Ramiz Alia & Albania's Transition
FATOS TARIFA
<***> A L B A N I A N - Mon, 26 Feb 1996 10:08:31 GMT-05 <***>
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Reading Angela Hasanne's replay on Ramizi's Cuffs to several members of this
list I would like to express at some length my thoughts about who Ramiz Alia
was and what kind of role he played in Albania's transition from communism.
I am absolutely sure that a number of people in this list -- I can almost
mention their names in advance -- as has been shown in previous cases,
will certainly want to once again attack me on political grounds. I tell
must tell them at the outset I am not one of Alia's supporters. Yet, I
strongly agree with Hasanne that
> We *don't* need to like or love Ramiz Alia to respect his right as a human
> being in a true democracy. We should allow Alia to express his views as he
> wants because it's consistent w. the ideals of democracy that we all so
> much desire for Albania. In democracy, there should be no exceptions --
> not even for one so blatantly disliked and who embodies anti-democracy
> as Ramiz Alia.
It is my belief that as members of this discussion list, we should listen
more carefully to critical voices. One should feel neither hurt nor
embarrassed when someone voices her/his criticism towards Albanian politics.
That is a right none of us can deny to others. Let's listen to them even if
someone may want, or chose, or a priori decide to disregard other's
opinions. Personally, I think that Hassane's judgements are well grounded and
that she is not the only one to think this was about Albania's current
transition to (hopefully) democracy. I share my thoughts with her.
What follows is how I personally view Ramiz Alia as a political personality
and particularly his role during Albania's first endavour of transition.
I certainly claim no absolut validity for my interpretations.
In my view, Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's hand-picked successor, was not as
strictly orthodox Communist as Hoxha. Neither did Alia possess the strong
authority and charisma of his predecessor. Above all, one could hardly
call Alia a dictator. Those who have known him personally say that he
was a benign human being. In order to ensure full support from the population
when Hoxha was no longer alive, and to prove to the Labor Party his loyalty
to Hoxha's political line, Alia had no choice but to follow closely in the
footsteps of his mentor. Misha Glenny, a highly respected journalist and
activist for human rights has pointed out that Alia was faced with the
same dilemma that Khrushchev encountered when he decided to confront the
criminal legacy of Stalin. However, during his first years in power
(1955-1988) Alia made virtually no change to Hoxha's policies.
By the end of the 1980s, with the extreme brutality of Hoxha's
regime very slowly but gradually easing, Alia began to relax the rigid
isolationism of his predecessor and to make some minor adjustments to the
previous statement. A favourable structure of political opportunities was
created gradually and many people started to believe that Alia would be
the "Albanian Gorbatchev."
By the end of the 1980s Albania's economy had become a major
problem, and political solutions were needed. First of all the 1976
Constitution, with its ban on foreign credits and investments, had to be
revoked. This was clearly no easy task for Alia, given the ideological
fanaticism prevailing among the hardliners who still dominated the party
leadership, its strong bureaucracy, and the state, and Alia's own pledge
to continue Hoxha's line. Alia himself had neither a clear vision for
future changes nor the courage to bear the responsibility for his
country's destiny. However, he realized that there were only two choices:
to try to save socialism in Albania at any cost, as Hoxha had done for
many decades, or initiate and promote changes in both domestic and
foreign policies. To his credit, he understood that isolation and
"self-reliance" were leading the economy to the edge of the abyss. Alia
certainly understood that if Albania was to be less poor, it had to open up
and become more democratic.
Although Alia remained loyal to Hoxha until the end, he was more
of a pragmatist than his mentor. After decades of centralist rule Alia
started, albeit slowly and gingerly, to move away from the principle of
self-reliance. He tried to reconcile Albania's ideological rigidity with
the pragmatism required to manage a modern economy, feed the people, and
broaden ties with the West. Gradually he adopted a Kadarian or
perestroika-style "new economic mechanism," introducing a raft of limited
reforms designed to make life a little easier. These reforms were, in
fact, a response on the part of Albanian leadrship to the threat to their
political survival generated by events elsewhere in Eastern Europe. They
were aslo a desparate move aimed at integrating Albania into the world
economy and at promoting a gradual transition from central planning to a
market-oriented system. Despite the introduction of the "new mechanism",
however, all economic indicators continued to decline.
Ramiz Alia appeared to be more successful in foreign affairs than
on the domestic front. In 1986 h began to show serious interest in
emerging from isolationism and gravitating toward the West in search of
new political and economic ties. Diplomatic relations were established
with several countries, including the German Federal Republic, Canada,
and Spain. At the same time Albania's diplomatic missions with the GDR.
