:28 and 2:24,
> >that the reason for the differences between males and females is the
> >different roles they play in generation. (Please see Aquinas' _Summa
> >Theologica_ for a similar conclusion).
>
> I don't think Thomas is quite adequate in this instance.
Hey, he's only a Doctor of the Church; he's not infallible <g>.
> >Your suggestion that my decision on the ordination of women was made _a
> >priori_ is not only inaccurate; it is insulting.
>
> So now I am an insulting ogre... After all, since you made the decision
> after careful and prayerful study then... then what? But I don't think
> I want to go into how you personally came to this decision; I can't look
> into your heart and mind. I have to say though that there is something
> deeply disturbing about your ecclesial communities arriving at this
> decision after 'careful and prayerful study'. Permit me to doubt there
> was much 'careful and prayerful study' when these decisions are so much
> in line with the thinking of the secular world. That sort of thinking
> is not careful and still less is it 'prayerful'.
Doubt all you want, Michael; factually, you are simply wrong. The
decision to ordain women was not made rashly or easily in either the
Lutheran or the Anglican Churches. It came only after very long, very
careful, and very prayerful consideration. There continues to be, as you
may know, discussion on the question within both the Lutheran and Anglican
communions.
I might point out that this careful and prayerful consideration is going
on within the Roman Catholic Church also, although that Church has not yet
(and perhaps never will) made the decsision to ordain women.
> At any rate, I am
> wondering how much of a right you have to feel insulted. You recall when
> you said that the Catholic and Orthodox Church "neither know nor need to
> know" why they refuse to ordain women to the priesthood. Exactly how
> charitable was it of you to reduce them to a cretinous bunch?
A little intellectual integrity, if you will, Michael.
What I said is that there are three groups within the Roman Catholic
Church, vis a vis the ordination of women:
The first group is those who, while they acknowledge that the Church
currently has no authority to ordain women, believe that in theory, at
least, such authority may be granted in the future. I have no reason to
believe that this group is large; it has, however, been represented on
this list by those who consider themselves to be devout Roman Catholics.
The second group (and you may belong here) believe that it is impossible
for a woman to be a priest; consequently, there never have been, are
not, and never will be women priests.
And the third group -- which for all I know may be the largest within the
Roman Catholic Church -- regards the refusal to ordain women as the
expression of authentic Tradition, and does not ask the reason why.
This last group is neither bad, stupid, nor lazy. On the issue of the
oridination of women, at least, they simply accept the decision of the
Roman Catholic Church, without asking for a reason. This does not
preclude them from being persuaded by a reason for this tradition, if
such explanation should be given now, or in the future. But those have
more important things to do with their lives than prove the _necessity_
of a longstanding custom are scarcely cretins.
> >And I take it that since _your_ decision on the ordination of women was
> >_not_ made _a priori_, you have consider the issue of women's ordination
> >to be a proper topic of discussion in your ecclesial community.
>
> Not sure what you mean here. The issue is a proper topic of discussion
> so long as a Catholic does not gainsay what one must _definitively_ hold,
> as Ordinatio Sacerdotalis says. The object of the discussion is to deepen
> the understanding of what must be held _definitively_.
And what, according to _Ordinatio sacerdotalis_, must be definitively held
is that the Church has no _authority_ to ordain women. There is no ban
on discussing whether or not the Roman Catholic Church might acquire, at
some future date, the authority to do so, and, if it does, whether it
ought, in prudence, to exercise that authority.
> >God became a _human_. Now, if you are going to argue that half of
> >humankind _cannot_ become priests because of something in their nature
> >which disqualifies the, the burden of proof is on you.
>
> I never said women cannot become priests because of something in their
> nature. That seems to be another beloved canard.
You must be making some distinction between "nature" and "ontology" that
I am unfamiliar with.
> I explicitly said
> that both the male and the female image the entire Trinity but that
> they image the totality of the Trinity _differently_. This difference
> makes possible a complementarity (unity and distinction) that is
> Trinitarian and not asexual or hermaphroditic.