Bulgaria, Czecholsovakia, and Hungary were upgraded to the ambassadorial
level. In April 1990, to the surprise of many, Alia declared that Albania
was now ready to resume dilomatic relations with the United States and
the Soviet Union and anounced the decision to abandon its boycott to the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and sig the
previously scorned Helsinki Final Act. In a matter of months the USSR and
the USA opened diplomaytic officies in Tirana, while negotiations were
going on to exchange ambassadors with Israel, Great Britain, and the Vatican.
Joining the CSCE and re-opening relations would give Albania a
chance to make the new tis to the outside world -- both political and
commercial -- which were so badly needed after the long years of
isolationism. On the other hand, participating in the Helsinki process
would necessarily impose obligations on the Albanian government to
abolish a number of repressive and discriminatory laws, and to
fundamentally improve its human rights record. Indeed, the move to sign
the Helsinki Final Act was accomplished by a series of laws and
governmental decisions restrivting the deth penalty, giving those on
trial the right to a legal defence and the right to appeal, allowing the
distribution of religious material and the performance of religious
activities, as well as allowing Albanian citizens to apply for passaports
and to travel abroad into the previously prohibited world.
There is no doubt that all these changes were enthusiactically
received by the intellectuals and the majority of citizens. As Kadare has
writen, "We were all waiting expectantly. And what a surprise -- realy a
surprise, a rare moment -- ... authorization to travel abroad freely;
the plan to renew relations with the United States and the Soviet Union...
a slight hope for freedom of worship; private property, credit; and the
amendment of various articles of the constitution. Without question,
something had been accomplished ("Albanian Spring," 1995, p. 48).
Yet, while conservative forces were concerned that too many
changes were being made, other people seemed to be dissatisfied with the
scope and the speed of change. Even two years earlier, these reforms
might have seemed adequate, and Alia would have gained tremendou
political credit; but the time for half-measures had passed. Alia's mild
relaxations merely made people more restless. Far from thanking him, they
felt frustrated that the changes were being carried out too slowly and
thatmore time was being lost. Once minor changes were put on the agenda,
the people, headed by the intellectuals, demanded total change, as they
did all over Eastern Europe. Little change, as they were intended and
designed by Alia and his followers, would have been impossible in the
same way that it is impossible of being a little pregnant. I must assume
that Alia did not realize that Albania had embarked upon the spiral which
had become familiar in Eastern Europe: pressure for change brings minor
concessions, which in turn create pressure for greater change, which
elicits fresh concessions, and so on until the old system cracks.
By the end of 1989 and during 1990, Alia was recognized as a
reformer. He was admired by most Albanians -- so much so that many placed
their hopes on him -- even some of those who were in prison (see Kadare,
1995:25). Soon, however, many began to doubt whether he was a real
reformer, seriously committed to substantial changes, or a time-server,
merely interested inmaking minor cosmetic adjustments. As time passed, an
increasing number of people put little faith in what Alia said. Indeed,
although not opposed to moderate economic reform, Alia wanted a minimum
of political change and certainly no reform of the political system,
having every intention that the Labor Party should remain in power.
According to Alia, changes could be made as long as the country's freedom
and independence were protected and the socialordr preserved.
Although this pragmatic approach left the door open to a number
of opportunities, Alia remained fearful to radical change. It seemed that
the changes initiated by Alia invariably worked against him. This
translated into political opportunity and contributed to an increasing
political dissent. Indeed, "Pandora's box" in Albania had oppened since
1985 when the dictator died, generating a profound crisis of the
communist regime and general political instability. Underrating the
relative power of the opposition forces, Alia continously ignored the
persisted demand of many people, especially intellectuals, who were
establishing a reformist wing within the party, and by the urban youth:
the abrogation of the 1976 Constitution, which was the greatest hindrance
to the democratization of Albanian society. Revoking the constitution
would imply consenting to a multi-party system, replacing a police-state with
the rul of law, removing the barriers bult into the Communist legal
system by restoring freedom of conscience and belief, permitting people
to freely express their opinions, to organize societies and hold meeting
without fear of punishment. Abandoning the old Constitution would not
simply mean rectifying the many ruman rights violations and social
injustices of Hoxha's dictatorship; it wouldmean creating a new legal
framework, essential for democracy and for economic and social progress,
and a new set of democratic institutions. But these demands were rejected
by Alia and the ruling elite, who believed them to be the demands of
exclusive intellectual circles, laking in popular support. Alia sincerely
believed that the Albanian people had bound their life to socialism.
One could hardly argue that Ramiz Alia was quite unaware of
people's dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. Most likely Alia was
still believing at this time that it was not the legitimacy of the
socialist system that had eroded but the moral authority of certain party
leaders and aparatchiks.
Although Alia made, in my view, a remarkable move forward, he
underestimated the iron rule of reform -- that one change leads to
another. Furthemore, having seen every othr East European Communist
leader fall, Alia did not know what lessons to draw and what mistakes to
avoid. The official line adopted by Alia vis-a-vis events in Eastern
Europe was simple and self-serving: it was not Socialism that had failed,
but revisionism. Even when the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Communist
regimes in Eastern Europe toppled, Alia made no effort to alter his
orientation. With this, Alia had lost the historical opportunity, shuting
the great dor that had been opened before him. Assessing Ramiz Alia's
role in Albania's transition from dictatorship, Kadare rightly points out:
"Unlike the true Gorbachev, separated by five successors from the
horrible Stalin, the Albanian Gorbachev, Ramiz Alia, came just after
Enver Hoxha, so that when showing the face of Gorbachev he was also
constrained to show tha masks of Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev,
Andropov and Chernenko...Under such ciscumstances the mantle of
the presidency that he inhereted had not been made to measure for
him and [therefore] Ramiz Alia found himself unprepared, in a tragic
arena that required tragic players..." (Kadare, 1995:179).
In the weeks following Ceasuscus's collapse, Alia showed his political
myopia by believing that Albania could remain unaffected by the tremors
shaking Eastern Europe. It was at this time that Alia designed the
political slogan "ALBANIA IS NEITHER WEST NOR EAST". However, nothing
proved to be further from the truth. Although the Communist system in
Albania had not yet come under the same degree of attack as the other
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, it was not going to be
exceptional. There were, certainly, differences between these countries
with regard to historical traditions and political and economic
developments, but the political system in Albania was of the same basic
type and most repressive regime among the Communist countries, and
growing number of people had, by this time, no illusions left about it.
In many ways, therefore, the need for change was even more pressing in
Albania.
I personally respect Alia's mature stand in the climax of February
1991 when after Enver Hoxha statue had toppled in the Skanderbeg Square,
political conflict in Albania reached its zenith and a civil war seemed
to be only a hair's breadth away. At that time, as we who were living in
Tirana know, Alia had only two choices: one, a crackdown -- the choice
favored by conservatives -- that is to order the demonstrators to be
shot, and turn the Skanderbeg Square into a Tienanmen; the other, to let
them accomplish their aim. Alia did not imitate Honecker's actions in
East Germany, and he should -- as he really is among many political
circles in and outside our country -- credited for having avoided a civil
was in Albania.
Objectively, Alia could have no future in a truly democratic
Albania. But in no way does he deserve to be imprisoned by those who
replaced him in office. I know of no proofs (other than Berisha's and
Albania's Ministry of Justice -- read unjustice -- version) to support
Alia's complicity in killings of citizens in the frontier. At least, no
reliable proof has been demonstrated by the competent organs of justice.
All charges against him are based on claims by different citizens. As a
matter a fact, there is no politician in Albania today, including Berisha,
who could escape a trial based on claims by certain citizens.
It is my strong conviction that both Nano's and Alia's first and second
imprisonments show no more than the level of Albania's democracy under
Berisha. Alia once was, but he is not anymore a rival to Berisha. And, for
those of you who are so much irritated when someone defends Alia's right to
enjoy his full rights as a citizen, can you tell me another example that former
Communist presindets (like Alia) or opposition leaders (like Nano) were
imprissoned in other countries emerging from the Communist era? Even Honecker,
so much responsible -- as we all know -- for his complicity in crimes, was
left to spend his last days as a free citizen of his newly democratic country.
In conclusion, to prevent any a la DeNatale allusion with regard to the
authorship of the above comments, I must admit that a version of these
lines has been published as part of an article entitled "Albania's Road from
Communism: Political and Social Change, 1990-1993", published by me in
"Development and Change" (1995, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 133-162).
Regards to all,
Fatos Tarifa
__________________________________________________________________________
Fatos Tarifa :
University of North Carolina : "Adam was the only man who, when
Department of Sociology : he said a good thing, knew that
CB#3210, Hamilton Hall : nobody had said it before him"
Chapel Hill, N.C., 25799-3210 :
fst...@gibbs.oit.unc.edu : Mark Twain
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