Which is, of course, fully realized in the complementarity
(unity and distinction) in generation.
> I also said explicitly
> that the discussion must be carried out at the level of the _person_.
> You repeatedly veer into the unity of the nature: "God became a _human_".
> That forces me to conclude one of two things: either you don't see the
> relevance of my insistence on the _person_, or you are deliberately
> muddying the waters.
And a woman is a _person_, who fully bears the Divine Image.
> >I am saying that if your argument is that the Church _cannot_ do so, then
> >you are going to have to do something more than offer your _personal_
> >(and, to the best of anyone's knowledge, uncodified by Scripture or any
> >ecumenical council) speculations concerning the internal metaphysics of
> >the Holy Trinity -- which you yourself admit cannot be fully understood.
>
> Several things here: 1) these are not my _personal_ speculations... I
> wanted to avoid mentioning names, but I got these ideas from others.
I have no doubt about that, Michael; but private theological or
metaphysical speculations are not binding on the faithful, even in the
Roman Catholic Church.
> 2) 'uncodified by Scripture' is a useless stick to threaten a Catholic
> with... the real difference is over the interpretation of certain texts.
> "Male and female He created them in His image" does suggest a distinction
> of 'supra-genders' in the Trinity.
I'm not threatening; I'm observing.
And looking over the indices that I have for the Fathers, I am not aware
of any Patristic exegesis which would suggest that Genesis 1:27 suggests
"a distinction of 'supra-genders' in the Trinity;" references would be
appreciated. (Please note that when I referred to Aquinas' exegesis of
this passage, your response was that "Aquinas was not quite adequate" --
presumably because he didn't support your pet theory). Very well, Michael
-- some references to those -- particularly from the classic era -- who
are "adequate."
> 3) An ecumenical council is the wrong
> place to look for metaphysical explanations. As I understand it, a
> council defines the minimum it sees fit to define (to 'codify') and the
> rest is left up to the theologians to be elaborated. Councils only
> profess the faith; they do not explain it.
And the Conciliar definition is that the Second Person of the Trinity is
_homoousios to patri_ with respect to His Divinity, and _homoousios to
anthropo_ with respect to His humanity; nothing about "supra-genders,"
much less anything about "supra-genders" in the Trinity which would
prevent a woman from becoming a priest.
> 4) You again raise the issue
> of 'speculating' when one doesn't fully understand the underlying reasons.
> I wrote at some length in the previous post about this Trinitarian 'logic'
> and how it has been used before. Do you agree or don't you with that
> assessment? You don't say a word on that.
What I meant by "speculation" is that the Church -- even the Roman
Catholic Church -- has never formally accepted your notion that
Trinitarian "supra-genders" prevent the ordination of women.
And no -- there is nothing in the "logic" (or "necessity") of the Trinity
which would prevent female priests (or even prevent the Incarnation in a
female -- although this was not, in fact, done).
> >> I'd suggest that if "We do not know", then the safest thing to do is to
> >>stick to Tradition... the way we (and I really mean _WE_) have always
> >>done it.
> >
> >Fine -- bed like the one talent guy who wraps up his treasure for fear of
> >losing it. But that makes the refusal of the Roman Catholic Church to
> >ordain women prudential and disciplinary, not a necessity.
>
> Huh? I wasn't the one who claimed "We do not know". You were the one
> who preferred to believe that the Catholics and Orthodox "neither know
> nor need to know" why they do what they do. Not me. I believe some
> powerful reasons can be advanced to justify why they won't ordain
> women to the priesthood.
Once again, Michael, I never questioned the fact that _you_ have reasons
which are convincing to _you._ But these reasons -- no matter how
compelling to you -- have never become defined Dogma of any Church.
> I was saying that if you in fact "do not know",
> then the most prudent course of action is to do as things have always
> been done. It seems that when you speak of "careful and prayerful
> thinking" on this issue, you really mean you haven't found any objection
> worth considering... that's not too impressive. One ought not to reject
> Tradition so glibly... pretensions of "careful and prayerful study" by
> ecclesial communities notwithstanding.
And the tradition of not ordaining women was not rejected glibly. The
Church was one of the the last institutions in the world to select women
for every office at its disposal.
> :-) And how long do we have to wait before we are justified lobbing eggs
> at _your_ great-great grandchildren? In other words: how long does the
> Catholic Church have to maintain women cannot be ordained before one
> concludes the issue is closed? 100 yrs? 500 yrs? How does one answer
> this sort of pious expectation that someday, someday finally, that
> glorious Council will take place?
How long did it take to elect a Polish Pope?
I don't know how long it's going to take, Michael. I do know one thing,
however: you would have a far stronger case that the Roman Church will
not change its mind if a Pope (this one, or one of his successors) were to
explicitly invoke his Papal infallibility (and not merely through a press
release from one of his aides), and declare that there never has been, is
not now, and never will be, a woman priest -- and not leave matters
vaguely hanging with respect to "authority."
> What really amazes me is why you think this 'generation' is strictly a
> matter of biology. Is there a deeper ground that anchors this biological
> generation? Things are clearest at the level of biology and psychology
> but that doesn't mean that's where things end.
And what really amazes me is that you haven't listened to what I have
said. First of all, I made it quite clear that the differentiation of
sexes includes "the sum of the structural, functional, and behavioral
characteristics;" this goes beyond biology.
And secondly, I have quoted with approval, on many occasions, the Talmudic
dictum, "There are three partners in man: the father, the mother, and the
Holy One, blessed by He." Generation is far more than biology.
> If you look into the
> Trinitarian 'generations' (the basis for all human generations) you
> will see the 'supra-genders'. But tell me, Walt: you want me to
> 'demonstrate' the ontology of gender with what sort of rigor? If you
> could give me a parallel example that has been so 'demonstrated' to
> your satisfaction, I could see what you had in mind...
But the Trinitarian 'generations', as you have described them, are both
'supra-masculine' and 'supra-feminine.' Human generation requires a male
and a female; this mirrors or images, in your language, the Trinitarian
'gnerations." But what on earth does it have to do with why women can't
become priests?
> >If there are both 'supra masculine' and 'supra feminine' movements in the
> >Trinity, the Trinity is most perfectly imaged in a priesthood which
> >contains -- in its whole -- both male _and_ female priests.
>
> Say what? My own 'theory' shoots down the claim I am trying to make? How
> do you figure that? I don't follow the above at all.
Your theory is that there are both 'supra-masculne' and 'supra-feminine'
genders in the Trinity. Both of these genders are most perfectly imaged
in a priesthood which -- in its entirety --includes _both_
'infra-masculine' and 'infra-feminine' genders. How does an all male
priesthood image the 'supra-feminine' gender of the Trinity?
> It looks terrifically
> warped to me. I thought you agreed that Christ has the mission of showing
> us the _Father_. Yes, I remember: you said I was correct on that
> account... and twice. And the priesthood of Christ takes place in a man
> and not a woman.
Slow down, Michael.
The priesthood of Christ takes place in an _anthropos_; the particular
_anthropos_ happened to be an _aner_, jut as He happened to be a
_tekton_, etc.
And Jesus was able to show us the _Father_ without being, Himself, a
physical Father. As a matter of fact, in the Roman Catholic Church,
physical fatherhood is not only not required for priests; it is
discouraged.
Therefore, if God-- who is referred to spiritually as Father can be imaged
by Jesus who was not a physical father, and Jesus can be imaged by a
priest who is a father only spiritually, and not physically, then why
can't a woman -- although not physically a father -- image a father
spiritually?
> There is a good corollary to that: the Church is the
> Bride to His Bridegroom (Biblically 'codified' too: see Paul in
> Ephesians).
Sounds like a good argument for women priests, to image the Bride.
> A female priest on the altar images nothing of the Trinity.
A female -- priest or otherwise -- bears the full image of God -- as does
a male.
> On the contrary, it is full of suggestions of lesbianism...
Nonsense, Michael -- Beth, who was formerly a priest on the staff of
our parish, has a husband, and two children.
I'm not going to echo the
smutty remark which you made, and which is unworthy of you.
> A homosexual
> 'bridal' imaging (no such thing) denies the Trinity by collapsing it.
Say what? Who has "collapsed" the Trintiy?
> I don't even want to think of your hint of _improving_ the imaging of
> theTrinity by Christ and the Church... no doubt you'll say that
> 'insight' came to you by much careful and prayerful study. I think it's
> terrifically stupid to pretend to look beyond Christ and to 'correct'
> Him...
Michael, your argument would have been helped had Christ actually taken
the trouble to say, "no woman can become a priest." Of course, He did
not. And interesting as your speculations, are, there remain that --
uncodified by Ecumencial Council or even Papal decree.
And yes, it was after long and prayerful study that I -- and my Church --
discerned that it was fit to ordain women.
Michael, while I have thought you to be in error, I have never thought you
to be stupid.
I saddened that our discussion must end with what is your ultimate
argument - an _arguementum ad hominem_.
Peace,
Walt
Walter Tappert
On Tue, 27 May 1997, Alexander R Pruss wrote:
> Walter admits that only males can be fathers. But a priest is called to be
> a spiritual father.
And I would suggest that a woman superior in a religious order functions
as a "spiritual father" to those who owe her canonical obedience, and a
woman spiritual director serves as a "spiritual father" to her directees,
whether they be men or women.
> So, the question is this: Is there sufficient analogy
> betwen fatherhood and spiritual fatherhood for it be the case that only
> males can be spiritual fathers?
Of course, my answer is no. Stop and think about it: if the analogy is
that cogent, why would not those Churches which reject ordaining women to
Holy Orders show greater interest in assuring that the majority of their
"spiritual fathers" were also actual fathers?
Even the Eastern Churches, which permit a married clergy, reserve
"spiritual fatherhood" _par excellance_ -- the Episcopacy -- to celibate
clergy;.
> I think that in effect the question comes
> down to do this: are there non-biological differences between fatherhood and
> motherhood?
Not necessarily. Many a single parent must function -- heroically -- as
both father _and_ mother to his/her children.
> For instance, is being an adoptive father really the same thing
> as being an adoptive mother? I would say: no.
I assume that we are speaking of adoptive parents, not wives or husbands.
A husband who adopted his wife's child would still be a male; a wife who
adopted her husband's child would still be a female.
But in the case of non-marital adoptions, one can be, and often is, simply
an adoptive "parent" who can, and indeed must, fulfill the roles of
both father and mother toward the children, even though biologically they
can only perform the role of father or mother. And the parenting role
can be, and is, distinct from the biological role in parenthood.
eace,
Walt
Walter Tappert
On Tue, 27 May 1997, Alexander R Pruss wrote:
> It seems evident from the context which shows that the pope wants to end
> much of the discussion on the issue that the "has no authority" is written
> in the timeless present, i.e., is to apply always. Besides which, the Church
> cannot acquire any authority it does not have, since all authority comes
> from the primitive revelation in the 1st century.
The possible alternative explanation is that the Pope wanted to forestall
any [renegade] bishops in communion with him from presenting the Roman
Catholic Church with a _fait accompli_ by illicitly ordaining a woman.
(This is precisely what happened in the Episcopal Church USA; ordination
of women was subsequently authorized by two consecutive General
Conventions of the Episcopal Church).
We have discussed, on this list, the status of the women ordained by Old
Catholic bishops in the eyes of the Roman Catholic Church. I am not sure
that the Pope himself -- or even anyone who can reliably speak for him --
has spoken on that subject.
I would point out, though, that the Pope _does_ have the opportunity to
remove the ambiguity by meeting the conditions for a
statement infallible by virtue of his office which declares that there
never has been, is not now, and never will be a woman priest.
Until a Pope chooses to remove the ambiguity, it remains a possibility
that the Pope has learned from the _filioque_ controversy being discussed
on another thread, and simply wants to assure Easterners that he and the
bishops in communion with him will not presume to ordain women until that
step is authorized by an Ecumenical recognized by both.
Don't hold your breath waiting for such a Council.
Peace,
Walt
Alexander R Pruss
Walter Tappert (wtap...@CENSUS.GOV) wrote:
: > So, the question is this: Is there sufficient analogy
: > betwen fatherhood and spiritual fatherhood for it be the case that only
: > males can be spiritual fathers?
: Of course, my answer is no. Stop and think about it: if the analogy is
: that cogent, why would not those Churches which reject ordaining women to
: Holy Orders show greater interest in assuring that the majority of their
: "spiritual fathers" were also actual fathers?
It would be like requiring that before a person becoming a father of one
child, he already have been a father of another... The persons who are
spiritual fathers are in most cases spiritual fathers of _different_ persons
than they are physical fathers of (if they are physical fathers at all).
That someone is a physical father of X is not a necessary condition for him
to become a spiritual father of Y, any more than it is a necessary condition
for him to be a physical father of Y (else fatherhood would never get started).
: Even the Eastern Churches, which permit a married clergy, reserve
: "spiritual fatherhood" _par excellance_ -- the Episcopacy -- to celibate
: clergy;.
Yes, it is more appropriate for a person to have one set of children to be
the father of, and that is one reason for celibacy. But, just as it is
morally possible for a person to father more than one set of children if
his first wife dies, so too it is possible for him to be a physical father
AND a spiritual father, though in the Latin Church the latter is now
disallowed just as remarriage after the death of the spouse is somewhat
discouraged by St Paul.
: > I think that in effect the question comes
: > down to do this: are there non-biological differences between fatherhood
and
: > motherhood?
: Not necessarily. Many a single parent must function -- heroically -- as
: both father _and_ mother to his/her children.
Do they succeed? Or is it rather that the children really do lack a father
or a mother in such a case, or maybe God supplies the need through His own
love of them?
: But in the case of non-marital adoptions, one can be, and often is, simply
: an adoptive "parent" who can, and indeed must, fulfill the roles of
: both father and mother toward the children, even though biologically they
: can only perform the role of father or mother. And the parenting role
: can be, and is, distinct from the biological role in parenthood.
I think part of our disagreement here is that you think of parenthood as
a "role", while I think of it as a _relation_ (analogous to the relation
of begetting/filiation in the most holy Trinity).
--
Alexander R. Pruss || e-mail: pru...@pitt.edu
|| home page: http://www.pitt.edu/~pruss
==============================================================================
Current summer address: || Regular address during the academic year:
Department of Mathematics || Department of Philosophy
University of British Columbia || University of Pittsburgh
Vancouver BC || Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Canada V6T 1Z2 || U.S.A.
Walter Tappert
On Wed, 28 May 1997, Alexander R Pruss wrote:
> : Of course, my answer is no. Stop and think about it: if the analogy is
> : that cogent, why would not those Churches which reject ordaining women to
> : Holy Orders show greater interest in assuring that the majority of their
> : "spiritual fathers" were also actual fathers?
>
> It would be like requiring that before a person becoming a father of one
> child, he already have been a father of another...
If the Church wanted to make the analogy between "physical fatherhood" and
"spiritual fatherhood," if could make marriage at least, and perhaps even
having a child, a prerequistie to ordination -- much as it makes
attainment of a certain age a prerequisite for ordination. It has not
done so (and I do not suggest that it do so). "Physical fatherhood" and
"spiritual fatherhood" are concepts which can be held apart from each
other.
> Yes, it is more appropriate for a person to have one set of children to be
> the father of, and that is one reason for celibacy. But, just as it is
> morally possible for a person to father more than one set of children if
> his first wife dies, so too it is possible for him to be a physical father
> AND a spiritual father, though in the Latin Church the latter is now
> disallowed just as remarriage after the death of the spouse is somewhat
> discouraged by St Paul.
I do not know what you mean. I do not have a "set" of children; I have
three sons. I could have more -- and these could be physical children,
spiritual children, or both.
> : Not necessarily. Many a single parent must function -- heroically -- as
> : both father _and_ mother to his/her children.
>
> Do they succeed? Or is it rather that the children really do lack a father
> or a mother in such a case, or maybe God supplies the need through His own
> love of them?
Of course they do! Many a widow or widower much function as a single
parent.
And there are also single persons who become parents by adoption -- and
quite successful parents at that; a priest in Chicago who has adopted, and
successfully reared, troubled youths comes to mind.
> I think part of our disagreement here is that you think of parenthood as
> a "role", while I think of it as a _relation_ (analogous to the relation
> of begetting/filiation in the most holy Trinity).
I'm not sure the distinction between "role" and "relationship" is all that
great.
A father has a relationship with a woman, who becomes the mother of his
child. Even if he is completely derelict in his responsibilities, and
never sees the mother after he gets out of bed, and never sees the child
at all, he is still the father of the child.
A parent is one who nurtures a child into adulthood. It is, of course,
the responsibility of the father and the mother to nurture their children
in the knowledge and love of the Lord. But if the father and mother
cannot or will not do this, then others -- whether male or female, whether
physically related to the child or not -- can have this nurturing
relationship with the child.
Now, which is the relationship of begetting/filiation in the Holy Trinity?
Physical fatherhood? Parental nurturing? They _are_ separable.
Peace,
Walt
Walter Tappert
On Wed, 28 May 1997, Marida Ignacio wrote:
> Thanks be to God. But, by your mere dependence on "logic", WaltT,
> it is okey to be dissensitized of the difference between male and
> female (pretty much New Agey; although Romans 1 already warned us
> about it) that nobody can discern which is which anymore.
MaridaI, I am well aware of the differences between myself -- male,
husband, father -- and my wife of almost 36 years -- female, wife, mother.
Thanks be to God.
eace,
Walt
Alexander R Pruss
Walter Tappert (wtap...@CENSUS.GOV) wrote:
: On Wed, 28 May 1997, Alexander R Pruss wrote:
: > : Of course, my answer is no. Stop and think about it: if the analogy is
: > : that cogent, why would not those Churches which reject ordaining women to
: > : Holy Orders show greater interest in assuring that the majority of their
: > : "spiritual fathers" were also actual fathers?
: >
: > It would be like requiring that before a person becoming a father of one
: > child, he already have been a father of another...
: If the Church wanted to make the analogy between "physical fatherhood" and
: "spiritual fatherhood," if could make marriage at least, and perhaps even
: having a child, a prerequistie to ordination
Not at all. In the spiritual fatherhood of the priest, the priest is
married to the Church. An ordinary marriage would only make the analogy
worse, because then the priest would have children by two mothers: his
wife and the Church.
Alex
Walter Tappert
On Thu, 29 May 1997, Michael Kouyoumadjian wrote:
> Yes. Here's how. "Ontology" is concerned with being. It is tied with
> esse. The _person_ in turn provides the key to the meaning of esse/being.
> "Nature" is the essence, the substance. The nature of both man and woman
> is the same: it is the human nature. Similarly, the nature for all three
> Persons is the Divine nature (the 2nd Person also has the human nature).
> Now, the _person_ makes the unspecified nature concrete.
The Second Person of the Trinity has both the divine nature and the human
nature. The natures are made concrete in His person. Although the Second
Person of the Trinity happens to be a male, that is incidental.
Should God in Her infinite wisdom have chosen to become incarnate in a
fermale, the Daughter would still fully possess the both divine nature and
the human nature in its fullness.
Of course, Scripture and Tradition (so far) speak of Father and Son, not
Mother and Daughter; I am not seeking to change that. But the language is
analagous; because it is analagous, rather than literal (or ontological),
there has been no major movement within Christianity which ever imaged a
[male] God having sexual intercourse with Mary, as some pagan
myth-structures do (reflected in Genesis 6:1 ff?)
The _being_ of the Second Person of the Trinity is _human_ and divine;
gender a characteristic of that specific human being (person), along with
other characteristics.
> I will say it again: the discussion
> must be carried out at the level of the _person_... at the level of esse,
> "ontological". At this level, there is a distinction between man and
> woman that is grounded in their being (ontology).
And the _esse_ of any person is "human," not male or female; a _person_
who is human can be (must be, actually) one or the other; but neither
males nor females are more human than the other.
> >And a woman is a _person_, who fully bears the Divine Image.
>
> Quite so. Fully but _differently_ than the man. If you make them
> interchangeable, then you collapse the Trinity.
No, if you change the differences between males and females, or if you
make males and females interchangeable, then you change the process of
human reproduction. You do nothing to the Trinity.
> Yes. But some 'private theological speculations' become the norm as time
> goes on. Like the 'private theological speculations' of the Capaddocian
> Fathers in the 4th century.
Then cite the authoritative papal or conciliar documents which teach that
"gender is ontological." There's no shame in thinking as you do, Michael;
but you are mistaken if you identify your personal views (even if
supported by other theologians) with the defined teaching of the Roman
Catholic Church, let alone the whole of the Catholic Church.
> >And looking over the indices that I have for the Fathers, I am not aware
> >of any Patristic exegesis which would suggest that Genesis 1:27 suggests
> >"a distinction of 'supra-genders' in the Trinity;" references would be
> >appreciated. (Please note that when I referred to Aquinas' exegesis of
> >this passage, your response was that "Aquinas was not quite adequate" --
> >presumably because he didn't support your pet theory). Very well, Michael
> >-- some references to those -- particularly from the classic era -- who
> >are "adequate."
> It's really a curious no-win situation: I admit the inadequacy
> of the metaphysics of the Scholastics, but when trying to remedy it I get
> slammed by a reference to these same Scholastics who are then labeled as
> "sexist" in the light of that very _same_ reference...
>. Second, as to
> references from the 'classic era' (Patristics?): I don't see why the
> philosophy and metaphysics of the Fathers and the Scholastics ought to be
> the last word. I disagree with that. In a sense, they are _all_
> inadequate: I believe the metaphysics of gender as rooted in ontology is
> a genuine advance in understanding.
I asked about the exegesis of Genesis 1:27, and you go off on a ramble
about the ontology of gender.
Why couldn't you just say that you disagree with the exegesis of Augustine
and Hillary of Poitiers and Aquinas?
Who knows? Perhaps in future generations Kouyoumadjian's _Ontology of
Gender_ will be up there with _On the Trinity_ or the _Summa Theologica_
-- if it does not replace them <g>.
> What
> is the problem you have with my understanding of Gen. 1:27? If the Trinity
> is imaged in "man and woman", then how much of a leap am I making to posit
> such a distinction in God?
What Genesis 1:27 says is that humankind (_'adam_, _anthropos_, _homo_) is
in the image of God. Humankind is male and female (_zakar weneqabah_,
_arsen kai thelu_, _vir et virago_).
There is no distinction between male and female vis a vis God, insofar as
they both bear the image of God.
There is no suggestion in Genesis 1:27, or in any exegesis of Genesis 1:27
that I have seen from any save you, that _zakar weneqabah_, _arsen kai
thelu_, _vir et virago_ are distinctions _in God_, as opposed to be a
characteristic (_zakar_, _arsen_, _vir_) of a Person in Whom God became
incarnate.
> :-) How many times should I repeat it, Walt? If you want to talk about
> the ontology of gender, leave the _ousia_ (essence; nature) behind and
> come up to the level of the _hypostasis_ (the person).
Because ontology deals with _ousia_ (being)! As you said, the _person_
makes the nature concrete -- and the nature, in this case, is _human_,
made concrete in persons, half of whom are males, the other half females.
The Second Person of the Trinity -- being only one Person -- had to be one
or the other. It turns out He was a male, although (S)he could have been
-- ontologically -- a female.
>>What I said above
> about Councils defining the minimum remains intact. Even after the
> Conciliar definition, there is still the issue of understanding and
> interpretation. Especially with a council like Nicea where the terms
> _ousia_ and _hypostasis_ appear to have been interchangeable.
Strange that the _Quicunque vult_ does not go into the gender of the
Persons of the Trinity!
> God cannot act contrary to His being.
And you're saying that the _essence_ of God is that He is a male? Curious
then that Sacred Scripture (Deuteronomy 32:18) should refer to Her as a
Mother!
Or do you -- when you see a feminine image for God -- interpret them as
metaphorical, while masculine images are interpreted as ontological?
> He acts as He is. In that sense,
> the Incarnation as a man and not a woman is a 'necessity'. It is a
> revelation of the way things are and of the inner life of the Trinity.
No, what you are doing is retrojecting custom -- or even Tradition -- into
the "inner life of the Trinity."
> Looking more deeply into the content of the faith to understand it more
> fully is a never-ending task. It is the business of theology. It is very
> strange if you're going to ask me for a dogma as proof at every step to
> support my claim. Is that how you think? From dogma to dogma in an
> unbroken chain?... Weird.
Which is exactly what I am attempting to do.
In particular: When one observed that the Church had no women priests --
in spite of the fact that women were able to fulfill every other role and
every other reponsibility which a man was able to fulfill, save their
distinctive roles in generation -- then the Church looked deeply into the
content of the faith, to ask whether this was a necessary state ordered by
God for all time, or a decision made, honestly and sincerely, by the
Church as it ministered in specific times and specific places -- but not
necessarily binding for all places, and for all times.
I, and my community within the Catholic Church, have chosen the
latter path. While your community within the Catholic Church still
chooses not to ordain women to the priesthood, _why_ that is so is still
being debated. "Looking more deeply into the content of faith" _may_ --
and I stress the "may" convince your community that women may be ordained
to the priesthood. Likewise, some members of my community -- even me!
_ may (as some already have) be persuaded that this is sufficient import
to warrant leaving our faith community, and uniting with another.
> The issue of the ordination of women to the priesthood is closed for
> Catholics. Entertaining doubts about it and wishing for an ecumenical
> council to reverse OS seem to be futile exercises imo.
If you really thought that because _Roma locuta est; causa est finita_, I
don't think you would be spending quite so much bandwidth on it! Nor
would you be so reluctant to cite authoritative ecclesiastical definitions
that because of the being of their persons, women are unfit matter for the
sacrament of orders -- since they do not image the ontology of the Trinity
-- which is the argument you have been making.
ut
since the Bishop of Rome does not exercise ordinary authority over my
community -- to say nothing nothing of Cdl. Ratzinger --, their _ipse
dixit_ means very little.
Surprising, though, that the recent CCC contains so little (actually, it
contains nothing) of the ontology of gender in the Holy Trinity.
Peace,
Walt
Walter Tappert
On Thu, 29 May 1997, Alexander R Pruss wrote:
> Not at all. In the spiritual fatherhood of the priest, the priest is
> married to the Church. An ordinary marriage would only make the analogy
> worse, because then the priest would have children by two mothers: his
> wife and the Church.
While the Roman Catholic Church (and to a much lesser extent, the Orthodox
Churches), may discourage the marriage of priests, neither have
ever forbidden it, or regarded clerical celibacy as a dogmatic issue.
If a male priest can be a physical husband and physical father without
considering himself, or being considered by the faithful, either
adulterous and/or bigamous becuase he is also a spiritual father, what is
to prevent a woman from being both a physical wife and mother as well as a
spiritual father?
Peace,
Walt